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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
Rebellious Citizens: National Reforms and the Practice of Local Governance in Jalisco, 
Mexico. 1914-1940. 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
 
Ulices Piña 
 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in History 
 
 
 
University of California, San Diego, 2017 
 
 
 
Professor Eric Van Young, Chair 
 
This dissertation is a political history of the central-western Mexican state of 
Jalisco from 1914-1940 that explores the interplay between national reforms, local and 
state politics, and popular responses to regional crisis. I approach the study of this region 
by focusing on three interrelated stories, showcasing how state power was understood at 
 xvii 
various levels of society. The first is concerned with how individuals came to see their 
place in the social order, especially during and after moments of disruption and crisis. 
The second narrates the struggle between regional authorities in Guadalajara and the 
central government in Mexico City over effective political control of the state. And the 
third studies how political projects—such as agrarian reform, anticlericalism, and 
educational reform—came to intersect with the social and cultural contexts of life in the 
countryside.  
Central to this dissertation are three significant rebellions that shook the 
established social order: the de la Huerta Rebellion (1923-1924), the Cristero Rebellion 
(1926-1929), and the Second Cristero Rebellion (1934-1940). Together, the long-term 
effects of these recurring upheavals were formative to the new regime that emerged in the 
postrevolutionary period. The dissertation argues that anxieties over violence shaped the 
manner in which citizens in Jalisco understood their rights and ultimately contested the 
presence of the state. This challenges our understanding of local participation in the 
political process, often seen as a closed sphere dominated by powerful state agents ruling 
with unquestioned authority, where ordinary people rarely made their voices heard. 
Instead, these episodes reveal how local officials debated the limits of national power and 
struggled with how to govern, while simultaneously consenting to the demands of 
citizens. 
1 
Introduction 
 
Tiempo es ya, jaliscienses, de que salgáis de ese ostracismo en que ha pretendido 
hundiros el fatico tirano, sacudid la apatía que os embarga y abate, erguíos altivos y 
bravos como sabéis hacerlo y aprestos a cooperar con las legiones que desde las apartadas 
tierras del Norte vienen a reconquistar los derechos del pueblo, tan ultrajado, tan 
oprimido, tan vejado. 
-Manuel Diéguez, Manifesto to the People of Jalisco, 1914.1 
 
 
The date was 21 July 1914. Pedro Ramírez, the Municipal President of 
Chimaltitlán, wrote Governor Manuel Diéguez to complain about several unruly men 
who surreptitiously appeared in the surrounding areas. Under the “shadow of the 
revolution,” the bandits had terrorized the region, stolen from many, set fire to buildings, 
and raped women. The people that Ramírez represented claimed not to understand 
politics, nor did they desire to mix themselves up in it. But the sudden turn of events had 
compelled many of these country folk to take up arms in defense of their way of life and 
to protect the town where they had been born, grown up, and called home. And they had 
done so for the better part of the past fourteen months. The triumphant entry of the 
Constitutionalist forces into Guadalajara earlier that month, however, motivated them to 
lay down their arms. They simply desired to remain in possession of their weapons. 
These people were against the bandits, not the Revolution. As such, they remained eager 
to submit themselves to the new order of things and to receive the promises offered by 
the Revolution.2  
                                                            
1 Boletín Militar, Tomo 1, Guadalajara, 18 de Julio de 1914, Núm. 3. 8 July 1914. 
2 Archivo Histórico de Jalisco (hereinafter cited as AHJ), Gobernación 1914, sin clasificación, 
Caja 41, exp. 3135, “Carta del Municipio de Chimaltitlán al General Manuel Diéguez, Gobernador 
Constitutional,” 21 July 1914. 
  
 
2 
In many ways, this is a microcosm for the larger divisions that would emerge in 
the central-western state of Jalisco in the tumultuous decades to follow—experiences that 
innately shaped how individuals understood their choices as citizens of a modern nation-
state. The focus of this study is on the 1920s and 1930s, a period of high political drama 
in Mexico, but what I write here is in many ways a different kind of story. Instead of the 
high drama of national events, I examine how ordinary people and authorities used 
political institutions for their own ends, and interacted with officials and other powerful 
actors to enact democratic governance. Rebellious Citizens, then, is as much a story of 
ordinary people trying to adapt to the changing circumstances unleashed by the Mexican 
Revolution of 1910, as it is of state power. 
This dissertation focuses on three significant rebellions that shook the established 
social order: the de la Huerta rebellion (1923-1924), the Cristero rebellion (1926-1929), 
and the Second Cristero rebellion (1934-1940). I contend that the long-term effects of 
these recurring upheavals were central to the new regime that emerged in the 
postrevolutionary period. After each rebellion officials debated the limits of national 
power, while simultaneously acquiescing to the demands of citizens. I argue that 
anxieties over violence shaped the manner in which locals in Jalisco understood their 
rights and contested the presence of the state. Collectively, the three rebellions were more 
about ordinary people struggling with modes of governance in the countryside than they 
were about ongoing efforts to dismantle the state’s capacity to rule. By situating the 
history of postrevolutionary Mexico within the dynamics of local rule, we see the state 
emerge as a valuable historical site for reframing narratives of violence and resistance, 
and less as an instrument for the control of society. 
  
 
3 
Three narrative threads run through this dissertation. The first is a study of how 
individuals came to regard their place in the social order during and after moments of 
crisis. To this end, I am equally concerned with highlighting disorder as disruption as I 
am with revealing the anatomy of rule hidden beneath the surface of the social order. The 
second thread is a chronicle of the power struggle between regional authorities and the 
central government over effective political control of Jalisco in the decades following the 
Mexican Revolution. In particular, I explore Mexico’s early attempts at democratization 
and document how the idea of a dominant revolutionary faction came to prevail within 
the political class of Mexico. As entrenched local power structures gave way to inchoate 
and outside forces, the capital city of Guadalajara gradually fell under Mexico City’s 
sphere of control. This was a process that gained much traction after the founding of the 
Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) in 1929—the forerunner to the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which became one of the longest-lived regimes of the 
twentieth century and remained in power uninterruptedly for seventy-one years. The third 
examines the ways in which short-term political projects of state building intersected with 
the social and cultural contexts of the countryside, and their subsequent translation into 
daily practices and/or strategies of collective resistance. During the 1920s and 1930s, 
Mexico’s postrevolutionary government undertook an ambitious state-building scheme. 
Crucial to these efforts are what scholars of Mexico have called the “revolutionary” 
process, which consisted of the agrarian, religious, and educational reforms implemented 
in the postrevolutionary years. And this came to represent the most important medium 
through which the new ruling party attempted to construct political hegemony in the 
countryside.  
  
 
4 
Two concepts undergird my argument. The first is citizenship and what this meant 
in postrevolutionary Mexico. James Holston, for example, has reminded us that 
citizenship is an especially challenging concept because it “both constitutes fundamental 
structures of modern society and unsettles them.” Since the Enlightenment, citizenship 
has come to embody not only a hallmark of modernity, but has also played a dominant 
role in reconfiguring structures of social membership, privilege, and constraint away 
from previous forms of subjectship, kinship, and cultship; while the nation-state, in turn, 
replaced the “neighborhood, village, city, or region” in establishing its scope, rights, and 
obligations. In this regard, citizenship is viewed as one of many associational identities 
that individuals adopt in society, but it is unlike others because the state frames it: “Its 
conditions have greater effect because it articulates the other statuses in terms of the 
nation-state’s particular framework of law, institutions, demands, and sentiments.” As a 
means of organizing society, however, citizenship has been “subversive” and 
“reactionary” inasmuch as it has also been “inclusionary” and “exclusionary.” This 
dissertation understands citizenship as much more than a formal political institution; that 
is, through the establishment of laws, institutions, and cultural norms, the state 
simultaneously produces and perpetuates inequality.3 
The second concept is hegemony. Antonio Gramsci made a distinction between 
‘rule’ and hegemony. The former is expressed in political forms and in times of crisis by 
direct or effective coercion, while the latter is the more normal situation consisting of a 
complex interlocking of political, social, and cultural forces. Hegemony, then, “is either 
                                                            
3 James Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 21-22. 
  
 
5 
this or the active social and cultural forces which are its necessary elements.”4 William 
Roseberry has taken up the notion of hegemony “as ongoing, multilayered, 
geographically divergent, and conflictive.” He argues that the term should be understood 
as a “problematic, contested, political process of domination and struggle” through which 
a language is constructed for expressing both acceptance and discontent. In other words, 
it is a “common framework for living in, discussing, and acting upon social orders 
characterized by domination.”5 Contention and struggle between ruling and dominated 
groups, then, takes place within “a field of force” connecting both groups in organic 
relations. Rebellious Citizens explores this field of force and common language, which 
emerged in postrevolutionary Mexico and was forged through state projects. National 
reforms, therefore, not only became arenas for articulating state domination, but also 
carved out arenas for contesting that domination. These types of arenas served a dual 
purpose. As creators of civil society, they opened  a physical and ideological space for 
subordinate individuals to express demands; and they functioned “as the provider of 
skills, attitudes, linkages, and behaviors that would create citizens who would seek a new 
pact, a new language, and a new set of political relations” with the new postrevolutionary 
state.6  
                                                            
4 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p 108.  
5 William Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention” in Joseph and Nugent 
Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 360-361. 
6 Mary Kay Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution: Teachers, Peasants, and Schools in Mexico 
(The University of Arizona Press, 1997), p. 24 
  
 
6 
On a broader level, Rebellious Citizens is meant as a contribution to the extant 
literature on state formations. Over the past two decades, scholars have revisited long-
standing questions of state-building, striving to illuminate state formation in a great 
number of diverse geographical areas.7 Krohn-Hansen and Nustad, for example, have 
proposed to see states as outcome of practices and processes, while claiming that a state 
formation “is the result of myriads of situations where social actors negotiate power and 
meaning.” In other words, this shifts the focus to how a state is produced in everyday life 
and to the practices of power and rituals that make up the state.8 Latin America, 
meanwhile, has proven to be a hotbed for thinking through such questions. With respect 
to this, two important camps have emerged: “[T]he first group focuses on how subaltern 
groups resist, appropriate or help construct the nation-state, while the [second] is 
generally more concerned with how state rule is accomplished.”9 The extremely 
                                                            
7 See George Steinmetz, “Introduction: Culture and the State” in State/Culture: State-Formation 
after the Cultural Turn (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1999); Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando 
López-Alves, eds, The Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001); Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, eds, State of Imagination: 
Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); James Dunkerley, 
ed, Studies in the Formation of the Nation-State in Latin America (London: Institute of Latin American 
Studies, 2002); Clifton C. Crais, ed, The Culture of Power in Southern Africa: Essays on State Formation 
and the Political Imagination (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003); Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. 
Pereira, eds, Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Robert Holden, Armies Without Nations: Public Violence and State 
Formation in Central America, 1821-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Mayfair Mei-hui 
Yang, ed, Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2008); Benjamin T. Smith, Pistoleros and Popular Movements: The Politics of State 
Formation in Postrevolutionary Oaxaca (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009); and Chris 
Vaughan, Darfur: Colonial Violence, Sultanic Legacies and Local Politics, 1916-1956 (Boydell and 
Brewer, 2015). 
8 Christian Krohn-Hansen and Knut G. Nustad, “Introduction,” in State Formation: 
Anthropological Perspectives (Ann Abror: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 12. 
9 Helga Baitenmann, “Counting on State Subjects: State Formation and Citizenship in Twentieth-
Century Mexico” in Christian Krohn-Hansen and Knut G. Nustad, eds, State Formation: Anthropological 
Perspectives (Pluto Books Press, 2005), p. 171.  
  
 
7 
influential Everyday Forms of State Formation (1994) did much to chart out a marriage 
between these two approaches, and attempted to place them in conversation with James 
Scott’s work on everyday forms of resistance. The result was that a generation of scholars 
working on state formation in Mexico took up Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as a prism 
to analyze how the PRI maintained itself in power.10 
Coronil and Skurski, however, have reminded us that while political violence has 
played a central part in the formation of nations, its historical constitution and its role in 
forming nations have received scant attention. Instead, what continues to prevail in the 
historiography is a “myth central to modernity” perpetuating the notion that modern 
states have established their authority not with recourse to divine will or force, but 
reason: “The modern state, it asserts, having domesticated the bloody theater of violence 
of the ancien régime, replaces publicly inflicted physical punishment with a myriad of 
disciplinary procedures that permeate the body politics and engender the modern soul.”11 
While governments and institutions continue to assert, divert, and regulate violence to 
suppress what they deem threats and dangers, violence itself, then, cannot be divorced 
from the wider context wherein such action occurs.12 I contend that the violence 
exercised in the formation of states should be understood with regard to the “social and 
                                                            
10 See the edited volume by Gilbert Joseph and Daniel Nugent, Everyday Forms of State 
Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1994) and James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985). 
11  Fernando Coronil and Julie Skurski, “Dismembering and Remembering the Nation: The 
Semantics of Political Violence in Venezuela,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 33, No. 2 
(April 1991): 332. 
12 Coronil and Skurski, “Dismembering and Remembering,” p. 332. 
  
 
8 
cultural worlds” in which citizens reside, without disregarding the myriad clashes among 
“forms of agency, interests and rationalities.” 13 The work of Vaughan—albeit in the 
context of colonial Darfur—warns us that while scholarship has underplayed the role of 
violence in maintaining authority, refocusing attention to violence can also run the risk of 
minimizing the importance of local negotiations in which the state actually attempted to 
engage the partial consent of subject populations. The “improbable stability” of the 
colonial regime in Darfur, for example, did not depend on an interpretive choice between 
a view of state power as either consistently, violently coercive or perpetually willing to 
compromise: “[R]ather it requires the acknowledgment that both violence and negotiation 
remained interactive elements of colonial authority, shifting in emphasis and manner over 
time, but nonetheless continually intertwined.” This dissertation follows Vaughan’s lead 
and seeks to understand authority in Jalisco as a limited version of hegemony, “in which 
consent to rule, generated in processes of local negotiation” centered around regional 
politicians, was extracted rather than freely given, while being firmly bolstered by the 
coercive capacity of the state.14   
Working from the assumption, then, that Jalisco deserves to be seen as an 
important site of postrevolutionary state formation, Rebellious Citizens asks what a 
history of the violence there can look like from the viewpoint of the lowliest in society to 
the most powerful. In doing so, I complicate the standard interpretations of 
                                                            
13 Christian Krohn-Hansen and Knut G. Nustad, “Introduction,” State Formation: Anthropological 
Perspectives (Ann Abror: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 20. 
14 Chris Vaughan, “‘Demonstrating the Machine Guns’: Rebellion, Violence and State Formation 
in Early Colonial Darfur,” The Journal of Imperial Commonwealth History, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2014): 303. 
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postrevolutionary Mexico on the basis of four questions. First, what factors led to popular 
support for, or genuine opposition to the state? Second, how did common people, elites, 
politicians, rural teachers, and the clergy view the postrevolutionary order and their place 
in it? Third, what were the limits to state concentration of power at both national and 
local levels? Fourth, how did three decades of sustained (and cyclical) violence affect 
citizens and the practice of local governance in a historically conservative Mexican state 
such as Jalisco?  
Relevant Literature on Revolutionary Mexico 
 
Rebellious Citizens also engages the historiography of revolution and 
postrevolutionary reform in Mexico, traditionally separated into three historiographical 
currents: populist, revisionist, and neo-populist. In the first current historians focused on 
the desire of citizens for land reform, education, and political participation, arguing that 
these demands were fundamentally popular in origin.15 The 1970s and 1980s brought 
forth a new generation of historians that revised the findings of earlier scholarship and 
brought to light how several aspects of pre-revolutionary Mexico such as caciquismo 
(strongman politics), corruption, and undemocratic principles survived the Mexican 
Revolution. These revisionist scholars tended to adopt a Marxist perspective and shifted 
attention toward the relationship between the revolution and the state, and focused on 
                                                            
15 For populist interpretations see the works of Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian 
Revolution (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1929), The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), and Peace by Revolution: Mexico After 1910 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1966); Eyler Simpson, The Ejido: Mexico’s Way Out (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1937); José C. Valdés, Historia General de la Revolución Mexicana (México: M. Quesada Bandi, 
1963-1967); and Jesús Silva Herzog, Trayectoria ideológica de la Revolución Mexicana, 1910-1917 
(México: Cuadernos Americanos, 1963).  
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regional-level studies. Moreover, they suggested that the Revolution had overthrown the 
traditional land-holding class only to replace it with a petit bourgeois ruling class.16  
In the late 1990s, another current of scholarship, which we may call the neo-
populists, emerged that contested revisionist interpretations and findings. These scholars 
expanded upon revisionist theoretical frameworks and moved toward assessing the 
impact of revolution and reform through an analysis of everyday society and state 
formation.17 While much of the revisionist historiography underlined the “defeat and 
subordination” of popular social movements, neo-populists drew particular attention to 
the vitality and efficacy of popular participation during the period of armed rebellion in 
revolutionary Mexico—or as Alan Knight has put it: “[T]here can be no high politics 
without a good deal of low politics.”18 Three of the best recent studies on regional politics 
                                                            
16 See Roger Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1971); Arnaldo Córdova, La ideología de la Revolución Mexicana: la formación del nuevo régimen 
(México: Ediciones Era, 1973); Jean Meyer, La Cristiada, Vol. 1-3 (México: Siglo XXI, 1974); David C. 
Bailey, Viva Cristo Rey! The Cristero Rebellion and the Church-State Conflict (Austin: University of 
Texas, 1974); Heather Fowler-Salamini, Agrarian Radicalism in Veracruz, 1920-1938 (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1978); Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); David A. Brading, ed, Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican 
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Ramón E. Ruiz, The Great Rebellion: Mexico, 
1905-1924 (New York: Norton, 1980); Ian Jacobs, Rancher Revolt: The Mexican Revolution in Guerrero 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983); Dudley Ankerson, Agrarian Warlord: Saturino Cedillo and the 
Mexican Revolution in San Luis Postosí (Dekalb: Northern Illinois Press, 1984); Romana Falcón, 
Revolucióny caciquismo: San Luis Potosí, 1910-1938 (México: El Colegio de México, 1984); and John 
Gledhill, Casi Nada: A study of Agrarian Reform in the homeland of Cardenismo (Austin: The University 
of Texas Press, 1992). 
17 See Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, Vol. 1-2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986); John Tutino, From Insurrection to Revolution in Mexico: Social Bases of Agrarian Violence, 1750-
1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); John Mason Hart, Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming 
and Process of the Mexican Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Joseph and 
Nugent, Everyday Forms of State Formation; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution; Jennie Purnell, 
Popular Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico: The Agraristas and Cristeros of 
Michoacan (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); and Christopher R Boyer. Becoming Campesinos: 
Politics, Identity, and Agrarian Struggle in Postrevolutionary Michoacán, 1920-1935 (Stanford: Standford 
University Press, 2003). 
18 Knight, The Mexican Revolution, pp. x-xi 
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in Mexico that reflect the neo-populist approach have been those of Jennie Purnell 
(1999), Christopher Boyer (2003), and Matthew Butler (2004)—all of them, however, 
focus exclusively on the state of Michoacán.  
Purnell studies peasant partisanship in the Cristero Rebellion of 1926-1929 and 
contends that the rebellion affords a different understanding of state formation, “holding 
that no Leviathan, embryonic or otherwise, existed in Mexico in the 1920s.”19 She shifts 
our attention to local agrarian and political conflicts that peasant communities had been 
engaged in for decades, “and some times centuries, prior to the revolution.” These 
historical factors—among others such as local religious practice, petty political 
factionalism, popular notions of property rights, and the interaction with officials and 
clergy—directly affected people’s decisions to rebel against the state. Boyer challenges 
the assumption that individuals residing in the countryside inherently share a sense of 
cultural solidarity and political consciousness. He argues that what become known as 
campesino identity in twentieth-century Mexico was both the outgrowth of popular 
militancy and its subsequent translation through localized versions of popular ideology 
after the Revolution. Butler also challenges the assumptions regarding Mexican peasants 
in the 1920s, but does so from the perspective of religion and problematizes the idea that 
they held similar religious outlooks, and that their behavior was driven by political and 
materials factor. In doing so, Butler has reminded us that “religion mattered as peasants 
negotiated a path between the conflicting agents of Church and state […].”20  
                                                            
19 Purnell, Popular Movements, p. 11 
20 Matthew Butler, Popular Piety and Political Identity in Mexico’s Cristero Rebellion: 
Michoacán, 1927-1929 (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2004). p. 3 
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While all three works address salient themes regarding the Cristero Rebellion 
(1926-1929), none of them, nor other works, systematically pays attention to the two 
other major rebellions of the postrevolutionary period that preceded and succeeded this 
uprising. The de la Huerta rebellion (1923-1924) and the Second Cristero Rebellion 
(1934-1940) receive limited mention, at best. The recent works of Enrique Guerra Manzo 
(2005) and Ben Fallaw (2013) have begun to expand upon the complexity of the Second 
Cristero Rebellion through an analysis of its goals, organization, style of violence, and 
the challenges it posed to state projects. Guerra Manzo’s study, which also centers on 
Michoacán, for example, has argued that the rebellion more closely approximated a social 
movement led by rebels promoting specific political plans, which intended to establish 
alternative social orders founded upon Catholic principles and civil liberties.21 Fallaw’s 
work has branched out to the states of Campeche, Hidalgo, and Guanajuato, and suggests 
that during the 1930s the revolutionary state project floundered, which led to the 
decentralized Catholic strategy of resistance and to the expression of complex offensive 
and defensive violence throughout the countryside.22  
The de la Huerta uprising, on the one hand, continues to be interpreted as a mere 
anomaly in the history of postrevolutionary Mexico; while on the other hand, scholars 
                                                            
21 Enrique Guerra Manzo, “La Segunda Cristiada y el caso de Michoacán (1931-1938),” Historia 
Mexicana, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Oct. – Dec., 2005): 514-515. Adrian Bantjes’ regional study of Sonora made a 
similar argument, however, claiming that the Second Cristero Rebellion should be understood as a three-
month struggle occurring within the backdrop of the power struggle between Calles and Cárdenas. In his 
view, such violence was simply symptomatic of just how closely both national and regional politics were 
intertwined, which ultimately allowed for political openings at the local-level in which opposition groups 
took advantage of to promoted specific agendas; see Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth: Cardenismo, 
Sonora, and the Mexican Revolution. (Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 1998), p. 43-56 
22 Ben Fallaw, Religion and State Formation in Postrevolutionary Mexico (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2013).  
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continue to acknowledge that the defeat of the rebellion consolidated central state power 
and reaffirmed Mexico’s process of modernization. Very few studies, however, have 
actually attempted thoroughly to understand it.23 Insufficient scholarly attention has been 
paid to the long-term effects of the recurring political upheavals of postrevolutionary 
Mexico on the process of state formation and on the lives of citizens—despite the fact 
that they were central and formative to the political system produced in their wake.   
The Mexican Revolution 
 
The Mexican Revolution of 1910 to 1920 was the first major social revolution of 
the twentieth century. Its causes, among many others, included the authoritarian rule of 
dictator Porfirio Díaz (who had ruled the country since 1876), the confiscation of 
numerous village lands by wealthy oligarchs and foreign speculators, and the growing 
divide between the rich and the poor in Mexico. While the revolutionaries were 
successful in ousting Díaz from office in six-month’s time, they could not agree on the 
new social and political order. Francisco Madero eventually inaugurated a period of 
democratic rule in 1911, but that came to an abrupt end on 9 February 1913 when a revolt 
turned coup d’état broke out against the Madero regime. General Victoriano Huerta 
emerged victorious from the bloodletting as the new president of Mexico; Madero and his 
vice-president, José María Pino Suárez, were assassinated three days later. The following 
month Venustiano Carranza, the governor of the northern state of Coahuila, issued the 
                                                            
23 See Jürgen Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution. (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007) and Gilbert M. Joseph & Jürgen Buchenau, Mexico’s Once and Future 
Revolution: Social Upheaval and the Challenge of Rule since the Late Nineteenth Century (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2013).  
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Plan de Guadalupe opposing the Huerta regime. He subsequently called for a 
constitutional government and asked to be named Frist Chief of the movement.  
The Constitutionalist Revolution, as it became known, quickly gathered strength 
and allies, and began advancing from the north to south in three divisions, which were led 
by Alvaro Obregón, Francisco “Pancho” Villa, and Pablo González. Meanwhile, the 
Zapatistas—led by Emiliano Zapata—and others continued fighting Huerta in the south, 
just as they had previously fought Porfirio Díaz and Madero.24 In June 1914, the 
Constitutionalist forces advanced towards Jalisco and, a month later, took the capital city 
of Guadalajara. It was in this context, then, that the Constitutionalist Revolution arrived 
into the region under the command of Obregón and appointed General Manuel Diéguez 
as the new governor and military commander of the state. In his first address as governor, 
Diéguez declared to the people of Jalisco the following: 
What in the beginning was only a heroic push of only a few gambling 
patriots, soon turned into the formidable Constitutionalist Army that today 
victoriously advances to the Metropolis to finish the triple job of restoring 
order, punishing those responsible for the sorrows that afflict the country, 
and to ensure the fulfilment of effective rights.25  
  
After the occupation of Veracruz by the US Marines and a series of decisive losses, 
Huerta resigned on 15 July 1914 and Obregón went on triumphantly to occupy Mexico 
City.26  
                                                            
24 Jürgen Buchenau, The Last Caudillo: Alvaro Obregón and the Mexican Revolution, (Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), p. 58. 
25 Boletín Militar, Tomo 1, Guadalajara, 18 de Julio de 1914, Núm. 3. 9 July 1914. 
26 Buchenau, The Last Caudillo, pp. 64-65. 
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The first reports regarding differences between the clergy and the 
Constitutionalist government in Jalisco, however, began to circulate the following week. 
On 22 July, the Boletín Militar claimed that the local government had discovered a 
deposit of weapons and munitions in Guadalajara linked to the clergy. In response, the 
Constitutionalists occupied the churches of the state capital, “assuring the public that for 
now they [the clergy] will not be above the Law [and will not] trample upon our 
Constitution, as [several prominent clergymen] have.”27 Three days later, the 
Constitutionalists asserted that they were not antireligious:  
What the Constitutionalist Government detests [and] what it considers as 
an irreconcilable enemy of peace and public order is intransigent 
clericalism, [which has historically] caused more damage to our nation 
[…what we do not want is] clericalism within politics, the church within 
the State, the instigating and evil friar who converts his pulpit into [a] 
parliamentary tribunal to advise contempt for our laws, hatred toward the 
legal Government and rebellion in all of its forms; [the Constitutionalist 
Government] is an enemy of the lustful and cunning clergy (not of 
religion) which only lives to exploit the masses […].28  
 
Over the course of 1914, the disagreements between the multiple revolutionary factions 
again expressed themselves. In Jalisco, Alan Knight notes that the anticlerical acts of the 
Constitutionalists won them an evil reputation in the eyes of many Catholics: “Since the 
perpetrators were Carranza’s men, Jalisco’s Catholics logically inclined towards [Pancho] 
                                                            
27 Boletín Militar Tomo 1, Guadalajara, 22 de Julio de 1914, Núm. 3. 22 July 1914. 
28 Boletín Militar Tomo 1, Guadalajara, 25 de Julio de 1914, Núm. 3. 25 July 1914. While a 
radical, anticlerical liberal tradition dating from the nineteenth century existed among some sectors of the 
working, artisan, and middles classes, “it was eclipsed in the early years of the revolution by the rise of a 
multiclass Catholic social and political movement that promoted the principles of Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum 
Novarum of 1891;” see Maria Teresa Fernández Aceves, “The Struggle between the Metate and the 
Molinos de Nixtamal in Guadalajara, 1920-1940” in Sex in Revolution: Gender, Politics, and Power in 
Modern Mexico edited by Jocelyn Olcott, Mary Kay Vaughan, and Gabriela Cano (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2006), p. 148 
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Villa: Villismo seemed the ‘antidote’ to anti-clerical Carrancismo.” As a result, some of 
the more militant and conservative Catholic groups began to recruit armed brigades “with 
a view to violent resistance” against the Constitutionalists. By the fall of 1914 there were 
already reports of actual revolts against the Constitutionalist order and forces mounted by 
outraged individuals. These acts, therefore, represented “the first shots [fired] in the 
Church/state struggle that would culminate in the great rebellion of the ‘twenties [and 
beyond].”29 
The Mexican Revolution eventually produced one of the most radical doctrines on 
social rights in the twentieth century. Crafted at a time of global upheaval, the 
Constitution of 1917 championed human solidarity with the poor and the working class 
over abstract ideology. It was also the first of its kind to begin to take into account a 
world that had been profoundly shaped by World War I, Russian unrest, significant 
globalization, and the growing power of Latin America’s northern neighbor. The 
document preserved almost intact the complement of classical civil and political liberties 
granted to citizens under the previous Constitution of 1857, but also extensively 
incorporated social and economic guarantees to all Mexicans—significantly adding 
important provisions on labor, agrarian reform, and the social dimensions of property 
rights. In 1920, after some military generals led a coup to overthrow the regime of 
Venustiano Carranza, the conflict “officially” ended. A succession of revolutionary 
generals began to govern in Mexico and gradually centralized political power until 1946, 
when the first civilian presidential candidate was elected.  
 
                                                            
29 Knight, The Mexican Revolution, p. 208. 
  
 
17 
Overview of the Chapters   
 
The de la Huerta rebellion (1923-1924) left a significant legacy for the political 
future of Mexico. It was the first of three successive conflicts of the 1920s and 1930s that 
began to weed out the caciques (regional political bosses) who had formed fiefdoms 
during the Mexican Revolution. Scholars still know very little about how this rebellion 
actually played out on the ground, why some rural dwellers decided to take up arms in 
defense of the national state, and why regional political bosses and generals attempted to 
undermine the state’s capacity to rule. Chapter 1 focuses on the regional manifestation 
of this uprising, known locally as the Estradista Rebellion. I analyze the political 
precursors that led up to the rebellion and explore a set of contemporary statements 
regarding what citizens from all walks of life thought about local authorities, governance, 
and the social order. This chapter makes use of a comisión,30 which interviewed 
approximately four hundred citizens hailing from various classes, ages, occupations, and 
political views. The actas (records) that made it into the final report reflected the 
experiences of people who took part in contemporary events or who were witness to 
them. Rather than constructing a larger explanatory model for understanding the 
rebellion, this chapter instead takes up a thematic approach to assess how local officials, 
ordinary citizens, and rural dwellers interpreted the behaviors of elected officials, 
struggled over what the insurgency meant to them, and why they decided to risk their 
lives or simply discount the disorder that engulfed the countryside.  
                                                            
30 Archivo General de la Nación (hereinafter cited as AGN), Dirección General de Investigaciones 
Políticas y Sociales (hereinafter cited as DGIPS), Caja: 244, Exp. 9, 313.1-968, Tomo I, March 1924.  
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Chapter 2 shifts our attention to an analysis of the anatomy of rule and 
establishment of a local power structure in the Guadalajara region of the 1920s. In the 
aftermath of the first significant challenge to the new social order, Governor José 
Guadalupe Zuno Hernández established himself as the most powerful politician in the 
region. One of the most controversial public figures of the period, Zuno’s political career 
provoked conflicting opinions from contemporaries and has also led to a healthy debate 
among historians.31 On one hand, the national and Catholic conservative presses 
portrayed Zuno as a politician who did not respect the legal system and as an individual 
determined to reach and maintain power by any means;32 while on the other hand, most 
of the revisionist historiography has lauded his role in defense of regional autonomy at 
the municipal and state levels, and his anticlerical, pro-labor, agrarian, and educational 
policies.33 Very few studies, however, have attempted to understand the consequences of 
such state inventions on the lives of of citizens or their impact on local governance. This 
chapter explores the chronic anxieties that Mexican citizens expressed about state 
sovereignty in the first decade of the postrevolutionary era. I argue that such disorder was 
not only part of an on-going negotiation over how to govern and rule, but was also part of 
an extensive debate regarding the limits of local and national power during this period. 
                                                            
31 Maria Teresa Fernández Aceves, “José Guadalupe Zuno Hernández and the Revolutionary 
Process in Jalisco” in State Governors in the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1952: Portraits in Conflict, 
Courage, and Corruption, edited by Jürgen Büchenau and William Beezley (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2009), p. 95. 
32 AGN, DGIPS, Caja: 2024-B, Expediente: 9 & 10. These expedientes contain well over 300+ 
pages of newspaper clippings from regional and national presses, government reports and letters, political 
analysis, and such an incredibly detailed inventory of Zuno’s possessions in 1925 that one would have 
thought him a bona fide celebrity by the scope of coverage devoted to him.  
33 Fernández Aceves, “José Guadalupe Zuno,” pp. 95-96  
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 Chapter 3 centers on two significant problems that the administration of 
President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924 to 1928) encountered in Jalisco during its first two 
years in office: 1) the specter of another armed uprising in the countryside; and 2) a local 
political crisis over effective control of the state. First, I explore how Mexico’s budding 
intelligence services—the Departamento Confidencial—systematically engaged in the 
surveillance of Jalisco’s countryside. This process began in earnest following the 
suppression of the de la Huerta Rebellion, but intensified in the years to come. The spy 
reports that my analysis rests upon are located in the collections of the Dirección General 
de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (DGIPS). These spy reports, however, provide us 
with an intellectual challenge: one the one hand, they reveal a certain degree of 
selectivity on the part of supervisors in positions of power, who decidedly privileged 
certain snippets of information over others deemed irrelevant; while on the other, as 
practicing historians we too engage in this same exercise as we select from the already 
selected pool of sources in the dusty boxes we find. As a result, the use of these sources 
requires us not only to focus on their content, but also on the nexus of networks that 
produced this knowledge. The decoding of this information and rumors contained in it, 
for the most part, reveals a great deal about the popular beliefs of those individuals that 
were targets of surveillance; and they also reveal the preoccupations of agents themselves 
and what authorities believed important enough to archive. Consequently, the fear of 
another rebellion greatly transformed the manner in which the central state interacted 
with, and produced knowledge, of the countryside.  
 The second part of this chapter focuses on the how zunistas attempted to survive 
politically after their leader Zuno was “toppled” in March 1926. Despite being officially 
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ousted from power, Zuno remained the de facto governor of Jalisco for quite some time 
and posed a significant challenge to President Calles’s plan for organized labor. He made 
considerable progress, for example, in halting the centralizing efforts that increasingly 
came to characterize the Calles administration. In particular, I highlight how federal 
intervention into labor politics and state elections affected the local power structure of the 
Guadalajara region. The section focuses on two political disputes: The Cinco Minas 
Company Strike and the gubernatorial election of 1926. I argue, however, that the 
supporters of Zuno were not merely reactors to official policy emanating from Mexico 
City, but were also “political initiators” who themselves exercised an important role in 
limiting the impact of the national government in the region during these formative years.  
 In mid-1926 a massive upheaval of a religious character erupted in central-
western Mexico and quickly engulfed the states of Jalisco, Colima, and Michoacán. 
Chapter 4 narrates the events at both federal and state level that led to the Cristero 
Rebellion in Jalisco and explores how citizens reacted to the ensuing violence. The first 
part of this chapter provides a history of anticlericalism in Mexico following the 
Constitution of 1917 and, above all, contextualizes the Calles administration’s effort to 
implement anticlerical measures. In the second part, I shift my analysis to how partisans 
of the national state experienced the rebellion. Much like Chapter 2 of this dissertation, 
my interest in this chapter is not so much in analyzing the logic of the rebellion; instead, I 
focus on how partisans of the state, such as agraristas, local authorities, and tax 
collectors thought and wrote about the violence they encountered. I begin with an 
overview of agrarian reform and the formation of political identities in the countryside, 
and then examine the anxieties that agrarian communities expressed in the early phases of 
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the rebellion. Through an analysis of letters or reports submitted to state and federal 
authorities, I subsequently consider how local governance and politics functioned in 
times of unrest and crisis, particularly emphasizing the apprehensions that municipal 
administrations and government employees expressed to their superiors. The chapter 
ultimately draws attention to the state government’s acquiescence to Mexico City with 
the creation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) in 1929.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the upsurge in rural collective political violence in 1930s 
Jalisco, known as the the Second Cristero Rebellion or colloquially as La Segunda. When 
Lázaro Cárdenas came into office in December of 1934 and displaced the informal 
political clout of Calles, he inherited a “Six-Year Plan” on education that intended to 
increase rural schools by 12,000 to a total of 20,000 by the end of 1939.34 The instruction 
imparted in these schools was to be socialist and, on the one hand, sought to eliminate 
“religious dogmatisms and prejudices” in schools; and, on the other, to put an end to the 
Church’s role in educating the masses. The implementation of the socialist education 
program in the countryside played a tremendous role in inciting the widespread popular 
uprisings of this period. Despite the constant insistence on the part of the high clergy in 
assuming a conciliatory attitude towards the state, many rebel groups and parish priests 
interpreted socialist schools as state instruments to eradicate their traditional belief 
systems. I argue that local community grievances, political divisions, and varying degrees 
                                                            
34 The plan provided for the opening of these schools on the following timetable: 1,000 in 1934; 
2,000 in each of the years 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1938; and 3,000 during the year 1939. And to achieve 
this, fifteen per cent of the national budget was set aside for public education, which was raised gradually 
so that by 1939 the budget for public education would have reached 20 percent; see El Universal, 20 July 
1934. 
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of religious sensibilities directly molded the manner in which rural people understood the 
state’s cultural revolution of the 1930s. In what became increasingly a hostile working 
environment for supporters and representatives of the postrevolutionary state, as rebels 
and parish priests worked together to undermine federal schooling policy, violence 
against partisans of the state again became a central story. This ultimately determined 
whether locals accepted, disregarded, or altered the Six-Year Plan on education. 
Let us now turn our attention to the eastern shore of Lake Chapala in Jalisco 
where President Alvaro Obregón had arrived from Mexico City to get some much needed 
rest from running the country. It is now the fall of 1923. Meanwhile, Governor José 
Guadalupe Zuno hurriedly left Guadalajara and also made his way to the small lake town. 
Zuno had urgent news to deliver. This was a matter of national security and it could not 
wait. The president must be interrupted.  
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Chapter 1 
‘As Revolutionaries We Are Obligated to Comply’: The Politics of Reconstruction  
and the Estradista Rebellion 
 
The civil war roused by the action of President Obregón in his endeavors to usurp the 
public liberties of the people, assumes the character of a National War. The revolt for 
freedom that started with the perils that were threatening our democratic institutions is 
growing to a gigantic size and [so too is the] dignity in the sacred duty to defend the 
sovereignty and the freedom of our country. 
  -Adolfo de la Huerta1 
  
 
Bárcenas: Where did you pass the revolution?  
Mejia: In my pueblo, in Tonaya. 
Bárcenas: Who rose up in favor of the Government? 
Mejia: Nobody, neither in favor nor against, even though everyone in my town was 
against [it].  
  -Acta twenty-seven of the Comisión2 
 
 
In mid-October 1923 President Alvaro Obregón retreated to his ‘El Fuerte’ 
residence on the eastern shore of Lake Chapala, near the town of Ocotlán, Jalisco. The 
president’s sojourn had salubrious undertones, but not long after his arrival Governor 
José Guadalupe Zuno made the short trek to speak with his compadre.3 Zuno, 
accompanied by General Jesús Madrigal, informed President Obregón of the recent 
                                                
1 State Department (hereinafter cited as SD), 812.00/27042, 20 February 1924. 
2 Archivo General de la Nación (hereinafter cited as AGN), DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, 
Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Confidential Report investigating if the powers of the State 
disappeared because of the delahuertista rebellion,” Acta 27. “Declaration of Antonio Mejía,” 1 April 1924.  
3 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 103-Z-4. “Correspondence between Obregón and Zuno,” f. 1-9, 16 
October 1923-10 November 1923. Alvaro Obregón and Governor Jose G. Zuno began to correspond on 16 
October 1923 about the impending birth of the latter’s first child—born María Eugenia Zuno Arce on 28 
October. Two weeks later, Obregón writes: “It would be an honor for us to act as godparents to your first-
born, certainly accepting this distinction.” In a subsequent letter, the president reiterates his happiness to 
serve as godparent to the daughter of Zuno, “I have the pleasure of informing you that María [the first lady] 
already has the dress here and I only wait to recover my health which has seriously weakened in the last 
days to give you notice [so you can] indicate to us the time and day with the objective of transferring 
ourselves there. We would like to know if you desire to carry out the baptism at the house or at the church, 
and if you could provide me with that information I would greatly appreciate it.”  
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seditious activities that General Enrique Estrada—the former Commander-in-chief of the 
Second Division of the Mexican Army of the Northwest—had committed under his 
watchful eye, which included the sending of arms to the Head of Military Operations in 
Zacatecas and secret meetings with military officials in Guadalajara.4 The rumblings of 
rebellion were now in the air. All had not been quiet on the western front of Mexico.  
After the men broke the news to Obregón, he led them to the terrace of his 
residence, situated near the lake. Zuno recalls what happened next: “We saw [General] 
Estrada there, in short sleeves, his grand gala jacket and hat had been left on the seat of a 
chair […and] he was [imitating] a horse for the son of Don Alvaro, who joyfully hit him 
with his own whip […while Estrada] pranced in the most human of imitations, throwing 
kicks and [making] weak neighs.” Obregón asked Zuno and Madrigal, “Do y’all see him 
[…] he appears to be a friend of my family and my own…he plays with my son 
Alvarito.” General Madrigal interrupted the president and reiterated that the 
documentation they presented to him was convincing, indisputable. “I also believe it 
[…but] my duty is to respect him until his acts of rebellion are verified […] I am not a 
traitor of traitors,” affirmed Obregón, “I do not know yet if he will rebel; but if he does, 
then I will have all the justification [needed] for my actions […].”5 
On the afternoon of 6 December 1923 General Enrique Estrada6 declared himself 
in open rebellion against the Government of President Obregón and denounced the First 
                                                
4 José Guadalupe Zuno, Reminisciencias de una vida, 2a. ed. (Guadalajara: Biblioteca de Autores 
de Jaliscienses Modernos, 1956), p. 139.  
5 Zuno, Reminisciencias, p. 139.  
6 The Second Division of the Mexican Army of the Northwest commanded by General Estrada 
encompassed the states of Jalisco, Colima, and Michoacán. Forces under his command, according to a State 
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Magistrate for violating the Constitution of 1917.7 The following day, Estrada made 
official declarations to the press regarding the scope of his efforts: “This movement is not 
the result of a political pact […our] loyalty to the Constitutional Charter of the Republic, 
cannot be conserved [if we do not] disavow whomever violates the Constitution,” 
affirmed the General, “[…the] decision to not recognize [the] President of the Republic, 
was taken [to] sustain our institutions and to once again raise the banner of the 
Revolution […].”8 The lines were crossed, bridges burned. The rebellion had now begun 
and there was no turning back.  
The overthrow of Governor José G. Zuno’s pro-Obregón regime in Guadalajara 
was accomplished on the following day “with such celerity and lack of the usual 
ostentation and military display” that very few individuals, outside of the governor’s 
inner circle, were aware of it until many hours after. Obeying orders emanating from 
General Estrada, armed soldiers swiftly entered the Palacio de Gobierno, Casa 
Municipal, and revenue offices (State and Federal), and obtained complete control in the 
name of the rebel forces. The officials in charge of these posts were immediately 
dismissed, and guards disarmed and replaced—on a temporary basis—with military 
officials. “No opposition was offered to the demand of the military officers,” reported 
A.J. McConnico, the American Consul, “and no conflicts of any kind occurred […in] 
                                                
Department report, were estimated to be in the vicinity of 16,000 soldiers, “all being regarded as loyal and 
well-disciplined;” see SD, 812.00/26651, 8 December 1923.  
7 Archivo Histórico del Municipio de Autlán (hereinafter cited as AHMA), Gobernación 6, 
“Telegram to ex-President Alvaro Obregón from General Enrique Estrada,” 6 December 1923.  
8 El Informador, 8 December 1923. 
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fact, it was a quiet and peaceful surrender of an unprotected civil government to military 
power […] Opposition or resistance of any kind would have resulted tragically; hence, 
the surrender.”9  
The Estradista Rebellion formed part of a larger series of contemporary armed 
insurgencies already in motion—collectively known as the de la Huerta Rebellion—that 
for nearly sixty days shook the newly established social order11 to the core and 
reverberated all throughout the countryside of Mexico. The de la Huerta Rebellion was 
comprised of four major rebellions in Guerrero, Jalisco, Veracruz, and Oaxaca led 
respectively by Rómulo Figueroa, Enrique Estrada, Guadalupe Sánchez, Fortunato 
Maycotte. While Adolfo de la Huerta claimed to be the Supreme Chief of the movement, 
“with the exception of Guadalupe Sánchez none of the military caudillos [that were] up in 
arms recognized him as such.”12 In the subsequent bloodletting, politicians came of age, 
                                                
9 SD, 812.00/26651, 8 December 1923. The military authorities demanded 500,000 pesos in the 
form of a forced loan. Shortly thereafter, a commission was nominated to secure the amount and its 
delivery before the imposed deadline of 10 December, 11:00am. The forced loan was met with much 
resistance and debate, however, in particular by the Members of the Consular Corps of Guadalajara. As the 
American Consul made clear: “Members of the consular corps in this city, including the consul of France, 
the consul of Italy, the vice consul of Great Britain, and the vice consul of Spain, met at the American 
consulate at noon on the day mentioned (Saturday), and after a conference decided to submit a protest to 
General Estrada against the proposed loan insofar as it would affect their respective nationals. And each 
consul advised his nationals to refuse to make contributions except under protest;” see SD, 812.0026701, 
11 December 1923. 
11 I define the “social order” as reflective of the manner in which societies create institutions that 
support the presence of specific forms of human organization and relationships, and through the incentives 
created by the pattern of organization. Political, economic, religious, and military powers, then, are created 
through those same institutions; that is, “these institutions simultaneously give individuals control over 
resources and, by dong so, limit the violence by shaping the incentives faced by individuals and groups 
who have access to violence.” See Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, 
Violence and Social Orders: a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 1-2.   
12 Fidelina G. Lleneras and Jaime Tamayo, El levantamiento delahuertista: cuatro rebeliones y 
cuatro jefes militares (Guadalajara, Jalisco, México: Universidad de Guadalajara, 1995), p. 15.  
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rose to prominence or were eliminated; political parties were created and dissolved; 
alliances shifted and were strengthened. The established historiography recognizes that 
the defeat and suppression of the de la Huerta Rebellion served an important role in 
reaffirming Mexico’s process of modernization and in reconfiguring politics at regional 
and local levels. Very few studies, however, have investigated how these regional 
wellsprings of violence actually played out on the ground, why some rural dwellers 
decided to take up arms in defense of the national state, and why regional political 
strongmen attempted to undermine the state’s capacity to rule.13 Scholars, on the one 
hand, have deemed the rebellion as merely a reactionary movement against the 
impositionist politics of the National Government (in the same vein as those that occurred 
against Díaz, Huerta, and Carranza); while, on the other, some have instead 
conceptualized the four major strands of the rebellion as “a great social conflict” 
comprised of forces that were either ideologically identified with the Revolution or 
                                                
13 The classic study on the rebellion is Alonso Capetillo’s book, La rebelión sin cabeza (génesis y 
desarollo del movimiento delahuertista) (México: Imprenta Botas, 1925), which is filled with anti-de la 
Huerta propaganda and paints a portrait of a rebellion without much leadership. While this is an important 
topic of debate (that is, whether Generals like Estrada actually supported and recognized Adolfo de la 
Huerta as the Jefe Supremo of the Revolution) it has perpetuated the lack of historical analysis applied to 
studies regarding the rebellion. The idea of whether certain Generals supported certain leaders distracts 
from the fact that these rebellions were great social upheavals that not only impacted national and regional 
political loyalties, but also shaped how citizens interpreted and began to conceptualize their place within 
the new social order. The study of Llerenas and Tamayo (El Levantamiento delahuertista) provides a 
detailed account of each rebellion, focusing on political and military developments, and shifts the focus 
towards the diversity of social actors involved in the conflict; while Enrique Plascencia de la Parra’s 
Personajes y escenarios de la rebellion delahuertista, 1923-1924 (México: Instituto de Investigaciones 
Históricas, UNAM: M.A. Porrúa, 1998) instead focuses on the major figures of the rebellion—avoiding an 
analysis of social classes. No study, however, has focused on how these forces impacted how ordinary 
people, among others, interpreted these contemporary events. As Plascenia de la Parra writes on page 14, 
“the disdain towards this topic, perhaps is due to [the fact] that it deals with a military rebellion, it lacks the 
fascination of a ‘popular war’ like Villismo, el Zapatismo or the Cristero War.”    
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comprised of social actors, such as landowners, clergy, and military officials, “who 
simply sought to reverse the revolutionary process.”14   
This chapter explores the political precursors to the rebellion led by Enrique 
Estrada in the state of Jalisco and also analyzes a set of contemporary statements 
concerning what citizens thought about local authorities, governance, and the social order 
during a destabilizing moment of crisis. The first part of the chapter revisits the years 
following the triumph of the Plan de Agua Prieta and reevaluates the administration of 
Alvaro Obregón. This section offers a chronological narrative on the major political 
events—alternating between national and regional developments—that culminated in the 
mass outbreak of violence in December 1923. Rather than constructing a larger 
explanatory model for understanding the rebellion, the second part takes on a thematic 
approach and focuses on how local officials, ordinary citizens, and rural dwellers 
interpreted the behaviors of elected officials, struggled over what the insurgency meant to 
them, and why they decided to risk their lives or simply discount the disorder that 
engulfed the countryside.  
Three central questions guide the analysis in this chapter: How did the 
Obregonista regime reestablish control and effective rule in the years immediately 
following the Revolution? What factors led to popular support for, or genuine opposition 
to, the new state? How does the Estradista Rebellion help us to reconsider the importance 
of popular inquietudes (anxieties) about state interventions as a central tenet in the longer 
history of the revolutionary process in Mexico? 
                                                
14 Lleneras and Tamayo, El levantamiento delahuertista, p. 12 
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The Time in Between: From Revolution to Rebellions 
 
Plans (proclamations) in Mexican history have always sought to explain and 
justify the reasons for an armed revolt. The Plan de Agua Prieta was no different. On 23 
April 1920, Generals Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles, and fellow Sonoran 
Governor Adolfo de la Huerta, declared themselves in open revolt against the National 
Government of Venustiano Carranza. The Plan, deemed a reaction to the president’s 
efforts to “impose his will by intimidating de la Huerta’s state government,” announced 
to the nation that Carranza had repeatedly violated the sovereignty of the Mexican people 
and was no longer considered president of the republic by the insurgents.15 Support for 
the rebellion grew in great numbers.16 Widely seen as the definitive end of the Mexican 
Revolution, it culminated a month later with the assassination of Carranza, while he slept 
in the town of Tlaxcalantongo in the Sierra Norte de Puebla. A week later de la Huerta 
was elevated to interim president of Mexico and General Calles to secretary of war. 
General Obregón eagerly waited in the wings for the next legitimate (and legal) popular 
elections to sweep him up to the highest office in the country. 
During the six months that de la Huerta remained in office much of his attention 
focused on pacifying the country. The Sonoran dynasty, as the three prominent figures 
came to be known, believed the process of pacification not only to be a crucial step 
towards national reconstruction and modernization, but also a necessary one in order to 
                                                
15 Jurgen Buchenau, The Last Caudillo: Alvaro Obregón and the Mexican Revolution (Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), p. 99. 
16 Among those who remained loyal to Carranza, however, where General Manuel Diéguez 
(Jalisco), Cesáreo Castro (Coahuila), Cándido Aguilar (Veracruz) and Francisco Murguía (Michoacán). 
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achieve “internal and external legitimacy, and, with it, the recognition of the United 
States of America.” One of the first orders of business on the agenda was the complete 
overhaul of the armed forces. As Secretary of War, Calles attempted to reform the armed 
forces through a four-part project that would: 1) limit the total number of military men to 
fifty-thousand; 2) revise the military ranks of commanders and officers under more well-
established criteria; 3) curb the number of these promotions and prevent their exceeding 
existing established numbers; and 4) retire those commanders and other officials who 
could no longer render service to the armed forces. Once the size of the military had been 
reduced, the aim was to introduce a new military culture consisting of proper instruction, 
discipline, obligatory service, moral reorientation, and reorganization of garrisons.17  
These precautionary measures made it clear to all that there was to be no repeat of 
Agua Prieta. The political power the federal government achieved after the Revolution 
melted away in the face of established regional and local military fiefdoms, preventing 
complete control of the country. If the new national state was to achieve any semblance 
of cohesion and truly succeed, then, it needed to rein in the same armed forces that it had 
ridden to power during the previous rebellion. Political compromises with the prominent 
caudillos who supported the Plan de Agua Prieta, thenceforward, needed to be reached, 
and their power effectively curtailed (or in certain cases completely suppressed). These 
important relationships had to be “mediated through personal loyalty,” which in the 
                                                
17 Martha Beatriz Loyo Camacho, Joaquín Amaro y el proceso de institucionalización del Ejército 
Mexicano (México, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones 
Históricas: Fideocomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca: Instituto Nacional de 
Estudios de la Revolución Mexicana: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003), pp. 63-65. 
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coming decade would come to form the cornerstone of the Mexican political system.18 Or 
as General Obregón bluntly put it: “there is no general that can resist a cañonazo (cannon 
shot) of fifty-thousand pesos.”19 But many of the triumphant revolutionaries, however, 
who over the years climbed the highest ranks of command into powerful positions, did 
not have a unifying ideology beyond the shared experience of the Revolution. “Some 
[gravitated] towards agrarian or labor reforms, be it out of idealism or towards the end of 
solidifying their support bases,” asserts Loyo Camacho, “[…] the personal power of the 
[military] general converted itself into a potential threat to the political stability [of the 
state].”20 While the Constitution of 1917 headlined a national effort at reconstruction, 
central political authority continued to remain relatively weak in Mexico as “Governors 
and local jefes políticos defied the federal government to rein in their powers, applying 
revolutionary-era legislation inconsistently.”21 Moreover, the institutional place of the 
presidency in Mexico, from the start of the Revolution to the triumph of Agua Prieta, had 
yet to be confirmed and reaffirmed; that is, no elected president had managed 
successfully to complete his term in office and peacefully transfer power to a successor. 
Meanwhile, the role of the federal branches of Government, within the new strictures the 
Constitution of 1917 laid out, also remained unclear.  
                                                
18 Loyo Camacho, Joaquín Amaro y el proceso, pp. 63-65 
19 Loyo Camacho, Joaquín Amaro y el proceso, p. 76 
20 Loyo Camacho, Joaquín Amaro y el proceso, pp. 75-76 
21 Buchenau, The Last Caudillo, p. 113 
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It was during this crisis of political legitimacy—and in the midst of a post-World 
War I economic recession—that Alvaro Obregón was sworn into office in the fall of 
1920.23 Dulles observes that metal mining had long proved to be an important activity 
and source of tax income and foreign exchange, and that in this respect the year 1920 had 
been a “banner year for metals generally and had seen Mexico export more silver and at a 
greater value than during any earlier year of the century; the value of copper and lead 
exports in 1920 was second only to their value in 1918.” The following year, however, 
proved to bring vastly different fortunes as the fall in quotations led to a decline (and in 
some cases a complete cessation) of mining production.24 On this matter, Buchenau 
writes that from 1920 to 1921 “the value of silver and copper exports decreased from 159 
million to 78 million pesos.” Additionally, the violence of the Mexican Revolution had 
also proved detrimental to agriculture to the point that in areas that had been “marked by 
intense fighting” were the areas where landowners had abandoned their landholdings, 
infrastructure had been devastated, and railroad tracks in disrepair. “Only the 
performance of the oil industry saved the nation from greater disaster,” affirms 
Buchenau, “[since] in 1921, Mexico was the world’s leading oil exporter, contributing to 
26 percent of the world market.”25 As president, Obregón quickly became known for his 
pragmatic style and not his revolutionary ideology. He cautiously implemented many 
                                                
23 Obregón won the election in a landslide on 30 November 1920. He obtained 1,979,801 votes to 
the 47,440 cast to his closest opponent, Ing. Robles Domínguez; see Jaime Tamayo’s La conformación del 
Estado moderno y los conflictos políticos 1917-1929 (Guadalajara: Gobierno de Jalisco, Universidad de 
Guadalajara, 1988), p. 95. 
24 John W.F. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico: a chronicle of Revolution, 1919-1936 (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1961), p 106.  
25 Buchenau, The Last Caudillo, p. 112.   
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social and economic provisions of the Constitution, while at the same time supporting 
others he had no intention of actually implementing.26 The Constitution itself created an 
expansive framework for the dissemination of “a populist political culture” in Mexico, as 
Buchenau notes: “[The] political culture centered on the idea of the ‘revolution’ as a way 
of bringing redress to a variety of grievances, from the concentration of land in the hands 
of the wealthy to the Mexicanization of the economy, the absolute separation of church 
and state, and guarantees for labor.”27 Over the course of his presidency, Obregón carried 
out such determinations through the cultivation of extensive connections with governors 
and regional bosses, Congress, the military, and with the formation of alliances with 
popular organizations; the creation of an impressive cabinet (consejo de ministros); 
continued efforts at reforming and institutionalizing the military, as a way of preventing 
threats to his authority; and through the establishment of a federal Ministry of Public 
Education.  
 
The Principled General: Enrique Estrada  
 
When the Plan de Agua Prieta was proclaimed Enrique Estrada threw his lot in 
with the Sonoran faction, which he supported out of a genuine revolutionary conviction. 
He held the proud distinction of never having chosen the wrong side during the Mexican 
Revolution; an impressive feat, considering the shifting alliances that came to 
characterize the civil strife. Estrada could also trace his revolutionary lineage to the 
“Apostle of Democracy,” Francisco I. Madero, because his older brother, Roque Estrada, 
                                                
26 Buchenau, The Last Caudillo, pp. 113-114 
27 Buchenau, The Last Caudillo, pp. 113-114 
  
34 
served him in the capacity of personal secretary. Enrique Estrada, however, came into 
prominence on the battlefield when he collaborated with the famed Felipe Ángeles during 
the Decena Trágica in 1913; and then again in 1914, under the orders of Lucio Blanco 
and Alvaro Obregón, when he fought against the forces of Victoriano Huerta to take 
Guadalajara.28 The following year he was promoted to General de Brigada and began to 
serve a series of appointments: governor and military commander of Zacatecas (1916) 
and Chief of Operations in Michoacán (1917). After the movement against Carranza 
triumphed, he emerged from the conflict largely unscathed and with an impeccable 
revolutionary reputation intact. In 1920, Interim President Adolfo de la Huerta promoted 
him to General de División and in June of that year he began to serve as the Chief of 
Operations in Jalisco, Colima, and Zacatecas. In November, Estrada was appointed Sub-
Secretary of the Department of War and Navy.29 And when General Benjamín Hill died 
in mid-December, he was elevated to the post of Secretary of War.30 
A year into the Presidency of Obregón, General Enrique Estrada—now a well-
respected star in the Military—received official notification of his nomination to become 
the next Secretario de Agricultura y Fomento; a nomination, to the surprise of many, 
which he declined in spectacular fashion. Experience and influence had emboldened the 
young General. As Plascencia de la Parra writes: “Enrique [came to represent] the 
powerful military [man] with command of troops and a great power in the [western] 
                                                
28 Plascencia de la Parra, Personajes y escenarios, p. 95 
29 Archivo Histórico de la Defensa Nacional de México (hereinafter cited as AHDNM), Archivo 
de Cancelados, XI-111-1-75, Tomo III, “Estrada Reynoso, Enrique. General de División.”  
30 Loyo Camacho, Joaquín Amaro y el proceso, p. 76 
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region, willing to question presidential politics.”31 In a carefully drafted response 
addressed to the president, Estrada praised him, offered his loyalty, but implicitly decided 
against the appointment on moral grounds:  
Even though the problems and branches that correspond [to] the 
aforementioned Ministry are important and varied, [with] the most 
important [one being,] because of [the] imperious demand from the public 
opinion [which] requires consideration and [an] immediate solution, given 
the action [related to] it that has developed, is the restitution and dotación 
(granting) of ejidos […]. I understand that my criteria over the particular 
matter differs radically from the collaborators that have dealt with these 
matters, and also differs from the publics’ erroneous opinion on the 
matter. These circumstances oblige me, as I said before, to ratify to you 
with my customary loyalty [my] way of thinking about these matters, so 
that in [the] case [that] I do not deserve your approval, it be appropriate to 
designate another person who with more sound judgment and 
identification, can be a more effective and suitable collaborator. The 
public opinion[,] induced to error and without a doubt founded upon the 
procedures and problems developed in the Ministry of Agriculture[,] 
believes that the resolution of the agrarian problem fundamentally derives 
from the granting and restitution of ejidos; the Ministry of Agriculture 
approves the same criteria. My opinion is radically different.32  
 
The agrarian problem, according to Estrada, was, and continued to be, an overbearing 
necessity created by modern life; instead, the resolution of this problem needed to be 
developed in accordance with the needs of the period. “In summary the system of 
granting ejidos […] within modern life is essentially reactionary, inadequate, 
detrimental,” continued the General, “and it is enough to understand this, the fact that it 
was characteristic of the Viceroyal Government [of New Spain].” Estrada was not 
opposed to land redistribution and insisted that if the Constitution provided another 
                                                
31  Plascencia de la Parra, Personajes y escenarios, p. 99. 
32 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 104-E-25, “Letter from General Enrique Estrada to General de División 
D. Alvaro Obregón,” f. 1-4, 9 December 1921. 
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“more radical” and “more sensible” procedure that took into consideration contemporary 
needs, and incentivized the formation of the pequeña propiedad (small private holdings), 
he would support it. But simply granting peasants communal land was not the solution 
and it represented what he considered a menos mala (lesser evil) solution. The General 
reiterated that if he was chosen to serve in the capacity of Secretario he would continue 
the system of granting ejidos only “to the people who legally petitioned and [it rightfully] 
belonged to, but on a purely constitutional basis, without committing the error of 
deceiving ourselves that with only this, we are resolving the agrarian problem and 
consolidating, as is our capital duty THE ORGANIC PEACE OF THE REPUBLIC 
[emphasis in the text].”33 
 General Estrada’s views were very much shaped by those of his older brother Lic. 
Roque Estrada. To support his detailed positions, he attached an article written by his 
brother where R. Estrada argued that the granting of ejidos is not only unjust, but should 
not even be considered legal. According to R. Estrada, the Mexican Government had yet 
to stipulate what the “maximum extension” of any given private property could be (and 
this was important because the break up of those lands was the basis for the granting of 
ejidos). Therefore, the main argument resided in the fact that the Constitution protected 
the pequeña propiedad, but that it had not—up until then (except in Zacatecas)—been 
clearly defined or demarcated: “Not one administrative step forward should have been 
                                                
33 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 104-E-25, “Letter from General Enrique Estrada to General de División 
D. Alvaro Obregón,” f. 1-4. 9 December 1921.  
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taken [with regard to] the granting of ejidos without the “pequeña propiedad” previously 
having been deemed unconstitutional […].”34   
 
 
Figure 1: General de División Enrique Estrada. N.D. 
Courtesy of the AHDNM, Archivo de Cancelados. 
 
 
As expected the response caught Obregón off guard—in fact, it placed him on the 
defensive. After reading the lengthy letter (that with attachments numbered twelve 
pages), the president praised the General’s sincerity and actually appreciated the 
frankness and honesty contained in the letter. Without wanting to enter into what he 
called “dissertations about the distinct points which the alluded to memorial touches 
upon,” Obregón made it absolutely clear that the politics on agrarian matters which he 
intended to carry out during his Presidency was well-defined and had already been made 
                                                
34 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 104-E-25, “La administración agrarian sobre dotación de ejidos carece 
de base constitucional desde el primero de mayo de 1917 hasta hoy,” ff. 5-11. N.D. 
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clear.35 President Obregón cited the following guidelines to support the relative 
consistency of his political thoughts on agrarian matters: a conference that he gave at the 
Cámara Agrícola of Jalisco (November of 1919); a lecture that he held in an extra-
official manner, but in the capacity of president-elect at the Chamber of Deputies 
(October 1920); and the two subsequent law projects he sent to the two legislative 
Chambers. The first one was related to the subdivision of latifundios (February of 1921), 
“[which] created the right so that all citizens who are capacitated to be so can be 
proprietors in accordance with the stipulations that the same law contains;” while the 
second, had been recently approved by the Chambers, “related to the restitution and 
granting of ejidos (November of 1921) whose promulgation has already been ordered.” 
He was, however, able to find common ground between them: “I am entirely in 
agreement with the thesis that you establish, which says: ‘…the collaboration of the 
Government should not be based only on good will, trust and personal esteem, but rather 
principally on the identification of ideals and procedures, without which it is impossible 
[to] assure the unity of governmental action’ […].” The president reiterated that the 
nomination had been extended to him, Estrada, before knowing his personal position on 
agrarian matters, since he had always been a reliable collaborator. “[But] if I have 
incurred in an error, it is up to you to resolve this matter [by] accepting or declining said 
nomination,” ordered Obregón, “I consider it useless to reassure [to you] that [the] 
resolution [of] this matter, whichever it may be, will not diminish the personal esteem 
                                                
35 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 104-E-25, “Letter from General de División D. Alvaro Obregón to 
General Enrique Estrada,” ff. 12-14, 12 December 1921.  
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that I have always had for you.”36 General Estrada promptly responded to the letter with 
the following: “If I am to be sincere, I not only find myself appreciative but also confused 
by the distinctions of which I have been the object of, and especially, that to which refers 
to your note from the twelfth; reiterating in a firm and conclusive manner, that you have 
not acquired even the slightest commitment to me on this matter and that, returning to the 
starting point, you should make an appointment, with all freedom, of the person for his 
ideas you judge [to be] more appropriate to carry out the politics of our Government on 
this matter.”37 After receiving the letter, the General withdrew from consideration and 
continued serving in his post as Secretary of War and Navy. While Estrada’s loyalty at 
this time was never in doubt, he proved to be the antithesis of a sycophant; he was a 
principled individual willing to defend his ideals, even if they went against those held by 
the most powerful man in the country—and this would not be the last time he stood up 
for what he believed to be righteous.     
When it became clear that Estrada would not accept the nomination to become the 
next Secretario de Agricultura, he was also suddenly out as Secretary of War. As a result, 
he was surprisingly transferred to the position of Chief of Operations in the states Jalisco, 
Colima, Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, and Michoacán. In other words, the 
General was given the reins of the famed and powerful Second Division of the 
                                                
36 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 104-E-25, “Letter from General de División D. Alvaro Obregón to 
General Enrique Estrada,” ff. 12-14, 12 December 1921.  
37 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 104-E-25. “Letter from General Enrique Estrada to General de Div. 
Alvaro Obregón,” ff. 16-17, 14 December 1921. 
  
40 
Northwest.38 But Estrada’s newfound power proved deceptive and only temporary, and 
the following year his Second Division was dissolved, leaving him with only jurisdiction 
in Jalisco. “This agreement was part of a reform whose end was to debilitate various 
military caudillos,” writes Plascencia de la Parra, “[out of] 20 headquarters of operations, 
the number rose to 35.” The president then proceeded to transfer regiments and battalions 
belonging to the Second Division and relieved those whom he deemed to be most loyal to 
Estrada.39  
On 19 May 1923 there appeared much discussion about the importance of the 
presidential elections to be held later in the year. El Universal, for example, published an 
editorial in which it emphasized that if was to be in reality a just election, rigidly 
subjected to democratic principles, with effective suffrage protected, “let the parties be 
organized at once: let there be, as it [is] planned, conventions, programs, candidates, 
political propaganda, leagues, and agreements between groups, etc.” While the 
newspaper emphasized its belief that the farce of a single- candidate election in Mexico 
was a relic of the past and would not repeat itself as it had so many times before, it 
warned:  
[…If] we are mistaken, if contrary to all our optimistic predictions, the 
steam-roller policy should be made use of in favor of some candidate or 
another; and what is worse, if that candidate be of official extraction and 
there be placed at his service, as in other times, the machinery of the State, 
the failure of the Revolution and the Government will be absolute and 
                                                
38 Plascencia de la Parra, Personajes y escenarios, p. 100.  
39 Plascencia de la Parra, Personajes y escenarios, p. 105. With regard to the larger purpose of this 
effort, the author writes: the ‘professionalization’ of those armed forces served, at least in this case, more or 
less as an excuse than an end […]. In Irapuato, for example, the president established a camp that would 
supposedly functioned as an instructional base for the troops, but that in reality served [the purpose] of 
keeping close to Jalisco [the] forces loyal to the government and independent of Estrada.”  
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resounding. History invariably repeats itself and all impositions will be 
reproduced once more. And the popular disdain and ire, then [would be] 
more profound than ever because the taunt would be greater, would 
provoke a new bloody convulsion, whose consequences would be sad and 
not only for those to blame, but also for the country.40 
 
Three days later, the first rumors attaching Plutarco Elias Calles to the presidency began 
to appear, when Mexico City’s Excelsior learned that he was expected to resign from his 
position as the Secretary of Interior to take up his campaign. “The candidacy of General 
Calles would be supported by the National Cooperatist party, which is threatened with 
division, but has the support of several State Governors,” explained Excelsior, “[while] 
the Congressional minorities: labor, agrarian and Socialists of the southwest, it is said 
will join the Cooperatista party in support of its candidate.”41 
With the presidential elections on the horizon, President Obregón issued a lengthy 
circular admonishing Army leaders, requesting their complete abstention from the 
political conflict. The circular read:  
Seldom in the lives of men are duty and expedience found to be running 
parallel. Generally these two guides run in opposite directions and men of 
honor never hesitate to follow the dictates of the former. […] Duty 
demands from the members of the Army a complete abstinence from the 
political conflict and expedience counsels the same abstinence, for if the 
Army takes no part in the politico-electoral campaign, whatever party may 
triumph and whatever man may be called upon to represent the Executive 
Power of the nation will have to respect and have every consideration for 
the members of the Army, which in one of the most transcendental and 
delicate crises of our national life, has zealously fulfilled its duty. On the 
other hand, if following a contrary policy part of the members of the 
Army, forgetting the dictates of their duty and the suggestions of their own 
                                                
40 See El Universal, 19 May 1923. 
41 Excelsior, 22 May 1923. 
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expedience, take part as militant political factors, they will be exposed to 
the contingencies of the contest and will share in its vicissitudes.42  
 
Estrada, not one to back down, replied with a cryptic message of his own: “Today I 
permit myself the satisfaction of communicating to you the opposite sentiment, and it is 
the favorable and moralizing effect [that] the doctrine you expressed has caused in the 
[public] opinion [which states] that NO FUNCTIONARY, WHILE HE REMAIN IT, 
HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN ELECTORAL POLITICS [emphasis in the 
text].” The General continued stressed that the president was correct in pointing out that 
functionaries should steer clear of the coming election; Estrada, however, implied 
(without directly writing it) that if this logic held true, then Obregón also needed to steer 
clear. But if the president could not separate himself from the matter—given that it was 
long rumored that he had already decided on Plutarco Elias Calles as his successor—
what, then, was he to expect from the many ambitious military men who were already 
champing at the bit to ascend the political ladder? Not long after, Estrada received a 
cañonazo of $15,000 pesos via a presidential decree, “without there being any 
administrative reason [for it].”43   
The Presidential Campaign  
 
During the greater part of 1923 General Calles was touted as the next president of 
Mexico, whereas Adolfo de la Huerta, now a popular figure within Obregón’s Cabinet (as 
                                                
42 SD, 812.00/26468, 27 September 1923. The following day, General Francisco R. Serrano—the 
Secretary of War and Marine—in a statement directed to the press, “heartily seconded the president’s 
sentiments and declared that the army had thus far abstained from political activity and would continue to 
do so.” According press reports, several other Army leaders were put on record as being in agreement with 
the position of their chiefs. 
43 Plascencia de la Parra, Personajes y escenarios, p. 107. 
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Finance Minister), showed no real inclination towards running for the highest office in 
the country.44 The first rumblings of discontent within the triumvirate that had ruled the 
country in the aftermath of Agua Prieta, however, began to be felt much earlier in the 
summer of 1922, when de la Huerta entered negotiations with U.S. bankers. After the 
meeting, Obregón privately (and then eventually publically) chided the Finance Minister 
for consenting to American interests much too easily. The Bucareli Agreements 
negotiated the following year altered the relationship between the two Sonorans: “For 
don Adolfo, the agreements hurt worse because they wounded his personal pride. After 
perusing the minutes from the meetings, he complained bitterly that Obregón had raked 
him over the coals one year earlier for promising too much to US negotiators.” 
Negotiated on 13 August 1923, the agreements laid the foundation for formal U.S. 
recognition of Mexico. The concessions given to the U.S.—in particular the curtailment 
of the retroactive application of Article 27 against the landed interests of foreign 
companies, as long as they demonstrated positive intent to put the land to use—were seen 
by de la Huerta (and nationalists alike) as “a treasonous sacrifice of national 
sovereignty.”45 To make matters worse, a few days later, President Obregón on the 
pretext of invalid elections sanctioned the violent removal of the governor in San Luis 
                                                
44 As a matter of fact, regarding de la Huerta’s intention to run for president, Dulles writes: “A 
great deal of pressure was brought to bear on Don Adolfo, who was probably pleased to find himself so 
popular but who made it clear that he would not run for the presidency and who repeated that his choice 
was his friend, General Calles;” see Dulles (Yesterday in Mexico), p. 175. 
45 As Buchenau writes: “[…] Obregón’s delegates promised that most existing concessions 
awarded to US investors by the Díaz and [Victoriano] Huerta regimes would remain in force;” see 
Buchenau (The Last Caudillo), pp. 130-131.    
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Potosí.46 The intervention provoked the ire of many statesmen who resentfully 
complained that these actions were not becoming of a regime, which three years earlier 
had made such a big fuss about the inviolability of state sovereignty. The coalescing of 
both the Bucareli Agreements and the San Luis Potosí affair led de la Huerta to tender his 
resignation, officially putting on record that “he would not tolerate an attack on the 
sovereignty of the state of San Luis Potosí.”47  
De la Huerta’s decision to leave the Administration was “final and irrevocable,” 
and he would now seek to stake a claim to the Presidency. His subsequent entry into the 
election transformed the race into a dangerous one; there were now two powerful 
candidates with two fairly evenly matched factions who had the potential to undermine 
the established order. General Calles’ main support, on the one hand, resided chiefly 
among the agrarian and labor organizations and he also appeared to have the support of 
President Obregón, “with his technical command over the Army.” His popularity, 
however, had recently begun to decline and his strength among conservative and 
moderate elements had completely disappeared. On the other, de la Huerta—in addition 
                                                
46 There were originally three candidates running for governor of the state. General Samuel M. de 
los Santos withdrew and threw his support behind Jorge Prieto Laurens. This was not viewed favorably by 
President Obregón, because the other candidate, Professor Aurelio Manrique, Jr. “the Agrarista Part leader” 
and a supporter of the candidacy of Calles appeared destined to lose out on the governorship. After a highly 
contested gubernatorial election, both sides declared victory. Meanwhile, Prieto Laurens set up his 
administration in the state capital and had also been endorsed by the pervious interim governor. The 
situation escalated to the point that the powers of the state, on Obregón’s orders, were declared 
“disappeared” and a provisional government was established. Given that Prieto Laurens was a Cooperatista 
candidate, this created a political maelstrom and led to the party’s leader declaring “open battles against 
Calles and all his supporters in Congress. On the heels of these actions, the National Government refused to 
recognize the Prieto Laurens government and instead declared the powers of the state disappeared. 
“Perhaps this is brought about because of the reputed Prieto support of de la Huerta […perhaps] it is really 
because the election was nothing more than a farce,” observed the American Consul. See SD, 
812.00/26504, 13 November 1923 and Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, pp. 181-186. 
47 SD, 812.00/26467, 28 September 1923.  
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to the avowed support of a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, numerous “petty” 
political clubs and parties—had the clear moral support of the Army and the support of 
trained officers from the conservative group, and also drew a preponderant financial 
backing. “The army is generally believed to be more friendly to Mr. de la Huerta than any 
other candidate,” confirmed the State Department: “[Sure] of a large body of moderate 
and conservative support, Mr. de la Huerta is discovering rapidly an increasing strength 
among the radicals themselves.”48  
 In the coming month, General Calles and de la Huerta both released several 
campaign manifestos to the press in Mexico City expressing their ideological positions. 
The Calles faction was said to have taken a more radical and “revolutionary” stance: with 
Calles announcing his intention to fight against “capitalism, landlordism and the 
Church.” The de la Huerta manifesto, in stark contrast, was described as boldly 
conservative (in fact, he even claimed that he was not a “radical”). He promised to 
encourage foreign capital and to carry out the sound economic reconstruction of the 
entire republic. And of note, many of his followers championed the cause of the 
persecuted Catholic Church. “With issues sharply drawn between radicalism and 
conservatism as it has been thus far, the enormous following which has attached to the de 
la Huerta cause, regardless of the personalities involved,” commented a State Department 
communique, “is a noteworthy commentary on the tendency of the Mexican public 
sentiment.”49 
                                                
48 SD, 812.00/26467, 28 September 1923.  
49 SD, 812.00/26483, 19 October 1923.  
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Meanwhile, the Cooperatista Party had also broken up into two factions. And while a 
group of de la Huerta supports continued to call themselves the Cooperatista Party, the 
party—as it was heretofore constituted—ceased to exist. As a result of the factional 
fighting, the pro-Calles faction formally seceded from the organization, “including the 
former president of the party and about a third of the Cooperatista bloc in the Chamber of 
Deputies.” The stark divides directly affected the Obregonista administration, as they lost 
the ability effectively to use the party as an instrument to carry out its policies in 
Congress: “The Cooperatista Party of today is a body of young politicians who have 
flaunted President Obregón, and scorned the ‘ignominious cooperation of the Agraristas 
and Laboristas’.”50 Another State Department report from 6 October 1923 also confirmed 
that the Cooperatista Party, formerly led by General Calles and presided over by his loyal 
second, Emilio Portes Gil, “is now out-and-out and unanimously a De la Huerta 
organization […and] that in changing from Calles to De la Huerta, it has not lost more 
than possibly a fourth of its membership.” Recent votes and actions within the Chamber 
of Deputies demonstrated that there was serious and determined support of de la Huerta 
on the part of the Chamber of Deputies.51 The numerous political parties of Mexico, 
therefore, followed the lead set by the “dominant” Cooperatista Party, of either siding 
with the Calles or the de la Huerta factions, “allowing their former identities to 
disappear.”53 In the ensuing political turmoil rumors of the possibility of an armed 
                                                
50 SD, 812.00/26467, 28 September 1923. 
51 SD, 812.00/26473, 8 October 1923.      
53 SD, 812.00/26513, 16 November 1923. Specifically, the U.S. Chargé d'affaires decried the 
contemporary political climate in the following manner: “Where a large majority favor either one of the 
two leaders[,] the party declares in favor of him and the dissenting members secede from the party and 
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conflict arising out of the presidential contest began to circulate, and were increasingly 
taken into serious consideration by interested observers and the public.  
The flames were further fanned on 23 November 1923, when Adolfo de la Huerta 
formally accepted the nomination of the Cooperatista Party to be their presidential 
candidate. Such actions invited both Callistas and delahuertistas to indulge in threats of 
military action to enforce their political views. The speeches delivered at the Cooperatista 
Convention, in particular, were “alarmingly tinged with threats of revolution and 
generally dangerous bravado.” The following day, for example, El Democrata of Mexico 
City reported that delegate José Villanueca Garza, who formally presented the 
nomination to de la Huerta, prefaced his remarks with an unabashed appeal to the Federal 
Army, urging them to ignore the desires of the Administration of Obregón and to support 
the candidacy of his party’s nomination through military force—if necessary. The 
speaker declared the following: “…the army is our brother, because it springs from our 
class. When the sword was given to that glorious army, to those glorious officers, the 
words of the Emperor Trajan should have [been] used: ‘Use this [on] my behalf, if I 
deserve it; but use this against me if I deserve to be overthrown.”54 Despite calls for 
armed revolt on the part of his supporters, de la Huerta resisted the idea of rebellion, that 
is, until he received a death threat and was presented with an order for his arrest. As a 
result, he secretly fled Mexico City, bought passage and boarded a train to Veracruz, and 
                                                
form an opposition group. In their convention held in Mexico City this week, the Social Reform Party and 
the National Agrarista Party declared for Mr. De la Huerta and General Calles, respectively. The Liberal 
Constitutionalist Party, on the other hand, appears to be dividing into two distinct Callista and De la Huerta 
factions.”   
54 SD, 812.00/26546, 30 November, 1923; El Demócrata, 24 November 1923. 
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took refuge in Orizaba.55 The de la Huerta Rebellion officially began two days later on 7 
December 1923.56 
The Rebellions Arrive 
 
The insurgencies that emerged in the wake of the Plan de Veracruz spanned 
almost the totality of the country with their greatest concentration in the states of Jalisco, 
Guerrero, Veracruz, and Oaxaca (due in large part to their strategic political and military 
strength).57 On the eve of the rebellions, the army was comprised of 508 generals, 2,758 
commanders, 8,583 officials, and 59,030 troops. Estimates vary, but at least a total of 102 
generals, 576 commanders, 2,477 officials, and 23,224 troops, 18 infantry battalions, 28 
cavalry regiments, two marine infantry battalions, and some of the corps comprising the 
air force—that is, roughly over two-thirds (70 percent) of the entire Army—joined the 
rebel forces. “At the beginning the government could only count upon 35,000 men to 
resist 50,000 rebels,” writes Loyo Camacho, “but this disadvantage was counteracted 
during the course of the month because the army reserves were mobilized […and] some 
                                                
55 Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, pp. 210-211. 
56 It was on that day that Adolfo de la Huerta proclaimed the Plan de Veracruz, formally 
denouncing President Obregón for favoring the candidacy of Plutarco Elías Calles and for his multiple 
violations against the Constitution. According to de la Huerta, Obregón had not limited himself to simply 
undermining the sovereignty of the legislative and judicial powers, “but moreover had used the immense 
power which the people had deposited in his hands to place liberties in chains, turning himself into the 
political leader of [Plutarco Elías] Calles’ unpopular candidacy with the idea of assuring for himself later 
on a re-election […].” De la Huerta’s platform that gave life to the plan, however, called for more intensive 
education to be implemented, effective suffrage for women, abolition of the death penalty (except in certain 
cases), and that payments to be made—in cash—for expropriated real estate. See Dulles, Yesterday in 
Mexico, p. 219. For other versions of subsequent proclamations released by de la Huerta see AGN, 
Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-P-18, “Plan Rebelión Delahuertista” and SD, 812.00/27042, 12 March 1924.   
57 The following states, however, also saw action: Michoacán, Colima, Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, 
Yucatán, Hidalgo, Tamaulipas, Sonora, Nuevo León, Chiapas, and Campeche. 
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irregular forces were armed […including agraristas and laborers].”58 In addition to 
General Estrada, the rebel movements were led by the following important military 
caudillos: Fortunato Maycotte, José Guadalupe Sánchez, Rómulo Figueroa, Manuel M. 
Diéguez, Cirpriano Alzado, Salvador Alvarado, and Rafael Buelna, among others.59 
On 9 December 1923, after the bloodletting broke out, General Calles officially 
accepted the nomination “offered [to] me by political groups, all of revolutionary 
tendencies.” His crafted response had a two-fold purpose. First, he vowed to continue the 
work begun under the administration of Obregón “in the sense of carrying out the social 
reforms which embody the aspirations of the Mexican People.” Moreover, Calles painted 
the current regime as an intrepid protector of the rights of citizens, as one which, for 
example, had been the first government to accomplish the distribution of lands as quickly 
as the Constitutional procedure permitted it, and of being the first to afford the “greatest 
facilities for the perfecting of labor organization.” In sum, he ensured the citizens of the 
country that they would be able to reap the benefits enshrined in the Constitution of 1917. 
Second, he painted those who had recently taken up arms as neo-reactionaries; as 
individuals who endeavored to prevent the consolidation of a regime so firmly devoted to 
social reform that sought on the battlefield “what it would never obtain in the legitimate 
field of civic activity.” Calles asserted that the neo-reactionaries, which were led by 
Enrique Estrada and Guadalupe Sánchez, who were two sworn enemies of agrarianism 
                                                
58 Loyo Camacho, Joaquín Amaro y el proceso, p. 111. Estimates related to contemporary size of 
the military varies among primary and secondary sources; however, my own forays into the archive show 
that the size of the military troops to be in the vicinity of 40,600; see AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-A-1, 
Legajo, No. 1, Anexo 1, pp. 10-11. 
59 Llerenas and Jaime Tamayo, El levantamiento delahuertista, p. 9. 
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and accomplices of the great landowners in Jalisco and Veracruz, would not succeed 
because “for the first time in history, the regular Army is united, by its origin, with the 
proletariat of the country and the city and with the strong nuclei of the middle class 
[…].”60  
The presidential candidate was not one to show any sign of weakness and, to the 
tune of war, offered his services to General Obregón. He vowed also to enter the 
battlefield—in the process interrupting his own campaign—to once again defend with 
arms in hand the revolutionary principles, which the neo-reactionaries now threatened.61 
Meanwhile, in his address to the nation after the rebellions began, President Alvaro 
Obregón captured the gravity of this moment:  
After our internal struggles, in which the people through necessity bought 
by the price of blood [the] civic liberties and social reforms which have 
served as a basis for tranquility and welfare[,] the fearful specter of 
another rebellion headed by Generals Guadalupe Sánchez and Enrique 
Estrada [arises…]. The Executive declares in all sincerity that the situation 
will be met with the same energy that has marked passed crises and that 
not one sacrifice will be made that will compromise the norms for which 
the Revolution was fought.62  
 
After Estrada made his telegram public on 7 December 1923, declaring himself in open 
rebellion against the Government of Obregón, the president wrote to the former clearly 
conveying a feeling of betrayal: “[during] my stay in El Fuerte, Jalisco, just in the last 
days, you would make no less than two trips a week to visit me, and you would stay at 
my house and occupied my table at the place of honor, [even] having invited me in the 
                                                
60 El Demócrata, 9 December 1923. 
61 El Demócrata, 9 December 1923. 
62 Excelsior, 12 December 1923. 
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last [couple of] visits to be a witness to your wedding.” For Obregón this betrayal 
stemmed from Estrada’s own vanity because of his removal from the post of Secretary of 
War, and because of the spite held and expressed when he was not appointed Secretary of 
Agriculture. “My own fault lies in having esteemed you more than what you deserved,” 
lamented Obregón, “and in having believed in your military honor and in your 
gallantry.”63 
Over the course of the next sixty days the rebel forces fought it out against what 
remained of the federal army and, in the process, posed a grave challenge to the national 
process of reconstruction. In Jalisco, the forces of General Estrada swiftly overtook 
Guadalajara and continued to accumulate decisive victory upon victory. Dr. Cutberto 
Hidalgo, Minister of Foreign Relations during the interim-presidency of de la Huerta, and 
now a representative of General Estrada, confirmed to the State Department on 11 
December that the “present revolution was the result of false promises made by President 
Obregón; that efforts had been made in every possible way to obtain from the president 
effective suffrage, but without success; and that as a last resort an appeal to arms had 
been made.” Dr. Hidalgo, however, predicted that the “revolution” would be successful 
within fifteen days since they already controlled fourteen states and were currently 
fighting for the possession of six others, whereas the Obregón government “has only 
seven, including the Federal District.”64   
 
 
                                                
63 Jaime Tamayo and Laura Romero, La rebelión estradista y el movimiento campesino, 1923-
1924 (Centro de Estudios Históricos del Agrarismo de México, 1983).  
64 SD, 812.00/26710, 11 December 1923. 
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Figure 2: Generals during the de la Huerta Rebellion. 
Pictured from left to right (top): General Plutarco Elías 
Calles and General Francisco R. Serrano, Secretary of 
War; (bottom): General de División Eugenio Martínez 
and President Alvaro Obregón. Circa December 1923 
Courtesy of the State Department, 812.00/27028. 
 
One of the premier battles of the rebellion took place in late December 1923, 
when President Obregón ordered General Lázaro Cárdenas to combat the rebel forces in 
Jalisco. As soon as Estrada got wind of the advancing two thousand cavalrymen, he sent 
General Rafael Buelna with numerically superior forces to trail them. Buelna encountered 
the troops of Cárdenas at Teocuitatlán de Corona and after twelve hours of fighting 
“completely routed the Federal forces.”65 On 27 December, Buelna reported to his 
                                                
65 SD, 812.00/26729, 28 December 1923. 
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superior, Estrada, that the column of callista General Lázaro Cárdenas had been 
completely destroyed—Federal General Paulino Navarro killed, Cárdenas wounded and 
taken prisoner, alongside all of this Staff. “I have at this moment more than five hundred 
prisoners and more than a thousand rifles taken from the enemy who lost their droves of 
horses,” boasted Buelna, “It is my opinion that very few times [in history] has such a 
complete triumph been obtained.”66 The State Department echoed similar sentiments: “It 
was a complete victory […] and has caused much rejoicing among them and their 
supporters.”67 
After the crushing blow dealt to General Cárdenas and his forces, rebel victories 
did not continue in such a spectacular fashion and became few and far between. During 
the course of the following month, the tide began to turn in favor of the Federal Forces. 
The eventual defeat of the rebellion was in large part due to three primary factors: 1) 
Obregón’s ability to rally the majority of the campesino element and working-class 
individuals to fight for the state; 2) the lack of military coordination amongst major rebel 
leaders commanding the rebellions; and 3) the U.S. government’s willingness to sell arms 
to federal forces and their reluctance to afford the rebels the same privilege.68 The last 
point was well-expanded upon in a letter written by Federal Deputy Juan Manuel Álvarez 
                                                
66 AHMA, 1923 (Gobernación, 6). “Telegram from General Enrique Estrada to Chief Supreme of 
the Revolution Adolfo de la Huerta.” 27 December 1923. Estrada made it clear to Buelna to not “follow 
barbarous customs but rather to treat prisoners like old companions and to attend to the enemy wounded 
with the same care applied ‘to our own wounded.’” As a result, General Cárdenas, who was in bad shape, 
received first-rate medical treatment in Guadalajara and duly recovered from his injuries; see Dulles 
(Yesterday in Mexico), p. 242. 
67 SD, 812.00/26729, 28 December 1923. 
68 Lleneras and Tamayo. El levantamiento delahuertista, p. 13.  
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del Castillo to U.S. President Calvin Coolidge. Álvarez del Castillo—who was writing in 
the capacity as a representative of Adolfo de la Huerta—asked President Coolidge to 
“end […] all of the assistance, the good will and help, and support which you have 
heretofore extended to the Obregón Government which had initiated a policy of 
intervention hurting the most sacred sentiments of the Mexican people as none of your 
adversaries had done up to this date and compromising the diplomacy of the United 
States […].” The federal deputy did not ask for assistance, but rather on the contrary, he 
wanted the assistance given to the Obregonista Government to cease because their 
“authorities have made use of the arms obtained from the United States not only for their 
fight against the Mexican people but also for the murder of respectable official.”69 The 
western-front experienced the heaviest fighting during the insurgency, or as a 
contemporary put it “the heaviest in recent Mexican revolutionary history,” but the 
reverberations of that violence were not just felt on the battlefields; they permeated 
everyday life, indiscriminately thwarted class lines, subsumed political loyalties, and 
influenced how citizens interpreted the new social order.  
The Estradista Rebellion was indeed comprised of a wide array of participants, 
among them urban intellectuals, state-level politicians, landowners opposed to agrarian 
reform, pro-clerical rebels eager to wipe out the secularizing provisions of the 1917 
Constitution, and agraristas defending their newly enshrined rights. Nevertheless, no 
study has attempted to shift the focus of inquiry down to what these citizens actually 
thought about these contemporary events, how they interpreted the social order (or 
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disorder), and how they imagined (or reimagined) their roles and places within it. Let us 
now turn to Ocotlán, Jalisco, the area where we began our chapter. If the reader recalls 
Governor Zuno and President Obregón met to discuss the evidence that linked General 
Estrada to a major rebellion. The time is four months removed from that fateful meeting 
and the scene is the most significant battle of the rebellion.  
 
Interpreting Political Behaviors and Social Constructions  
in the Estradista Rebellion 
 
Near the town of Ocotlán not far from the shores of Lake Chapala, well-
entrenched rebel forces held out against federal forces for more than twelve days. The 
day was 9 February 1924 and the battlefield in question was the principal rebel 
stronghold in the West. It had been carefully selected for its naturally formidable strategic 
position. In an effort to reach rebel entrenchments, federal forces, who possessed far 
greater numbers and superior artillery, attempted to ford the Río Lerma. They faced 
constant enemy fire; many died in the bloodletting. The fighting quickly escalated 
leading to three hundred officially reported federal casualties, which the press increased 
to six hundred; subsequent public and private reports placed the number at a much larger 
figure. Rebel losses were estimated at four thousand killed, wounded, or made 
prisoners—and approximately one-thousand rebels deserted to the federal side. “It is now 
almost universally agreed that the Federal losses greatly exceeded those of the rebels,” 
claimed the State Department. Train loads of wounded federal troops began to arrive in 
Mexico City two days later, and continued for several days.70  
                                                
70 SD, 812.00/27028, February 16, 1924. 
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Not long after this decisive victory, the Federal Army went on triumphantly to 
occupy both Guadalajara and Veracruz. “The rebellion that broke out in the Republic 
during the first fortnight of December last,” proclaimed the Secretary of War, “can now 
be considered [...] stamped out […the] troops of the three main insurgent leaders, 
Estrada, Sánchez and Maycotte—for de la Huerta has been nothing but an instrument in 
their hands—have been practically annihilated by the true National army.”71 On 13 
March 1924 the Ministry of Interior ordered Colonel Martin Bárcenas to transfer himself 
to the city of Guadalajara to investigate if the “powers” of the state “disappeared” during 
the recent rebellion led by General Enrique Estrada.72 This section makes use of that 
comisión,73 which interviewed approximately four hundred citizens hailing from various 
classes, ages, occupations, and political views. The actas (records) that made it into the 
final report came from people who “in their immense majority” took part in 
contemporary events or who were witness to them.  
At times, the document reads like a report that has systematically collected, 
organized, and—to a certain extent—cataloged a myriad of interviews and impressions 
related to the disruption of the social order. In other instances, the comisión allows one to 
experience a certain level of intimacy with each historical subject. Many of the actas bear 
                                                
71 SD, 812.00/27029, February 15, 1924. 
72 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Confidential 
Report investigating if the powers of the State disappeared because of the delahuertista rebellion.” The 
order emanated from Secretary Enrique Colunga. Additionally, the “comisión” entrusted to Colonel 
Bárcenas as president was comprised of the following individuals: Colonel Gaspar Tellez Girón who had 
the capacity of speaker and Lic. Don Salvador Mendoza as Secretary. After eleven days, Tellez Girón and 
Mendoza separated themselves from the comisión, leaving Bárcenas to carry out the remainder of the 
investigation by himself—he completed the task on 8 May 1924.       
73 AGN, DGIPS, Caja: 244, Exp. 9, 313.1-968, Tomo I, March 1924.  
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a resemblance to formal depositions. The official conducting the session would 
administer a clear line of questioning and the responses, information, and experience of 
the declarants, in turn, guided how the interview developed. Other actas, however, were 
either hastily hand-written statements (if the subject was literate) or carefully recorded 
oral statements delivered in the presence of witnesses, which were then read back to the 
subject and signed (if the subject could sign). The statements collected in the aftermath of 
the Estradista Rebellion, nevertheless, provide unique access to a significant and 
previously unexamined view of how local politics and governance were observed to 
function in times of unrest and crisis. Equally as important, they allow us to grapple with 
what citizens thought about the first major challenge to the postrevolutionary order.    
Social scientists—and historians, for that matter—have a limited comprehension 
of what actually goes on inside the minds of individuals; that is, what angers, scares, or 
pleases, and motivates their actions. As North, Wallis, and Weingast illuminate, 
individual interests arise from the interaction of preferences, alternatives, and causal 
beliefs: 
What is in the perceived best interest of individuals is a complicated 
amalgam of their preferences over different outcomes, the alternatives that 
they face, and their beliefs about how their actions will affect the world 
around them. People are intentional; they are trying to accomplish the best 
outcomes with their limited resources and choices, but how they behave 
depends critically on how they believe the world around them actually 
works. Because the world is too complicated for human understanding to 
master fully, no belief system can be a completely accurate depiction of 
the world around us.74 
 
                                                
74 North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, p. 28 
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Similarly, Simon writes, “virtually all human behavior is rational […people] usually have 
reasons for what they do, and if asked, can opine what these reasons are [and when] we 
do not find people’s reasons for their actions to be credible, we do not thereby judge the 
people themselves to be irrational.”75 Instead, continues Simon, we come to believe that 
they were either deceiving us or themselves, and therefore ascribe “other, more plausible 
reasons to the behavior.” However, when individuals are deemed irrational, it does not 
mean that there are no reasons sustaining the actions they undertake. Rather, this merely 
comes down to four conflicts 1) the reasons that motivate their action are different from 
those individuals “normally” provide; 2) the reasons are based on entirely different 
assumptions; 3) there are more compelling, sometimes “unstated,” reasons for not taking 
other actions; and 4) or the individual possess a different value system.76     
Many of the causal beliefs interviewers/declarants expressed in the comisión 
about how other people behaved during the rebellion can be both confirmed or disproved. 
But the certainty they displayed in their own beliefs being true, and of their explanatory 
power over causal patterns in human behavior, here, serves as a potential guide to 
understanding intentional human behavior. For the interviewer/declarant, then, 
understanding the tumultuous events of the period and their consequences transforms into 
a function of how close their own experience fit into the prevailing assumptions about the 
historical moment.77 The idea of what is going on in politics and war (and the mundane 
                                                
75 Herbet A. Simon, “Rationality in Political Behavior,” Political Psychology Vol. 16, No. 1, 
Special Issue: Political Economy and Political Psychology (March, 1995): 45-46 
76 Simon, “Rationality in Political Behavior,” p. 46. 
77 North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, pp. 28-29. 
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experiences reflected in the actas) are indeed related, but they are not necessarily 
connected, and this is completely acceptable. I take as a given that contemporaries find it 
difficult to see the temporal organization of the conflict as it unfolded, for example, and 
that verbal responses cannot fully model it, since multiple scales of spatially extended 
phenomena came to shape the many local rebellions that occurred during this period. But 
I am more interested in portraying the reality of citizens who were indirectly or directly 
caught up in the spasmodic episodes of violence and in interpreting what they thought 
about local authorities, government, and the violence at large, than in developing a larger 
explanatory model for understanding the rebellion. I find it important to note that the raw 
data the comisión produced is a social construction in itself; however, it is exactly that 
social construction of contemporary events, irrespective of whether the views were 
deemed to be true, false, or mundane, that I opted to highlight. 
The Rebellion Ends. The Comisión Begins.  
 
After the battle of Ocotlán and the triumph of federal troops, Governor José G. 
Zuno—who had been in hiding since the outbreak of the rebellion—delivered an 
inflammatory speech to thousands of followers in the plaza, in front of the Palacio de 
Gobierno, in which he asserted: “that once more their lawful representative had 
recovered power; and once more in the history of their country they witnessed the 
triumph of the Constitutionalist over the acts of revolutionists.” He called for 
“revolutionary justice” to be imparted against the church and its priests, capitalist, and 
hacendados. The following morning, armed partisans of the governor began to terrorize 
the city, “taking automobiles and forcibly entering homes, in search of weapons, [and for] 
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all of [the individual] they suspected to be political adversaries or favorable to the 
revolutionary cause.”79  
It was against the backdrop of this heightened sense of hysteria that Colonel 
Bárcenas began his month-long investigation in Guadalajara. Evoking many of these 
difficulties in his final report to the Ministry of Interior, he insisted that an “environment 
of terror” intensified while he carried out the task: “[Governor] Zuno did not pass up any 
opportunity to directly harass the individuals who made declarations to the commission.” 
Notwithstanding these actions, Bárcenas confirmed that he was visited by a great number 
of individuals during his month-long investigation—in particular, those of the “humble” 
classes—who presented complaints to him of thefts, assassinations, and persecutions 
carried out by functionaries or employees of the state government, “by order of the 
governor.”80 Zuno’s whereabouts and allegiance during the Estradista Rebellion, 
however, were also extensively debated on floor of the Chamber of Deputies. In 
particular, labor-boss Napoleon Morones—in what looked to be the start of a longer feud 
between the two—claimed: “The reports received in Guadalajara by our companions that 
had the opportunity of leaving after Estrada’s uprising, prove his coexistence with 
                                                
79 SD, 812.00/27035 February 12, 1924; SD, 812.00/27046 February 21, 1924. 
80 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Confidential 
Report investigating if the powers of the State disappeared because of the delahuertista rebellion.” Chapter 
2 of this dissertation explores Governor José Guadalupe Zuno and the consequences of this episode in 
greater depth. In particular, it provides insight into the consequences of such state interventions on the lives 
of citizens following the Estradadista Rebellion, up until his untimely resignation in 1926. Remarkably, the 
evidence the commission collected hinted at a widespread cover-up following the insurgency on the part of 
regional government officials (including Zuno, himself). From the moment, then, when the rebellion broke 
out and Governor Zuno was once again in charge of the Executive of the State, concluded Colonel 
Bárcenas, the former had committed abuses to individual guarantees and to property, “which translated to 
assassinations, imprisonments and persecutions, robos (theft) and raterías (petty thievery) […and the] 
desincautación (confiscation) of property has converted it into a pingue (plentiful) business that has 
produced many thousands of pesos.” 
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Estrada […] that governor Zuno finds himself in the capital of Jalisco, there is no doubt 
[…].” The labor-boss even went as far as to imply that the governor was cowardly 
waiting for the federal forces to arrive in Guadalajara so that he could “simulate that he 
had been upheld [an] position of honor [in favor of the government]” during the events 
that happened in the state of Jalisco.81 
Investigations into the “disappearance of powers” have long been an important 
point of contention within the Mexican federalist system. Written into the Constitution of 
1917, Article 75, Section 5, “mandated that when the powers of a state had ‘disappeared,’ 
the federal Senate was responsible for naming a provisional governor who would occupy 
the office until new elections could be held.” In the 1920s these investigations became a 
common source of controversy and debate among federal and state authorities, given that 
many state elections often ended in gridlocks. However, Osten has elsewhere argued that 
“[a]lthough not all disappearances of state powers were the result of a failed 
gubernatorial election, it was a common cause.”82 In fact, there existed no regulatory law 
to establish its boundaries and “it had been exercised in multiple and diverse cases […] 
from violations to individual guarantees, to pronouncements of governors against the 
federal government […].” The “disappearance of powers,” according to González 
Oropeza, then, remains one of the most significant political quandaries facing the 
                                                
81 See Diario de los debates de la Cámara de Diputados,” H. Congreso de la Unión, 
http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/index.html. Legislatura XXX – Año II – Período Comisión 
Permanente – Fecha 19240102 (2 January 1924) – Número de Diario 37. 
82 Sarah Osten, “Trials by Fire: National Political Lessons from Failed State Elections in Post-
Revolutionary Mexico, 1920-1925,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2013): 
253-254. 
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federalist system in Mexico because of the inherent magnitude which underlies it: “the 
transcendence that the disappearance of the powers [clause] has is corroborated [by] the 
consequences that the respective declarative implies […].”83 The clause, however, has 
been frequently misinterpreted immediately to depose state governments that were 
considered either hostile or contrary to federal politics.84 Jalisco’s first investigation into 
the “disappearance of the powers,” which occurred when the Plan de Agua Prieta 
triumphed on 5 July 1920, clearly illustrates this point. 
When Military Commander Manuel Diéguez refused to recognize and give 
credence to the Plan, General Enrique Estrada, who had seconded the Sonoran 
movement, ordered the arrests of the former and Luis Castellano y Tapia (the governor of 
Jalisco). Estrada then made public his refusal to recognize the powers in Jalisco because 
they had “committed various crimes against the common order.” After forwarding his 
formal petition to the executive and legislative branches, General Estrada officially 
transferred the state’s executive power to Ignacio Ramos Praslow, a native of Sinaloa.  
Praslow was then elevated to the post of provisional governor “due to the circumstances 
which the country experienced.” When the larger conflict came to a conclusion, Senators 
Ancona Allbertos, Amado Aguirre, Luis Pescador, Elías Arias, and Enrique Colunga, 
formally asked the Senate for the powers of the state to be declared disappeared in 
Jalisco, and in the states of México, Puebla, Veracruz, Yucatán, and Campeche. A new 
interim governor was shortly thereafter appointed A few days later, a short list of 
                                                
83 Manuel González Oropeza, La intervención federal en la desaparición de poderes (México: 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 1983), p. 159.   
84 González Oropeza, La intervención federal, p. 146. 
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candidates for interim governor were then offered and were forwarded to a commission 
for further studies regarding the merits and antecedents of each candidate. The governor 
that Estrada had appointed, Praslow, was quickly disqualified because according to 
article 115 of the general Constitution, he could not serve as provisional governor 
because he was not a native of Jalisco, but rather of Sinaloa. As a result, a new set of 
candidates were offered up and Francisco Labastida Izquierdo was selected. But the 
declaration that was made with regard to the disappearance of the powers, however, was 
not deemed lawful, “since [Jalisco] did not exist [in an] acephalous [state] because the 
governor imposed by the Plan de Agua Prieta being able to have been authorized to 
power to convene elections.” 86  But unlike this previous foray, however, the investigation 
that began in March 1924 was never consummated at the highest levels of the national 
government. The commission, however, left an impressive written record. 
  
*** 
 
 
The Ministry of Interior’s initial inquiry into the Estradista Rebellion served a 
two-fold objective. On the one hand, it reflected a wider inquietud over regional political 
loyalties—in particular, those of governor Zuno who during one of the darkest moments 
of obregonismo retreated to a house on Calle Sarcófago and turned his back on the duties 
required by his office.87 On the other, the various declarations also provide us with 
                                                
86 González Oropeza, La intervención federal, pp. 186-187, 250. 
87 Much of Governor Zuno’s action (and inaction) during the rebellion produced an impressive 
array of evidence that would later come form part of a larger discussion regarding him in both the Chamber 
of Deputies and the Senate. See Chapter 2 of this dissertation and/or “Diario de los debates de la Cámara de 
Diputados,” H. Congreso de la Unión, http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/index.html. Legislatura 
XXXI – Año II – Período Extraordinario – Fecha 19260323 (23 March 1926) – Número de Diario 3, or 
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insight into not only what individuals thought about these contemporary regional and 
national political developments, and how they behaved, but extends our understanding of 
how the rural towns and settlements of the state experienced this moment of crisis. As a 
result, this section grapples closely with what can be more broadly defined as political 
culture—that is, a set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments, which give order and meaning 
to the political process, and that provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern 
behavior in society.  
In particular, I focus on three areas that were of chronic interest to ordinary and 
prominent citizens alike: 1) how the events of the rebellion unfolded and were 
experienced by individuals in Guadalajara; 2) the statements that emphasize what citizens 
interpreted the actions of state officials to be before and during the rebellion; and 3) 
declarations from agrarian communities, insurgents, landowners, and other individuals 
who resided in the rural regions of the state. The larger goal here is to shift my analysis 
away from the actual acts of violence—whenever possible—and instead to interpret how 
individuals from various social classes felt the reverberations unleashed when the state’s 
capacity to rule was undermined in the winter of 1923. 
 
Mayhem Erupts in Guadalajara 
 
On either the 5th or 6th of December 1923, Manuel I. Gómez,88 a former Colonel 
turned agriculturalist, travelled to Guadalajara to obtain money for wages—presumably 
                                                
AGN, DGIPS, 7/310 (3.2) “25,” Box 2024, State of Jalisco, Political Situation, 1925-B, Exp: 10, “Local 
Minority Report to the Permanent Commission of the Congress of the Union,” February 1926. 
88 In March of 1923, nine-months before the rebellion broke out, President Alvaro Obregón 
discharged Colonel Manuel I. Gómez and the Rural Forces of the State. The mounted municipal policemen 
were, as a result, increased, which “in fact continued to carry out the labors [that were] before entrusted to 
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to pay the workers that he employed in the town of Tala. While in the capital Gómez 
encountered the Head of the Mounted Police and the General Inspector of Police. “Both 
told me that they knew that General Estrada was going to rebel and that we should go see 
[the Municipal President of Guadalajara] Lic. Gustavo R. Cristo to see what he ordered,” 
observed Gómez. Now caught in the developing maelstrom, he accompanied the 
policemen to the Lonja Mercantil (merchant market) where they found Cristo and “he 
told us that it was necessary to see Governor Zuno.” Gómez subsequently travelled to the 
Palacio de Gobierno to speak with Zuno and said to him: “I know that all the 
preparations for General Estrada to rebel are already made. I’m at your orders.” The 
governor responded that he did not have knowledge of anything and they should wait and 
see if it ended up being true.89 
Rodrigo Ramírez, aide-de-camp to General Enrique Estrada, asserted he knew 
that there were no preparations made prior to the rebellion, “given that when the 
[movement] broke out […none] of the corps that protected him [Estrada] knew of the 
movement.” He spoke of an important meeting on the afternoon of the 6 December, 
following its conclusion Estrada and fellow general, Ramírez Garrido, decided to 
withdraw recognition of the Government of General Obregón. And that at around 11:00 
p.m. in the evening of that same day, they came closer to a table and dictated a message, 
                                                
the rural forces.” Gómez was then transferred and appointed Commissioner in the Department of War and 
Roads, a position he held in Guadalajara until the end of August or September. After leaving his post, the 
former Colonel returned to the town of Tala and dedicate himself to agricultural work, but travelled weekly 
to Guadalajara with the objective of obtaining money for wages—presumably to pay the workers under his 
own employment.  
89 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244. “Confidential 
Report investigating if the powers of the State disappeared because of the delahuertista rebellion,” Acta 28. 
“Declaration of Colonel Manuel I. Gómez, 3 April 1924. 
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“that I wrote [which indicated that they did] not recognize the Government; with a copy 
for all of the Officer Corps, telling them to wait for orders from General Estrada.” 
Ramírez suspected that the governor was aware of the meeting between the generals, 
given that he noticed Zuno had sent a patrol out to the streets. The following day, 
Municipal President Cristo and three other members of the ayuntamiento arrived to 
confer with Estrada. The aide-de-camp listened in and heard Cristo tell the General the 
following: “I have orders that all of those from the mounted Police that you want, [that] 
they should present themselves in the Colorado Headquarters so that they can be enlisted 
in the 8th Battalion and that the cavalry be remitted to the Colorado Grande 
Headquarters.” Governor Zuno, according to Ramírez, was to be spared because “General 
Estrada gave importance to the personality of the governor and for that reason he was not 
persecuted.”90  
When the rebellion broke out Deputy Ramírez was locked in under seven keys. 
About thirteen days before the rebellion a friend of his from the Chamber of Commerce 
forwarded rumors to him of an impending insurgency to be led by General Estrada. 
Ramírez relayed this to Zuno, to which the governor replied “I already told the President 
of the Republic and [he] does not want to understand.” About seven or eight days before 
the rebellion, the deputy once again brought to the attention of Zuno that it had been 
confirmed that Estrada was going to rise up in arms and that he should call the Deputies 
together as friends, “not in Chamber.” And since everyone controlled their districts 
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Ramírez claimed that “I thought that every one of them could contribute a contingent of 
500 men.” As soon as he suggested the idea the governor laughed at it: “Zuno said that he 
had [made some] preparations in Tequila, and that he had armed men, but they were 
never to be seen.”91   
On 7 December, the day after the outbreak of rebellion, Ignacio Hermosillo Gil—
a local correspondent of Mexico City’s El Universal, saw Governor Zuno arrive in a 
government automobile near the former’s place of residence on Calle de Progreso 8 in 
San Pedro Tlaquepaque. The time was 1 a.m. and Zuno was accompanied by a relative, 
and two other individuals: one who could not be identified, the other was Local Deputy 
Manuel Vidrio Guerra. Governor Zuno marched directly to the office of Municipal 
President Antonio Sánchez to speak with him. When the governor left, Hermosillo Gil 
proceeded to speak with Sánchez, telling him that “the Municipal President told me that 
Estrada had rebelled and that Zuno had ordered him [Sánchez] to recognize the rebel 
movement.” Later that day, at 11:30 a.m., the local correspondent went to the Palacio de 
Gobierno where he was handed the governor’s official declarations to the press, which 
were to be published in local newspapers. He remembers that “[Zuno said] he did not 
know where his head was.”92 Similarly, Local Deputy Lic. Esteban García de Alba 
noticed that Zuno was extremely intimidated by recent events, “but he intended at all 
                                                
91 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244. “Confidential 
Report investigating if the powers of the State disappeared because of the delahuertista rebellion,” Acta 41. 
“Declaration of Regino Ramírez,” 11 April 1924. 
92 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Confidential 
Report investigating if the powers of the State disappeared because of the delahuertista rebellion,” Acta 22. 
“Declaration of Ignacio Hermosillo Gil,” 31 March 1924. 
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costs to remain as governor, [and] with that motivation he gave his declarations [to the 
press].”93   
A few hours before, at 9:00 in the morning, an employee of the Governmental 
Palace arrived at the house of Local Deputy José García de Alba to deliver an urgent 
message from Zuno “so that I [Garía de Alba] could then attend [the] Governmental 
Palace [and I admit that] I ignored that the rebel movement had broken out, even though 
all the Deputies knew that it would break out […].” After some initial confusion as to 
why he was there (and after confronting the governor) he was told that it was to find out 
if the rebellion broke out and to determine what course of action they should take. “I 
answered that these things would not be deliberated,” firmly responded J. García de Alba, 
“that it was clear that this movement [had as its goal] to depose the General Government 
and the local Government of the State, and that before such a situation it would be a 
waste to deliberate, that what was needed was to act.” The local deputy urged Zuno to 
telegraph or to notify, though the appropriate channels, the municipal presidents of the 
towns so that they oppose the rebellion—to which he received a simple “he could not do 
anything of what [I] indicated.” J. García de Alba made specific mention of President 
Obregón’s repeated visits to his El Fuerte residence near the town of Ocotlán, claiming to 
have indicated to Zuno the benefits of having numerous groups of Deputies accompany 
the governor to ask for the removal of General Estrada as the Chief of Operations “telling 
him [Zuno] that we [the deputies] did not prejudge his loyalty, but that we only did it 
                                                
93 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Confidential 
Report investigating if the powers of the State disappeared because of the delahuertista rebellion,” Acta 10. 
“Declaration of Esteban García de Alba and Rodolfo García de Alba,” 25 March 1924.  
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because he was not a pleasant person to us.” After offering up these ideas to Zuno, he 
replied “No, man, Estrada works.”94  
The following afternoon, members of the Partido Reconstructor Jalisciense 
(PRJ) led a major demonstration throughout the major avenues of Guadalajara, in support 
of the rebel forces and officially to depose Governor Zuno. “There were, I believe, 
representatives of the A.C.J.M., of the Democratic Party, of the Syndicate of 
Agriculturalists,” testified Saturnino Coronado (a prominent member of the 
aforementioned political party), “or at least that was the intention.”95 The crowds were 
estimated at anywhere from 50 to 100 individuals. They eventually arrived to the General 
Headquarters of the Second Division of the Northwest and once in front of the building, 
the crowd made their desire for a new governor known to all. A group including 
Coronado, among others, was given passage into the office of General Estrada, where 
they declared to him their desires and intentions. And in light of that meeting, the 
representatives again addressed the crowd and told them that it was “they who had to 
make the decision [of] who would replace Zuno.” The local press claimed that all of the 
demonstrators “agreed to declare Francisco Tolentino governor” and then headed towards 
the Palacio de Gobierno.96 When asked if the PRJ had organized a demonstration with 
the objective of deposing him, Zuno, himself, played coy: “I don’t know […the] press 
                                                
94 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Confidential 
Report investigating if the powers of the State disappeared because of the delahuertista rebellion,” Acta 29. 
“Declaration of José García de Alba,” 3 April 1924. 
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said it, but I was in hiding […] I knew that the Syndicate of Agriculturalists had 
participated, the A.C.J.M., the Knights of Columbus [and] one of those members was 
apprehended by the municipal president.” The governor claimed to have been informed 
of this by his Secretary of Government Silvano Barba González who was standing on the 
corner of the Fama Italiana (a fine dining establishment) in the moments when the 
demonstration broke out. And when pressed on whether he had more knowledge of the 
individuals who participated, Zuno exclaimed “Well I did not know, because I abandoned 
the city with trusted employees.”97 
After the demonstration, Juan Espinosa, thirty-six years of age, a pottery-maker 
by trade, from the barrio of Mezquitán in Guadalajara, also found himself near the 
Palacio de Gobierno between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m. in the evening. He did not make mention 
of the demonstration, but instead chose to focus on an automobile that arrived to the 
Palacio, “in which I saw Governor Zuno with General Estrada, [with] the auto entering 
into the interior of the Palacio.” The following day, on 9 December, he again saw Zuno 
and Estrada conversing with other people, standing at the plaza, in front of the same 
building in question. “This happened at [approximately] 10:30 in the morning,” 
remembers Espinosa, “I stood around [for] like five minutes to see them and then I 
retreated.”98 Meanwhile, local debt collector José G. Hernández also alleged to have seen 
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similar propositions earlier that day at 8:00 a.m. when he went to the Military 
Headquarters of Guadalajara to charge Colonel German Aldaba the rent owed to him. An 
official informed him of Aldaba’s location within the building. When Hernández arrived 
at the door he proceeded to knock. The door opened and the individual whom he was 
looking for appeared and invited him to pass. While waiting in the corridor, the debt 
collector claimed to have seen Zuno and Gustavo R. Cristo—the municipal president of 
Guadalajara—and overheard the former telling Estrada that “he was a friend of the 
movement.” Apparently, Zuno also told Estrada that “he would be at his orders and that 
he could count on contingents of men, and that all of the political parties were in 
agreement with him.” Cristo was said to have made similar offers. Estrada replied that for 
the moment he could not accept their services, but that he would keep an eye open to see 
if he needed them.99  
Aflonso Martínez Sotomayor, who temporarily served as Secretary in the rebel 
government of Guadalajara, and remained in the city during the rebellion maintained that 
the “whole world new that [Governor Zuno was here during the rebellion…I] saw him up 
until the 8th [of December]; after that I did not see him, but everyone knew he was 
hidden.”100 Local Deputy José García de Alba also confirmed such observations, 
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Report investigating if the powers of the State disappeared because of the delahuertista rebellion,” Acta 25. 
“Declaration of Saturino Coronado,” 1 April 1924.  
100 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Confidential 
Report investigating if the powers of the State disappeared because of the delahuertista rebellion,” Acta 30, 
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dedicated to the purchase of cattle for [Hacienda] el Jazmín [which Buelna managed].”  
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declaring that Zuno had gone into hiding in the house of numerous relatives: “When I 
was able to send him a message, I did it in a forceful manner and condemned his 
behavior, at the same time I urged him to fulfill his duty.”101 Even Lic. Mariano Ramírez, 
who found himself outside of Guadalajara at the start of the rebellion, but returned nine 
days later, for example, also truly believed to have knowledge of Zuno’s subsequent 
propositions to Enrique Estrada so that he could stay on as governor, but that they were 
not accepted nor discarded by the General: “there is no doubt that Zuno was working in 
the government of Estrada.”102 
While some of the above accounts overlap—and this could be the result of a 
simple mixing up of dates or exaggerations—it should be evident that one of the chief 
concerns expressed in the actas relates to the role government functionaries played 
during the rebellion—in particular, Governor Zuno and Municipal President Gustavo R. 
Cristo. The alarm bells that both ordinary citizens and fellow politicians rang with regard 
to the immoral behavior prominent politicians in Guadalajara exhibited did not go 
                                                
101 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Confidential 
Report investigating if the powers of the State disappeared because of the delahuertista rebellion,” Acta 29, 
“Declaration of Deputy José García de Alba,” 3 April 1924. Specifically, J. García de Alba sent him the 
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102 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Confidential 
Report investigating if the powers of the State disappeared because of the delahuertista,” Acta 3, 
“Declaration of José Guadalupe Hernández,” 19 March 1924. Lieutenant Colonel Herculano Valdés, who 
fought in the rebel army alongside General Rafael Buelna “against the federal forces at the command of 
General Rafael Cárdeas” (the General in question was most likely Lázaro Cárdenas), was reluctant to 
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knowledge that circulated among the commanders and officials within the rebel forces as the source of his 
information; see Acta 38, “Declaration of Lieutenant Colonel Herculano Valdés,” 10 April 1924.  
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unnoticed by our interlocutors. In fact, it prompted the comisión to conduct a thorough 
investigation into these allegations, delving into whether authorities had prior knowledge 
of the rebellion, whether they carried out the duties of their office, whether they were 
complicit in acts of rebellion, and/or if they took the proper steps to prevent or combat 
seditious activities. Although many of the declarations indeed focus on Zuno and Cristo 
specifically, others expanded the scope of their accusations and placed the responsibility 
squarely on the branches of the state government.  
 The Partido Liberal Unionista Jalisciense (PLUJ), for example, placed the blame 
upon the representatives of the “Powers” that made up the Government of Jalisco because 
of the “cowardly, negligent, ambiguous and partial behavior” they all demonstrated in the 
days of the rebellion. The representatives of the political party confirmed that Governor 
Zuno already knew about Estrada’s rebellion at least twenty-hour hours in advance 
“because he knew that his brother [Colonel Alberto Zuno] was apprehended.” 
Meanwhile, according to the PLUJ, the majority of the local deputies in Jalisco evacuated 
to diverse places, “some went into hiding and […] did not think to install themselves all 
together in one settlement of the state […]. Therefore, the inactions of both Zuno and the 
local deputies, according the PLUJ, disqualified them from being able to receive the 
confidence of the Federal Government since they had not fulfilled the pact to which they 
were elected to uphold. It was hoped that they be stripped of all trust and be judged so 
that a future precedent be set and there be no repetition of a similar case. The politicians 
in Guadalajara had not only betrayed the commitment to watch over the good and 
sovereignty of an entity, which they swore to uphold, but also turned their back on “an 
entire people, even though they might not be responsible for everything and all of their 
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culpability consists in consenting [power…] to cowards and [people who] lack 
principles.”  
Citing Article 41 of the General Constitution of the Republic, wherein it is 
claimed that the people can exercise their sovereignty by means of the Powers of the 
Union, when actions are of their own responsibility, and by the State when the issues are 
related to their interior matters, the PLUJ argued that it was clear that the governor did 
not comply with his obligations to loyally safeguard the state:  
 
[And] with his cowardliness to not […] expose [the] anarchy [that] 
reigned in this entity, of which he did not even attempt to prevent, nor 
combat, since he was in possession of the real fact that demonstrated that 
Estrada directly attacked the Federal Government and that [he] had as his 
only goal to destroy it. Zuno instead of combating [this] with the elements 
he […] let the enemy take advantage of the situation; instead of 
disagreeing with it, he went to the office of Estrada to offer his services; 
instead of absenting himself to not sanction with his presence an 
illegitimate government, he limited himself to hiding without being 
persecuted, because he knew well that they would not persecute him and 
he abandoned everything, at the mercy of the Estradista mobs, [without] 
even showing a sign of reproach, but trying to continue carrying out his 
charge in agreement with the rebels. This [effort committed by] Zuno, to 
not prevent, nor even attempt to stop the crime from being consummated 
[rendered him guilty of violating several penal codes].103 
 
The PLUJ believed and reiterated that Governor Zuno knew that preparations were being 
made on the part of Estrada to commit treason, but did not take any measures to prevent 
the plan from being executed. And that during the sixty days Guadalajara remained 
occupied by the rebel forces, the governor and the other “Powers” did not show any signs 
of life. Therefore, argued the PLUJ, “all the previous proves our judgment, that the 
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cowardly and partial form in which the representatives of the Government acted, 
incapacitates them to deserve the confidence of the Federal Government, from the 
moment that with their behavior they [did] not fulfill the pact they have with said Federal 
Government.” For the members of this political party these public functionaries did not 
deserve the trust accorded to them.104   
Deputy José García de Alba stated that when the rebellion broke out the majority 
of the members of the Congress of Jalisco remained in the city: “On the day that the 
rebellion broke out, Manuel Martínez Valadez and J. Rodrigo Camacho [of the 
Permanent Commission’ were in this [city], but I knew that possessed with panic they left 
that same day […].” But only a total of fourteen deputies105 remained within the limits of 
Guadalajara. The four elected functionaries who were not present, stressed Deputy García 
de Alba, had left for Mexico City to seek a meeting with the president “whom they took 
money from and told him they had armed groups [to resist the rebellion], which resulted 
as a lie.” The deputy stressed the Local Congress had sufficient numbers to form a 
quorum, but in order to achieve that they needed to summon the Permanent Commission 
or the governor of the state, and since Zuno was hidden “in a place I did not know,” they 
could not promulgate a decree. And when asked if the lack of action was due to the 
relatively few number of members of the Permanent Commission present within the city 
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limits, J. García de Alba curtly responded that the Permanent Commission functions in an 
irregular manner and does not serve an important role, “given that the Constitution of the 
State gives very little abilities to the Permanent [Commission] and it is in Jalisco no other 
thing than a receiving office or mailbox […] I can assure you that the Permanent 
[Commission] during this time in which it was constituted did not function.” 
 J. García de Alba also claimed that he and his fellow deputy colleagues were 
honorable individuals, and did not abuse their power: [Not like] the large cuts [of money] 
that Governor Zuno spent on who knows what […].” He testified to the comisión that if 
by misfortune the deputies of the state who stayed in Guadalajara, “we were not 
apprehended, it was because we knew how to free ourselves from being [so].” One 
deputy actually rose up in defense of the Government; as it so happened, it was his 
brother and fellow deputy, Esteban García de Alba, who he frequently sent arms and 
ammunition in the areas of Teocuitatlán, Tecolotlán, and Juchitlán. And with regard to 
the role, if any, that deputies assumed in support of Estrada, J. García de Alba quickly 
distanced himself and his colleagues from any such connections: “No, I do not have 
knowledge of any Deputies offering their services to General Estrada.”106  
While not the primary focus of this section, the military officials within the ranks 
of the rebel forces were not devoid of their own “perceived” ideological differences and 
subsequent actions taken to prevent discord among the rebels assumed what could more 
aptly be described as highly preventative measures. For example, when Ex-Lieutenant 
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Colonel Rafael Prado put himself at the orders of the revolution ushered in by the 
estradista forces, he left the Practical Cavalry Military School to take charge of a badly 
organized regiment. “I went to work there, as I was asked, but because of politics of some 
officials very close to Estrada, they took the regiment away from me,” lamented Prado, “I 
was dismissed and passed over then to the 7th [regiment], which was commanded by 
Alvarado.” In the meantime, rebel authorities opened up three previous investigations he 
had on record “to see if they could take me away from the regiment and they could do 
nothing.” After seeking an audience with Estrada, which was denied to him, he managed 
to learn from another General that “they are going to take you away from the 7th regiment 
because you are a callista.” Perplexed by the accusation, Prado exclaimed: “I am not a 
politician and I will not be; I am a soldier.”107 
The above actas reflect the common consensus that the rebel forces did not bother 
Governor Zuno and local officials during the rebellion. They were all permitted to remain 
in Guadalajara, if they so desired, and some even went about publicly within the city 
limits. But the predominant view held among these witnesses was that elected officials 
either did nothing to prevent the rebellion or did too little in the face of such a menacing 
threat to the social order. The prevailing belief about what elected officials did or did not 
do in these moments of crises varied greatly according to the subjectivity of each 
declarant. And some were indeed in compromised positions when interviewed, as was the 
case with Governor Zuno; others felt the need to trumpet their colleagues’ immoral 
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behavior, while slightly elevating their own—hindsight is always twenty-twenty. What 
these internalizations about the contemporary movement effectively reveal, however, are 
consistent (almost chronic) inquietudes about the insurmountable circumstances that 
elected officials faced, the professed sanctity of political office, and the repulsiveness of 
those who did not fulfill the pact they swore to uphold. Let us now focus our attention 
beyond the urban metropolis of Guadalajara, to the rural towns and settlements of the 
state, which served as prominent theatres of violence throughout the rebellion.    
 
Local Governance, Divided Allegiances, and Agrarian Communities    
 
The day after Francisco Tolentino came into power as provisional governor of 
Jalisco—that is, on 10 December 1923—he published Decree Number One, comprised of 
three articles directed to the inhabitants of the state. The “First Article” reaffirmed the 
state’s sovereignty and proceeded (in the same vein as General Estrada had done before 
him) withdraw recognition from General Alvaro Obregón in his capacity as president of 
Mexico; the “Second Article” asserted that his administration did not recognize the 
existing Public Powers of the State (comprised of the Executive, Legislative, and 
Judicial); and the “Third Article” was aimed at reconstructing and reorganizing “pubic 
functions” across the entire state, ordering the appointment of Municipal Councils with 
strict subjection to the “will of the people in those municipalities where it be necessarily.” 
Tolentino subsequently released a manifesto to the people of Jalisco, which was 
published in the local press and distributed to municipalities across the state. “Convinced 
that the will of the people of Jalisco was that I be the one who in provisional manner take 
charge of the Government of the State, and notwithstanding the difficult circumstances of 
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the moment,” claimed Tolentino, “I had no qualms about casting over my shoulder the 
heavy burden of carrying the reigns of one of the most important States of Republic.”109  
Whereas some ayuntamientos were indeed replaced by these “Municipal 
Councils” during the rebellion, the majority of them actually remained intact and 
continued to function, or simply remained impartial. A document from 1923 (see Table 
1), for example, listed fifty municipalities that did not adhere to the Government during 
the rebellion. The Comisión could only verify that the following eight municipalities 
actually confirmed receipt of Tolentino’s decree and agreed to support it: Tala, 
Magdalena, Cocula, Tonila, San Martín, Totlán, Zapotiltic, and Lagos de Moreno; while 
the municipalities of Ahualulco, Jocotepec, Etzatlán, Cuquio, San Marcos, La Barca, 
Ocotán, Atotonilco, Ayo el Chico, Chapala, San Juan de Lagos, Jesús María, Arandas, 
Tepatitlán, Quitupam, San Gabriel, Ixtlahuacán, C. Guzmán, Zacoalco, Atemayac, Santa 
Ana, and Tapalpa all declared that they had not received any decrees from the provisional 
governor nor any invitations to recognize the rebellion. Only the following ayuntamientos 
explicitly recognized the rebellion with a telegram directed to Tolentino and another to 
Estrada: Yahualica, Teoclatiche, and Ameca.110 
 
 
 
 
                                                
109 AHMA, 1923 (Gobernación, 6), “Manifesto to the People of Jalisco,” 12 December 1923. He 
subsequently released a manifesto to the people of Jalisco, which was subsequently published in the local 
press and distributed to municipalities across the state. “Convinced that the will of the people of Jalisco was 
that I be the one who in provisional manner take charge of the Government of the State, and 
notwithstanding the difficult circumstances of the moment,” reiterated Tolentino, “I had no qualms about 
casting over my shoulder the heavy burden of carrying the reigns of one of the most important States of 
Republic.” 
110 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 (3.2)/6-I, ff. 204-205, N.D. 
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Table 1: Municipalities that did not adhere to the Government during the 
Estradista Rebellion 
 
Acatic Chimalitán 
Amacueca  Chiquilistlán 
Atengo  Degollado 
Atoyac  Ejutla 
Ayo el Chico El Grullo 
Arenal Encarnación 
Bolaños Huejucár 
Cañandas S. Diego de Alejandría 
Cihuatlán  El Limón 
Concepción de Buenos Aires Huejuquilla el Alto 
Cuautla Jamay 
Jilotlán Teocuitatlán 
La Barca Tizapán el Alto 
San Julián Tlaquepaque 
La Manzanilla  Tolimán 
San Martín (8th Cantón) Tomatlán 
Sta. María de los Angeles Tonaya 
Mexticacán Totatiche 
Mezquitic Tuzcacuesco 
Ojuelos Unión de S. Antonio 
Pocitlán Valle de Juárez 
Purificación Villa Hidalgo 
Quitupan Villa Guerrero 
Tecalitlán Zapotitlán 
Techalute Zapotlán del Rey 
    ______________________________________________________________ 
Source: adapted from Llerenas and Tamayo, p. 118. The documentation can be found in the 
Archivo Histórico de Jalisco, Ramo Gobernación, 1923.  
 
 
Félix Ramos, the municipal president of Teocuitatlán de Corona, had a recent 
history of standing up to power. In fact, on either September or October of 1923, he 
found himself in Mexico City to denounce the express petition of Governor Zuno to 
disarm the agraristas of his region. According to Local Deputy José García de Alba “the 
agraristas [of Teocuitatlán] were disarmed, but to do it, they were beaten, driven away 
and even hanged.” While Ramos found himself in the nation’s capital to speak to the 
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Congress of Ayuntamientos, he was told by a delegate to the Congress: “do not get 
involved, these are [Governor] Zuno’s matters.” Ramos was not at all happy with what he 
was told; as a result, he successfully sought out a meeting with President Obregón. After 
the president heard him out, he was again told that these “are things of your governor of 
Jalisco; deal with him.”111 The declaration given by Colonel Manuel I. Gómez also 
corroborates part of the story. He claimed that well before the rebellion started, Governor 
Zuno, in agreement with General Estrada and other troops of the 24th regiment under the 
command of Colonel Alberto Zuno, disarmed the agraristas of Teocuitatlán de Corona: 
“The same troops persecuted, mistreated said agraristas and established a detachment in 
the same place and bordering haciendas, helping hacendados against the agraristas until 
the rebellion broke out […] I am quite sure that Governor Zuno was not persecuted by 
General Estrada, but rather on the contrary, he ordered various officers who had various 
kinds of respect for [him] for being a friend of the cause.”112 
On the afternoon of 7 December 1923, Municipal President Ramos, received a 
notice from a government official, Gilberto Godínez, informing him that they [the rebels] 
intended to apprehend him, “[and] were going to execute him [by firing squad].” 
Consequently, in the evening of that same day, President Ramos, alongside fifteen 
[individuals], rose up in arms to defend the Government, “afterwards being able to gather 
up to 60 [individuals].” During the course of the rebellion, Ramos, the local politician 
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turned pro-state insurgent operated in the Cerro de García, Tuzcueca, Lunas del Refugio 
(in the municipality of Teocuitatlán de Corona) and in cerro del Chivo, Barranca de San 
Pedro, Barranca de Soromutal (in the municipality of Tizapán el Alto). He primarily 
engaged in battles from the 19th or 20th of December 1923 to 28 January 1924. Among 
the events that he was swept up in, were the burning of railway bridges and skirmishes 
against the acordadas of the haciendas of San Pedro de Gracia; a significant 
collaboration with General Lázaro Cárdenas in the combat of Teocuitatlán; and a 
prolonged encounter against General Novoa. Ramos affirmed that he had not received 
any letters from Governor Zuno that invited him to rise up against the Constitutional 
Government. While he did not believe Zuno supported the rebel forces, he did feel that 
Zuno did not comply with his duties as governor of the state and that he “thought [Zuno] 
was playing with two decks of cards, to look good with anyone who would win, the 
Government or the rebellion.113   
With regard to the functioning of municipal administrations during the rebellion, 
the above-mentioned Municipal President Ramos gave a well-defined indication of the 
behavior many of his fellow colleagues demonstrated, which ranged from passivity to 
indignation: the municipal president of Tuxcueca remained in his post, but he did not 
receive help of any kind; the municipal president of Cojumatlán left when the agraristas 
[on the federal side] occupied the plaza; and the municipal president of Tizapán rose up 
in favor of the government. His own administration in Teocuitatlán had even attempted to 
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contact the governor before the rebellion: “[I] told Zuno that the Estrada uprising was 
rumored and he answered that if [I] saw something suspicious, that [I] should let him 
know.”114 In Tonaya, Antonio Mejía, an administrator of an hacienda that was property of 
the state, for example, claimed that his local ayuntamiento did not recognize the rebels 
and that everyone was against it, “[but] they [the rebels] did not remove it, it kept 
functioning.”115 Meanwhile in the town of Tala, Manuel I. Gómez confirmed that, “since 
they did not receive any counter-order [and] much less from the governor and seeing that 
everyone was in agreement [with the rebellion], the Ayuntamiento was also in 
agreement.”116 
Governor Zuno, himself, who after the rebellion replaced most of the Municipal 
Governments, declared to have done so because they were “reactionary” and that “those 
that adhered [to the Estradista rebellion] even though [they did] not act, [their lack of 
action placed them] in the terrain of usurpation [and for that] I have not recognized their 
legitimacy.” Zuno proceeded to lambast several ayuntamientos for recognizing the 
rebellion: “in turn [other municipalities], [many] were content with not communicating 
like those of the region of Mascota; same happened with those of Teocaltiche; there were 
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other enthusiasts, like ones from a Barca, Ocotlán, Poncitlán.”117 Many of the actas, 
however, expressed the declarant’s belief that while Zuno was neutral in the conflict, his 
actions were very much opportunistic. Sotomayor, for example, believed that in early 
December 1923 the governor ordered dated sheets to be printed with decrees, which were 
to be delivered on the 15th or 20th of January (presumably when the tide would begin to 
favor the federal government). In one of these sheets, dated on 19 December 1924, for 
example, Zuno, “in use of his extraordinary faculties” decreed that “the public 
functionaries of the State who lend their obedience to the people that currently usurp the 
public power will lose their position” and that “[all] of the acts carried out by the usurpers 
will be nullified […].”118 The dated sheets, therefore, declared that those who aided and 
abetted the rebels would be punished with the full rigor of the law. “I have this very much 
present [in my mind] due to [the fact] that this caused much laughter,” recalled 
Sotomayor, “because [I knew] that he was in hiding […and] he did not make any effort to 
rise up people with the objective of defending the constitutional army […the] only thing 
he did [during the rebellion] was to discourage his colleagues.”119  
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Mauricio Meléndrez, a resident of the community of Achío in Amatitán, married, 
thirty-seven years of age, and an agriculturalist, received a note from the municipal 
president of Tequila, Malaquias Cuervo, on the evening of 7 December 1923. It was in 
those moments that he first became aware of General Enrique Estrada’s rebellion against 
the National Government. Shortly thereafter at 1 a.m. in the morning, Meléndrez decided 
to rise up in arms to combat the Estradista rebellion, “being able to gather for said 
objective thirty-five men, whose elements swelled to fifty-eight some days thereafter.” 
Municipal President Cuervo provided these individuals with some arms and they then 
proceed to recognized Susano Casteñeda, a colonel, as their Jefe Superior. Echoing a 
similar belief present in many actas, Meléndrez claimed not to have received any 
indication from the governor, nor through any other official, to begin preparations to 
combat Estrada—the agriculturalist did this of his own accord, after being informed by 
local authorities. During the course of the rebellion, affirmed Meléndrez, he and the 
individuals that he gathered up to suppress the rebellion, did not engage in any battles 
with “rebels,” but spent the majority of their time patrolling the Potrero de los Rivera, 
Tetezapote, Chiquilstán, San Gazpar, and the Rancho de los Naranjos.120  
Meanwhile, Tiburcio Carrillo—married, forty-nine years of age, and an 
agriculturalist—from nearby Los Narajos in Tequila did not directly participate in the 
armed conflict, however, but felt compelled to put on record that the same Municipal 
President Malaquias Cuervo “is always discouraging [us] in everything related to 
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agrarianism, assuring [us] that ‘the rich always win.” But Carrillo did remember seeing 
Deputy Enrique Cuervo in Tequila a couple of days before the movement, “ignorant of 
why [he] had gone to that place, since he did not address the communities or their 
representatives for any reason.”121 Other declarations corroborate the assertion that 
Governor Zuno sent Deputy Cuervo to Tequila on 6 December to gather enough armed 
people to fight against Estrada. Deputy Esteban G. de Alba testified: “[Cuervo] came 
here and told Zuno that he had people ready, 100 armed men, but Zuno did not want to 
go; he thought differently […]. Cuervo invited him with insistence, telling him that the 
people were with Zuno, [but] as I said, he did not want to go.”122 The governor, 
nonetheless, remembered it differently. When Bárcenas pressed him for an answer, he 
declared:  
I took my car with the intention of going to Tequila, where I had armed 
people. [Enrique] Cuervo was there: he went to go recruit people and 
came to tell me that 50 men were ready in the ravine. I was going there 
when Luis Sauza, an enemy of ours, was leaving his house to drop off his 
mom in the automobile that waited for them. I thought: ‘Luis is an enemy, 
yesterday we disarmed him, [it’s] logical that when seeing me pass he 
would suppose that I will leave, and he would suppose that I’m leaving to 
Tequila.  
 
According to the governor, his decision to wait was the correct one because a car, which 
was mistaken as his own, was found completely shot-up with bullets. With regard to the 
orders given to Deputy Cuervo, Zuno confirmed that he obeyed all orders, disarmed all of 
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the haciendas, “among others the ones belonging to Sauza and stationed Susano 
Casteñeda in the ravine […].” The issue at hand was that his emissary should have stayed 
in Tequila, instead of returning to Guadalajara on 9 December.123 Fidelina Llerenas has 
elsewhere contended that when the rebellion broke out Governor Zuno fled to Tequila 
and afterward to Mascota, “there he organized irregular forces, similar to the guerillas of 
Veracruz, to face off with the rebels […Zuno] came to represent the civil resistance to the 
coup d’état in the entity.”124 But as Zuno himself declared: “[the unit led by Cuervo] did 
not have any combats because one of the things that disoriented me was his turn […] I 
reproached him for coming [back to Guadalajara]; in reality he was the only one that rose 
up forces.” 
While the governor’s plans to raise troops never fully materialized, he did shed 
some important insight into the preexisting problems between himself, and the 
indigenous and agrarian communities of the region:  
The agrarista corps [of the region] were well commanded; there was a 
league of Indigenous communities of which I helped, but [then] Marcelino 
Sedano started to do politics—he is an individual that belongs to a family 
that believes, that has the obsession that some of its members are going to 
become governor of the state.  
 
Sedano, according to the governor, had only joined the league of Indigenous 
Communities a few months back—in March of 1923—because of the unsuccessful 
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opposition the former had waged against him, Zuno. And that it was only after this 
occasion that he admitted having denied help to the communities, “because it [the 
community] had a political end and in my concept the Communities have an economic 
end as they damage themselves with politics, because it divides the opinions and comes 
[with] economic disaster.”125 Zuno, therefore, did not see the benefit of democracy for 
these local communities (and their agrarian element); that is, they were not capable of 
debating and formulating their own agendas reflecting their own necessities and desires. 
Instead, they needed to be told what to do and, perhaps most importantly, they needed to 
curtail their ambitions and simply focus on farming. But despite the childish contempt 
Zuno held against these communities, when the rebellion arrived they were among the 
first elements the state mobilized to combat rebel forces.    
The rebellion, however, reminded contemporaries that not all campesinos threw 
their lot in with the state; in fact, Governor Zuno declared that because of the 
“discordance of the League of Communities, there came a complete separation amongst 
many of them […some] of them became delahuertistas, some rose up, like the one from 
Autlán; the ones from Tequila and others felt great enthusiasm when [General Joaquín] 
Amaro arrived [at the end of the rebellion].”126 Zuno claimed that the acordadas of 
haciendas did not exist, because under his administration they had been disbanded. In 
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fact, Zuno alleged that: “they kept calling the peons from the haciendas who [took up] 
arms that; and [I] did not authorize that.” It was the governor’s impression that those 
peons were under the command of Estrada and that landowners indirectly helped the 
movement. Eventually, some truths or half-truths (as surely it is a matter of perspective) 
started to flow: “Well there were 6 or 7 [acordadas that helped the rebels], I remember 
the one from Jonacatepec, Zapotitlán, Huexcalapa, Zalamea, in La Barca or Manuel Rios 
and others.” When asked about whether or not he maintained himself in communication 
with the agrarian leaders that rose up in arms, Zuno confirmed to have communicated 
with the majority of them through a rancher named Romualdo Rodríguez or González of 
Tlajomulco. Specifically, he remembered Casimiro Castillo and when asked about the 
abovementioned Félix Ramos, he curtly responded “it is possible.”127  
The particular experience of agraristas and politicians from the town of Autlán 
paints the portrait of a town divided along prior ideological commitments. Brigadier 
General Casimiro Castillo, a revered champion of agrarian causes, rose up in arms to 
defend the Government in Autlán on 14 December 1923, “because in that manner I had 
committed myself at the Agrarista Convention [in Mexico City], and I did [it] because I 
knew through the press of the rebellion of Estrada.” While Castillo appeared a most 
honorable individual willing to risk his life to defend the agrarian causes promised to his 
people, his motivations for fighting on the side of the state appeared to be much more 
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immediate. A week earlier, when local politicians128 began the talk of forming a Social 
Defense Unit in Autlán to defend the town against possible attacks from the agrarista 
groups, which already operated in defense of the government, Castillo was approached to 
join. But not long after he became aware that it was a trap designed to make “me gather 
[up] my arms [so that they] could take them away, I answered that I counted with 40 men 
who could take arms, but that they did not have arms in their possession nor 
ammunition.” Substitute-Deputy Florencio Topete expressed to Castillo that they could 
not do anything if the followers of Castillo did not have arms. On 13 December, Topete 
and his associates again invited Castillo to go pick up arms near the area of Cinguiñuela, 
“in which place I think they were trying to assassinate me and where they already had the 
Acordadas of the Haciendas of Ahuacapán and Ayuquila, which operated in favor of the 
rebellion.”  
Fearing for his life, Castillo left that same evening, alone, and headed to the 
outskirts of town—to an area to the north of Autlán, called “El Digue.” “[Since] I had 
already warned [my] companions at first notice, up to 60 men gathered [to wait for me] 
and [we] all left for the mountainous region of Mezcala and San Juan Cacoma around 10 
in the evening,” recalled Castillo. He was able to gather around two-hundred and fifty 
individuals. The following day Castillo and his followers—known as the Syndicate of 
Poor Agriculturalists of Autlán—released a statement reiterating their commitments to 
the institutions that support the “Constitutional Articles twenty-seven and one hundred 
twenty-three” and also the commitments they had taken up during the Second Convention 
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of the Partido Nacional Agrarista, which had been celebrated the previous month on 11 
November 1923 in the Capital of Mexico. According to Syndicate of Poor 
Agriculturalists, at the convention General Alvaro Obregón “gave a warning to all the 
revolutionaries of good faith[,] members of the Syndicate, exhorting us to struggle but 
this time ‘with arms in hand’ to defend our emancipatory rights, life and honor until now 
negated by the traitor Adolfo de la Huerta.” And because of all of these prior 
commitments, the Syndicate proceeded to organize a column, which they verbosely 
called the Ejército comunista libertario. Primera Brigada Rojo y Negro. Caballería e 
Infantería. Columna Exploradora de Occidente. From 16 December 1923 to February 14 
1924, then, they participated in seven distinct battles against the Social Defense of Autlán 
and El Grullo, and various Acordadas from the region’s haciendas.129  
 Carlos Valencia, proprietor of the aforementioned hacienda Ahuacapán near 
Autlán—in addition to owning the local power plant, and other urban estates—declared 
that: “the town was armed by a group of men, because they had been recruited by various 
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individuals and were assaulting the estates, they lit some on fire and even assassinated an 
individual from one of them, I think he was a relative of the landowners […and said] 
assailants had the banner of Agrarianism.” He confirmed that Casimiro Castillo was 
indeed the leader of the body of agraristas, but completely denied any wrong-doing and 
went as far as to claim that the people at the haciendas were not armed.130 Meanwhile, 
Juan Presa of San Juan de Ocotán—married, fifty-five years of age, an agriculturalist—
spoke of the fear that broke out amongst members of his community when Estrada 
rebelled: “D. Cirilo told all of [us] that they [the estradistas] could now destroy the 
forest, that they could cut down the forest with impunity, because his party had won. That 
his boss Daniel Orozco was [a] Colonel of Estrada; that we poor agraristas, that they were 
going to hang all of us.” The “forest” that D. Cirilo referred to in his threat were the lands 
that had been redistributed as ejidos to the community of San Juan de Octoán. These were 
lands that now belonged to Hacienda de la Puerta de la Venta, property of the 
aforementioned Orozco. Three individuals, Margarito Noguera, Seferino Navarro, and 
Victoriano Olivares, accompanied Presa and verbally confirmed all of this to be true, but 
they were unable to sign the declaration because they did not know how to sign their 
names. All claimed that no officials invited them to defend the Government, which 
Alvaro Obregón currently presided over.131   
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Silverio de Anda, forty-nine years of age, single, campesino, and resident of 
Tesistán in the Municipality of Zapopan, insisted that the current Municipal Authorities 
were the same ones that functioned before and after the rebellion, and that no Authority 
or person invited the local community to defend the Government of General Obregón. 
While he himself was not physically swept up in the violence, he did note that the Head 
of the Acordadas of Hacienda de Magdalena, Francisco Chávez killed four individuals at 
the beginning of February of 1924, “with the objective of raising people against the 
Constitutional Government, taking from them their arms and horses.” The above acta, 
notwithstanding, also points to a salient moral issue that impacted local communities and 
had the potential to divide towns, entering into the realm of what one might call the 
divine. Many of the actas have provided us with important insight into the behavior of 
agraristas, landowners, and authorities during the rebellion, but they offer very little with 
regard to the religious sensibilities of these individuals—a gross oversight considering 
the importance of religiosity in the region, which has elsewhere been dubbed the “rosary 
belt.” Originally coined by Carlos Monsaivaís, the “Rosary Belt”  describes the central-
western states of the Bajío, such as: Jalisco, Colima, southern Guanajuato, Michoacán, 
Nayarit, and southern Zacatecas. Specifically, Ben Fallaw has written that “Catholics in 
Rosary Belt states like Querétaro and Jalisco are known for their exceptional religious 
fervor, and they generally followed the orthodox liturgical practices endorsed by the 
institutional Church, as opposed to the syncretic or fold traditions with strong indigenous 
and African strains.”133 
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The few declarations on the matter indicate that parish priests (and in some cases 
clergy) played an important role in the rebellion. De Anda, for example, in his 
declaration, also chose to emphasize the role that parish priest Gregorio Rodríguez played 
during the rebellion, since it was publicly known that he had offered one hundred armed 
and mounted men to General Estrada, “and that in a Society of the A.C.J.M. [the Mexican 
Catholic Youth Association] he preached against the Government.134 Señora Olimpa 
Estrada, from the same town Tesistán, also corroborated the claims of de Anda, insisting 
that the priest of Tesistán “predicated that all the Catholic Party had their people ready to 
help Estrada which was the Constituted Government [and that] everyone should be one, 
Indians, neighbors, etc., and that even women should arm themselves to combat the 
Government, that it was a group of bandits [the government].”135 And once the rebellion 
ended, the inclination priests demonstrated over the course of the sixty days, to support 
and side with the rebels, was commonly utilized by politicians to attack the clergy. When 
Governor Zuno gave a stirring speech on the day of his return to power—cited in the 
beginning of this section—for example, he shouted the following: “in spite of the rich, 
the “cuervos” [insulting word directed at priests] land will be redistributed among the 
countrymen, and revolutionary justice will be done.” Whereas, another unnamed deputy 
                                                
134 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Confidential 
Report investigating if the powers of the State disappeared because of the delahuertista rebellion,” Acta 7. 
“Declaration of Silverio de Anda,” 20 March 1924.  
135 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Confidential 
Report investigating if the powers of the State disappeared because of the delahuertista rebellion,” Acta 8. 
“Declaration of Señora Olimpia Estrada,” 20 March 1924. 
  
95 
claimed that “Chamula (insulting name for Archbishop Francisco y Orozco) and the 
reactionary priests will [soon] be dragged through the streets.”136 
 
Conclusion 
 
Chapter 1 explored the major political precursors to the Estradista Rebellion and 
analyzed a set of statements concerning what citizens thought about local authorities, 
governance, and the social order during this critical moment of crisis that faced an 
incipient democracy. In the first half of the chapter, I revisited the years following the 
triumph of the Plan de Agua Prieta, contextualized the process of reconstruction, and 
offered a chronological narrative of the major political events, which led to the mass 
outbreak of violence in Jalisco, while also paying close attention to both regional and 
national developments. The second half made use the Ministry of Interior’s comisión on 
the “disappearance of the powers” during the Estradista Rebellion and eschewed the 
construction of a larger explanatory model for understanding it, in favor of an interpretive 
approach focusing on how local officials, ordinary citizens, and rural dwellers 
experienced contemporary events, and struggled over what the insurgency meant to them. 
A vocally pro-Obregón governor throughout the first year of his administration, 
Jose G. Zuno’s pragmatism in the wake of the rebellion prompted suspicion on the part of 
federal authorities. Colonel Bárcenas’ relentless investigation into the rebellion certainly 
placed Zuno on the defensive, but it also portrayed a complex and able politician: one 
forced to atone for his sins and political behavior, and another who when pressed on 
                                                
136 SD, 812.00/27046, 21 February 1924. 
  
96 
matters was willing to completely deny any wrongdoing. The written record left behind, 
however, highlighted what several contemporaries thought about both his action and 
inaction, and in the coming years provided political enemies with the necessary fodder to 
continue their impressive list of attacks against him, both warranted and unwarranted—
the subject matter which forms the foundation for the next chapter.   
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Chapter 2 
Terror and Progress: The Anatomy of Rule and Local Power Structures  
in the Guadalajara Region 
 
[…The] State of Jalisco has suffered [under] the terrible zunista tyranny and […] the 
everyday dictatorship, more, much more, than with the revolutions that have moved us. 
And if that barbarous system of terror created in our State, worries the rich classes, 
because they have been exploited, the majority of the victims, as it has been seen, belong 
to the large campesino class, the healthiest and most charitable. The tyrant [Zuno] has not 
respected anything […] in Jalisco he is seen as a curse. 
  -Report from the Minority Deputies to the Congress of the State of Jalisco 
 
 
It was the morning of 7 December 1923. Governor José Guadalupe Zuno spoke to 
a room full of Guadalajara’s most important politicians, who had gathered at the Palacio 
de Gobierno to save the dignity of the State.1 “I called you together to let you know that 
[General Enrique] Estrada has rebelled…I desire to know the opinion of the Authorities,” 
asked the governor. Leopoldo Cuéllar, a respected councilman, spoke up and stressed the 
benefits of marching to the sierra, and of moving the Authorities of the City to a safer 
location. Magistrate Guadalupe Ruvalcaba, however, suggested a diplomatic route in 
combating the revolutionary movement that had recently begun to take hold of the 
countryside.2 Both proposals fell on deaf ears. The governor did not reveal alarm nor did 
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he express any anxiety.3 In those moments, Zuno was handed a sealed document. He 
opened it and read it, and became aware that the rebel forces wanted the treasure of the 
State. “Do not oppose, deliver,” barked the governor to Santos Aréchiga—the man who 
had handed him the envelope. He then accepted a telephone call from General Estrada 
where it was made clear that they had already taken the city’s Police Department. Unable 
to come to an agreement with Estrada, Zuno once again addressed the group of local 
deputies, magistrates, and councilmen: “Now you can see there is nothing that can be 
done…Let’s go to our houses before they kick us out.”4   
 A few minutes elapsed. Zuno remained in his office and called for a stenographer 
to dictate a personal series of statements publicly declaring his neutrality in the eyes of 
the press. With the intention of preventing the press corps from compromising his 
neutrality, the governor proceeded to distribute the delicately crafted document to the 
representatives of El Sol and El Informador with specific instructions to “insert the 
questions [the reporters] believe to be suitable.”5 “It is the Mexican people who have to 
[make a decision] about this grave problem,” read the statement, “[my] duty is to remain 
in the post to which I was elected and to remain in it in a very peaceful manner [as long 
as] the circumstances and official dignity permit me.”6 The following day the Partido 
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Reconstructor Jalisciense (PRJ) held a political rally between 5-6 in the afternoon, 
comprised of 50 to 100 individuals. Marching to the beat of a brass band and chanting 
“down with Zuno,” the truants, porters, and the people of the city that gave life to the 
manifestation, headed towards the Alameda and paraded in front of the Palacio de 
Gobierno. The demonstrators demanded the immediate resignation of Zuno and asked 
that Francisco Tolentino be named governor instead.7 A few hours later Tolentino was 
officially appointed provisional governor through a popular plebiscite in the name of the 
rebel forces. With his political future in shambles, Zuno went into hiding and Guadalajara 
remained under the control of rebel forces for approximately 60 days.8   
Fearing that the Government of the Center would reprimand his conduct, Zuno 
walked a political tightrope during the rebellion—and did it well. In the weeks that 
followed Estrada’s uprising, he had several offers on the table to leave Guadalajara and to 
establish his government in other places around the State but openly refused them. When 
the military campaign against the rebels began to turn in favor of General Álvaro 
																																								 																				
[your administration]? What is the opinion of the dependencies of your government on the electoral 
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Obregón, however, Zuno began to show some signs of life. Believing that the federal 
forces would make their entrance into Guadalajara on 11 February 1924, a triumphant 
Zuno finally emerged from his hiding place, went to the outskirts of the city, “armed 
himself,” and made plans to take the Palace back; unfortunately, the forces did not make 
their entrance until the following day.9 So it was then that a bearded Zuno—accompanied 
by a soldier and a painter—and armed with nothing but an empty gun holster went on to 
unite with the deputies who had advanced with the forces of General Joaquín Amaro. 
And thenceforth gracefully entered Guadalajara, as if he had known all along that the 
state would reign supreme, to once again seize the governorship of Jalisco.10  
In the years following the triumph of the Constitutionalist Revolution—under the 
guidance of President Alvaro Obregón (1920 to 1924)—a national strategy of 
reconstruction was set in motion, which centered upon four key components: firm 
restrictions on foreign investment and on social guarantees for the poorest sectors; the 
backing of agrarian and labor leaders in exchange for their political loyalty; a cultural 
revolution to promote a set of secular national core values; and the repair and 
development of the nation’s unkempt infrastructure. The reform program, however, was 
largely forgotten in the throes of the de la Huerta Rebellion, but was reactivated 
following the ascent of Plutarco Elías Calles to the Presidency in December 1924. This 
began a new phase for the Mexican state, “characterized by a greater concentration of 
																																								 																				
9 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, Acta 54 
“Memorandum prepared by M. Estrada Magallanes for Enrique Colunga, Secretary of the Minister of 
Interior.” 
10 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, Acta 10, 
“Declarations of Deputy Lic. Esteban Garcia de Alba and Rodolfo Garcia de Alba.” 
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power in the federal executive and greater political centralization [… which was balanced 
with the] corporatism of popular movements and the elimination of regional caudillos.” 
In particular, the centralization, fortification, and modernization of the military also 
meant greater incorporation of peripheral regions that had, up until then, alluded the 
geographical ambit of the state.11 “Calles’s reforms demonstrated a greater adherence to 
the radical provisions of the 1917 Constitution than his predecessor Obregón had 
displayed,” claim Joseph and Buchenau, “[…all] in all Calles drew on the support of 
leaders who had grown disaffected with the slow pace of reform under Obregón, most 
important being that of Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM) leader 
Luis Napoleon Morones.”12  
The defeat of the de la Huerta Rebellion and its local manifestation, the Estradista 
Rebellion—explored in the previous chapter—not only reaffirmed Mexico’s process of 
modernization, but also reconfigured politics at the national and regional levels. In the 
aftermath of the first significant challenge to the new social order, Governor Jose G. 
Zuno surfaced from the depths of a political purgatory to reestablish himself as the most 
powerful politician in the region.13 Most of the revisionist historiography has recognized 
																																								 																				
11	See Jaime Tamayo’s La conformación del Estado modern y los conflictos políticos, 1917-1929 
(Guadalajara: Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco, Universidad de Guadalajara, 1988), p. 257 and Los 
moviminentos sociales, 1917-1929 (Guadalajara: Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco, Universidad de 
Guadalajara, 1988) pp. 28-29.	
12	See Gil Joseph and Jürgen Buchenau, Mexico’s Once and Future Revolution: Social Upheaval 
and the Challenge of Rule Since the Late Nineteenth Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), p. 83 
and 98-99. The reforms also promoted, among other things, “measures designed to improve the fiscal 
situation of the state with the professionalization of the army, nationalist efforts to control natural 
resources, and […] economic development, education, and social welfare.” Tamayo, La conformación, p. 
257 	
13 Following his resurgence to power, the governor was accused of carrying out attacks against 
individual guarantees, replacing municipal governments (with loyal followers foreign to local populations), 
and confiscating the property of presumed rebels—in addition to making a fortune in the process; see AGN, 
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the governor’s contributions to the defense of regional autonomy (at municipal and state 
levels) and to agrarian, labor, anticlerical, and educational policies; very few studies, 
however, have attempted to understand the consequences of such state interventions on 
the lives of citizens and the impact of such efforts on local governance.14 This chapter 
showcases the chronic anxieties about state sovereignty that Mexican citizens displayed 
during this period. I argue that such disorder was part of an on-going negotiation over 
how to govern and rule, and was also part of an extensive debate regarding the limits of 
local and national power in the first decade of the postrevolutionary era.15 I ask two 
questions: How did Zuno’s administration reestablish order in the years following the 
																																								 																				
DGIPS, Departamento Confidencial, 310(3.2)–3 I, Nombre: Estado de Jalisco, Asunto: Situación Política, 
“Report authored by Minority Deputies to the Permanent Commission of the Congress of the Union,” 
February 1926. A contemporary reporter, invoking the memory of the Italian republics of the Renaissance 
to describe the political moment in Mexico, compared Zuno to a Cesare Borgia—the man who had inspired 
Machiavelli’s memorable book, The Prince—to illustrate the ephemeral nature of power that is conquered 
with violence and retained through terror. “Borgia, [a] cardinal, duke, general, gonfaloniere, climbed all of 
the summits [and] drank from the glass of all honors […]; but was to die […] without any glory, in 
complete obscurity, under the walls of Pamplona,” forewarned the reporter; see Excelsior, “La Guadalajara 
de Zuno,” 17 December 1925. 
14 Fidelina Llerenas, for example, has noted that Zuno carried out diverse actions to give life in 
Jalisco the new project of the revolutionary state, such as: issuing labor, agrarian, education laws, and 
sanctioning property expropriations. In this manner, agues Llerenas, “he stimulated popular demands and 
protected the struggle and social conquests [of the revolution], fulfilling […] the new tutelary character of 
the state towards the unprotected classes […]; see her chapter, “José Guadalupe Zuno. Civilismo y 
Legalidad Revolucionaria” in José Guadalupe Zuno Hernández: vida, obra y pensamiento, (Guadalajara: 
Editorial Universidad de Guadalajara, 1992), p. 59. See José G. Zuno’s Reminiscencias de una vida 
(Guadalajara, n.p., 1956) for a memoir that he authored in 1956.  
15 On 21 August 1923, Jose G. Zuno acknowledge in a circular that “nobody can ignore [the fact] 
that currently the most important problem in our Republic consists of the act of renewing democracy” to 
peacefully transfer presidential power. The governor suggested that this transcendental political problem 
can and would be solved through this conscious and serene exercise, and with the complete abstention of 
the authorities from any political-electoral matter. “The public consciousness happily recognizes without 
[mistake],” affirmed Zuno, “the deep necessity of vigorously fulfilling civil rights, [which] will assure the 
general well-being of the nation.” See Archivo Histórico de Jalisco (hereinafter cited as AHJ), 
Gobernación, 1923, Sin Clasificación, Caja 25. 
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first major challenge to it? What were the limits to state centralization of power at both 
the local and national levels? 
 
The Aftermath of the Estradista Rebellion  
and the Rise of José Guadalupe Zuno 
 
José G. Zuno was born in 1891 to a rural middle-class family at hacienda San 
Agustín, near the town of La Barca, Jalisco. Two years later, the Zuno Hernández family 
moved to Guadalajara and opened a small grocery store.16 In 1908, a seventeen-year-old 
Zuno was expelled from the Liceo de Varones of Guadalajara—along with his friend, 
future military general Rafael Buelna—for taking part in student protests against the 
Dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz and, as a result, went to go live in Mexico City.17 A 
confidential report culled from the Ministry of Interior, however, alleges that he was 
dismissed from school because he did not pass the first year exams, which forced him to 
abandon his studies a year later. Shortly thereafter, he found work as a butcher’s assistant 
at the Flea Market of Guadalajara, but was not employed for long because he was caught 
stealing meat, and was subsequently forced to resign. And that to support himself he 
spent a good deal of time passing off as a caricaturist in the city’s bars to obtain a “note” 
or a gift from his customers.18 
																																								 																				
16 María Teresa Fernández Aceves, “José Guadalupe Zuno Hernández and the Revolutionary 
Process in Jalisco,” State Governors in the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1952: Portraits in Conflict, Courage, 
and Corruption, eds. Jürgen Büchenau and William Beezley (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), p. 
96	
17 Fernández Aceves, José Guadalupe Zuno, p. 96. 
18 AGN, DGIPS, 311(3.2)-1, Nombre: Jalisco, Asunto: Antecedentes y filiación política de 
gobernadores, Caja 148, Exp. 17, March 1925.	
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While in the metropolis, Zuno, a budding artist, meddled in the elite circles of 
painters and befriended iconic figures such as José Clemente Orozco and Gerardo 
Murillo (Dr. Atl).19 On his return to Guadalajara in 1914, he founded the Centro Bohemio 
with artists Xavier Guerrero and Carlos Stalh. The Centro would later count upon the 
membership of future literati and artists, among them: Mariano and Salvador Azuela, 
Agustín Basave, Ixca Farías, Alfonso Gutiérrez Hermosillo, Manuel Martínez Valadez, 
Guadalupe Marín, and David Alfaro Siqueiros. The Centro quickly became the most 
prolific and vibrant political and cultural center in the city, and served as an incubator to 
many future social leaders and what would become most important political forces of 
Jalisco in the 1920s.20  
Figure 3: From left to right: José Guadalupe Zuno, Alfredo Romo, and Carlos Orozco Romero. Circa 
1917. Courtesy of La Jornada Jalisco. 
 
																																								 																				
19 Fernández Aceves, José Guadalupe Zuno, p. 96. 
20 Tamayo, La conformación, p. 236.  
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When a thirty-one-year-old Zuno assumed the governorship of Jalisco for the first 
time on the last day of February 1923, he was already at the head of a strong political 
movement that represented the best developed version of obregonismo. During these 
years, the administration of Alvaro Obregón (1920 to 1924) promoted a social pact with 
the campesino and labor movements of Mexico. At the behest of the president of the 
republic, the social pact established with these sectors was carried out through several 
important mediums, such as the National Agrarian Party (PNA) and the National 
Agrarian Confederation (CNA)—in addition to the Regional Confederation of Mexican 
Workers (CROM) and the Mexican Labor Party (PLM).21 But in many parts of the 
country—and especially in the conservative state of Jalisco—the successful mobilization 
of the masses was only achieved through an adherence to traditional local power 
structures; as a result, the regional caudillo emerged as one of the most important 
mechanism still available to deliver the postulates of the Constitution of 1917 to the 
popular masses.22   
Zunismo, as a political movement, established a broad alliance with the workers 
and campesinos of Jalisco “through [the cooptation of their] organizations and leadership, 
[and] by means of an active politics that permitted [Zuno] to consolidate [his movement] 
as the most important political current […in the region].” The alliance established with 
																																								 																				
21 Tamayo, La conformación, p. 244.  
22 Apropos Obregon’s presidency, Jurgen Buchenau has written: “[he] had proven to be a 
fanatically pragmatic president—one who consistently sacrificed political ideals and principles for practical 
solutions. More so than strengthening the state by building its institutions, he resorted to the methods that 
caudillos knew best—military campaigns, violence, and personal deal-making. In his eyes, the ends 
justified the means;” see Jürgen Buchenau, The Last Caudillo: Alvaro Obregón and the Mexican 
Revolution (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), p. 136     
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popular sectors went beyond the simple subordination or manipulation of social 
movements and more aptly reflected a symbiotic relationship that demonstrated an 
effective balance between radical caudillo politics and the demands of workers and 
campesinos in the region.23 Governor Zuno’s brand of politics, however, came at a cost to 
those deemed outside the purview of the new social order. The end result was the use of 
strongman tactics to rule and the establishment of a system of attacks against individual 
guarantees, or as one group of dissatisfied local deputies put it: “against the life of the 
inhabitants of Jalisco […].”24 
 In what follows, I focus on citizens who regularly voiced legitimate grievances, 
but whose anxieties often fell on deaf ears. To achieve this, I explore the aftermath of the 
Estradista Rebellion and focus on five topics: 1) the property confiscation of “presumed 
rebels” in the wake of the armed uprising; 2) the anxieties and complaints rural 
(especially agrarian) communities expressed; 3) popular conceptions of local sovereignty; 
4) corrupt political practices; and 5) regional labor politics. 
Repressing Rebels? The Confiscation of Properties   
 
Once the smoke began to clear and the extent of the de la Huerta Rebellion 
became more visible, the Attorney General of the Republic estimated the damages 
inflicted upon the nation to be in the range of forty million pesos.25 To punish the 
																																								 																				
23 Tamayo, La conformación, pp. 235, 244-246.  
24 AGN, DGIPS, Departamento Confidencial, 310(3.2)–3 I, Nombre: Estado de Jalisco, Asunto: 
Situación Política, “Report authored by Minority Deputies to the Permanent Commission of the Congress 
of the Union,” February 1926. 
25 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1 (Confiscation of rebel properties), “Letter to the President 
of the Republic from the Attorney General of the Republic,” f. 130, 11 July 1924. 
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insurgents and their accomplices, the Government of Jalisco circulated an official bulletin 
informing the public that it had ordered the confiscation of 56 rural and 60 urban 
properties “to assure the fulfillment of the presidential disposition on the confiscation of 
rebel properties.”26 The Government, nevertheless, made sure to point out that these 
confiscations paled in comparison to the more than 160,000 rural properties that were 
currently functioning statewide. “I am entirely sure that the agriculturist of Jalisco, 
principally the latifundistas, will think […] from now [on] before mixing in new political 
adventures […],” announced the governor, “since they will have in front [of them] the 
ghosts of the new confiscations.”27  
With the end goal of completely smothering any remnants of the uprising and to 
achieve public order and tranquility, Zuno stressed that he intended to achieve nothing 
less than the complete destruction of the enemies of the legal institutions: “it [is] logically 
indispensable and urgent [to] remove all of the elements that have taken advantage [of the 
rebellion] to attack the Government and foment the criminal disloyalty that has caused 
many [deaths], much blood and many heartaches.”28 The confiscation of properties that 
Zuno and his administration carried out—according to a memorandum addressed to the 
Ministry of Interior—for the most part, however, had nothing to do with the rebellion, 
“given that they did not interfere [in] anything [and] that according to rumors, those who 
																																								 																				
26 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1 (Confiscation of rebel properties). “Files of the Federal 
Agent of the Public Ministry,” f. 110-112. 23 July 1924. In the city of Guadalajara, the scope of such 
efforts affected 12 individuals; while generals Enrique Estrada and Rafael Buelna faced lawsuits, and were 
accused of the crimes of rebellion and “civil responsibility.” 
27 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1 (Confiscation of rebel properties), ff. 37-42 
28 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1, “Confiscation of rebel properties,” ff. 45-46, 15 February 
1924 
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have given [the] money that was asked for have not been consigned nor have they had 
their properties confiscated.”29  
On the matter, the governor conceded that those in charge of opening up 
investigations in every district had committed some irregularities with respect to the 
carrying out of the presidential disposition. “In some cases I had knowledge that there 
have been paid influences by the landowners to obtain the restoration [of properties],” 
confirmed Zuno.30 In the month that followed the armed uprising several companies, 
politicians, and landowners protested the abuses Governor Zuno committed, labeling 
them unfounded accusations and/or threats. The submission of twenty-three complaints 
and petitions to the Ministry of Interior for review—in addition to documents found in 
other repositories—attest to these vindictive actions. The twenty-three petitions filed to 
the Ministry of Interior, for example, while only representative of a small sample, can be 
organized into four categories: complaints against Zuno regaining the governorship 
(two); reported political repression (three); threat of property confiscation (three); and 
reports of property confiscation (fifteen). If we were to focus on the fifteen reports and 
the total number of properties confiscated, the total number rises to twenty-eight. 
Together, the confiscations were aimed at three types of properties: business-related 
(five); rural estates (seventeen); and unspecified properties (six).31 Such documents, 
																																								 																				
29 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, Acta 54, 
“Memorandum for Enrique Colunga from Estrada Magallanes,” March 1924. 
30 Governor Zuno made reference to some concrete cases of landowners who partook in such 
affairs, such as: Jesús Rosas of San Martín Hidalgo; Gortázar, who had three estates confiscated; the 
Camarena men from Teuchitlán; Manuel Rivas in La Barca; Uribe Valencia; and the Catarina and Villa 
Michel men in San Gabriel—among others. 
31 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244. 
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however, only represented the tip of the iceberg in a systematic purge that intended to 
restructure power at the regional level, and to repress those deemed to outside the bounds 
of the new order.  
Jesús Álvarez del Castillo, the proprietor of the Guadalajara-based newspaper El 
Informador, for example, noted that not only had his building been confiscated, but so 
too had the company’s offices and printing press.32 On 15 February 1924, Governor Zuno 
wrote to Álvarez del Castillo to inform him that, “[as] a result [of] the rebel actions of the 
Newspaper Company […that are] publically known, this Executive, in use of its 
extraordinary faculties […] agreed to provisionally confiscate said Company […].”33 
Two days later, Álvarez del Castillo refuted such accusations, attesting to the fact that it 
was not true that the newspaper had carried out “revolutionary labors.” “Before the 
movement it [El Informador] did not make political propaganda in favor of any 
candidate, and after, during the occupation of Guadalajara by the rebel forces,” confirmed 
Álvarez del Castillo, “I limited myself to publishing the censored news and the bulletins 
to which I was obligated by the force of circumstances.” The proprietor affirmed his 
belief that his company has always been absolutely independent and “never has it 
received rewards, gifts, subsidies, public offices or concession from anyone […].” And 
that in his seven years as a journalist, never had he belonged to a political party, but 
rather he believed the Government of the State confiscated his newspaper company 
																																								 																				
32 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Complaint 
about the confiscation of the Newspaper El Informador,” 16 February 1924.  
33 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1, “Confiscation of rebel properties,” ff. 45-46, 15 February 
1924 
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because his brother is Lic. Juan Manuel Álvarez del Castillo: “[this] repression [is] 
monstrous because a person can never be responsible or free of the acts of a relative 
however close they may be.”34   
Not long after, Alfredo Morfín Silva, a resident of Guadalajara, complained of the 
government’s confiscation of the Compañía Telefonica Jalisciense. On 25 February 
1924, American E.G. Purnell also echoed these sentiments in a letter directed to the 
Ministry of Interior, wherein he communicated that Governor Zuno had confiscated his 
telephone company without a written order: “without even permitting [that] an inventory 
of the [present] goods [be made nor] that a public notary carryout the respective act […] 
with which the rights of American shareholders were violated.” In response to such 
actions, the corresponding agency sent a document to the governor of Jalisco expressing 
the complaints and ordering him to turn in a report justifying the particular matter, and 
asked for guarantees on behalf of the company. Zuno responded to such pressure with a 
series of attachments, providing a copy of the appointment made in favor of José Aviña, 
as auditor, and declaring that the confiscation of the company was ordered because of 
“the coexistence [between] the people who run the Compañía Telefonica Jalisciense 
[and] the rebels being notorious and [for] the indispensable [nature] of the complete 
																																								 																				
34 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1, “Confiscation of rebel properties,” f. 8, 17 February 1924. 
In a similar fashion, the local newspaper Restauración was also confiscated “for the same reason that the 
confiscation of El Informador occurred” and an expedited appointment was made by the Executive of the 
State in favor of an Enrique C. Villaseñor to serve in the capacity of provisional auditor of the company; 
see AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Complaint on the 
confiscation of the newspaper Restuaración.” 
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destruction of the enemies of the legal institutions.” The governor, however, refused to 
deliver the report that was asked of him in order to justify his actions.35 
Deputy Dionisio Y. Gómez bemoaned the confiscation of the property belonging 
to his windowed mother, doña Lorenza Zavala Vda. de Gómez, which Zuno ordered and 
subsequently requested reports to justify such actions. A worried Gómez even personally 
appeared before the governor, “who in a rude manner told him to wait […] and [he] was 
not provided with a definitive answer.” The deputy concluded that Zuno carried out these 
efforts in the spirit of revenge and that “the motive for the hostility [toward] him was that 
he was not a supporter of the politics that Zuno and his camarilla have developed in the 
State of Jalisco […].” And that he wanted to get rid of individuals who “constitute an 
affront” to zunista politics.36 Meanwhile, Salvador Cortina Solórzano, complained that an 
hacienda called Citala, property of his mother Soledad Solórzano de Cortina, had also 
been confiscated after the occupation of Guadalajara by the federal forces. An armed 
group at the orders of Vicente Soto, who “calls himself municipal president of 
Tuxcueca,” had apparently taken possession of the estate and in the process impeded its 
employees from carrying out their labors. “[…Señora] Cortina possesses a small shop in 
the town of Tuxcueca containing seed, sacks, tools and other agricultural implements,” 
confirmed the complainant, “of which have been confiscated by the municipal authorities 
of that place.” The petition alleged that due to the sex of señora Cortina, it was not 
																																								 																				
35 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Complaint 
about the confiscation of the Compañía Telefonica Jalisciense,” 21 February 1924. 
36 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Complaint 
from Deputy Dionisio Y Gomez for the confiscation of the Property from Lorenza Zavala Vda. de Gomez,” 
26 February 1924. 
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possible that she could have had any intervention in the last events that happened in 
Jalisco, “something that is completely known in Guadalajara.” Additionally, Cortina 
Solórzano solicited the help of the president of the republic so that justice may be 
imparted “since they [her three sons] live dedicated to their labor in the fields without any 
connection to the armed elements that caused the revolt […].”37 
All the way from the tequila producing fields of Amatitán, Luz Ornelas de 
Ontiveros, in representation of her own interests and those of her five children (whom 
were not of age), complained that the governor decreed and carried out the confiscation 
of her rural and urban estates—including some lands planted with agave and a factory 
that distills “Vino Tequila.” The widow claimed the mandate was not carried out with a 
written order nor was there any detail provided with regard to the motives undergirding 
such actions. The complainant was, however, able to find out that she was being accused 
of supplying the rebels with livestock, arms and other resources, and moved to dismiss 
such accusations as “entirely implausible” on the basis of her sex and of the young age of 
her children (the oldest not even 12 years of age). “[It] is not possible that [I] would have 
had any complicity with the actions that have been attributed to [me…],” affirmed señora 
Ornelas de Ontiveros. While Governor Zuno confiscated the property as “an auxiliary of 
the Federal Government” with the purpose of having an accomplice to rebellion pay for 
their actions, the Ministry of Interior saw it differently and promptly conceded that 
articles 14, 16, 22, and 27 of the Federal Constitution had been violated, and, as a result, 
																																								 																				
37 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Complaint 
from Salvador Cortina Solorzano in his own name and of his brother Jose of the same last name for the 
confiscation of the Hacienda Citalas of the Municipality of Teocuitatlan and of Tuxcueca, Jal,” 14 March 
1924. 
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ordered him to return the confiscated properties, “giving the necessary guarantees [to the 
widow], for the benefit of her and of her young children.”38  
In the nearby municipality of El Arenal, Manuel Ruiz narrated how in a similar 
fashion his properties were confiscated by a government inspector without a written order 
demonstrating the legal cause of the “illegal procedure” carried out. “[The] person in 
charge verbally explained,” detailed Ruiz, “that the confiscation was due to the act of 
having supplied the [estradista] rebels [with] livestock and arms […].” The petition, 
however, clarified that the accusations against him, of proportioning resources to the 
rebels, were not true because the rebels took from his business whatever they wanted, and 
that they did it through their own authority and with force (with the opposition that his 
employees put up not being enough). The proprietor closed his petition with a strong 
critique of the governor: “that when […] Zuno made [a] public declaration through the 
press […in] December [of 1923 wherein he] expressed that in light [of the fact] that he 
lacked sufficient strength to confront the rebel movement, he would assume a passive 
character […] the governor abandoned the important post of which he had obtained in a 
popular election.” Making no secret of his disappointment, Ruiz called for the illegal 
procedure to be brought to an end and for an “undoing” of the confiscation that had 
greatly impacted his financial and personal interests.39    
																																								 																				
38 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Complaint of 
Luz Ornelas de Ontiveros, about the confiscation of town property and some lands plated with mezcal 
(agave) and of a factory for the elaboration of Vino Tequila, located in the Municipality of Amatitán, Jal,” 
5 March 1924. 
39 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Complaint 
from Manuel Ruiz for the confiscation of his Industrial Agricultural Property, located in the population of 
Arenal, Jal,” 4 March 1924.  
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 Outside of the petitions directed to the Ministry of Interior, there were also several 
personal letters addressed to the president of the republic, which denounced individuals 
who had actively taken part in the rebellion, but had yet to be sanctioned for siding with 
the rebel forces. What makes these letters especially revealing, however, are the 
perspectives they hold with regard to the governor’s role in pacifying the region. Juan 
Martínez, for example, wrote a letter to President Obregón on 12 March 1924 reaffirming 
his loyalty to the state: “You do not ignore the names of many of those that have 
contributed to the growth of the revolution that in these regions has finished due to the 
wise dispositions that you dictated, and of which the current governor of the State, J. 
Guadalupe Zuno, has not wanted to contribute to […].” Martínez went on to describe 
how local landowner Manuel M. Rivas—proprietor of the Hacienda de Zalamea—forced 
Maximiliano Ortega, Pedro Ortega (administrator and foreman at his hacienda), J. Santos 
Echeverría (field manager), and others “to second the [estradista] rebel movement.” And 
highlighted other cases to prove that many local landowners also took part in the armed 
movement but were not punished, such as: Joaquín Aceves, proprietor of Hacienda del 
Tarengo, who apparently lent his horses to the movement; and Agustín H. Hernández, 
proprietor of the Hacienda de Margaritas, who helped an esteemed friend in the rebel 
government of Francisco Tolentino and had not been compromised because of being a 
relative of Governor Zuno.40  
On 21 March 1924 Governor Zuno wrote to President Obregón to confirm receipt 
of his letters whose “content definitively marks the line of conduct that the Government 
																																								 																				
40 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1, “Confiscation of rebel properties,” ff. 69-70, 28 April 
1924. 
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of Jalisco should follow with respect to the property of the rebels.” The abusive practices 
and irregularities committed under the zunista administration, in a short-time, 
notwithstanding, amassed a good amount of pressure from aggrieved parties. To the 
extent that those actions now warranted a response and a concerted effort made to correct 
such wrongdoings. The governor expressed the following to Obregón:  
I hope to communicate to you very soon, […] who by my concept were 
the proprietors whose commitments with the rebels merited the 
confiscation. I will secure that all restorations be made under the promise 
that the affected […not] make any reclamations for the damages that they 
could have suffered, since I think that these were not grave because I have 
established a surveillance that has given good results; and because, 
additionally, in all occasion I hope to defend the interests of the Federation 
and of the State.41 
 
Zuno closed the letter with an attachment of the “first studies” of the property that Adolfo 
de la Huerta had returned to the Clergy in Guadalajara during the rebellion—in effect, it 
was a lengthy report detailing the clerical origins of the School of Arts and Offices of the 
Holy Spirit, and the College of Catholic Ladies—and that Zuno intended to reclaim for 
the State. This report not only offered the Government of Jalisco a basis to obtain the 
nationalization of such properties, but also reaffirmed a commitment on the part of the 
zunista administration to promote an unwavering secularism, which in years to come 
would escalate to unprecedented levels. 42 
																																								 																				
41 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1, “Confiscation of rebel properties,” ff. 88-89, 21 March 
1924. 
42 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1, “Confiscation of rebel properties,” ff. 88-89, 21 March 
1924. In reference to the religion question, Zuno wrote: “About that related to Archbishop Orozco y 
Jiménez, I have verbally referred to Ponce de León, the special conditions of the region where said catholic 
priest searches for protection when he believes himself persecuted. Also, I am making a thorough 
investigation and will proceed with all the tact and preparation that you advise.” 
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 In a brief addressed to President Obregón—submitted about a week later—a 
consulting attorney, commissioned to assess the constitutionality of the confiscations 
carried out in the State of Jalisco, conceded that those responsible for all crimes indeed 
had the “civil responsibility” to pay for the damages and harm that their criminal act 
could have caused. For political matters, the attorney advised President Obregón of the 
highly beneficial nature of establishing a law that would not force a retroactive demand 
of such responsibilities from those guilty of the crime of rebellion,  
since the [original law] was made following the triumph of the 
Constitutionalist Revolution when the Constitution of 1917 was expedited 
[…] that empowered the [individual] in charge of the Executive Power to 
execute the Law of Civil Responsibility [and to apply it] to the authors, 
conspirators and accessories to the crimes committed against the 
constitutional order in the month of February of 1913 […].43 
 
Thus, the attorney observed that a confiscation could not proceed in any other manner 
without violating guarantees established in the Constitution. But if the confiscation of any 
properties were to to have been verified during the alteration of public peace—such as 
during the outbreak of the Estradista Rebellion—and before the suspension of individual 
guarantees, “all measures dictated against the properties of the rebels would have 
remained sanctioned by the same events without any room for a complaint […].” Since 
the confiscations in Jalisco did not occur in the manner detailed, and because of the fact 
that the administrative authorities intended to take possession of the properties—of those 
responsible for the armed movement against the constitutional Government—after the 
fact, the attorney claimed: “it is undeniable that this conflict would be irregular, against 
																																								 																				
43 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1, “Confiscation of rebel properties,” ff. 98-100.  
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all law and especially in conflict with the guarantees that the General Constitution of the 
Republic concedes.” This matter, therefore, fell under the jurisdiction of judicial 
authorities and it was they who had the power to decided on all issues related to the “civil 
responsibility” incurred by the individuals who took part in the rebellion.44 Not the 
Executive branch of the State nor its administration as had become commonplace 
following the armed uprising. 
Popular Anxieties and Community   
 
On 26 January 1924, the people of Teocaltiche filed a petition signed by more 
than 230 residents and directed it to the president of the republic, energetically asking 
that José G. Zuno not be allowed to recapture the governorship because: 1) they felt had 
not been elected by the people, but rather his “so-called election” was due to the 
intervention of the Municipal Authorities of the State who—with all of the means 
available to them—prevented the people from taking part in the election; and 2) they 
claimed that not even in the era of don Porfirio Díaz, “were the interests of the State 
managed [so closely], justice [as] prostituted, [nor] individual guarantees [as] broken.” 
The members of the community assured the President Obregón that if the previous 
rebellion found echo amongst some elements, it was due to the abuses and exactions of 
all kinds, “suffered by the citizens of all social, political and religious creeds.”45 
Similarly, the predominantly indigenous northern town of Mezquitán also complained 
																																								 																				
44 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1, “Confiscation of rebel properties,” ff. 98-100, 1 April 
1924.  
45 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 428-J-6, f. 1-3. 27 January 1924; AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, 
Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Complaints from various people of Teocaltiche, because of the 
taking of possession of the Government of Jalisco, by J.G. Zuno,” 9 February 1924. 
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about Zuno’s return to power “for not having defended [during the rebellion] the legal 
institutions which Álvaro Obregón presides over.” The nine individuals, who authored 
the petition, put on record that, “[Zuno] DID ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DEFEND 
THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE [emphasis appeared in the original].” In agrarian matters, 
the community went as far as to accuse the governor of carrying out a politics 
diametrically opposed to that of the Federal Executive and cited a specific example to 
highlight his conniving ways: “that […when] the town gathered on the 26 of March of 
the past year [1923] to celebrate a session, Zuno sent some agents to divide them, and 
[after] achieving his objective, he jailed in the Penitentiary one of the Indigenous 
[peoples] who had the communal titles of the town of Mezquitán and did not free him, 
until he obtained the related titles.”46 
The Central Executive Committee of the League of Agrarian Communities of 
Jalisco wrote to President Obregón “as Mexican citizens in the use of their rights” and in 
representation of the diverse people “we have been able to assemble” to assert that Zuno 
had prior knowledge of the military uprising led by Enrique Estrada. And to make 
matters worse, according to the Committee, when the movement broke out the governor 
went in search of resources, which could be of use to him if the national government of 
Alvaro Obregón triumphed. The Committee asked that a provisional governor be named 
with the goal of forming an administration that complies with the Law. “The people of 
Jalisco [and] of Guadalajara never had knowledge of Zuno launching a protest or 
[disavowing] the rebel movement,” claimed the agraristas, “and if he did formulate some 
																																								 																				
46 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 968, Tomo I, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Exp. 9, Caja 244, “Complaint from 
the old town of Mezquitan, against Guadalupe Zuno, because of his return to Power,” February 1924.  
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decrees […] they were probably kept in his pocket for future objectives [to] benefit his 
interests.” The fourteen communities that supported the petition stressed the need to bring 
the authors, accomplices, and accessories to the uprising to justice, “even […] those that 
now make themselves appear [as] loyal supporters of the Constitutional Government.”47  
An additional nineteen agrarian communities complained of the conduct of 
regional authorities, the rural forces, and of the private henchmen sent from the great 
landed estates—whom all committed numerous killings and atrocities against them to the 
point that they “were tearing us apart.” When the military uprising arrived to their 
doorsteps, however, the majority of these citizens did all they could to fight against the 
“reaction.” “We declared […] with all fortitude, that in Jalisco we were against 
estradismo, and in favor of the Government […],” reaffirmed the agraristas. During the 
rebellion, several communities organized themselves into armed groups to combat the 
“traitors,” suffered many casualties, and actively risked their lives in support of the 
Government; yet after the triumph of the national state, the situation grew worse for 
many. Naïvely believing that the defeat and suppression of the uprising would mean a 
definitive victory for the ideals and rights they had long fought for in the name of the 
Revolution, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, numerous soldiers, loyal to 
Governor Zuno, were said to have been deployed in many towns throughout the 
countryside. “We confess […] our astonishment, that José Guadalupe Zuno has been 
																																								 																				
47 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 428-J-6, ff. 10-12, 18 February 1924. The letter sent to president on 
behalf of the Central Executive Committee of the League of Agrarian Communities was signed by the 
following communities: the town of Teuchitlán; Rancho Nuevo and San Ignacio (Mpio. De Ahualulco); 
Tonalá; Zalatitán; Tequila; Ahualulco; Techaluta; Atemajac de Brizuela; Acatlán de Juárez; Zapopan; Villa 
Corona; the town of Tololotlán; and the town of Teocuitatlán de Corona. 
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authorized to arm [his] forces […],” lamented the collective of agraristas, “so that they 
can persecute us with an inexplicable hatred, as if going to the battle field to defend [the 
state], was a monstrous crime […].”  
The above-mentioned agrarian communities never asked to be compensated for 
the services they lent to the Government in their moment of need, “given [that] we felt it 
our duty to sustain it.” But never in their wildest dreams did they believe their 
recompense would come in the form of hatred and persecution. Protesting the constant 
atrocities and intolerable and illegal hostility they were subjected to, the nineteen agrarian 
communities submitted three formal requests to President Obregón: 1) they wanted the 
disarmament of the acordadas of the haciendas to take place; 2) a formal investigation of 
the abuses committed, to be carried out by Headquarters of Military Operations; and 3) 
that the zunista forces either be subordinated and placed under the control of said 
Headquarters or be definitively disarmed, so that the federal forces would be able to 
instead provide the necessary guarantees. “[In] Jalisco there are no other revolutionary 
elements like the agraristas, and […] they are the only element with which the 
Government can effectively count on […] except in the case that you consider us 
useless,” lamented the agrarian representatives to President Obregón, “and this could be a 
consequence of the persecution that is carried out against us.”48 
																																								 																				
48 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 428-J-6, ff. 213-215, 16 April 1924. The petition was signed by thirty-
nine individuals in representation of the following communities: Acatlán de Juárez, Zapopan, San Marcos 
(4o Cantón), San Sebastianito, Atotonilco el Bajo, Catarina (4o Cantón), La Barranca de Santa Clara, 
Chiquilistlán, San Juan de Ocotlán, Zacoalco de Torres, Los Naranjos, Tescalame (5o Cantón), La Calera 
(5o Cantón), San Marcos (12 Cantón), Ahualulco de Mercado, Nextipac (1er Cantón), Atemajac de 
Brizuela, Sindicato de Agricultores de Autlán, and San Martín de las Flores (1er Cantón).   
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In a letter addressed to Governor Zuno, Cosme R. Sedano, the speaker of the 
Secretariat of the Local Agrarian Commission, described his visit to Chiquilistlán—one 
of the communities that signed the above-mentioned petition—and provided significant 
insight into the specific grievances this particular community expressed. Shortly after 
taking residence in the community, Speaker Sedano proceeded to interview the municipal 
president with goal of having this individual call upon the Agrarian Committee of the 
area. Not long after complying with his request, the municipal president returned with the 
secretary of the Agrarian Committee—escorted by 30-armed agraristas. Sedano 
proceeded to interrogate the members of the community in order to gather information 
about the difficulties they were experiencing to which they revealed that they had not 
faced any difficulty in matters related to the acquisition of their ejidos; however, when it 
came to the ‘political question’ such was not the case. The community claimed that not 
long ago a representative of the Confederación de Partidos Revolucionarios approached 
them and ordered the agraristas to vote for the zunistas on the ballot—but the community 
openly refused to submit to such wishes on the grounds that the “Confederados” of Zuno 
had previously betrayed them. During this exchange of impressions various community 
members made use of “the spoken word” in what was described as “a simultaneous 
manner,” and phrases not all that pleasant for the Government were heard. Sedano 
continued to push his interrogation tactics upon the community, asking whether the 
governor, as well as the other competent authorities, had refused support to the 
community or if their complaints had been adequately addressed. But before he could 
finish the question, an individual interrupted Sedano’s efforts: “Let’s go […] Let’s not 
listen to him, he is a Zunista […] You all know what our comrade Manzano says that 
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when Calles comes to power they will elevate our own [people] and the traitors will go 
down.” In the report’s conclusion, Sedano offered to diagnose the problem present within 
the community: “With sadness I was able to ascertain the antagonism that exists among 
the campesino element of that place for the governor of the state and his collaborators, 
[and it is] the municipal president, the municipal secretary, the president of the Agrarian 
Committee, and the secretary of the Agrarian Committee (Manzano), in my humble 
opinion[, who are] responsible for that disorientation.”49 
Across many municipalities in the state, however, the actions of the zunista 
administration were rumored to have led to bloody and grave conflicts, which the 
governor was accused of combating with a series of assassinations. In the middle of May 
1924, for example, the Political Boss of Cocula, with the help of an armed zunista force, 
carried out the assassination of two agraristas. The bodies were subsequently hurled into 
a waterhole, where they were found a few days later already in a state of decomposition. 
A half year later, Governor Zuno sent henchman Pedro Flores Grajeda to assume the 
political leadership of the Atoyac with specific instructions to act “energetically.” Local 
Deputy Basilio M. Rodríguez was also sent to Atoyac to officially transfer power to the 
new Political Boss and to direct the political maneuvers agreed upon beforehand. Grajeda 
and Rodríguez, with numerous individuals from the zunista forces, then proceed to 
apprehend various agraristas—among them, Felipe Diego, Donanciano Estrada, and 
Gilberto Casasola—and locked them up in the Municipal Jail. The agraristas were 
supposed to be taken to Sayula to be processed, but “in reality they took them to 
																																								 																				
49 AHJ, Gobernación, 1924, Sin Clasificación, “Escrito de Cosme R. Sedano al Goberanador del 
Estado,” 15 November 1924. 
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Amacueca, where they killed them [and hid] their bodies in a waterhole [and] covered 
[them] with rocks and dirt.” In Tuxcueca, motivated by personal political conviction, the 
governor provoked the division of the community and made use of a zunista group to 
assassinate the agraristas Jesus González and Rafael González. “The current persecution 
continues against the father of the González’s and the agraristas [that are] not zunistas,” 
confirmed the report. Many political assassinations were also reported to have been 
carried out by henchmen loyal to Zuno, which included but was not limited to the deaths 
of: the municipal president of Zacoalco de Torres, Lorenzo Anzaldo; the campesino 
Andrés Ramos from Citala in Teocuitatlán de Corona; Froilan Rodríguez, president of the 
antizunista political group and councilmen-elect of Tecolotlán; and Brígido Rosas from 
El Grullo. “All of the bloody crimes have remained unpunished,” lamented the same 
report, “as if it is not in the best interest that [the assassinations] be clarified […].”50  
Numerous agrarian and labor organizations of Jalisco declared that they would 
not be on the side of Zuno because of his conduct towards the workers who labored in the 
field and in the city, which they deemed an affront to the revolutionary principals of the 
country. “We have been victims of his speculative tendencies, […Zuno] has carried out a 
politics of appeasement and revenge, which has facilitated opportunities to harmonize 
with a majority of the reactionaries that satisfy his ambitions for wealth, and only [the] 
ones who combat him are those who do not fold to his demands.” And to the citizens that 
the governor could not exploit, he showed hostility towards them to the point that many 
																																								 																				
50 AGN, DGIPS, Departamento Confidencial, 310(3.2)–3 I, Nombre: Estado de Jalisco, Asunto: 
Situación Política, “Report authored by Minority Deputies to the Permanent Commission of the Congress 
of the Union,” February 1926. 
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accused the current administration of simulating an antirevolutionary ideology. The 
organization of agrarians and laborers affirmed that all of the people could prove that 
Zuno had exploited them, “snatching the product of their labor,” and that every agrarian 
procedure had given him some room to do business with the affected proprietors. The 
time had come, according to these workers, to name a provisional governor since the 
“powers had disappeared.”51 Given that the political opposition authored and/or collected 
many of these types of reports, it might be plausible to detect an element of exaggeration. 
The sheer number of events—in addition to the discontent voiced by numerous agrarian 
communities across the State—however, is worthy of consideration and point towards 
either the presence of local petty political factionalism or a larger systemic attempt to 
repress agrarians not in line with the official politics of the zunista administration. 
Zuno complained of the agraristas groups left in some regions of the State who 
were not used to the life of a soldier and that were badly disciplined, which ambitious 
politicians consistently took advantage of and that frequently caused his Government 
unease. The governor asserted that: “in some cases [they have] even tried to depose the 
aunicipal authorities in Acatlán de Juárez, in which I saw [myself] obligated to reinstate 
the municipal president by means of armed force [and…without there being] [any] 
victims, since the agraristas fled when they [saw] the presence of the forces of the 
Government,” asserted the governor. Zuno, nonetheless, warned the president of the 
republic of General Eugenio Aviña—commissioned by President Obregón to organize 
“those people”—that “[Aviña] should have some care on the selection of his emissaries 
																																								 																				
51 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 428-J-6, ff. 63-64, 24 March 1924.  
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and officials, since it is notable […that] at his side [are] the false agraristas [who] occupy 
themselves in stirring up and worrying the Communities […].” And while General Aviña 
remained enthusiastic about the “theory” that all agraristas should be armed, Zuno 
cautioned the president of the republic that in specific regions of the State such notions 
caused concerns.52 On 24 May 1924, however, Marcelino Cedano telegraphed President 
Obregón to let him know that the Segunda Convención Agrarista de Jalisco agreed to 
energetically protest the zunista abuses carried out the day before against agrarian 
comrades in Ocotlán, “taking away their pistols and reducing them to prison.” The 
agrarians in question were said to be members of the first regional agrarian corps that 
fought against the estradista forces in defense of the National Government.53 
On 10 April 1924 Governor Zuno threw his support behind the activation of the 
agrarian question to a “high grade” and sought to take advantage of the fallout from the 
Estradista Rebellion to help the former. In a letter addressed to President Obregón, he 
wrote the following: “I believe that [the] culminating […] agrarian problem in Jalisco has 
now been resolved and I am quite sure that through my action, in a short period I will be 
able to finish the provisional grants that have been solicited from me.”54 Although 
continuously denounced as an enemy of the agrarian cause, over the course of his 
administration a total of 324,740.899 hectares of land were redistributed to more than 
54,387 campesinos. To place this into context, from 1915 to 1935 Jalisco had a total of 
																																								 																				
52 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1, “Confiscation of rebel properties,” ff. 37-42. 
53 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 428-J-6, ff. 181, 24 May 1924.		
54 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1, “Confiscation of rebel properties,” ff. 37-42.  
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19 different governors with a median tenure of 10 months in power—Zuno had the 
longest tenure of any governor at 38.25 months. Under his governorship, a total of 
113,636.81 hectares of land were redistributed to 22,157 campesinos; that is to say, the 
efforts of the governor represented 34.99 percent of all land redistributed in State and 
approximately 40.73 percent of all campesinos that received land grants during that 
period (see Table 2). A total of 107 expedientes were resolved and only 5 were denied, 
which in turn comprised 34.74 of all expedientes resolved in the dataset, and only 5.49 
percent of all those denied.55  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
55 AGN, Lázaro Cárdenas del Río, 404.1/140.  
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Table 2: Hectares Awarded by Governors in Jalisco, 1915-1935. 
 
Source: Archivo General de la Nación, Lázaro Cárdenas del Río, 404.1/140. 
 
 
In a report given to the XXIX Local Legislature at the beginning of 1925, for 
example, Zuno boasted about the thirty-six files that had already been resolved and 
claimed that an additional twenty-three communities were in the process of having their 
files processed.56 And a year later, at the same venue, the governor declared that during 
the course of the previous year the Executive of the State, in cooperation with the Local 
Agrarian Commission, granted fifty thousand twenty-six hectares and fifty centiares of 
																																								 																				
56 El Informador, “Periodo Congreso. El ciudadno gobernador rindió su informe,” 2 February 
1925. 
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land to seventy agrarian communities.57 Zuno took full advantage of the defeat of the 
Estradista Rebellion—and also a favorable national decree—to grant numerous citizens 
land. And while his politics aroused conflicting anxieties among many of Jalisco’s 
agrarian communities, the measure allowed for an unprecedented amount of citizens to 
enjoy lands to farm; the decree, however, was subsequently repealed by federal 
authorities, but not without Jalisco taking full advantage of it. The governor claimed that 
when the landowners saw themselves dispossessed, “they vigorously presented 
themselves before me, celebrating favorable arrangements; and so by mutual agreement, I 
was able to deliver a large number of hectares that today, [even when all the land given 
by] all governments before and after is totaled, does not equal the amount.”58  
Popular Sovereignty and The Free Municipality   
 
When provisional Governor Francisco Tolentino came to power shortly after the 
outbreak of the Estradista Rebellion in December of 1923, he issued “decree number 
one” that reaffirmed the sovereignty of the State of Jalisco—deciding to not recognize 
General Obregón as president of the republic, and the public authorities of the State 
(comprised of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches). Moreover, in an effort 
to restructure and organize public functions—both in the capital of Guadalajara and in the 
rest of the population of the State—Tolentino appointed “Municipal Councils with strict 
																																								 																				
57 El Informador, “Ante la H. Legislatura rindió ayer su informe el señor Gobernador del Estado,” 
2 February 1926. 
58 Llerenas, “José Guadalupe Zuno,” p. 67 
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subjection to the will of the people [in] the municipalities […] where it be necessary.”59 
On his return to power in mid-February, however, José G. Zuno published a decree in the 
Periódico Oficial del Gobierno wherein he made use of the extraordinary powers granted 
to him by the Constitution of the State to “not recognize all of those functionaries that 
directly or indirectly have contributed to the uprising of a pseudo government.” The 
decree he enacted affected a total of fifty-three municipalities, immediately suspended 
their municipal administrations, and designated new representatives to take charge of “the 
Municipal Power until the responsibility of the suspended functionaries is determined or 
extraordinary elections are called [for in every one of those municipalities].”60  
Article 115 of the Constitution of 1917 proclaimed that all States in Mexico “shall 
adopt the popular, representative, republican form of government, with the municipio 
libre as the basis of their territorial division and political and administrative 
organization.”61 Zuno is often remembered as one of the boldest promoters of the recently 
conquered principal of municipal autonomy and a ferocious defender of federalism. Such 
descriptions conjure up images of an obsessed individual who walked the streets of 
Guadalajara with a Constitution in hand spouting, as one historian has noted, “the most 
complete and consistent civil project of the revolution in defense of legality, against 
																																								 																				
59 Archivo Histórico del Municipio de Autlán (hereinafter cited as AHMA), 1923 (Gobernación, 
6), “Decree number one, Francisco Tolentino,” 11 December 1923.  
60 Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, 14 February 1924. The decree was originally authored 
during the Estradista Rebellion (dated on 12 January 1924), but only came to light after the Government of 
the Center had reestablished control of the region.  
61 For a full text of the Constitution of Mexico, along with the see the “Mexico’s Constitution of 
1917 with Amendments through 2007” via Constitute Project, 
“http://www.constituteproject.org/constitution.Mexico_2007.pdf  
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threats […] from the ranks from the revolutionary and political apparatus.”62 Early in his 
political career Zuno upheld such values and demonstrated an inclination towards 
defending the principle of the Free Municipality. As municipal president of Guadalajara 
in 1922, for example, the budding politician convened a meeting with the municipal 
presidents of Ameca, Sayula, Tepatitlán, Ciudad Gúzman, and Tlaquepaque to “intensify 
the well-defined idea of municipal liberty and [to] accord the best way this idea [can] be 
made truth […for] the intellectual and material betterment of their comprehension.”63 
These efforts contributed to his ascent, and subsequent appointment, to the presidency of 
the board within the Congreso de Ayuntamientos of Jalisco, where Zuno joined eleven 
municipal presidents to discuss and debate critical issues regarding the scope and limits 
of municipal liberty. In a speech to said Congress Zuno declared the following:  
All social political action should be fundamentally grounded in municipal 
power […] it is the ayuntamientos who are responsible for giving 
education and [providing the facility for] survival of all social classes […] 
we want to inaugurate new political pacts […and] establish new paths for 
jalisciense politics.64   
 
The political opportunism to be had in the wake of the Estradista Rebellion, however, 
proved too much for Zuno to not capitalize on; and as a result, he swiftly spread the 
tentacles of his movement deep into the municipalities of the state and intervened in 
municipal-level politics.  
																																								 																				
62 Llerenas “José Guadalupe Zuno,” p. 54 
63 Tamayo, La consolidación, p 147.  
64 Tamayo, La consolidación, pp. 179-180.  
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In the months following the estradista uprising, the governor was accused of not 
only replacing all of the municipal councils formed during the uprising, but of also 
replacing several ayuntamientos in the State with individuals “that were foreign to the 
populations, employees of the Executive, and, therefore, absolutely unconditional 
[supporters].”65 For example, from 5 March 1924 to 23 June 1925, for example, the 
Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco reveals that at least twenty-seven municipal 
administrations were replaced—with at least five municipalities experiencing multiple 
changes (Tepatitlán de Morelos, Tecocuitatlán de Corona, Encarnación de Díaz, 
Juchitlán, and Villa Corona). Among the notifications published, Zacoalco de Torres and 
Manzanillo expressed specific complaints: the former voiced that no member of its 
ayuntamiento participated in the Estradista Rebellion; while the latter asked for 
guarantees because the governor had not recognized their capacity to rule. Additionally, 
the residents of Zapotlán proactively asked for the recovery of their town council, 
whereas the municipal president of Tonila wanted clarification on whether or not he 
should deliver municipal power to the individual named by the Executive the State.66  
																																								 																				
65 AGN, DGIPS, Departamento Confidencial, 310(3.2)–3 I, Nombre: Estado de Jalisco, Asunto: 
Situación Política, “Report authored by Minority Deputies to the Permanent Commission of the Congress 
of the Union,” February 1926. 
66 “Diario de los debates de la Cámara de Diputados,” Legislatura XXXI – Año II – Período 
Extraordinario – Fecha 19260323 (23 March 1926) – Número de Diario 3. Román del Campo, the 
individual in charge of the municipal administration of Tepatitlán de Morelos—also comes to mind. 
Responding to a circular asking for clarification regarding the municipality’s involvement in the previous 
rebellion, del Campo claimed that no rebel movement erupted in this municipality; rather, that it was 
instead occupied by the forces of rebel Colonel Cosme Anaya on 12 December 1923 that hailed from the 
capital of Guadalajara. On the 25th of that same month, the above rebel was said to have dissolved the 
ayuntamiento under the control of President Agripín Navarro and gathered some residents to form a 
Municipal Council that Dr. Pedro Torres presided over, “notifying [ here in this letter] that none of the 
people that assisted said junta did it voluntarily.” “Except for the Ayuntamiento, all of the employees of the 
state, federal and municipal, as well as the functionaries continued to serve in their posts, during the period 
of the rebellion,” stressed del Campo. On 16 February 1924, after the Municipal Council—who published 
notices declaring that they only carried out the municipal administration, so that it would not remain 
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The Municipality of Teocuitatlán de Corona, which claimed to have valiantly 
fought on the side of the state during the Estradista Rebellion, provides insight into one 
of the most egregious examples of unwarranted meddling into municipal politics. On 11 
September 1924, the municipal president of Teocuitatlán de Corona wrote a letter to 
Governor Zuno asking for clarification on why his municipality had been affected by the 
decree enacted earlier that year—since his administration had valiantly fought with arms 
in hand in defense of the state:  
[This Ayuntamiento], united with the one from Tizapán el Alto, was one 
of the few Ayuntamientos in this State [that] knew how to [fulfill] its duty 
during the rebel movement in that region, maintaining itself on the side of 
the Constitutional Government and lending its vigorous help to the loyal 
forces of the Federation, we hurriedly declare to you [Zuno] that surely 
[your] Government has been surprised by bad reports […].67   
 
Municipal President Montaño claimed to be in possession of reports that proved the 
opposite of what the governor had declared to the Ministry of Interior. He specifically 
made reference to a meeting in Celaya, between representatives of his municipality and 
Tizapán el Alto, and President Obregón. “The President of the Republic can, if it be 
necessary, confirm this fact, since he himself demonstrated his gratitude to the 
[previously] mentioned Ayuntamientos and additionally gave the Commission […] 
pecuniary help to go to Ocotlán to continue lending their services in favor of the 
constitutional Government […],” confirmed Montaño. The disclosed information, in the 
eyes of the municipal leadership, warranted a reconsideration of the governor’s decision 
																																								 																				
acephalous—the constitutional ayuntamiento once again took possession of their posts and assumed their 
duties; see AHJ, Gobernación, 1924, Sin Clasificación, Caja 4. 
67 AHJ, Gobernación, 1924, Sin Clasificación, Caja 2, Exp: 2.   
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to not recognize the legality of the local government, on the grounds that such actions 
were “entirely unjust.” President Montaño, nevertheless, warned that if such a decree and 
the subsequent sanctions remained intact, it would be “one of the biggest injustices that 
could be committed and that as a result [it would] forcibly lead to the demoralization of 
the [community] and their absolute indifference in [whatever would happen next] when 
he would most need their help.”68 
In an effort to “guarantee” effective suffrage at the local and national level, Zuno 
claims to have expedited extensive instructions to the municipal presidents of the State, 
warning them to completely abstain from any actions during elections beyond what the 
laws strictly assigned to them.69 A complaint lodged by the minority deputies of the 
Chamber of Jalisco, however, provides a different perspective with regard to the 
instructions individuals sent to take power were to follow: 
[they] were in charge of preparing the election of Ayuntamientos for the 
year of 1926, since during all the previous [year] they functioned in charge 
of the municipal power and naturally, these [individuals] in charge were 
included in the election ballots and currently assume the respective 
Municipal Presidencies, with marked displeasure from the residents, 
especially in the most important cities of the State.70 
 
In some cases—and mostly through the actions of maverick local deputies—independent 
ballots achieved some noticeable success, “which, the governor, naturally, saw with 
utmost displeasure and [made] use of his power [to] prevent that these independent 
																																								 																				
68 AHJ, Gobernación, 1924, Sin Clasificación, Caja 2, Exp: 2.   
69 El Informador, “Periodo Congreso. El ciudadno gobernador rindió su informe,” 2 February 
1925. 
70 AGN, DGIPS, 7/310 (3.2) “25,” Box 2024, State of Jalisco, Political Situation, 1925-B, Exp: 10, 
“Local Minority Report to the Permanent Commission of the Congress of the Union,” February 1926. 
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ballots take possession of their posts.”71 An anonymous group of popularly elected 
councilmen, for example, complained that a representative of the governor confronted 
them shortly after assuming their posts and “demanded that we resign from our posts […] 
since the governor did not trust us.” The councilmen rejected the illegal advances of the 
zunista administration and their calls to go see the governor in Guadalajara, largely due to 
that fact that they were aware “that various Ayuntamientos of the State were made to 
appear at his office at the Palacio de Gobierno, and there [at the same] place were made 
to sign their resignations.” The refusal on the part of the councilmen to succumb to such 
immoral tactics led to Zuno nullifying the verified elections that took place in that 
particular municipality: “[going] against all rights and flagrantly violating the popular 
vote.” This was none other than a dirty political maneuver, claimed the councilmen, since 
this was the only municipal government in the State that the governor could not 
eliminate.72  
																																								 																				
71 AGN, DGIPS, 7/310 (3.2) “25,” Box 2024, State of Jalisco, Political Situation, 1925-B, Exp: 10, 
“Local Minority Report to the Permanent Commission of the Congress of the Union,” February 1926. 
72 AGN, DGIPS, 2024-B, Exp. 10, “Estado de Jalisco. Situación Política.” February 1926. A 
report authored by the minority deputies from the Congress of Jalisco, a few months before, offered some 
interesting insight into some of the tactics deployed by the zunista administration. In the Municipality of 
San Pedro Tlaquepaque, Police Chief Juan D. Quintero was sent to San Martín de las Flores to head an 
armed group. They entered the population and opened fire upon the agraristas of the town—two of them 
died in the process. The assassin, Quintero, however, was rewarded by Zuno and sent to Teocuitatlán de 
Corona in the capacity of political boss to depose Municipal President J. Félix Ramos. The henchman then 
proceeded to assassinate agrarista Atanasio Martínez and not much later agrarista Francsico Villalobos 
experienced the same fate “for the only crime of not wanting to be a zunista.” On the fulfillment of his 
mission in the area and now “at the orders of the bloodthirsty cacique hacendado Ramón Villarreal,” 
Quintero was then sent to San Marcos and continued committing similar crimes until the agraristas of the 
town, “in defense of their lives and of their interests, killed him.” See AGN, DGIPS, 7/310 (3.2) “25,” Box 
2024, State of Jalisco, Political Situation, 1925-B, Exp: 10, “Local Minority Report to the Permanent 
Commission of the Congress of the Union,” February 1926. 
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During the annual report presented to the Congress of Jalisco, on February 1925, 
Zuno reiterated the specific actions taken after the Estradista Rebellion and presented a 
slightly modified version of the original decree drafted in the throes of the rebellion: 
“[…since] a great part of the constitutional ayuntamientos in fact recognized the so-called 
authorities emanating from the rebellion, [I saw myself] in the imperious situation of 
breaking in the absolute the political and administrative relationships with said 
ayuntamientos […].” The modified decree removed six municipalities from the list of 
targets—Jalostotitlán, Sayula, San Gabriel, El Grullo, Unión de Tula, and Pihuamo—and 
added twenty-two municipalities to the original list. This brought the total number of 
targeted municipalities accused of recognizing and lending a helping hand to the 
Estradista Rebellion to a total of sixty-nine municipalities. Additionally, Zuno claimed to 
have appointed provisional municipal presidents to take charge of those respective 
administrations “as the reformed article 23 of the Organic Law of the Executive Power 
and of Public Administration warns.” Throughout the duration of 1924 and beyond, 
nevertheless, municipal authorities were freely removed by the governor, “all the times 
[that] the administrative needs demanded it.”73			 
																																								 																				
73 El Informador, “Periodo Congreso. El ciudadno gobernador rindió su informe,” 2 February 
1925. The following ayuntamientos were affected by said decree: La Barca, Ocotlán, Jamay, Poncitlán, 
Atotonilco el Alto, Tototlán, Arandas, San Miguel el Alto, Unión de San Antonio, Zapotitlán, San Juan de 
los Lagos, Lagos de Moreno, Villa Hidalgo, Colotlán, Santa María de los Angeles, Hostotipaquillo, 
Etzatlán, San Marcos, Magdalena, Ahualulco, Tequila, Ameca, San Martín Hidalgo, Cocula, Tecolotlán, 
Ayutla, Ciudad Guzmán, Zapotiltic, Purificación, Cihuatlán, Jocotepec, Chapala, Acatlán de Juárez, 
Zacoalco, Tlajomulco, Concepción de Buenos Aires, Atemajac de Brizuela, Tlaquepaque, Zapopan, 
Tonalá, Tala, Quitupan, Manzanillo, Arenal, Valle de Juárez, Tamazula, Amatitán, Autlán, San Cristóbal 
de la Barranca, Chiquilistlán, Ejutla, Encarnación, Jesús María, San Sebastián (ex. 9º Cantón), Tecalitlán, 
Tepatitlán, Teuchitlán, Valle de Guadalupe, Yahualica, Zapotlán del Rey, Ayo el Chico, Atoyac, 
Teocuitatlán, San Diego de Alejandría, San Julián, Tapalpa, Amacueca, Tonila and, Cuautla. 
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The “legally elected councilmen” from the ayuntamiento of San Juan de los 
Lagos, for example, were forced to travel to Guadalajara and to present themselves at the 
office of Zuno’s Sub-Secretary, Gonzalo Amezcua. And once in said office, the 
councilmen claimed: “[we were told] that Governor Zuno would willingly welcome [the] 
presentation of our resignations with an irrevocable character as Members of the 
ayuntamiento of this place [San Juan de los Lagos].” The councilmen asserted their 
displeasure with the order, but Amezcua “insisted in his unjust demand, and went to the 
extent of threatening us if we did not fulfill his desires.” After taking into account the 
pressure exerted over the councilmen, they all agreed to present their resignations; 
Amezcua, however, wanted the councilmen to make it seem as if the impetus for the 
resignations originally came from them, which would require the councilmen to write up 
and sign their own documents. The councilmen refused to write up their own 
resignations. After a light discussion, they were given a document that a government 
employee drafted, “which we were forced to sign, in light of the pressure they exercised 
against us.” This pressure did not end at the office, but also travelled back with them to 
San Juan de los Lagos. A few weeks later, colonel Susano Castañeda presented himself 
and showed González Romo—the then municipal president—a message from 
Guadalajara, signed by Governor Zuno, “ordering him [Castañeda] to take charge of the 
Presidency, with the excuse that the components of the ayuntamiento had 
VOLUNTARILY resigned from their posts [emphasis in the original].” The councilmen 
colorfully described the administration of Castañeda: “The terrorist regime that survived 
in this Municipality during the ephemeral REIGN of CACIQUE Castañeda, was easily 
destroyed due to the power of public opinion that saw itself irritated [by] the oppression 
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that the cited cacique carried out over the people [emphasis in the original].” After the 
arrival of Sub-Secretary Amezcua to the population, substitute councilmen José L. 
Padilla was elevated to the post of municipal president who “was by any reckoning 
partial to the zunista administration […].”74   
Zuno commonly cited the extraordinary powers granted to him by the 
Constitution of Jalisco as sufficient grounds to justify the actions his administration took; 
but a deeper exploration of the articles contained in the Constitution of Jalisco reveals a 
slightly different picture. On the constitutionality of said actions, article 35, faction X, 
certainly authorized the Executive to suspend municipal adminsitrations, but as the 
Diario de Debates asserted: “[…] precisely for its unconstitutionality this precept was 
repealed, striking said fraction down by means of [a] reform of the Constitution of 
Jalisco, which with all legal formalities was decreed and was promulgated in the official 
newspaper of that State […] on the date of 16 September 1922.” The Organic Law of the 
Public Administration of Jalisco in effect also ordered that only in the complete absence 
of proprietary councilmen or substitute councilmen of an ayuntamiento “will the 
Congress of the State name a Municipal Council or the Executive [name] someone to 
take charge of the [Municipal] Administration.” In many cases, Governor Zuno even 
went as far as to dissolve ayuntamientos—including the municipal councils—that had not 
yet entered into functions, “which for the same [reason] could not have committed a fault 
																																								 																				
74 AGN, DGIPS, 7/310 (3.2) “25,” Box 2024, State of Jalisco, Political Situation, 1925-B, Exp: 10, 
“Letter from the legally elected councilmen of San Juan de los Lagos,” 30 June 1926. The councilmen that 
originally comprised the ayuntamiento of San Juan de los Lagos were: Ezequiel Alba, Benedicto González 
Romo, Benjamín R. León, Francisco Campos, José Padilla Rodriguez, José Lopez González, Enrique 
González, and Pablo Esqueda. Benedicto González Romo, Vice-President of the ayuntamiento and, at the 
orders of the governor, was the only one to stay behind and assume control of the Municipal Presidency. 
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or official crime.” Suffice it to say that following the Estradista Rebellion, the governor 
deposed councilmen without cause and without legal authority and named individuals to 
take over the functions of a great number of ayuntamientos, “with attributes analogous to 
political bosses.”75  
Sowing the Seeds of Political Corruption  
 
The wealth Zuno accumulated by the latter stages of 1925 was not only quite 
impressive, but also provides insight into how corrupt practices made their way into the 
political culture of the period. A confidential report from the Ministry of Interior, for 
example, confirmed that the governor “acquired the thousands of pesos with which he 
sustained his political [agenda…by] taking advantage of the fact that many of 
Guadalajara’s rich residents [were] sympathizers of the de la Huerta movement.” While 
some supported the uprising out of conviction and others to defend their own personal 
interests, Zuno, nonetheless, confiscated an “infinite amount of properties” and was said 
to have auctioned them off for a profit. On 14 February 1926, the governor’s worth was 
estimated to be in the vicinity of no less than three million pesos, with much of the 
																																								 																				
75 “Diario de los debates de la Cámara de Diputados,” Legislatura XXXI – Año II – Período 
Extraordinario – Fecha 19260323 (23 March 1926) – Número de Diario 3. Governor Zuno appeared to 
make a habit of deposing municipal governments at a whims notice, but his efforts did not just stop there 
and he also intervened in deputy elections. On 17 Mayo 1924, for example, Deputy Elías F. Hurtado sent 
an urgent message to President Obregón notifying him of the “era of terror” that had been inaugurated in 
Autlán and the panic this caused among the residents of the region, after the “cowardly assassination of 
Isauro Godoy, president of the Progressive Party of the South, which was the regional party that supported 
General Calles for president of the republic and the undersigned as deputy to the Congress of the Union. 
“[…It is nothing but the start of a series of crimes announced with an effrontery that embarrasses, since the 
list is already given of those that have to pay with their lives, the audacity of opposing the whims of the 
Governor [Zuno…], who [is] determined to impose in the District of Autlán, the candidacy of an 
unanimously repudiated individual that has already been legally and completely defeated in elections for 
the XXIX and XXX Legislatures of the same district,” decried Deputy Hurtado. The message emphasized 
that this was no longer a case of political intrigue, but rather these actions were now the only recourse 
available to their enemies—since those in power had abused it to such an extent that the elements that once 
believed in them had abandoned them; see AGN, Obregón-Calles, 428-J-6, ff. 177-178, 17 May 1924.    
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money deposited in foreign banks—in addition to owning various properties that “in their 
totality are worth a fortune.” “Likewise those that know the history of all those matters 
inform me that Zuno has spent in buying supporters and protégés to back his labors, no 
less than a million and a half pesos,” revealed the confidential report. These hired 
supporters allowed him to continue to deploy the “dirty tactics” that many attributed to 
his administration, such as the intervention, confiscation, and management of business’ 
such as the Compañía Hidroeléctrica, and the selling of products and cattle from 
Hacienda Bellavista.76 
Another report, forwarded to Gilberto Valenzuela, Secretary in the Ministry of 
Interior, corroborates—in great detail—the amount of capital that Zuno, in his short-
tenure, had already amassed. With regard to his real estate, for example, the governor 
owned a house in Colonia Reforma, specifically on Avenida del Bosque ($150,000.00 
pesos); two pilot boats taken from the Compañia Hidroeléctrica (no value listed); the 
Hacienda Santa Catarina located near Ciudad Guzmán ($125,000.00 pesos) registered 
under the name of a relative, Paulino Sánchez; two houses in the Portal Matamoros 
($100,000.00 pesos), again under the name of the same relative; various urban properties 
with about thirty deeds distributed to family members, along with spare part material 
from the Compañía Hidroeléctrica that was taken when it was confiscated ($400,000.00 
pesos); and miscellaneous accounts collected in cash ($105,000.00 pesos)—apparently 
used as “hush money.” The collection of the miscellaneous accounts implied no 
																																								 																				
76 AGN, DGIPS, 311 (3.2) 25, Nombre: Edo. de Jalisco, Asunto: Elecciones de poderes locales, ff. 
50-53, 14 February 1926.  
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reclamation of past actions or activities; notwithstanding, Zuno did enforce a “new 
condition” on these accounts:  
For Public Works of the State--------------------------- ----- $50,000.00 pesos 
For Public Works of the City--------------------------------- $25,000.00 pesos 
For the Zoo Park------------------------------------------------$10,000.00 pesos 
For Lic. Hernandez (his brother-in-law) --------------------$30,000.00 pesos 
 
The Municipality of Guadalajara had an outstanding balance of $190,000.00 pesos 
charged under “other trifles,” which were not going to be paid. Additionally, the report 
indicates that through the use of third parties, Zuno channeled from various proprietors of 
rural estates in the State of Jalisco a sum of $500,000.00 pesos. Not all proprietors who 
were approached complied; however, those who did were said to have been offered 
protection from ejido encroachments. And the honorariums the governor and his men 
charged under many of the above agreements were described as nothing short of 
“exorbitant.”77  
Over the course of his short political career, Zuno had already stockpiled the 
following automobiles for his personal use and that of his family: a 12 cylinder Packard 
(gift from Sr. Andrés Somellera, so that his estates would not be affected by the agrarian 
reform), a Studebaker (special edition), a Rickenbacker, and a Dodge. The governor also 
																																								 																				
77 AGN, DGIPS, 7/310 (3.2) ‘25’, Caja 139, Estado de Jalisco, Situación Política, Año de 1925. 
According to the report, the third parties that Zuno used were Lic. Gustavo R. Cristo, Juan Aviña, 
Guadalupe Rivalcaba, Constancio Hernández, Raymundo Hernández, Fernando Martín del Campo, and 
other Deputies to the Local Congress. One of the more disturbing accusations against Zuno present in the 
report, was the following: “[h]e frequently orders [the] carrying out of assassinations because [of] his 
personal ambitions [of] individuals that he believes oppose his political ends, giving as a case [that] he has 
inquisitorial torture [chambers], having some people various days without food to obtain what he wants.” 
The same report claims that, “[when] the Government triumphed over the last revolution [the de la Huerta 
Rebellion], Zuno confiscated without any legal authority, a great number of Haciendas, having ransacked 
from them cereals, cattle, [and] farming tools that were worth various millions of pesos, greatly hurting the 
agriculture of the State.”  
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took large amounts of money—although it is unclear where the he took this money 
from—under the pretext of forming Guadalajara’s first Zoo Park, and “charged every 
merchant of the city [anywhere] from one peso up to two thousand […] to buy the said 
animals for the Park […].” On 25 June 1925, the zunista administration boasted about 
completing the construction of the second largest observatory in the entire republic and of 
the establishment of the first Zoo Park in all of Mexico at the famous site named “El 
Agua Azul.” “We saw, among others, a lovely black panther from Java, of which there 
are few examples in the United States,” claimed El Demócrata, “a pair of legitimate 
tigers from Bengal, which has caused the admiration of those who see them; a pair of 
African leopards, an orangutan, two polar bears, two emus, two ostriches, a collection of 
pheasant pigeons, rabbits, deer, monkey and in general an innumerable amount of 
animals that not even Chapultepec Park [in Mexico City] possesses.” Zuno, proud of the 
accomplishment, was reported to have given money from “his own pocket” for the 
establishment of this park.78  
The zunista administration also dedicated a great amount of attention and effort to 
the construction and opening of public roads, declaring to El Demócrata that “[…] 
nobody escapes from [this] since the indispensable condition for material progress of the 
people is to be able to count on good communication channels.”79 Among the modern 
roads, which at the beginning of 1925 were in the process of being constructed, were the 
following: from Guadalajara to Puerto Vallarta; from Guadalajara to Aguascalientes; 
																																								 																				
78 El Demócrata, “La gestión del Gobernador del Edo. de Jalisco Sr. José G. Zuno,” 25 June 1925. 
79 El Demócrata. “La gestión del Gobernador del Edo. de Jalisco Sr. José G. Zuno,” 25 June 1925 
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from Guadalajara to La Barca; and from Guadalajara to Chapala. To fully see out the 
construction of the above roads, the Executive acquired modern machinery (worth 
approximately sixty thousand pesos) comprised of: seven steamrollers, three tractors, five 
bulldozers, four watering trucks, a rock breaker and grinder, two dirt elevators, six large 
trucks and ten smaller ones, seven motorcycles for inspectors to use, and a construction 
scraper. Additionally, the administration purchased a cement truck and another truck that 
would be able to deliver steel for the construction of bridges.80  
The governor and the municipal president of Guadalajara, José María Cuéllar—
along with other individuals, such as the Director of Public Works Engineer Manuel 
Lagarreta and Engineer Juan José Barragán—continued to enriched themselves through 
the construction and improvements carried out in the city. Cuéllar, for example, was said 
to have worked with Zuno to defraud private residents and to impose fines of up to two 
thousand pesos for “supposed infractions of water services.” The two individuals also 
purchased “with abuse of their power, the Pavement and Asphalt Company and will 
probably force the residents to pay the asphalt of a large part of the city”—clamed the 
report sent to Secretary Valenzuela. The accusations did not end there. The 
administration was reported to have opened many streets without practical objective and 
also of renovating calzada de Agua Azul, which destroyed urban properties worth more 
than a million pesos without making payments to those affected: “[and] one of them is 
																																								 																				
80 El Informador, “Periodo Congreso. El ciudadno gobernador rindió su informe,” 2 February 
1925. 
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Manuel Alderete who through expropriation had various acres of land [taken] without 
having received not one cent.”81 
The Zunista Pet Project: The Confederation of Libertarian Worker Groups of Jalisco 
 
After the defeat of the de la Huerta Rebellion, the Mexico City-centric Regional 
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM) found itself in a stronger position than 
before the uprising.82 When President Plutarco Elías Calles came to power in late 1924, 
he owed much of his ascent to the support given to labor during his electoral campaign; 
that said, his support of labor was not general, but was instead confined to the CROM and 
the Mexican Labor Party.83 In Jalisco, Governor Zuno directly opposed the CROM’s 
goals of organizing and of dominating the local labor movement and, as a result, “the 
clash between the center and local political power expressed itself with more virulence 
and force in Jalisco than in other States […].”84 The Confederation of Libertarian Worker 
																																								 																				
81 AGN, DGIPS, 7/310 (3.2) ‘25’, Caja 139, Estado de Jalisco, Situación Política, Año de 1925. 
82 The CROM was conceived in the mold of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and its 
leader, Luis Napoleón Morones—appointed by Calles shortly after taking office, to the post of Minister of 
Industry, Commerce, and Labor— “believed that the relative smallness of Mexico’s industrial proletariat 
demanded ideological flexibility and a willingness to cooperate with the government in order to win 
political concessions for workers.” The practices of European anarchism also very much influenced the 
formation of the labor organization and provided it with the flexibility needed to forge deals with the 
Government of the Center, “something that [in subsequent administrations] brought the CROM to powerful 
positions […].” The base of the CROM were unionized local groups, of the same trade or establishment 
that were united into local federations; local federations then joined into state federations, of which then 
formed the national group. Since its inception in 1918, at a congress of labor delegates called forth by 
Venustiano Carranza, the organization grew quickly and in 1924 the CROM claimed, “a (no doubt inflated) 
membership well in excess of a million workers.” This was enough to make it the most important labor 
organization in the country; see Christopher Boyer’s “The Threads of Class at La Virgen: 
Misrepresentation and Identity at a Mexican Textile Mill, 1918-1935,” The American Historical Review 
105, no. 5 (December): 1589.  
83 Aurora Gómez-Galvarriato, Industry and Revolution: Social and Economic Change in the 
Orizaba Valley, Mexico (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013), p. 168; Tamayo, Los 
movimientos sociales, p. 28. 
84 Tamayo, Movimientos sociales, p. 29 
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Groups of Jalisco (CAOLJ), for example, was founded on 7 September 1924 to provide 
workers with more autonomy and to counteract the intrusion of the CROM.85 Comprised 
of syndicates that at one time belonged to the Federation of Worker Groups of Jalisco 
(FAOJ)—a subsidiary of the CROM—from its formation the CAOLJ counted upon “a 
radical direction and the strong support of the regional caudillo [Zuno].” The newly 
formed CAOLJ, based in Guadalajara, promoted independent unions, strikes, and 
struggles against the CROM, and also directly opposed the policies of union boss Luis 
Napoleon Morones.86 
The rise of the National Catholic Confederation of Labor (CNCT), founded in 
April 1922, also served as a bulwark for many social groups in Mexico to resist the 
increasingly centralist policies of the callista administration. In mid-1925, the CNCT 
already counted upon the support of least 19,500 members and 384 groups across the 
country—whose National Committee was in Guadalajara.87  The CNCT was organized as 
a federation of catholic worker groups, each with the ability to maintain a certain amount 
of autonomy and to unionize workers from various professions. As a result, it was 
comprised of catholic artisans, textile workers, miners, women and children syndicates, 
and a great number of campesinos. The heterogeneous character was not unique to the 
																																								 																				
85 Tamayo, Movimientos sociales, p. 43  
86 Fernández Aceves, “José Guadalupe Zuno,” p. 99. Of note, Zuno also attempted to form a 
coalition with women “[j]ust like men, working women [also] demanded the implementation of their labor 
rights under the Constitution of 1917.” On this matter, Fernández Aceves claims that Zuno’s laws “derived 
from the Constitution of 1917, which benefitted women workers by granting them the rights to have child 
care centers, a minimum wage, maternity leave, and equal ages to those of men.” 
87 Manuel Ceballos Ramírez, “El Sindicalismo Católico en México, 1919-1931,” Historia 
Mexicana (XXXV: 4, 1986): 646. 
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CNCT, “since the CROM […also] had very special characteristics with regard to its 
internal constitution, [but] it [the CROM] responded [more] to the development of [an] 
incipient national industry than to the characteristics of [local] workers.” And with the 
establishment of the CNCT, “the clergy fortified its influence in the heart of society 
[…and] prepared itself for an assault on power.”88 To combat the influence of 
conservative forces into labor, Governor Zuno attempted to close off the “confessional 
syndicalist” path for many of the regions laborers and attempted to orient organizing 
efforts towards the libertarian cause his administration supported.  
On 13 May 1925, after a short period of relative peace in which the political 
climate of Jalisco began “to breathe and to carry out its [normal] activities,” El Universal 
reported that the region returned to a new level of disarray due to the “restless” and 
“long-standing governor.” “Yesterday it was the agriculturalists,” denounced El 
Universal, “today workers are the victims.”89 The reputable newspaper outlet was not shy 
in publicly favoring syndicalism as a means of organizing and defending workers; but the 
recent actions of Zuno forced one editorial to take an outright position on this particular 
matter. The anonymous reporter affirmed that the daily he represented had always 
combated, and would continue to combat, whoever used the cause of the worker as a 
recourse to make a fraudulent politics. The dismissal of more than three hundred 
operators who lent their services to the Compañía Hidroeléctrica of Chapala, 
nonetheless, led them to openly accuse the governor of:  
[Mixing] syndicalism with politics in an intimate and extremely [illicit] 
cohabitation [and] immobilizing the worker elements in “zunismo” 
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89 El Universal, “Una Política Partidarista,” 13 May 1925.  
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networks, in such a way, that, to make a living in those abundant lands [of 
Jalisco], the workers are obligated to join [his] army of followers, said 
functionary is organizing, with evident [ends].90 
 
The basis of such accusations were buttressed on claims made by a commission of tram 
workers and electricians (in representation of the dismissed workers at the Chapala-based 
company) who travelled to Mexico City with goal of speaking with the president of the 
republic. These workers specifically referenced an accord previously dictated by 
Governor Zuno, which promptly led to the dismissal of said employees for having “lent 
their services to the rebel movement that general Enrique Estrada led.”91 The editorial 
that appeared the following day believed the justification and explanation Zuno provided 
to be absurd, and thought it odd that it took him more than a year to find out there were 
more than three hundred accomplices to the military uprising. “Are the police 
information systems so bad over there [in Jalisco],” asked the editorial, “that not two nor 
three, nor four nor six, but rather an entire mass of three hundred ferocious and unsettling 
enemies of the order, were so calm and still [for] months and months [that] nobody 
bothered them?”  
The newspaper outlet was not defending nor legitimizing the act of rebellion; on 
the contrary, they agreed that “proven rebelliousness […] is a crime of which the 
tribunals have to recognize,” but that it was never a motive for taking bread away from 
workers that, “on the one hand, say and certify their innocence.” The lack of proof led El 
Universal to claim—as the commission of dismissed workers reported to them—that the 
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91 El Universal, “Una Política Partidarista,” 13 May 1925. 
		
147 
separation of those workers was due to them not wanting to be a part of the “worker 
federation” that Zuno preferred: “[and because] they preferred […] to continue working 
as organized workers based solely as a pure syndicate without any political derivations 
nor relationship to it […].” Many of the dismissed workers counted upon more than thirty 
years of service, which could have explained their unwillingness to change and the 
governor’s willingness to appeal to the recourse of accusing them of the crime of 
rebellion. If there was any crime, or rebellion for that matter, claimed El Universal, it was 
that they refused to integrate themselves “to the tentacles with which the alluded leader 
wants to assure his preponderance.” The governor had, therefore, according to the news 
outlet, the desire and determination of disturbing the social tranquility of the region 
through “however many means come into his imagination […].”92  
A little over a month later, Governor Zuno granted an interview to El Demócrata 
of Mexico City wherein he declared “the truth about the obstruction of the workers.” 
When asked about the charge directed towards him, of persecuting workers that did not 
want to unionize under the group favored by this administration, he responded with the 
following: “Believe me that there are many [charges] and so absurd is the slander of my 
enemies [towards me] that these provoke laughter instead of ire.” To prove his point, the 
governor made specific reference to the confiscation of the Compañía Hidroeléctrica of 
Chapala after the Estradista Rebellion, and to the events that followed. Under the 
Government’s administration, the majority of the independent personnel at the 
Hydroelectric Company joined the favored union—except for the catholic element—
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claimed the governor. The catholic element, then, apparently mobilized and carried out 
significant propaganda against the Government to such an extent that “the first thing they 
did was to break down trains in the middle of the street, leaving the passengers 
[stranded], with the purpose of [demonstrating that the] train service was bad, since the 
Government administrated it.” As a result of those actions, Zuno gave them a deadline to 
adhere to his so-called liberal unions, and since they did not follow through they were 
promptly dismissed. “Do not believe that the dismissal [of the workers] was for the 
motives that they expose, but [rather] because it was indispensable since those elements 
were intentionally destroying trains,” affirmed Zuno. When the Government returned 
ownership of the hydroelectric plant, it was apparently in better condition then when it 
was confiscated. “The company was so satisfied with the administration that the 
Government carried out,” affirmed Zuno, “that it accepted to not dismiss any of the 
people that were working [at the company].”  
The governor claimed that he was not making any “politics” nor did he have to 
make it, since elections were very distant and also because they counted on the support 
from workers and campesinos and thus had  “more than enough votes to beat any 
party.”93 El Universal, however, printed a story that same day reporting the imprisonment 
of 600 workers in Juanacatlán, Jalisco. The CNCT denounced the governor “as the Soviet 
Leader in Jalisco” and subsequently exposed his crimes against the catholic workers of 
the “Río Grande” factory in Juanacatlán. “[…A] slanderous crime against six-hundred 
families has been committed,” reported El Universal, “[…and] the families of the six-
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hundred captured laborers have remained persecuted and helpless […to the point that 
they are] threatened by hunger […].” The conflict was said to have taken root because the 
catholic workers openly declined to organize under the syndicate the governor favored. 
Zuno gave them a deadline of eight days to unionize. And when they refused the olive 
branch, the municipal forces—supported by the Red Guard—prevented access to the 
factory to the six hundred workers who refused to fulfill the requirement and 
subsequently arrested them. In response to Zuno’s tactics, the Executive Labor 
Committee of the Archdiocesan in Guadalajara circulated an urgent message to Mexican 
laborers requesting complete solidarity for the six hundred families, “that are in danger of 
dying of hunger.” The public outrage led to demonstrations against the local municipal 
president and Governor Zuno, which police detachments eventually quelled, but not until 
resulting in four deaths, and several injuries.94   
On 20 October 1925, El Universal reported a “great exodus” of workers from 
Jalisco due to the terrible persecution carried out against members of the CROM. 
Obeying instructions from the governor—to pursue all the workers not in agreement with 
his procedures—municipal authorities forced the majority of labor groups affiliated with 
the CROM from their offices and jailed those that they considered “dangerous.” “More 
than two hundred individuals find themselves in jail,” lamented the reporter, “and it is 
rare [that] a group has not suffered the closure of its offices and [the] destruction of its 
furniture and archives […].”95 The following day, Excelsior reported that workers from 
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Jalisco had gathered at the Congress of the Union in Mexico City to ask for the excesses 
Governor Zuno committed towards the workers, who adhered to the CROM, be put to an 
end. Since there was no legal reason for the detention of the “hordes of laborers” in 
Jalisco, the article claimed that the procedure of inventing crimes of common order had 
become the active policy of the administration and was a tool that kept them locked in a 
perpetual cycle.96 To resolve the issue, a delegation of labor corporations from Mexico 
City were to be sent to Guadalajara—and from there to various parts of the State—with 
the goal of collecting data about all of the attacks that had been committed, and “to 
demonstrate that Governor Zuno was persecuting the worker classes.” And that Zuno 
needed to think twice before proceeding against the delegation.97  
Meanwhile, a day later, Governor Zuno asked El Universal to rectify the reports 
related to the closure of the offices of the CROM. The article published the governor’s 
viewpoint as follows:  
Governor Zuno said that he ordered the said closure as a corrective 
measure, in virtue that he is sure that from the balcony which the workers 
occupy [that] they threw some explosives when he passed […] 
accompanied by prominent foreigners, and that the closure was carried out 
without the intervention of the American consul, nor with any indication 
from the First Magistrate of the Nation or from a judicial authority; but 
that the following morning he ordered the reopening of the cited offices to 
avoid interpretation on the part of his enemies. The governor adds that it is 
false that the workers belonging to the Confederation are [the] object of 
persecution by the local authorities and less that they are being 
assassinated.98 
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The stern opposition against labor unions with a national and/or regional character, such 
as the CROM and the CNCT—and the clear support the zunista administration threw 
behind the CAOLJ—represented a type of populist politics that endeavored to create and 
control an ample social base of supporters. On closer inspection, however, the tensions 
between the zunista administration and the above labor unions reveal much about the 
anxieties of laborers during a period in which many citizens found themselves outside the 
prevailing power structures.  
 
 
Debating Democracy and the Fall of José Guadalupe Zuno 
 
[By] virtue of democracy, the majority rules over the minority but it does not 
destroy it, it does not deny its right to exist as [a] minority […] The precedent of 
the Congress of Jalisco, if it is accepted, since [it is] widely known as being 
politically immoral, will not take us towards democracy, but rather to tyranny. 
-The Instructive Commission of the Grand Jury 
 
Let’s start to punish those bad revolutionaries that have made their source of 
wealth [from] the governments of the States; because it is not only Zuno, there are 
many Zunos, but we have to start with one [named] Guadalupe [Zuno]. If we do 
not punish this man, all of the others will [say] ‘if Zuno who robed and has 
committed so many diverse crimes, is absolved, us, with even more reason [will 
be absolved].’ 
  -Senator Maqueo Castellanos 
 
On 23 March 1926, the XXXI Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies formally 
charged José G. Zuno with violations against the General Constitution of the Republic 
and for crimes against the Federation. The extent of such accusations ran the gamut: 
attacks against the democratic institutions of Mexico, the concept of the Free 
Municipality, and individuals guarantees—in addition to the charge of rebellion against 
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the federal authorities.99 Zuno resigned that same and released the following statement to 
the local press:  
[…I] have become [the subject] of attacks and accusations that the 
Chamber of Deputies of the Congress of the Union wrongfully continues 
in the form of [a] trial […] Since I continue to tolerate this it could be 
supposed in the public opinion that my silence authorizes these attacks, 
and not desiring [for] it to be a pretext so that the sovereignty of the State 
of Jalisco can be hurt, I [submit] my resignation to separate myself from 
the post of Constitutional Governor of the State of Jalisco […].100   
 
Shortly thereafter Zuno sent a telegram to President Calles providing insight into his 
decision: “I have [decided] that I should not put the public institutions of Jalisco that are 
revolutionary in danger, just to maintain myself in an undue defensive attitude, because 
with my personal defeat the principal of the sovereignty of the States will [be] vulnerable 
[…].” And stressed his desire to be judged fairly “and not under the passionate 
considerations of the centralists [in the Chamber of Deputies].”101  
What follows is an inquiry into how elected-officials debated democracy and the 
limits to state intervention—and of regional autonomy—during a period of rapid social 
and political change. To examine these ideas, I focus on the impassioned and precedent-
setting exchanges regarding The Case of Jalisco that occurred on the floors of the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in Mexico City, which garnered national press and 
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101 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 428-J-13, ff. 252-253.  
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captivated the attention of the nation from late March 1926 to late May 1926. These 
debates not only put into perspective the scope of the Legislature’s power during these 
formative years, but also provided insight into whether it had the ability to meddle in 
local affairs; a matter that, up until then, resided solely within the purview of local and 
regional governments.  
Act I: From Regionalism to Centralism and the Case of Jalisco  
In the fall of 1925, Zuno made his proposed successor—José María Cuéllar—
know to the political circles of Guadalajara and not long after rumors began to circulate 
indicating that the Alliance of Socialist Parties and CROM labor leader Luis N. Morones 
had already offered up federal Deputy Alfredo Romo, the leader of the federal deputy 
delegation from Jalisco, and a close collaborator of Zuno, as the opposition candidate. 
The deal negotiated with Romo provided the aspiring candidate with all the necessary 
resources for his proposed campaign through the treasury of the Congress of the Union 
and other government agencies; in exchange, he was to defect from zunismo and create “a 
strong group of federal and local antizunista deputies to achieve the destruction of the 
governor before the celebration of the elections.”102 According to at least one historian, 
Romo was able to gather the support of the eight minority deputies to the local Congress 
of Jalisco, turn them in favor of callismo, and convince said local deputies to create their 
own legislature with the objective of not recognizing the governor.103 The eight minority 
deputies, however, described a different narrative:  
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[that during] the previous meeting with only eight proprietary Deputies 
and four substitutes that [took place on] the grounds of the Congress [the 
majority deputies] prohibited us [the minority deputies] from entering, 
[and because of that] we decided to install ourselves in another place in 
Guadalajara, in the house number 575 of Avenida.104   
 
The minority deputies cited their obligation as representatives of the people of the Jalisco 
to oppose by any lawful means available to them that the local Executive “keep causing 
so many victims and so many violations to satisfy the personal political interest of his 
ally Cuéllar […].” Lacking the guarantees necessary to even initiate an opposition to the 
politics of Zuno, the local minority deputies claimed to have suffered grave threats to 
their lives on the part of the governor’s henchmen and had even travelled to Mexico City 
to have their grievances heard.105  
On their return to Guadalajara, they faced challenges from twelve zunista-
majority deputies, who “behaved in an uncontrollable manner” and motioned to separate 
them from their elected offices on the charge of the crime of rebellion.106 “It is not only 
barbaric and immoral […that] a majority of the governing leaders prosecute, impeach and 
expel in the short time of three days the oppositional minority, en masse,” lamented the 
eight deputies, “but rather this atrocious procedure fundamentally attacks the essence of 
our republican, representative, [and] democratic institutions […].” Denouncing these 
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Marcelino Barba González, Miguel Mayagoitia, Luis R. Castillo, Esteban Loera, José de Jesús Cuellar, J. 
Guadalupe Covarrubias, Enrique Cuervo, Salvador Zuno Hernández, Francisco Espinosa, and Basilio 
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menacing efforts as a detrimental blow to the popular sovereignty of the people, the 
minority deputies feared this would forever set a fateful precedent—since it would 
signify the annihilation of “all liberties” and would be the consecration of a tyrannical 
regime over the principals of democratic republicanism. “We have not committed any 
crime […we] were accused by the Justice Attorney of Jalisco of the crime of rebellion for 
having intended to usurp the functions of the Congress of the State […and this lacks a 
legal basis],” complained the minority deputies.107 
In defense of the legality of their actions, the minority deputies claimed to have 
originally formed a legal quorum of eleven deputies (which would have allowed them to 
claim majority status), but that Zuno and Cuéllar sent their henchmen, captained by local 
deputy and brother of the governor, Salvador Zuno, and the Chief of the Mounted Police, 
“to attack the house where we constituted ourselves, and said house was shot at and we 
were insulted.” All of these efforts resulted in the corruption of three deputies with 
threats and gifts.108 The remaining eight deputies labeled Zuno a disgrace to the 
Revolution and colorfully described the significance of the political repression he and his 
supporters systematically carried out in Jalisco. In expanding upon its significance, they 
claimed:  
Zuno has caused more ills to the Revolution than the impenitent 
reactionaries [and he] has perverted the great revolutionary ideals of 
justice for the proletariat and has moved away from our cause, of the good 
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cause of numerous workers and campesinos. [...The] zunista regime in 
Jalisco is a disgrace for the Republic, an inexplicable anachronism. It 
dishonors us abroad.  
 
Much of the political clamor that supported such accusations stemmed from the 
governor’s deliberate objective of imposing his good friend and partner in crime, José 
Maria Cuéllar, as his successor to the governorship, and to this end spent a great deal of 
effort promoting the agenda. “Our strict obligation as representatives of the people of our 
State is to oppose by any lawful means available to us,” affirmed the deputies, “[…the] 
many constitutional violations to satisfy the personal political interest of his ally Cuéllar 
[…].”109   
On 1 February 1926 President Calles wrote to the Zuno to inform him of his 
office’s knowledge of the division that existed between members of the Legislature in the 
State of Jalisco and also to dispel any notion the governor might have with regard to his 
role in the conflict. “[This Federal Executive…] makes it known to you that the versions 
you refer to are completely inaccurate,” affirmed Calles, “since this Executive has never 
desired nor desires [the] frequent clashes […] produced between the Constitutional 
Powers of the States […].” Moreover, the president stressed that his administration had 
never nor would it take part in matters that would bring lamentable consequences to the 
federal entities of the country.110 Five weeks later, on 13 March, Zuno wrote a letter to 
the Personal Secretary of President Calles—Fernando Torreblanca—lamenting the crisis 
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that he and his administration were facing, and to openly declare where his loyalty 
resided: “The sentiments that animate myself in these moments, should be known by 
those that loyally serve the president of the republic […].” Conceding that many of his 
political actions and policies—such as reforms to the Laws of the State, public works, 
and moralizing efforts—had at times been met with the disapproval of friends and 
enemies alike, the governor sternly believed that this backlash did not serve as a strong 
enough pretext to completely nullify the benefits and progress which had been achieved 
under his watchful eye. “When I have believed that I could help the Federal Government 
in something, I have done it with some sacrifice and [have] overcome great difficulties 
[to do so],” declared Zuno.111 Two days later, the governor decided to voice his concerns 
to his fellow governors.112 
In a telegram dated on 15 March, Zuno made it known to the governors of the 
Republic of the impending acts that the Congress of the Union intended to execute, with 
which the sovereignty of Jalisco would be greatly injured: “[in] effect, a very irregular 
process has been initiated for supposed official crimes of the common order, against 
myself and against twelve [majority] Deputies to the Local Congress of this Entity […].” 
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The governor claimed that the accusations were none other than slander and libel 
promoted by his enemies. He expressed never having run away from his political 
responsibilities of implementing social reform, which he had been devoted to for many 
years, but did stress the gravity of the accusations:  
Even more so [now] before the possibility that some traitors [from Jalisco 
have] achieved starting an illegal resolution [in the] Chamber of Deputies 
which appears to be directed [against] myself that would in reality kill the 
federative spirit of the United Mexican States[,] infringing upon the 
constitutional precepts that establish the sovereignty of the Entities of the 
Federation to judge their functionaries for crimes of the common order.113  
 
With no other recourse, Zuno appealed to his fellow governors and hoped that the Federal 
Executive would, as it had in other occasions, carry out its disposition as the “jealous 
guardian” of the Constitution and Public Institutions. If such an assault on the pillars of 
democratic rule occurred, lamented the governor, “it would set a fatal precedent.”114    
Act II: The Chamber of Deputies 
 
On 22 March 1926 the Instructive Commission of the Grand Jury commenced 
proceedings on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies in Mexico City with the 
presentation of an official document emanating from the Local Congress of Jalisco. 
Secretary Cersiola read the document to the one-hundred and ninety-one eligible federal 
deputy voters, brought everyone up to speed on the twelve majority deputies’ decision to 
impeach the minority block of local deputies—comprised of J. Rodrigo Camacho, 
Enrique Díaz de León, Napoleón Orozco, Victoriano Salado, Joaquín Vidrio, J. Trinidad 
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de la Torre, J. Manuel Chávez, and Manuel V. Guerra—and of their choice to consign 
them to the local authorities. The twelve majority deputies of the Local Congress were 
said to have provoked a quick judgment in order to render the opposition responsible for 
the crime of rebellion, all because the local minority deputies carried out the functions of 
a Congress in a different building outside of the normative bounds their office dictated. 
The decision to impeach the minority, however, was in direct violation of numerous 
constitutional articles.115 It was now up to the Commission and the deputies to decide on 
the matter.  
The Commission stressed that the eight minority deputies had been deprived of 
their rights, “which they acquired legally as deputies” and that they were not even 
consulted nor afforded the opportunity to respond to the accusations brought before them. 
Instead, the Commission insisted that the majority rushed to a hasty judgment: “[this] is 
the result of a majority parliament banishing from the [local] Congress a minority en 
masse, and such procedure at its base attacks the institutions established by the 
constitution and ridicules the sovereignty of the people […].” In nullifying the rights of 
the representatives of the people, without recourse to a formal procedure (and without 
legal justification), the actions of the majority were interpreted as a formal attack. This 
matter was seen as a case where the majority had run afoul and “bastardized the public 
vote”—which the Commission claimed to be at the core of democratic rule. “[By] virtue 
of democracy, the majority rules over the minority,” continued the Commission, “but it 
does not destroy it, it does not deny its right to exist as [a] minority […] The precedent of 
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the Congress of Jalisco, if it is accepted, since [it is] widely known as being politically 
immoral, will not take us towards democracy, but rather to tyranny.”116 With those 
words, the formal accusations and the elocution of evidence came to a halt. It was now up 
to several statesmen to deliver persuasive speeches to sway the popular opinion of those 
present.  
Deputy Villaseñor Mejía opened deliberations in defense of the majority, that is, 
the twelve deputies of the local Congress of Jalisco, with the following:  
[…] a dictum has been presented for our consideration that accuses twelve 
deputies of the local Congress of Jalisco [of] impeaching, in use of its 
faculties, eight members of the same Congress that separated themselves 
from their duty [and] installed themselves in a building separate from the 
official [one], committing the crime of rebellion, which in the State of 
Jalisco in punished by our laws.  
 
The deputy lamented that in certain circles it was being said that the impeached local 
deputies were not notified nor were they given the opportunity to mount a defense against 
the actions of the majority. Villaseñor Mejía vehemently asserted that the individual 
guarantees of the minority deputies had not been violated and cited the amparo 
emanating from the expelled deputies, which the judge from the district of Guadalajara 
denied them; that is, “they [the majority] have not committed one fault, nor have the 
deputies of Jalisco been judged[,] leaving them [the minority] without the right to return 
to their posts.” The deputy once again echoed the fact that the eight minority deputies had 
been accused of the crime of rebellion, “which they committed by installing themselves 
in a house outside the official grounds, wanting to commit what they were not able to 
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commit: the crime of usurpation, but, yes, they were functioning in open rebellion.” 
Using the same logic the opposition had used, the deputy reminded all those present just 
how inconsistent it would be to punish one impeachment with another: “…we accuse the 
[majority] deputies of Jalisco of not having heard the impeached, but do not also forget 
that the deputies you intend to impeach now, have not been notified so they can come 
defend themselves here.”117 
Deputy Cuén, on the other hand, thought it wise to clarify Article 942 of the Penal 
Code of the State of Jalisco, specifically faction V—the precept upon which the Justice 
Attorney of the State based his accusation—that expressed the following: “They are 
guilty of rebellion, those that rise up publicly and in open hostility […] to deprive of its 
attributes one of the powers, impending the free exercise of them [through a usurpation].” 
Deputy Cuén rhetorically asked those present to meditate upon all of the consequences 
that this frightful precedent, which the twelve zunista deputies intended to establish, 
would set. “They subvert all of the social and political order of a country, because in the 
name of political passion and licentious ambitions of a governor,” claimed Deputy Cuén, 
“[they] condemn a minority parliament to the dictatorship of silence or [to be] devoured 
by majority, [labeling] them as rebels against the law and the well-being of a people, the 
enemies of all tyrants.”118 Responding to the scope of such allegations, Deputy Díaz Soto 
y Gama, a respected statesman and the leader of the Partido Nacional Agrarista (PNA), 
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agreed that it would indeed subvert all of the political order of the country, but he 
differed considerably with regards to its consequences: “Where are we going to end up if 
a minority of the Legislature brings down the majority of the Legislature, that is to say, 
the legally constitutive Legislative power […] and a governor?” In a calculated move, 
Soto y Gama shifted the direction of the debate to whether or not the Chamber of 
Deputies was actually qualified to hear the matter, stressing that the Commission was 
trying to make a conflict juridical and Constitutional, which is “clearly of a local 
character.”119 
Counting himself among those that sustained the defense of Zuno, Deputy Díaz 
Soto y Gama, in an attempt to guide the general wisdom of those present by criticizing 
the Commission’s handling of the matter, claimed that it should have instead presented 
“an unclothed truth, […] presenting the case as is, not the accusation against a governor 
who might have acted wrong or right.” To further illustrate his point, Díaz Soto y Gama 
reiterated that “nobody believes it, there is not one individual in the Republic […] there is 
not one child of ten years of age in the Republic, of seven years, that believes that here 
we are trying to punish José G. Zuno’s abuses of power.” The matter at hand, then, was 
not about Zuno per se; it was about, all of the governors, present and future—stressed the 
deputy. A clear signal would be sent if such a charade were allowed to continue and it 
would make it known to all that you only need the support of a few to bring down a 
majority. Soto y Gama rhetorically asked:  
Where does the sovereignty of the States reside if we [the Chamber of 
Deputies] are going to be authorized to destroy every Power and meddle 
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[in the affairs] of the governments of the States […]. Let’s cut the bad out 
from its root. That is why I asked for the word, not to defend Zuno; Zuno 
for me, is just like any other revolutionary: a unit at the head of an 
enormous revolutionary mass. I come here to avoid the [establishment] of 
the precedent, to defend the sovereignty of the States [which] is well 
understood; I come to defend a governor [that was] truly elected and 
already recognized by all of the federal and local powers.120 
 
Díaz Soto y Gama, however, reiterated that he did not believe Zuno to be a saint, but that 
it did not matter to him, “his fellow country men [over in Jalisco will judge him] and if 
they are so upset, they should promote a local revolution.” The scope of the debate had 
thusly been made clear—this was no longer a local conflict that merely engulfed the 
Congress of Jalisco and implicated Governor Zuno in the events leadings up the 
impeachment of the minority deputies. The case had the potential to redefine the role of 
the Legislature and to interpret, and put into practice what democracy now meant to this 
generation of politicians—who were very much conscious about the importance of their 
decision-making and of its impact for years to come.   
What became abundantly clear, nevertheless, was that The Case of Jalisco had 
become the case of the Republic. Deputy Covarrubias claimed: “We, [in response to] 
gentlemen Díaz Soto, come with the Constitution of [19]17 [in hand, and in] article 108 it 
is absolutely clear that: the governors of the States and the deputies to the local 
legislature are responsible for violation[s] to the constitution and the federal laws.” And 
to address any concerns regarding the jurisdiction of the Chamber to take up such 
matters, Deputy Covarrubias made reference to article 111, which states that “the Senate 
will try official crimes, set up as a Grand Jury; but it will not be able to open the 
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corresponding investigation without prior accusation from the Chamber of Deputies.” 
The deputy stressed that if in the State of Jalisco there is no respect for the Legislative 
Power and if the local deputies of that federal entity are taken away from power “only for 
a convenient cause […the] harmony [between all of the powers] is broken.” “Let it be 
known once [and for all],” affirmed deputy Covarrubias, “that the entire Republic know, 
that all breaches to the Federal Pact, that all breaches to the general Constitution of the 
Republic fall under [constitutional sanctions].” The deputy challenged the “satraps” of 
the States to rise up in arms against the Federal Pact instead of blatantly undermining the 
Constitution. With a not so subtle dig directed towards Governor Zuno, Covarrubias 
conceded that it is at least braver to proclaim: 
[The] De la Huerta plan [as others did in December of 1923], than to be 
hidden in your personal address when the fatherland calls for your service! 
[…] The case of Jalisco is a moral case, [it] will have a repercussion over 
all of the men of the States who believe themselves supreme electors, 
obliging them to respect the vote of the people.  
 
The deliberations were now brought to a halt and the Chamber of Deputies voted as 
follows: 132 votes in favor of passing to motion to accuse the majority deputies; while 59 
deputies voted against accusing the local majority of misconduct.121   
The following day, on 23 March, the XXXI Legislature proceeded to examine the 
specific crimes attributed solely to Zuno and his administration, which (as mentioned 
above) focused on three areas: attacks against the democratic institutions of Mexico; 
attacks against the Free Municipality; and attacks against individual guarantees. Deputy 
Anaya Ramón opened discussion with a concise description of the efforts the 
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Commission had up until then carried out, which he believed devoid of any political 
agenda. “The case is clear, it is as transparent as the light of day,” avowed Anaya Ramón, 
“a fatal precedent would be set if the Chamber of Deputies consented, tolerated, that the 
general Constitution of the Republic, the supreme law of the country, be violated in such 
a flagrant manner by the governor of the State.” Deputy Valadez Ramírez, on the other 
hand, attempted to get to the bottom of all the ruckus and made evident to all that the 
oppositional efforts promoted against Zuno revolved around two main points of 
contention: 1) he was accused of having been in agreement with the de la Huerta 
Rebellion and of being in coexistence with Enrique Estrada; and 2) he was accused of 
deposing many of the ayuntamientos of Jalisco. “All of those ayuntamientos were 
suspended, new municipal presidents were named[,] very well,” sarcastically remarked 
Valadez Ramírez, “but it is convenient that the Republic know, not this honorable 
Assembly, because this Assembly, I refer to the majority block, has already [come up] 
with a resolution on this matter; they will vote in favor of the dictum [to accuse] and the 
governor will be tried before the Senate, without regard to [any] argument said here.” 
Deputy Valadez Ramírez reiterated Zuno’s loyalty to former President Obregón and even 
cited a specific letter that was sent to him—on behalf of Obregón—that cleared the 
governor of any wrong-doing during said rebellion. With regard to Zuno’s conduct 
toward the ayuntamientos, Valadez Ramírez deemed it a jocular matter; that it was true 
that many ayuntamientos were deposed, but that this was only done because many of 
them took part in the rebellion and recognized the administration of Tolentino.  
Deputy Orozco David, however, reminded the honorable Assembly to seriously 
consider the evidence collected on the series of atrocities committed against many 
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constitutional ayuntamientos and suggested Zuno’s direct implication and responsibility 
for several of those unjust practices. After a long and drawn out debate, another deputy, 
José F. Gutiérrez, cautioned and concluded that while Zuno had already renounced the 
governorship of Jalisco on the previous day, he had not done it out of altruistic ideals; 
rather, it had been because of the efforts undertaken by the parliamentary majority within 
the Chamber of Deputies. “[It] has been the energetic attitude of the men that, 
considering their true roles as representatives of the people,” vividly described Gutiérrez, 
“have made their lamentations [and] all of their pains echo, and [have] attempt[ed] to 
apply the cautery on the wound that we are signaling with a sign of fire.”122 The session 
closed much like the day before, with a vote: one-hundred and forty-four votes in favor of 
prosecuting Zuno to forty-eight votes against—the case was now forwarded to the 
Senate.  
Act III: The Senate 
 The stage was now set. On 25 May 1926, two dictums of vital importance for the 
State of Jalisco were on the table for deliberation (and voting) by members of the 
Senate—the accusation against Zuno and the accusation against the Local Legislature. In 
a surprising turn of events, the accusation against the majority deputies of the Chamber of 
Jalisco, which dominated the halls of the Chamber of Deputies, took a back seat (but was 
by no means forgotten). The crux of the debate heard on this day oscillated between the 
fate of a man who had elicited a maelstrom of commotion and criticism from many of the 
nation’s most well-respect public servants, reporters, and citizens, and the consequences 
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that all of this entailed for defining the scope and reach of national power. The 
contemptuous ridicule within the Senate was such for the embattled politician that they 
were unable to initially convince a fellow senator to mount a defense. “[Without a] 
defender it is not possible to continue this matter since it is about obeying a constitutional 
mandate and, additionally, it is a primordial right that all [the] accused have,” interjected 
Senator Cisneros Canto. After many failed nominations, Senator Aguayo stepped up to 
the plate to accept the defense of Zuno, and promptly asked to be brought up to speed on 
all matters related to the expediente.123   
 Abundantly aware of the important role he would come to play in the ensuing 
debate, as the opposing council—even if he was to face an uphill battle from the start, to 
clear the name of Zuno—Senator Aguayo challenged those present to honestly 
contemplate the stakes of what was to be debated on the floor on the Senate:  
Great questions and questions of transcendence are being debated, 
gentlemen; on one side, the pure and correct existence of the Constitution 
of the Republic and of our system of Government; on the other, an infinite 
small matter, but in the end a matter, and it is how we are going to 
integrate the Chamber of Deputies in the following exercise; this is the 
truth. […] But what we the senators of the Republic attack with all 
energy[,] what we try to save and establish, is the institutional question of 
the legitimate and pure life of the Constitution, of the Constitutional Pact 
of [19]17 launched in Querétaro, among the hymn of many consciences 
that understood one another [as] libertarians […] with just and sublime 
desires.124    
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Senator Aguayo warned of the consequences that would be produced if they accepted the 
“guillotining” of the Legislature of Jalisco, which was well within their power, given 
their capacity as central powers. And if loudest voices prevailed and had their way, and 
centralism triumphed over the federative spirit of the country, such decisive actions 
would additionally lead to the “guillotining” the constitutional system for the simple 
convenience of “making” favorable elections in the State of Jalisco. This was not a case 
to be decided with due diligence to the law, but rather it had become one motivated by 
“political passions,” or as one senator frankly remarked, “Zuno will fall because his 
friends of yesterday abandoned him in the precise moment [of need] and, in turn, they 
now come with tricks and shields apparently with the law to wrap and sink him [Zuno].” 
 Those in favor of prosecuting, however, decided to stress what they deemed to be 
one of the clearest violations of the Constitution that Zuno committed while in power and 
focused their efforts upon how the former governor had undermined the concept of “the 
Free Municipality.” For Senator Alvarez y Alvarez, for example, they were debating the 
fate of the republican institutions of the country of which the Free Municipality “was the 
origin from [which] the public power emanates from, since it is the embodiment of the 
popular will.” Making reference to the numerous cases that filled the pages of the official 
expediente, Senator Alvarez y Alvarez stressed that they should demand responsibilities 
from the Legislative Powers of the country and orient it in favor of the great moral and 
ethical interests of the Revolution. Meanwhile, Senator Aguayo denied that there was 
clear evidence Zuno had actually violated the concept of the Free Municipality and 
actually used the opportunity afforded to him as a platform to denounce it “as a very old 
institution, very conservative […] because it was not invented by the Mexicans, [it] was 
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previously invented by the Italians, and much later adopted by the Spanish, and we 
introduced it in the Constitution of [18]24.” The declaration provoked an animated 
response from Senator Alvarez y Alvarez, wherein he reminded those present of the vital 
importance of article 115 of the Constitution, which declared and enshrined the Free 
Municipality as the base of administrative and political organization of the country.  
 Senator Araujo recalled that when when Zuno assumed the governorship of the 
state of Jalisco, he believed him to be a true revolutionary, a man animated by goodwill 
in favor of his State; but that somewhere along the way, after the numerous acts he 
committed, the Senator realized that the governor had bamboozled the Revolution. 
Following a similar line of inquiry, Senator Maqueo Castellanos pointed to the great 
fortune Zuno had accumulated in such a short time and the magnificent palace he dwelled 
in, “when he should have just enjoyed his salary as governor,” and asked everyone to 
consider whether they actually believed Zuno had constructed his palace and prince 
lifestyle in Jalisco with just that salary.  “Let’s start to punish those bad revolutionaries 
that have made their source of wealth [from] the governments of the States; because it is 
not only Zuno, there are many Zunos, but we have to start with one [named] Guadalupe 
[Zuno],” decried Senator Maqueo Castellanos, “If we do not punish this man, all of the 
others will quietly and contently continue […] saying ‘if Zuno who robed and has 
committed so many diverse crimes, is absolved, us, with even more reason [will be 
absolved]’.” 125 
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The Senate appeared to be ready to vote on the matter; however, just before the 
motion was signaled, Senator Robledo chimed in to clarify that Zuno had created a 
political apparatus of control in the region comprised of workers and agraristas. And that 
this was, in his own opinion, the most serious part of his attacks. He conceded that the 
former governor was “magnificent” with all of the workers and his unconditional 
supporters, but was terrible and persecuted all of those who opposed his politics. For 
Senator Robledo, this constituted the worst sin of the period and was reflective of the 
corruption they had all started to notice in the Republic, “in which the principles of the 
Revolution have become the political arms [for] profit in almost all of the country […].” 
After calling for an official vote, forty-three individuals voted in favor of prosecuting, 
while four voted against the measure. Zuno was officially found guilty of the charges 
leveled against him and, as a result, was handed a sanction of seven years and six months, 
which prevented him from taking part in any office or employment in the Federation—
essentially this crippled any national-level political aspirations he might have had.  
With regard to the twelve minority deputies of the Chamber of Jalisco, the 
popular sentiment appeared to back them in the face of the judgment previously rendered 
by the Chamber of Deputies. The Secciones Instructoras del Gran Jurado handed down a 
positive dictum claiming that they could not legally prove the existence of violations 
committed against the Constitution and subsequently deemed the local deputies not 
responsible for said crimes. The Senators quickly promoted a motion to vote and 
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unanimously accepted the dictum by a majority vote of forty-five.126 The decision to not 
prosecute the local deputies sent a clear message across the entire nation. In this case, the 
legislature would champion the sovereignty of the States and protect state autonomy, but 
their actions promptly reminded all that if the foundational principle upon which the 
system was premised upon found itself threatened—or a rogue politician overstepped the 
bounds of their office—nobody was immune to the new popular political currents that 
dominated national-level policy.  
Conclusion 
José G. Zuno’s meteoric rise into the ranks of the political elite captivated both 
the imagination and disdain of contemporaries, friends and foe alike; his downfall, 
nevertheless, teetered on the brink of the fantastical and garnered national attention. 
Chapter 2 displayed the chronic anxieties about state sovereignty that Mexican citizens 
displayed under the zunista administration in years that were formative to the political 
and social history of Jalisco. I argued that such disorder was part of an on-going 
negotiation over how to govern and rule, and was manifest in the extensive debates that 
took place regarding the limits of local and national power following the first significant 
challenge to the established social order (the Estradista Rebellion). The first half of this 
chapter explored the anatomy of rule in the Guadalajara region and focused on the power-
laden relationship that comprised zunismo as a political movement; however, special 
attention was given to citizens who regularly voiced legitimate grievances, but whose 
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anxieties frequently fell on deaf ears. The second half of this chapter focused on the 
impassioned and precedent-setting exchanges concerning The Case of Jalisco and the 
prosecution of Zuno that followed, which occurred on the floors of the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate from 22 March 1926 to 25 May 1926. I specifically inquired into 
how elected-officials debated democracy and sovereignty, and placed into perspective the 
scope of national power during a period of rapid social and political change.  
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Chapter 3 
The Road to Perdition: Seditious Activities and Political Disorders 
 
 
[The] rebels only wait for the clerical regulation [to take effect] to once again raise a new 
banner, which will be the religious question, [and] it appears that many of the region’s 
priests are interested in this matter.  
  - Informant González1 
 
[It] is not tolerable for Zunismo [in Jalisco] to be prolonged across many epochs and 
administrations as a hereditary accident in the midst of the grief and anxieties of a people 
which wishes, that needs, that demands good government, liberty, and integrity.   
-Excelsior2 
 
 
On 15 June 1926, ex-Governor José G. Zuno invited American Consul Dudley 
Dwyre to his lavish new residential palace in Guadalajara. Not more than three months 
had elapsed since the politician spectacularly resigned the governorship of Jalisco, 
purportedly to safeguard the sovereignty of the state. Dwyre was escorted by Consular 
Inspector James Stewart and together the men spent the better part of an hour-and-a-half 
inspecting the premises while listening to Zuno boastfully lecture about the building’s 
novel artistic features, which he himself had painstakingly designed and helped to 
construct.  
The American Consul noted in his report to the State Department that the 
relationship between his office and the former governor had, in recent weeks, become 
more cordial and friendly “since the pressure seems to have been lifted from his [Zuno’s] 
shoulders and there seems to be no doubt as to his position.” Dwyre, however, stressed 
                                                
1 Archivo General de la Nación (hereinafter cited as AGN), Obregón-Calles (hereinafter cited as O-
C), 101-R2-A1, “Confidential report prepared by González and addressed to the personal secretary of the 
president of the republic.” 
2 Excelsior, “The Latest Victory of Zuno,” 29 September 1926. 
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his desire to continue working on behalf of American interests and property through 
Zuno “who continues to be, without [a] doubt, the controlling force in this state.” The 
report also emphasized that efforts needed to be made not to lose sight of the likelihood 
that the former governor might soon become a very influential figure in the national 
political field: “[Zuno] is unquestionably, a most remarkable person, and shrewd almost 
beyond comprehension […and] has gone through many very strenuous political conflicts, 
and has always come up smiling and on top.”3  
In the previous chapter I examined the development of a regional power structure 
in the Guadalajara region and dissected the anatomy of rule following the Federal Army’s 
defeat of the de la Huerta Rebellion. Zuno’s widely publicized fall from grace earlier in 
the year and the subsequent sanctions levelled at his person by the Mexican Senate 
temporarily depriving him of his civil rights and precluding him from holding any 
political office for seven-and-a-half-years, marked a significant coup for the 
administration of Plutarco Elías Calles in Mexico City.4 As the reader will recall, stark 
divisions began to crystallize in the aftermath of the de la Huerta Rebellion between the 
supporters of former-President Obregón and current-President Calles.5 It was in this 
                                                
3 State Department (hereinafter cited as SD), 812.00/27823, 11 June 1926. Dwyre also suggested 
the following: “While it may have been the desire of the Federal Government to eliminate him, it is now 
becoming the opinion that the administration may consider it wiser to use him as an ally rather than permit 
him to be an opponent.”      
4 During its first two years, the Calles administration reignited a reform program that had largely 
been abandoned in the throes of that armed uprising and moved towards concentrating greater power into 
the hands of the federal executive. 
5 The politics of callismo were largely seen as a departure from those of his predecessor, Obregón, 
and not only demonstrated a closer adherence to the most radical provisions enshrined in the Constitution 
of 1917, but also strategically “drew [up]on the support of leaders who had grown disaffected with the slow 
pace of reform” under the previous administration. Specifically, the Calles administration actively pursued 
the corporatism of social movements, the elimination of regional caudillos, and the modernization of the 
military; see Gil Joseph and Jürgen Buchenau, Mexico’s Once and Future Revolution: Social Upheaval and 
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context, then, that Zuno—a close collaborator of the former, and a professed enemy of 
latter—rose to power, only to be unceremoniously ousted.  
This chapter focuses on two great problems the Calles administration faced in 
Jalisco: 1) the specter of another armed uprising in the countryside; and 2) a local 
political crisis over effective control of the state. A mass uprising with a distinctly 
religious character, in fact, began gradually to take shape during the second half of 1926. 
While the Cristero Rebellion, as the conflict came to be known, presented a significant 
obstacle to the Calles administration, it will not directly occupy the attention of this 
chapter.6 Instead, this chapter continues to interrogate the aftermath of de la Huerta 
Rebellion and the renewed conflict between Zuno and Calles, “two external factors that 
conditioned the composition and activity of the Mexican state on the eve of the Cristero 
[rebellion].”7 In the first part, I explore through an analysis of secret agent reports the 
Ministry of Interior’s anxieties regarding the possibility of another widespread 
insurgency. Following the suppression of the de la Huerta Rebellion in March 1924, the 
Deprtamento Confidencial—the Ministry’s intelligence services—began systematically 
to engage in the surveillance of Jalisco’s countryside. The agents and informants tasked 
                                                
the Challenge of Rule Since the Late Nineteenth Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), pp. 83 
and 98-99. The reforms also promoted, among other things, “measures designed to improve the fiscal 
situation of the state with the professionalization of the army, nationalist efforts to control natural 
resources, and […] economic development, education, and social welfare;” Jaime Tamayo, La 
conformación del Estado moderno y los conflictos políticos, 1917-1929 (Guadalajara: Gobierno del Estado 
de Jalisco, Universidad de Guadalajara, 1988), p. 257.  
6 The Cristero Rebellion and its aftermath will be the subject matter of the next chapter. 
7 Robert Curley, ““Avanza el desierto”: espacio público y suicidio político en el imaginario 
cristero,” in Los guachos y los mochos: once ensayos cristeros, edited by Julia Preciado Zamora and 
Servando Otroll (Morelia, Michoacán, Mexico: Red Utopía: Jitanjáfora Morelia Editorial, 2009), p 50. 
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with carrying out this espionage made up the state’s first line of defense against real 
and/or perceived domestic seditious activities. Largely housed in the collections of the 
Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (DGIPS), these agents’ reports 
focused on relaying to supervisors what they deemed relevant information about 
rebellious and social activities that could potentially affect the state’s interests. I contend 
that the de la Huerta Rebellion, despite these anti-sedition efforts, greatly transformed the 
manner in which the central state interacted with, and produced knowledge, of the 
countryside.  
The second part of the chapter analyzes how zunistas attempted to survive 
politically after Zuno was “toppled” in March 1926. I focus on how federal intervention 
into labor politics and state elections affected the existing local power structure of the 
region. I argue, however, that the supporters of Zuno were not merely reactors to official 
policy emanating from Mexico City, but were also “political initiators” who themselves 
exercised an important role in limiting the impact of the national government in the 
region. The chapter as a whole asks three questions: What role did the de la Huerta 
Rebellion and its local manifestation, the Estradista Rebellion, play in transforming the 
Ministry of Interior’s relationship with, and knowledge about, the countryside on the eve 
of another mass insurrection? What does the clash between zunismo and the federal 
government in Jalisco reveal about Mexico’s practices of democratic inclusion and 
exclusion? And to what extent did the Calles administration’s centralist policies 
transform the federalist system of governance established by the Constitution of 1917?  
 
Conspiracies and Rebellious Activities  
in the Countryside 
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 The date was 11 September 1924. It had been nearly six-months since the federal 
army defeated the rebel forces of General Enrique Estrada. On this day, Agente de 
Segunda Enrique Alcaraz Díaz found himself in Guadalajara to investigate seditious 
activities. The mission entrusted to him by the Deprtamento Confidencial consisted of 
befriending locals in order to gather intelligence about matters of interest in the 
countryside. In a letter to his department head, Alcaraz Díaz wrote that “a few days ago I 
learned that in Jalisco an armed movement against the local Government is [in the midst] 
of being prepared, [and said] movement is being organized by political groups that were 
defeated in the last political campaign […and the rebellion] will break out in this current 
month of September.”8 A week later, the agent informed his department that he had also 
learned that in various towns in the southern part of the state—near areas such as 
Pihuamo, Tecalitlán, and Ahuijullo, among others—rumors swirled regarding the 
presence of at least five-hundred armed men belonging to groups that former General 
Enrique Estrada once commanded. But after a careful investigation into the matter at 
hand, Agent Alcaraz Díaz assuaged any fears that the Ministry of Interior might have had 
about the rumors of the state government rebelling against central state authority: “The 
political groups that were ousted in the previous campaign will not prepare an armed 
movement against the Government of the State, nor in a general [sense] because with the 
exception of the florista group all of them are loyal to the Federal Government.”9 But at 
                                                
8 AGN, Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (hereinafter cited as DGIPS), 
Estado de Jalisco, Propaganda Sediciosa, 11 September 1924, f. 190 
9 Floristas were the supporters of General Angel Flores, the individual who had recently lost his bid 
for president of Mexico to Calles by a count of 1.34 million votes to 250,000; see Lyle C. Brown, “The 
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this moment, even the floristas remained dormant in the countryside. If a general 
movement were to breakout, however, warned the agent, this political group would be 
willing to support it. In addition to this incident, the agent also reported an upsurge in 
rebellious activities and pointed out several instances in which local politicians had begun 
to supply the rebels in the countryside with arms and munitions.10  
In the wake of the Estradista Rebellion hundreds of these reports containing 
information about contemporary seditious rumors that gained currency in the 
countryside—such as those submitted by Agent Alcaraz Díaz—began to arrive with 
greater frequency to the offices of the Departamento Confidencial (an agency under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior). The origins of this agency dated back to the 
regime of Venustiano Carranza who established the Servicios Confidenciales in 1918 to 
gather “information on his friends and enemies in order to maintain political control.”11 
                                                
Calles-Cárdenas Connection,” in Twentieth-Century Mexico, edited by Dirk Raat and William Beezley 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), p. 148. 
10 AGN, DGIPS, Estado de Jalisco, Propaganda Sediciosa. 18 September 1924, f. 187.  
11 Arron Navarro, Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-1954 (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), pp. 6-7, 153. During the next two decades the 
intelligence service underwent several reincarnations and name changes, successively becoming: The 
Departamento Confidencial (1924), the Oficina de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (1925), the 
Departamento de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (1938), and finally the DGIPS in the late 1940s. In 
its early stage the intelligence service largely remained under the command of military officials because 
“[i]ntelligence was [deemed] too important to be trusted to civilian chiefs, although agents could be—and 
often were—civilians.” The army remained powerful enough to run intelligence services up until the late 
1930s. For a discussion about the development of the intelligence services during and after the Alemán 
administration, see Tanalís Padilla and Louise E. Walker’s “In the Archives: History and Politics,” Journal 
of Iberian and Latin American Research, 19:1 (2013), pp. 1-10. There have been recent and concerted 
efforts on the part of historians to examine critically the reports generated by spies from 1947 to 1985, 
“which includes thousands of boxes collectively containing millions of pages […].” Many of the reports 
that I utilize resemble the contents of those reports generated for later periods, but for all the similarities, 
the cold-war context and the consolidation of Mexico’s one-party system greatly changed the type of 
surveillance carried out. For example, Padilla and Walker note that “[agent] reports detail public political 
meetings, private conversations of leaders and members of the rank-and-file [of the PRI], transcripts of 
illegal wiretaps, as well as speculation about political sympathies and affiliations.”  
 179 
After Obregón was elected president in 1920, he began to centralize power though the 
establishment (and strengthening) of connections with governors and regional bosses, 
congress, the military, and popular organizations. Crucial to this process was the 
formation of an impressive cabinet (consejo de ministros). Among those appointed to his 
cabinet was General Calles, a close friend, long-term collaborator, and fellow Sonoran, 
who was assigned the post of Secretary of the Ministry of Interior. The latter managed 
successfully to transform this office into an increasingly important position through the 
creation of the Departamento Confidencial “from the remnants of similar agencies that 
Carranza had employed.” As Stout has noted:   
Once ensconced in Gobernación [the Ministry of Interior], he [Calles] 
contributed significantly to Obregón’s efforts to centralize authority. 
Calles could now deploy all the tools of the national government to 
accomplish his ends, and he was determined to employ an internal agency 
that monitored political and social activities as one method of centralizing 
power.12 
 
The agency began modestly, with relatively few funds and few agents (no more than 
twenty), many of whom were deployed across the country to monitor political and social 
activities, and would “later [submit] reports to the agency.” In its infancy this department 
was characterized as an inefficient organization, where agents received only minor 
training in intelligence gathering; however, over the course of Calles’s tenure the 
department began slowly to improve “the quality of its agents and its methods.” Under 
Calles’s leadership resources were poured into reorganizing and strengthening the 
                                                
12 Joseph A. Stout Jr., Spies, Politics, and Power: El Departmento Confidencial en México, 1922-
1946. (Fort Worth: TCU Press, 2012), pp. 33-34.  
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department, and towards reorienting its focus to “the importance of knowing the social 
and political conditions of the country.”13   
In 1923, Calles established an archive for the Departamento Confidencial, which 
permitted the agency not only to organize their reports better, but also to “keep relatively 
good records of its activities.” The establishment of these formal channels allowed agents 
to submit and classify reports according to the type activities they carried out.14 Agents 
were also renamed (and reclassified) into two categories: Agentes Confidenciales de 
Primera and Agentes Confidenciales de Segunda.15 During this same period Calles also 
appointed the agency’s first director, Gilberto Valenzuela. The position would later be 
taken up by General Paulino Navarro and then Colonel Martín Bárcenas16 (after the death 
of the former in the throes of the de la Huerta Rebellion).17   
The experiences that Calles gained as Secretary and during the previous 
uprising—and the persistent violent skirmishes in the countryside against federal 
forces—led him to believe strongly “that [the] recurring rebellions against the 
                                                
13 Stout, p. 34 
14 Stout, p. 34 
15 Stout, p. 40. The author notes that the “former received fifteen pesos per day plus expenses, as 
before, and the latter were paid twelve pesos daily, along with expenses.”  
16 The name Martín Bárcenas should be familiar to the reader, as this is the same individual who 
carried out the investigation into whether the “powers” of the state had disappeared during the Estradista 
Rebellion in Jalisco; see Chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
17 General Paulino Navarro died in one of the premiere battles that took place during the Estradista 
Rebellion in late December 1924, where the forces commanded by General Lázaro Cárdenas were 
decimated at the hands of General Rafael Buelna. This outcome led led the latter to express: “It is my 
opinion that very few times [in history] has such a complete triumph been obtained;” see AHMA, 1923 
(Gobernación, 6), “Telegrama del General Enrique Estrada al Jefe Supremo de la Revolución Adolfo de la 
Huerta,” 27 December 1923. 
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government clearly [demonstrate] the importance of knowing the social and political 
conditions of the country.”18 If there was to be another rebellion, then, the department 
wanted to know about it well in advance; that is, uncovering challenges to the social 
order and efforts to undermine the legitimacy of the presidency were now to be privileged 
efforts for the agency. As a result, when Calles became president in December 1924, the 
agency became a priority to his administration. Under the leadership of Bárcenas, the 
director from January 1, 1924 to January 11, 1925, the agency pushed to augment the 
scope of its activities and sought to reorganize itself into a political and administrative 
division because the director felt “that political problems in the various states often did 
not come to the attention of the central government until they were almost too serious to 
resolve.” The director, however, spent the majority of his time in Jalisco—away from the 
office in Mexico City—coordinating efforts on the part of the agency to bring the de la 
Huerta Rebellion to an end.  
In particular, Bárcenas spent the better part of March-April 1924 carrying out an 
intensive investigation in Jalisco after de la Huerta Rebellion, where he uncovered 
several inconsistencies with regard to the actions of the state governor and other elected 
officials during and after the upheaval. To avoid these problems in the future, advised 
Bárcenas, in his recommendations to Calles, the agency needed to station permanent 
agents in each state to allow them to carry out more thorough investigations “where the 
agents could monitor [the] daily activities of state officials.” It was also during this period 
that Lt. Colonel Ignacio Jiménez, the de facto director when Bárcenas was away 
                                                
18 Stout, p. 40. 
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conducting investigations, significantly transformed the methods and procedures agents 
utilized in their investigations: 
He [Jiménez] insisted upon more complete documentation of departmental 
investigations, held agents reporting to work to strict schedules, 
established rules and guidelines to assure that agents provided valid 
information, and in essence established the structure that transformed the 
department into a true intelligence operation. Finally, he [continued to 
organize] the agency’s archive with a document numbering system so 
information could be stored and retrieved easily from an index.19 
 
After Bárcenas left to become the General Police Inspector of Mexico City in January 
1925, his successor Lt. Colonel Eufrasio Ortega, introduced additional improvements to 
the agency’s methods. For example, agents began—if they had not already not done so—
to conduct their investigations in secret and were instructed “to be discreet, treat people 
properly, be diligent in their work, read the newspapers in order to be informed about 
public issues, and obey the orders of superiors.”20  
It should be noted that the reports these agents produced have clear limitations, 
given their conditional and tentative nature; that is, the agents themselves may have 
presented “information without the benefit of context or even specific knowledge of the 
persons involved […].” In utilizing these documents, we are presented with a double-
edged sword of sorts: on the one hand, the documents reflect a certain degree of self-
selection on the part of supervisors in positions of power at the Departamento 
Confidencial, who themselves privileged certain tidbits of information over others 
deemed extraneous; while on the other, we too as historians in the archive cherry-pick 
                                                
19 Stout, p. 41 
20 Stout, pp. 42-43. 
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and self-select from the pool of already self-selected documents that made it into the 
dusty bins and boxes of a repository.21 The use of this documentation as a source base, 
then, requires us not only to direct some serious thought at critically interrogating their 
content, but also to the nexus of networks which produced this knowledge. But as 
Navarro makes clear: “[T]he tremendous advantages gained from these reports are the 
opportunities to read the considered analyses of interested Mexican officials writing 
about their own political reality and to see the variety of opinion feeding into the 
intelligence bureaucracy of the federal government.” The decoding of these rumors in the 
countryside can indeed reveal a lot about the popular beliefs of those who were the 
targets of surveillance. My interest here is not so much on the actual creation or inception 
of the rumors, however, nor on their truth-content or on the subsequent impact they had 
on communities from which they originated. Rather, in what follows my object of inquiry 
shifts to what agents in Jalisco deemed important enough to report and send to their 
                                                
21 There has been a good amount of healthy debate on the accessibility of these types of sources at 
the AGN. See Tanalís Padilla and Louise Walker, eds., “Dossier: Spy Reports: Content, Methodology, and 
Historiography in Mexico Secret Police Archive,” Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research, Vol. 
19 (2013): 1-103. In particular, Padilla and Walker note that, “the collections of the DGIPS records are 
much more loosely organized” than the Departamento de Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y 
Políticos del Pasado (DFS) collection. On the one hand, the collections of the DGIPS are organized into 
numbered boxes, identified only by years and state or federal district; on the other, the collections of the 
DFS have “a detailed card catalogue searchable by subject, but to our knowledge no scholar has had access 
to the catalogue itself.” Padilla and Walker continue: “Instead, it is mediated by the archive workers who 
tend the service counter in Gallery One […] Historians, therefore, depend on the goodwill of those in 
charge to entertain a keyword guessing game. The results are not always fruitful, but the dialogue can often 
be productive and archivists do at times suggest helpful leads or connections.” In my own experience, the 
DGIPS archive in Gallery Two is indeed more accessible and I concur with Padilla and Walker’s view that 
the research here “involves going through significant amounts of extraneous material in hopes of finding 
something pertinent to the topic.” My own strategy consisted of casting a wide net and ordering all the 
boxes on Jalisco and accidently stumbling upon the agent reports and other investigation conducted by the 
Ministry of Interior. What initially struck me about the reports, however, were their granularity and the 
tremendous amount of information they contained about the social, cultural, and political lives of 
contemporaries; see Padilla and Walker (“In the Archives”), pp. 4-5.  
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supervisors and, similarly, the content that actually made it into state archives in Mexico 
City.   
This section makes use of an extensive corpus of documentation gathered from 
the DGIPS Archive, largely produced by agents or informants in the countryside—reports 
then turned over to the Departamento Confidencial in Mexico City. The first set of 
reports, authored by Agents 15 and 115, focused on documenting the presence and 
activities of rebel groups that were again up in arms in the countryside (months after the 
previous mass uprising ended); and also on the prospect that many of these groups were 
working in collusion with the state government to undermine the central state’s capacity 
to rule. The second set of reports originated from the detailed investigations Agent 24 
carried out in southern Jalisco. I highlight two examples: the first directs our attention to 
the Jalisco-Michoacán border and emphasizes the continuance of de la Huertista 
networks, consisting of local and regional propaganda campaigns, and transnational links 
with exiled rebel leaders; while the second comes from the Sierra de Quila region—near 
the central part of the state—and concentrates on the neighboring towns of Juchitlán and 
Tecolotlán. I underscore the experiences of individuals in the countryside who were 
supporters of these latest rebellions, most of whom had direct links to the previous 
uprising and expressed a clear antipathy towards the central government. The idea here is 
not only to highlight what was actually being reported to the state’s intelligence offices in 
Mexico City, but also to shift our attention to what ordinary folks in the countryside were 
thinking.  
We begin our inquiry in the months that followed the defeat and suppression of 
the local Estradista Rebellion, when the countryside continued to be a fertile hotbed of 
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seditious activities against the central state and reported incidents of violence were on the 
rise. In fact, for the remainder of 1924 and beyond, the federal army continued to pursue 
rebels at a surprisingly high rate.22 It was also around this time that rumors of a mass 
insurrection in Jalisco began once again to reach the offices of the Departamento 
Confidencial and the Ministry of Interior with greater frequency. The state government, 
which following the previous uprising formed an impressive power structure in the 
Guadalajara region and rallied behind Zunismo, also began to distance itself from the 
central state. Consequently, the specter of rebellion in the countryside and political revolt 
in Guadalajara became a manifest reality to the area’s citizens. This greatly conditioned 
the manner in which government agencies—and the intelligence services, in particular—
came to understand the region as an object of inquiry. Let us now turn our attention to the 
years 1924 to 1926. 
 
Agents 15 and 115  
 
On 11 October 1924, El Demócrata reported on a plot that had recently been 
uncovered in Jalisco against the central government, which implicated several rebel 
groups across the entire state of Jalisco. The potential uprising was brought to the 
attention of General Lázaro Cárdenas—the Head of Military Operations in the region—
who proceeded to investigate the matter. The investigation yielded the arrests of the 
presumed leaders of the movement, “as they headed to diverse places in the State with the 
                                                
22 While the military continued to deny in official reports that rebels were up in arms, Agents 115 
and 15, and Alcaraz Díaz reported on the military’s response to these uprisings; see AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 
(3.2) – 6 – II, Estado de Jalisco, Propaganda Sediciosa and AGN, DGIPS, 313.1-13 (3.2), Tomo I, Estado 
de Jalisco, Partes diarios sobre novedades, Exp. 4. 
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objective [of growing] and intensifying the movement.” Ex-Colonel Vargas, president of 
the Partido Liberal Revolucionario and pegged as the principal florista leader, was 
accused of carrying out “active seditious propaganda” at military centers and private 
locations “where military men who were [previously] under the orders of ex-General 
Enrique Estrada [resided].”23 About two months later, on 16 December 1924, the town of 
San Cristóbal Zapotitlán (Municipality of Jocotepec) was assaulted and ransacked by a 
group of bandits at three in the morning. As soon as Municipal President Teodoro Gaitán 
received word of the event, he gathered up a group of men and took to the nearby hills in 
pursuit of the attackers. An exchange of gunfire followed, lasting fifteen minutes. The 
ruggedness of the terrain, however, made it impossible for the defenders of the town to 
capture anyone, and they quickly lost sight of the attackers.24 The following day, the 
spokesperson for General Lázaro Cárdenas declared to the press that “the small bands of 
rebels that maraud through various parts of the state, have been completely defeated […] 
and that […] all of the state finds itself in complete peace.”25  
Meanwhile, earlier that month the Departamento Confidencial in Mexico City 
had sent Agents 15 and 115 on assignment to investigate seditious activities in Jalisco. 
The official position taken by military officials, nevertheless, took the agents by complete 
surprise. Their investigations into the matter had revealed an upsurge in rebellious 
activities over the course of December. And before the above declarations were made to 
                                                
23 El Demócrata, 11 October 1924. 
24 El Informador, “Un Alcalde rechazó la acometida de unos bandidos,” 18 December 1924.  
25 El Sol, “Jalisco se halla en la paz más absoluta. Desaparecieron ya las gavillas que había,” 17 
December 1924. 
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the press on behalf of General Cárdenas, the agents claimed to have met with him face-
to-face to inquire about the current state of the countryside, a meeting of which they 
reported that “[General] Cárdenas told us that ‘In Mexico [the people] are highly 
emotional and scandalmongers.”26 The agents were taken aback by the dismissive nature 
of the comments voiced by the General, since their preliminary forays into the 
countryside revealed many seditious activities. 
The rumblings of rebellion had been in the air since 1 December, when José G. 
Palos—the self-proclaimed Second Chief and Colonel of the Armed Forces of Jalisco, 
made his way to Teocuitatlán de Corona with a group of fifty men and sent another group 
to the Jocotepec area. In these days, Palos circulated a manifesto calling upon the people 
of Jalisco to rise up in arms against the national government. It read as follows:   
Armed rebellion is a legitimate right of oppressed peoples, when bold 
imposters assault the Public power and take it over to commit all types of 
violations and attacks upon the guarantees[,] which the Law 
fundamentally grants citizens born in a free country. All armed movement, 
for it to be legal should have as its objective the implementation or 
defense of elevated principles of patriotism and of justice[. In] the present 
case the entire Nation has felt how the supporters of Gral. Plutarco Elías 
Calles, in heinous conspiracy with the […] Government of General 
Obregón[,] has mocked the most noble aspirations of the people […]. 
Obregón and Calles have betrayed the revolution. They will be responsible 
before the history [and] blood that will be shed in this new struggle that 
the true Mexican public [will] undertake to reconquer their rights.27 
 
Echoing similar sentiments that the Estradista Rebellion upheld earlier in the year, the 
Palos revolt reflected a continuance of the endemic struggle against the central state and a 
profound disdain for regional authorities that many in this region had. This uprising not 
                                                
26 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo I, Exp. 4, f. 12. 
27 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo I, Exp. 4, f. 14.  
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only reflected how violence had become a necessary recourse for many of the state’s 
rural population, but also highlighted a new lexicon of rebellion that became popular in 
these years. The political act of rebellion for citizens, here, was to be understood as a 
“legitimate right.” And their willingness to pay the ultimate sacrifice in order to be 
included in the new democratic life of the country meant that many rebel groups actively 
began to translate the language of the Revolution and appropriated it into their own 
worldviews. This political act, therefore, shaped and would continue to transform the 
region throughout the 1920s and beyond.  
The Mexican intelligence service was absolutely aware of the threat (and 
actuality) of rebellion in the regions of Jalisco, as hordes of reports attesting to this fact 
made their way into the hands of supervisors at an alarming rate. And the Palos revolt, as 
we will see, was not an isolated incident, nor was Jalisco the peaceful region that General 
Cárdenas had made it out to be, where rumors gained wide currency and filled the 
imaginations of chismosos, only to die away. “The conduct of [General] Cárdenas, 
appears to [us] more and more suspicious,” confirmed the agents.28  In fact, Agents 15 
and 115 reported and identified to the Departamento Confidencial at least seven other 
distinct rebel groups that were still up in arms in Jalisco, in addition to the Palos revolt:  
near Tlajomulco, there were at least 100 men up in arms; in Tapalpa, the Manzano 
brothers had gathered no less than seventy men; and near Ocotlán and La Barca, Rutilio 
Enxiástigia and his band patrolled with impunity. Meanwhile in Tequila, ex-Colonel 
Pablo González operated with about seventy supporters; just outside of Guadalajara, the 
                                                
28 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo I, Exp. 4, f. 21  
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Tolentino brothers controlled the area near La Barranca; Ciro Tovar operated in Villa de 
Purificación with a group of around forty men; and another individual, popularly referred 
to as “El Malacate,” controlled another band of rebels rumored to have been given 
ammunition by the state government and the clergy.29 Over the course of December the 
agents identified a great many more such groups.30  
 The two agents claimed to be in possession of evidence confirming that many of 
the rebels apparently enjoyed impunity, especially in the region controlled by General 
Alberto Zuno, the brother of José G. Zuno, and that the “inactivity of Governor Zuno can 
be interpreted as [his being] complicit with the rebels.” Both agents were also surprised at 
the fact that Governor Zuno learned they were in the state watching over the acts of the 
local government, given that the agents had only told General Cárdenas (per instructions 
of the Ministry of Interior). The agents sent to investigate these seditious activities, 
nevertheless, were not only themselves aware of being under the surveillance of General 
Cárdenas, but also of the fact that false stories were consistently planted in newspapers in 
order to mislead them in their efforts: “[T]he local press of the state has published news 
[stories] related to the rebellion that is being prepared in Jalisco, but [we] have been able 
to find out that it is not true [and] that [the military] is persecuting the rebels,” confirmed 
the agents, “but as we have said, in previous reports, those who are up in arms are not 
being bothered, and it has only been about six days in which the […] Head of Military 
Operations assured us that in Jalisco there is not one rebel band.” The agents, however, 
                                                
29 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo I, Exp. 4, f. 13 
30 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo I, Exp. 4. 
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felt that not enough was being done to truly pacify the countryside. All of this negligence, 
according to the agents, had led to Guadalajara becoming a hotbed of rebel activities, 
where delahuertistas could patiently and precisely plan their next moves[,] perhaps with 
the complicity of the authorities[, and] prepare a movement that will break out next 
January.”31 
 The following day, on 15 December, Agent 15 continued to shed light onto the 
seditious movement that was developing in the state. “Ex-Colonel Manuel Gómez, ex-
Head of the Rural Corps of the State, who rose up in arms with General Manuel M. 
Diéguez last December [during] the delahuertista rebellion, as well as his assistant 
Leandro González, are carrying out seditious activities,” confirmed Agent 15.32 The agent 
had also been in contact with individuals in Gómez’s hometown of Tala and reported that 
“this man has a great number of arms in possession of a compadre of his, and that said 
arms belong to the men he commanded during the [previous] rebellion.” This was 
significant, according to the report, because during that rebellion, almost half of the 
residents of Tala rose up in arms in support of ex-Colonel Gómez. Through an informant, 
Agent 15 had also come to learn that Juan Pérez, who rose up in arms during the de la 
Huerta Rebellion under the command of General Natalio Espinosa, was now in 
Mazamitla and counted upon the support of Governor Zuno and Local Deputy Victoriano 
Salado. Apparently, Pérez had gone to the area to lead rebel holdouts from the previous 
uprising who had been refashioned by the state into “agrarian forces.” “Through people 
                                                
31 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo I, Exp. 4, f. 22 
32 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo I, Exp. 4, f. 24 
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in Mazamitla,” reported agent 15, “I have learned that [Deputy] Salado had given orders 
to Juan Pérez [to be] ready with all of his people because they [might] need him at any 
minute.”33 
 One of the emerging trends reflected by these reports is a tendency for agents to 
highlight the collusion—whether real or not—between former and current rebels, and 
officials belonging to the state government. Agent 15, for example, claimed that during 
the rebellion the Mounted Police in Guadalajara rose up in arms against the Government 
and that “the officials from the Mounted Police are all ex-rebels [who fought for General] 
Enrique Estrada, who [are now] protected [by] Governor Zuno and Municipal President 
of Guadalajara José María Cuéllar.” This accusation, however, was not made out of thin 
air, but rather reflected the findings of a carefully calculated investigation into the matter. 
Earlier in the month, Agent 15 took a trip with Sánchez Aldana, an informant working as 
a civilian within the Ayuntamiento of Guadalara (who would later himself become an 
agent), to the town of Zapopan to interview Police Chief Arturo Campos, “who during 
the conversation we had told me, that his colleague ex-Captain Heredia who had been 
arrested on the charge of rebellion in Ocotlán during the previous uprising, was being 
protected by Governor Zuno […].” To prove collusion between the rebels and state 
officials, the agent claimed he was told of an incident that occurred about a month and a 
half before, when rebel General Félix Barajas found himself in close proximity to the 
aforementioned town, which resulted in a skirmish and led to the deaths of three rebels. 
As they searched the dead, they were able to find in their pocket credentials granted to 
                                                
33 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo I, Exp. 4, f. 24.  
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them by the state government. This ultimately meant, according to the agent, that 
Governor Zuno, and even the municipal president, were in agreement with the rebel 
Barajas, “as well as the others that are up in arms against the state.”34 
Agent 15 also observed that the conduct of Zuno towards his employees and, 
specifically, towards Local Deputy Luis Castillo was “completely suspicious” on the 
grounds that the deputy was a brother of Colonel Castillo (who presumably supported the 
previous uprising), and that the governor had several former supporters of Enrique 
Estrada carrying out important roles within his own government. As an example, he cited 
Benjamín Contreras, a sympathizer with the previous uprising, now chosen by the 
governor to become the new manager of the Compañía Hidroeléctrica e Irrigadora del 
Chapala after his administration confiscated it from its rightful owners.35 Additionally, in 
a separate report Agent 15 claimed that several other current civil employees of the state 
“had distinct roles [within] the Government of the Estradista Rebellion.” Among these 
men were Tomás Vidrio, who before and during the rebellion served the municipal 
administration of Guadalajara and edited “El Radio,” a pro-rebel newspaper, but was now 
an employee of the state government; and Angel Moreno, who during the rebellion 
served as a confidential agent to provisional Governor Tolentino, but now worked for the 
municipal administration of Cuéllar and privately served as an agent for Zuno. 36  
                                                
34 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 (3.2) 6, Nombre: Estado de Jalisco, Asunto: Propaganda sediciosa, Exp: 2, 
ff. 156-157. 
35 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 (3.2) 6, Nombre: Estado de Jalisco, Asunto: Propaganda sediciosa, Exp: 2, 
ff. 156-157. 
36 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo I, Exp. 4, ff. 25-26. 
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The agent’s distrust of the state government reached an even higher pitch in the 
days that followed. On 31 December 1924, Agent 15 claimed that Governor José G. Zuno 
had recently informed the municipal presidents of the state that the new rebellion “would 
break out on the first days of the month of January.” The agent thought it opportune to 
report this because he not only thought it interesting, but also to prevent this seditious 
movement, “which according to [the] information given to us by people who helped us in 
Guadalajara […] will be led by Governor Zuno.” Surprised by this and because of the 
sensitive nature of the intelligence, Agent 15 went out of his way to forward the 
information immediately to his supervisors, leaving his partner Agent 115 in Guadalajara 
to collect more intelligence. The Agent 15 boarded a train to La Barca, where he turned 
in the hand-written reports and also managed to exchange impressions about this matter 
with agraristas that were on their way out of the state. In the meantime, Agent 15 
confirmed that Agent 115 had also received a notice from a friend in Acatlán de Juárez, 
“who through various sources that merit absolute trust [claimed] that the governor of 
Jalisco, prepares a seditious movement [and] is in cooperation with his Political Bosses 
that are found in every town of the state.” All of these reports ultimately led Agent 15 to 
conclude that the matter could be resolved if General Lázaro Cárdenas, who repeatedly 
turned a blind-eye to this evidence, was removed from his post as Head of Military 
Operations in Jalisco, because “even if he is not in agreement with the seditious 
movement, he at least [ignores it].”37  
                                                
37 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo II, Exp. 2, ff. 81-83. 
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 When Agent 15 left Guadalajara, his partner Agent 115 wrote to their supervisor 
to inform him of how they had infiltrated the “revolutionaries.” To do so, the agents 
pretended to be “revolutionary agents” and befriended señora Olivera—a partisan of the 
movement, who maintained close links with the rebel leadership. According to an 
informant who reported to the aforementioned agent, señora Olivera was one of the 
principle leaders of the movement in Guadalajara and that “[she can] count upon many 
elements from the railway- and tramworkers […].” After briefly vetting the two agents 
and “asking that if I was an agent I not jeopardize her,” she took the agents to a meeting 
at a local cantina, where they learned more about the seditious movement. “[The 
individuals from the cantina] had [later] realized that they committed a grave [error and 
were] reckless,” reported Agent 115, “in identifying themselves as revolutionaries and 
letting us know about all of the matters related to the movement [brewing] in Jalisco.” 
Shortly after that incident, as señora Olivera received a letter from General Manuel G. 
Nuñez, she commented to him that two “revolutionary agents” had been in talks with 
their group. General Nuñez then asked señora Olivera if the agents had properly 
identified themselves as true revolutionaries to which she responded “no.” “The 
[previously cited General] was exceedingly upset, telling her that if the movement in 
Jalisco failed [it would be because] of her recklessness and Colonel Jesús Valdéz 
[…who] had presented us to the other people who were in charge of the movement,” 
reported Agent 115. The agent in question attempted to get a meeting with General 
Nuñez to prove his credentials as a rebel. This did not happen, but in the process he was 
able to meet with Colonel Valdéz, and after gaining his trust proceeded to ask the Colonel 
if he had any knowledge about when the movement would break out, to which the 
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Colonel responded that the exact date had not been set. The idea was that it would break 
out in the month of January, but that they would at least be given eight days’ notice in 
advance and that the movement would be carried out simultaneously with uprisings in 
Zacatecas and other states. 
 The uncovering of these networks led Agent 115 to conclude that in Jalisco there 
existed two different seditious movements. He wrote: 
“[O]ne that [is led by] officials of the State Government and the other by 
delahuertista rebels; [but] I could not find anything in common among 
these movement, if there is in fact an agreement among both. [There] is 
especially great alarm in various towns of the State, both because within 
the course of a month the governor of the state has been sending arms and 
munitions to various places in the State, [and] because on 30 December he 
ordered almost all of the current Municipal Presidents who […] have been 
functioning as Jefes Políticos, not to turn over the municipal power to the 
[new] town councils that had recently been elected […]. 38  
 
In great detail, Agent 115 reported that this process began on 15 December, when 
Governor Zuno suddenly began to call upon the state’s municipal presidents and political 
bosses not to turn over their power to the new authorities, and also “began to [move] 
authorities from one town to another.” Additionally, in agreement with the municipal 
president of Guadalajara, the state government had also recently named a new loyal 
Police Chief in Guadalajara “who had the reputation [of being] an assassin and killer 
[…].”  
 On the eve of his departure from Guadalajara, Agent 115 met with Antonio 
Medina, an accountant within the state government, to converse about the governor’s 
recent disposition with regard to the local governments around the state. “This [order] 
                                                
38 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo II, Exp. 2, ff. 74-79. 
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was due to to the governor’s fear that when Lic. Gilberto Valenzuela would take charge 
of the Ministry of Interior,” Medina informed the agent, “he would intervene in [the] 
matters [of] Jalisco to remedy the situation that prevails in that state.” The same 
individual declared to the agent that as a precaution, in case President Calles decided to 
“reconsider the performance” of the governor of Jalisco during the Estradista Rebellion, 
“he [Zuno] had organized, and currently was ready to face-off with the Central 
Government, and that that was the reason for all of the warlike activities of the 
governor.”39 This new information was significant because the previous tendencies 
reflected in the intelligence reports were to conflate all seditious activity in the 
countryside, labeling them as part of a single, larger conspiracy between rebel groups and 
the state government.40 Although the network uncovered by the agents revealed that these 
presumed links were not entirely clear, their reports did concede that both seditious 
movements were a threat to the interests of the central state in this region. 
 In separate reports, both Agents 15 and 115 made reference to smear campaigns 
sanctioned by Governor Zuno against President Calles, which consisted of the planting of 
false stories in local newspapers. For example, El Machete a local newspaper with 
circulation in Guadalajara, had now gained wider distribution among the state’s agrarian 
communities through the Local Agrarian Commission of Guadalajara. “[This] was not 
                                                
39 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo II, Exp. 2, ff. 74-79. 
40 Up until at least January 1925, however, the Departamento Confidencial’s agents continued to 
express very similar anxieties about the specter of rebellion and the prospect of regional authorities 
undermining the interests of the central state. “With respect to local matters, everyday I observe greater 
agitation on the part of elements [loyal] to the governor,” confirmed Alcaraz Díaz, “and precisely last night 
I was with some friends at the Cantina de la Fama, and after a few moments some deputies that belong to 
the current [state] Legislature arrived and were making strong comments [about] Gral. Calles […].” See 
AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 (3.2) 6, Estado de Jalisco, Propaganda sediciosa, Exp: 2, f. 18 
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strange, except for the fact that this newspaper consistently attacked the president of the 
republic, Calles,” reported Agent 115. On this matter, the agent was able to find out that 
these articles were not only penned with the consent of the governor (and in particular 
authored by the leader of the Local Agrarian Commission), but were also financed by the 
State Government, which directly paid the newspaper company.41 Meanwhile, Agent 15 
also reported on the publication of false newspaper articles with regard to the revolt led 
by José Palos: 
[…An] article that was published by the Press of Guadalajara said that 
when José G. Palos attacked Teocuitatlán, Jal., the political boss of that 
area, Alberto González, had pursued the rebel Palos, but this was not true 
because this article was published by order of Governor Zuno, to [make 
people] believe that the political boss is a supporter of the general 
Government.42 
 
In fact, the reality was actually quite to the contrary. Agent 15 reported that at the 
beginning of December, José G. Palos was indeed bent on attacking the town, but found 
himself too distant. After an arduous march, the rebel leader stopped by Hacienda San 
José de Gracia, where they rested and were provided with fresh horses in order to 
continue their march. When they finally entered Teocuitatlán de Corona, the local 
political boss “went to go hide at the house of Dionisio Velazco, a delahuertista 
supporter, and that [it was the] residents of that town [who] were the ones that actually 
pursued the rebel José G. Palos […].” But instead of thanking the residents of the town 
for their service, the political boss persecuted the people of the town, “threatening them 
with death to the extent that the majority of residents [that helped pursue] the rebel 
                                                
41 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo II, Exp. 2, f. 70 
42 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo II, Exp. 2, f. 66. 
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[leader] have had to abandon their residences […].”43 What is demonstrated here with the 
above two examples, then, is a larger anxiety about the diffusion of information to 
important constituencies. These efforts reflected the state government’s efforts to control 
news about what it deemed most important, even if that meant the rewriting of events as 
they occurred on the ground, or reorienting public opinion to reflect the state 
government’s position. Such activities not only peaked the interest of the agents, but also 
raised some serious concerns about the dangers of letting these behaviors continue. 
 
From Local to Regional to International Networks   
 
At the end of 1924 to the first half of 1925, Sánchez Aldana was entrusted with 
specific instructions to carry out a political investigation. He claimed to lack many of the 
necessary resources successfully to carry out the task and even admitted, at times, to 
dedicating himself to “other activities.” But despite his apparent difficulties in completing 
the mission, he felt a moral obligation, however, to bring attention to the superiors “some 
new aspects about the revolutionary activity which the discontented ‘delahuertistas’ 
continued developing in Jalisco.” In the process of his investigation, Sánchez Aldana 
befriended many “revolutionary propagandists” in Guadalajara, among them Joaquín 
Méndez, Gustavo Valencia, Serapio Estrada, the secretary of the group (who went by the 
alias “Leaño”), and María Refugio Olivera. He believed that the seditious movement 
would occur in December 1924 and even claimed that he too was invited to incorporate 
himself into the rank and file of the upcoming rebellion. The “conspiracy,” as the agent 
                                                
43 AGN, DGIPS 313.1 – 13 (3.2), Tomo II, Exp. 2, f. 66. 
 199 
labeled it, involved several important ex-estradista officials and prominent loyal federal 
generals, such as General Lázaro Cárdenas. “I pretended to be in agreement with 
everything,” noted Sánchez Aldana. The agent continued to collect more information 
about the conspiracy and, while the uprising appeared imminent, he tried his best not lose 
to sight of the conspirators. The rebellion had, up until then, not come to fruition, but he 
remained vigilant because “the matter is serious and they [the conspirators] do not want 
to fail again […and as a result] they have not stopped making ‘delahuertista” 
propaganda’ […].”44 
During the second half of 1925, Sánchez Aldana began signing his reports as 
“Agent 24” and consistently found himself in the southern parts of the state. On 26 
August, for example, Sánchez Aldana (hereafter referred to as Agent 24) wrote to the 
Departmento Confidencial to inform it about the recent trip he had undertaken to 
Yurécuaro, Michoacán, located near the southwest border separating Jalisco with 
Michoacán. While in that town he met up with Aurelio Alcalá, an individual purporting 
to be a colonel who enjoyed a great deal of sympathy from the majority of the region’s 
residents, people whose political dispositions ran counter to the central government. 
“Alcalá informed me that he had a lot of people [and] that he was just waiting for orders 
[announcing] that matters were serious [enough] to begin to organize his people,” wrote 
Agent 24. The prevailing opinion among the people the agent interviewed was that the 
movement would break out at the beginning of October because General Nuñez had told 
them so in a letter. In these years, the Departamento Confidencial deemed the border 
                                                
44 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1-968 Tomo II, Exp. 10. Caja. 244, “Informe de las actividades sediciosas que 
se estan elaborando en Jalisco,” 17 July 1925.  
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region of Jalisco-Michoacán an important area of inquiry because it was a center of 
rebellious activities. This surveillance, however, also points to an important 
understanding about violence that this government agency had learned over the course of 
the last few years. Rarely were rebellions cooked up in epicenters of power; rather, it was 
in the peripheries of power where the ground-work began to be laid and networks 
flourished.  
On this trip, the agent also met Francisco Villalobos, a major who had previously 
served with Alcalá, but was now the police chief of Yurécuaro. The agent pointed out 
that both men were greatly enthusiastic about the prospect of the “Revolution” because 
there were many sympathizers in the area ready to fight at a moments notice. 
Additionally, the agent reported that he was told of a letter General Nuñez sent to the 
border town of Tepalcatepec to a man named Carlos Casillas. “This man,” claimed the 
agent, “supposedly [can] count on the support of quite a lot of people who [are] 
sympathizers of the Revolution [who] possess elements of war that were left behind by 
the people of ex-General Enrique Estrada and Diéguez […] after their defeat as they were 
fleeing the Government of General Obregón.” If the men of Casillas had not risen up in 
arms in 1923, claimed the agent, it was only because he was taken prisoner early, and 
remained jailed throughout the entire conflict. On his return to Guadalajara, Agent 24 
also met an individual (alias “El Gringo”) who was extremely happy about the daily 
meetings he had been having with certain members of the clergy “who have offered 
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assistance [to the cause] and to date have [already carried out] propaganda [and] that the 
same clergy already counts upon [the support] of a lot of people in this city.”45  
Over the course of the previous year, Agent 24 had gone from working as an 
informant in the Ayuntamiento of Guadalajara to serving as an Agente Confidencial de 
Primera. While largely based in Guadalajara, he increasingly became involved in the 
rebel movement to the point that he managed successfully to infiltrate the revolutionary 
network controlled by General Nuñez. Portraying himself as a sympathizer of the 
movement, he was able to gain access to inside information that was normally not made 
public. For example, he was well aware of the propaganda campaigns carried out in the 
border regions of the state. On 28 August, when he met up with revolutionary Reinaldo 
Esparza, for example, Agent 24 was informed of the propaganda the former made in the 
sierra of Mazamitla (which was comprised of Mazamitla, La Manzanilla, Pueblo Nuevo, 
Tizapán el Alto, and Tuxcueca). In the first town, Esparza recruited an individual named 
Santiago Díaz—a sympathizer of the revolutionary movement, who had already given a 
lot of money to those involved—and entrusted him to carry out “revolutionary 
propaganda” and the distribution of manifestos.46 
The propaganda machinery of the rebels, however, was not just limited to the 
border region of Jalisco nor to the capital city of Guadalajara. Reports such as those 
submitted by informant “G.E.A.,” for example, noted that the region near Ciudad 
Guzmán, specifically at haciendas el Rincón and Santa Cruz and in the towns of 
                                                
45 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 -- 968 Tomo II, Exp. 10. Caja. 244, 26 August 1925.  
46 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo II, Exp. 10, 28 August 1925.  
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Zapotitltic, Tamazula de Gordiano, Tuxpan and Tecalitlán, there existed “[an epicenter] 
of conspirators” who continuously had meetings and allegedly counted on the support of 
a deputy, and the municipal president of Zapotiltic.47 This area, in particular, had already 
been on the radar of the Departamento Confidencial for a few months when a report 
made its way to the Ministry of Interior warning of a “Rebel Center” in Ciudad Guzmán. 
According to the report, the center was led by Martín Ramos (meat dealer), Manuel 
Corona (from Zacoalco), and Bernardino Tapia. The last individual was deemed the lead 
propagandist and organizer of the towns in this area, known as the Sierra del Tigre. The 
report went on to describe an extensive network comprised of at least eighteen other 
individuals from the above-mentioned haciendas, who helped distribute propaganda 
against the state.48 Bernardo Tapía made also trips to the sierra de Mazamitla to the 
rancherías of Las Cuevas, Los Corrales, Las Verdolagas, Rosa Amarilla, and La Lobera, 
where his companions worked under his orders to spread propaganda.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
47 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo II, Exp. 10, Without date. 
48 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo II, Exp. 10, “Informe relative al centro rebelde C. Guzmán, y 
sus actividades,” August 1925.  
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Figure 4: Map of Ciudad Guzmán Conspiracy. Source: AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo II, Exp. 10.  
No author listed. 
 
 
The network out of Ciudad Guzmán also spread to areas such Autlán, Atoyac, 
Chapala, Concepción de Buenos Aires, Ixtlahuacan de los Membrillos, Jocotepec, 
Tamazula de Gordiano, and Teocuitatlán, among others (see Figure 4). Petronilo Herrera, 
for example, made frequent trips to Autlán; Silvestre García, who resided in San Juan 
(Municipality of Atoyac), distributed arms among the residents of the nearby rancherías; 
and Solis, who resided in Ixtlahuacán de los Membrillos, made trips to Chapala to 
distribute propaganda under the guise of visiting friends or buying cattle. Two suspicious 
packages, presumably containing weapons, left the area of Teocuitatlán and were to be 
distributed to the “the sierra.” Rafael Sánchez focused on intercepting news that reached 
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the federal government, and was tasked with forwarding that information to Concepción 
de Buenos Aires. The report also warned of an active propaganda campaign recently 
begun by a priest aimed at the Peasant and Labor Syndicates of the region organized 
under Zuno’s union, which had already made significant headway in the area of 
Teocuitatlán. “[The priest] makes his trips to other rancherías [of this municipality and] 
in his various sermons tells [the groups] that the Federal Government is an enemy of their 
religion,” confirmed the report, “[and] that they should defend [their religion] at all costs, 
and if it is possible to give their lives to save their faith.”49  
Many individuals in the countryside came to understand the political world they 
lived in not only from the information and resources that intrastate networks provided, 
but also through international networks that provided mutual support and organization, 
and distributed propaganda. This in turn fueled imaginations and dreams of locals in the 
smalls towns and hamlets of Jalisco. Reinaldo Esparza, for example, informed Agent 24 
of the existence of a Junta Revolucionaria located in the United States, which was 
comprised of exiled former de la Huerta supporters. Bragging to the agent, at one point 
Esparza claimed that “he had asked the Junta […] for various blank sheets with 
signatures [of the leadership so that] he could extend appointments here to all of his 
friends […].” What should be clear is that preparations were well underway for a mass 
uprising; that is, a second attempt to overthrow the central state government. Esparza 
                                                
49 This priest—who was named Jesús Flores or Sahagún—was an individual who during the 
previous rebellion roused the Grupo de las Damas Católicas and led some members of the Grupo Católico 
to revolt. Two brothers of the priest actively participated in the Social Defense of the town, usurped public 
posts, and fought on the side the rebels. In their escapades they had committed a multitude of atrocities and 
assassinated many peasants and agraristas.    
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claimed that everything was in place for the revolution to breakout during the first days 
of October 1925, but that at the moment everything was silent because they did not want 
the government to become aware of their plans, “since they had already finished the 
majority of their plans and were only waiting [for the] end of the rainy season.” The 
agent himself confirmed that Esparza had a legitimate appointment from the Junta and 
was authorized to ask for loans. He also attested to the fact that he had been able to sneak 
a peak at a document in Esparza’s possession (but was unable to read it fully ), but did 
notice that it said “Revolutionary,” and that it had the signature of Adolfo de la Huerta.50 
A week later, Esparza went to go see Agent 24 to show him a letter his son, an exiled 
revolutionary living in El Paso, Texas, had sent to him, in which he was informed that a 
woman was on her way to Mexico in possession of “the code” that all of the 
revolutionaries would use.51 The Junta frequently sent letters and propagandistic 
materials to this region, which were then sent elsewhere around the state.  
Not long after this encounter, the agent surprisingly wrote that many people in 
these areas believed that the “revolution is now recognized by the United States” and that 
the White House had secretly committed itself to transporting weapons in American ships 
to ports chosen by the Junta Revolucionaria.52 While the veracity of such rumors could 
not be verified, they do attest to the tense relations the Calles administration maintained 
with the Coolidge administration. Earlier in the year, on 12 June 1925, Secretary of State 
                                                
50 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo II, Exp. 10, 4 September 1925. 
51 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo II, Exp. 10, 10 September 1925. 
52 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo II, Exp. 10, 27 September 1925. 
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Kellogg went on record to the press stating that his government’s positive attitude toward 
the Mexican government continued because Mexico fulfilled tis previously established 
agreements (i.e. the Bucareli treaty), but that the Calles administration’s new policies 
unjustifiably targeted American interests and property. Secretary Kellogg continued:  
I have seen the statements published in the press that another 
revolutionary movement may be impending in Mexico. I very much hope 
this is not true. This Government’s attitude toward Mexico and toward 
threaten[ing] revolutionary movements was clearly set forth in 1923 
[during the de la Huerta Rebellion], when there was such a movement 
threatening the constituted Government of that country, which had entered 
into solemn engagements with this Government and was making an effort 
to meet those obligations at home and abroad.53 
 
Secretary Kellogg maintained that the policy of the American government was to use its 
influence and apply support on behalf of stability and orderly constitutional procedure, 
“but [that] it should be made clear that this Government will continue to support the 
Government in Mexico only so long as it protects American lives and American rights 
and complies with its international engagements and obligations.” “The Government of 
Mexico is now on trial before the world,” announced Secretary Kellogg.54  
On 1 October, Agent 24 met with another revolutionary, Guadalupe Hernández, 
who informed him that all of the preparations for the movement were ready and that they 
only waited for their leaders in the United States to give the order to begin it, and for their 
subsequent entrance into the country. The upcoming rebellion, then, was to be national in 
scope. “[We are just waiting] for the Generals […] of each Division to enter the country 
[and] operate in their respective zones,” declared Guadalupe Hernández, “and let’s have 
                                                
53 New York Times, 13 June 1925. 
54 New York Times, 13 June 1925. 
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faith, that the Revolution […] will not fail [this time], because of how well it is organized 
all throughout the country.”55 
The Sierra de Quila: Juchitlán and Tecolotlán 
 
On 28 October 1925 Agent 24 temporarily shifted his area of inquiry from the 
Jalisco-Michoacán border to a region near the sierra de Quila—specifically to the 
neighboring towns of Juchitlán and Tecolotlán. Upon his arrival in the area, the agent had 
come to learn that when Local Deputy to the Congress of Jalisco Nicolás Rangel 
Guerrero visited Juchitlán earlier in the month, to prepare the upcoming municipal 
elections, the municipal president of the town denounced both Dr. Jesús Degollado and 
the local priest to Rangel Guerrero because “he [the municipal president] had [walked in] 
on a secret meeting [they were having] with a seditious character [and] took from them a 
list that had many names of individuals who had committed to rising up in arms, as well 
as other documents [of great importance].” The municipal president of Juchitlán drew up 
an official report of the incident and attached the documents collected from the 
“conspirators,” forwarding them to the lower court of the town. But no judicial action had 
been undertaken. “[This is because] the Judge is an old reactionary and [is] inept [and 
because the Secretary] of the same court is also a well-known reactionary [and is the] 
brother-in-law of the same Judge,” wrote the agent, “[…both] are sympathizers of the so-
called Revolutionary movement and are active members of the Guadalupana group 
[…].” This negligence on the part of the judicial authorities thus allowed the group to 
continue to carry out its activities with the intention of rising up in arms at some point in 
                                                
55 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1 – 968, Tomo II, Exp. 10, 1 October 1925.  
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the near future. Meanwhile, Dr. Degollado was allowed “mysteriously to disappear” from 
Juchitlán, reported the agent, “but I have been able to find out that he is in Guadalajara 
perhaps working [on] more activities.”56  
As result, Enrique García Ruesga, a resident of Juchitlán with a house on calle 
Reforma No. 2, was left as the leader of the “conspirators” and also as president of the 
Guadalupana group, which had religious undertones and counted upon the support of at 
least 150 active members. Specifically, Agent 24 described García Ruesga as a very 
repulsive man of bad faith, excessively prideful. This was an individual, according to the 
agent, who had directly lent his services to the de la Huerta “Revolution” and had done so 
through contributions in the form of cash, guns, and ammunition, in addition to making 
propaganda to recruit people to the side of the revolutionaries. “He [still] has many guns 
inside his home and while [my informants] were not able to precisely specify the place 
where he hides them, they assured me that he hides them in a hole he dug near [a] frame 
of his door,” reported Agent 24. Meanwhile, Salvador Covarrubias, an ex-colonel with a 
residence on calle Juárez No. 10, was also singled out as a conspirator. Describing 
Covarrubias as a quarrelsome man of very bad antecedents and an avowed enemy of the 
current Government, the agent reported that the ex-colonel had publicly expressed 
himself in a very bad manner towards General Calles and all of the members of his 
presidential cabinet, “hurling serious threats at those that sympathize and serve the 
Government […and] that the authorities of that place have not done anything to defend 
the […] Government to which they [supposedly support…].” Agent 24 attributed the 
                                                
56 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1-968 Tomo II, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Asunto: Propaganda Sediciosa. Exp. 
10. Caja. 244. “Agent 24 reporting from the populations of Juchitlán and Tecolotlán,” 6 November 1925. 
 209 
inactivity of local authorities to the fact that they feared this man because he was deemed 
very dangerous and a seasoned criminal. It should be noted that Agent 24 himself was a 
clear sympathizer of the revolutionary government and his descriptions, while quite 
possibly true, innately reflect his own bias and distrust of country folk in areas that had 
traditionally resisted the social order since the days of the Constitutionalist Revolution. 
The not so distant de la Huerta Rebellion, perhaps, did not do much to dispel these 
prejudices and resentments.  
The telegrapher of Juchitlán, Honorato Castillo, was also earmarked as an 
individual very active in the Guadalupana group, who regularly attended the processions 
the group sponsored on the twelfth of every month. Agent 24 reported that “in the process 
of [punctually attending] all of those […] fiestas [he consistently] neglected his job [in 
the] telegraph [office] as well as the post office because those offices are united and he is 
at the head of both of them.” When Castillo was actually in the office, however, he 
evidently accepted mail only from those he favored, and not from certain other 
individuals; that is, agraristas in this town were refused service and had to go to the 
neighboring town of Tecolotlán. The agent cited the particular example of a case when 
the municipal president attempted to send a telegram and pickup some mail, and was 
refused service on the grounds that office hours were suddenly over: “[A] good source 
informs me that it is always like this because he has bad will towards working people 
[and also due to the fact] that he is almost always drunk, finding himself in this state 
[since I arrived in the town].”57  
                                                
57 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1-968 Tomo II, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Asunto: Propaganda Sediciosa. Exp. 
10. Caja. 244. “Agent 24 reporting from the populations of Juchitlán and Tecolotlán,” 6 November 1925. 
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Castillo had allegedly begun his recent drinking binge on 31 October and was still 
inebriated when Agent 24 left for Tecolotlán on 2 November. In fact, when Agent 24 
arrived to Juchitlán he was greeted by a theatrical scuffle between Castillo and the local 
policeman, where the former raised a ruckus and threatened to fire his gun at the officer. 
“[To] repel the aggression [the officers] had to give him a blow avoiding in that manner 
that he [fire] his gun since he already had the gun in his hand,” narrated the agent, 
“[...and] on the 2nd of the current [month] he is still plastered in the company of the 
Empleado de Rentas and is [still] forming a major scandal […].” Castillo himself was not 
only well-placed amongst local society—he was married to a daughter of one of the most 
important families in town—but also consistently boasted about his connections and 
access to high-ranking “influences.” This boastful behavior was on clear display when 
the agent surreptitiously walked by Castillo and the Empleado de Rentas as they were 
drinking, and overheard the former threatening another passerby, telling him that he had 
already contacted a general in the Federal Army “so that he can come [to the town], since 
they arrive at my disposal and will do what I order them.” Additionally, Castillo was the 
brother of Manuel Castillo, who held an important position in the General Telegraph 
Offices of Mexico and frequently helped him out. Castillo claimed that nobody could do 
anything to him because he had a lot of “influence” with people in that office. Agent 24 
determined that Castillo “is an intimate friend of all the Conspirators [and this is known 
because] he brags [about] the sympathies [that he holds] with the other reactionaries, [and 
it has become] publicly known what they all intend to do […next].”  
Many of Juchitlán’s residents were indeed active supporters of the previous de la 
Huerta Rebellion. The proprietors of Hacienda Colotitlán, José María Covarrubias and 
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his son Trinidad, for example, were labeled as current enemies of the government, since 
they had wholeheartedly backed and aided the “revolutionaries” during the uprising. As a 
result, the owners of Colotitlán could not reside at their landed estate, but instead found 
themselves settled in the town of Juchitlán. The administrator of their property, however, 
had guns and ammunition hidden in Colotitlán, and continued tenaciously to carry out 
propaganda on behalf of the “conspirators” because according to the areas residents “the 
Revolution would break out very soon.” The few days that the agent spent in Juchitlán 
were enough to lead him to conclude that the above-mentioned individuals, in addition to 
others mentioned in his report, were all extremely active members of the Guadalapana 
group and were the principal leaders of the conspiracy against the government in this 
town.  
On 2 November 1925, Agent 24 travelled to the neighboring town of Tecolotlán 
where he encountered another de la Huertista stronghold and more active members of the 
Guadalupana group. The Priest of Tecolotlán, José María Robles, for example, continued 
to carry out an intense anti-government propaganda from the comfort of his pulpit. Agent 
24 reported:  
He frequently speaks of Bolsheviks [supports of the government] and 
incites various residents to harass them any way they can, telling them that 
whoever sends their children to Government Schools will be [left] out of 
the Christian Religion and [that] he will personally excommunicate 
them[,] warning them that the Official Schools are the Devil’s [work] 
because they only teach children [troublesome information].58  
 
                                                
58 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1-968 Tomo II, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Asunto: Propaganda Sediciosa. Exp. 
10. Caja. 244. “Agent 24 reporting from the populations of Juchitlán and Tecolotlán,” 6 November 1925. 
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Father Robles had apparently fanaticized the entire town of Tecolotlán and its environs so 
that the majority of these people blindly believed whatever he preached. The elites of the 
town were described as his most loyal followers, maintaining him in his position despite 
previous efforts on the part of government partisans to remove him. Agent 24 described 
one of the instances in which an effort was made to remove Father Robles from his 
position. These efforts were met with much resistance from the local population, which 
subsequently formed a commission that travelled to Guadalajara to speak with 
Archbishop Orozco y Jiménez, who kept the priest at the helm of the parish. And so 
strong remained his influence in the area that Robles managed to use his weight to 
replace the recently departed parish priest of Juchitlán with one of his loyal followers. 
This led Agent 24 to conclude that: “his [Father Robles’s] residency is dangerous because 
he now counts upon the [support] of a majority of the important residents of Juchitlán as 
well as Tecolotlán, and it will take a long time [to completely reestablish control of this 
area] since there is a very pronounced Fanaticism in these municipalities […].” 
Over the course of a few days, the agent stumbled upon another colorful cast of 
conspirators in the town. Juan Manuel Villaseñor, who resided on Calle Constitución No. 
39, was observed to be a diehard enemy of General Obregón’s government who 
personally lent his services to the “de la Huertista Revolution.” He had also recently 
ordered the assassination of a poor laborer, simply because he was an agrarista who 
supported the constitutional government with arms in hand—actions that were not 
punished by the local government. “[To] this date he is an irreconcilable enemy of the 
current Government [and] counts upon the support of some war elements,” observed 
Agent 24, “as he is always armed with a pistol and carbine [and] has assured [everyone] 
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that he has rifles [and ammunition] hidden […].” This man was an individual of means 
who held “influence” before the local government, and because of this any complaint 
against him fell on deaf ears. Another wealthy resident, Francisco L. Preciado, a previous 
de la Huerta colonel, owned at least fifty guns with ammunition in abundance, and also 
had the support of many people in the town. He had also not been bothered nor 
denounced to the local government, mainly due to an agreement he had previously 
reached with Governor Zuno, to whom he had delivered a great amount of money. 
Meanwhile, Salvador Villaseñor, an individual working vey hard to disseminate 
revolutionary propaganda “assured […people] that this time the Revolution would 
triumph because now they have what is needed [and] that they should not fear that it will 
fail because […] they have in their possession arms and munitions […].”59 
 
Table 3: List of the residents who have guns and ammunition (Tecolotlán, Jalisco). 
 
Name               Number of Guns 
 
Francisco L. Preciado    50 
Salvador Villaseñor    20 
Leopoldo Sauza    6 
José García      6 
David H. esposo de Carlota García  5 
Eutiquio García    4 
Juan Manuel Villaseñor   2 
Santiago Lepe     2 
Ynocencio     2 
Ygnacio Gómez Medina and 5 sons.   1 
____________________________________________________________ 
Source: AGN, DGIPS, 313.1-968 Tomo II, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Asunto: Propaganda  
Sediciosa. Exp. 10. Caja. 244. 6 November 1925. 
 
                                                
59 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1-968 Tomo II, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Asunto: Propaganda Sediciosa. Exp. 
10. Caja. 244, “Agent 24 reporting from the populations of Juchitlán and Tecolotlán,” 6 November 1925. 
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When Agent 24 departed from this region, he observed that the conspirators from 
both Tecolotlán and Juchitlán, whom he mentioned numerous times throughout in his 
lengthy report, were all “revolutionaries” and “fanatics” who blindly obeyed the parish 
priest of Tecolotlán and that they all were active members of the Guadalupana group 
headquartered in Juchitlán.60 Rebellion was on the horizon, preparations were in progress, 
and those defeated in the previous uprising were now on the mend—actively recruiting 
individuals once again to rise up against the federal government. And while the rebellion 
never came to fruition as the conspirators envisioned it, the clash between President 
Calles and the Church that occurred in mid-1926 would once again provide many groups 
in the countryside with a new rallying cry. As Agent González wrote in a confidential 
report to the personal secretary of the president of the republic on 17 May 1926: “[The] 
rebels only wait for the clerical regulation [to take effect] to once again raise a new 
banner, which will be the religious question, [and] it appears that many of the region’s 
priests are interested in this matter.”61 This rebellion will be addressed in the next 
chapter, but first let us turn to an important political clash between President Calles and 
former governor Zuno, which preoccupied the minds of contemporaries and also reminds 
us that, even during moments of mass upheaval and political revolt, someone still has to 
govern.   
 
 
 
                                                
60 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1-968 Tomo II, Nombre: Estado Jalisco, Asunto: Propaganda Sediciosa. Exp. 
10. Caja. 244,“Agent 24 reporting from the populations of Juchitlán and Tecolotlán,” 6 November 1925. 
61 AGN, O-C, 101-R2-A1, “Confidential report prepared by González and addressed to the personal 
secretary of the president of the republic.”  
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El que pierde gana: Zuno’s Last Stand 
  
For the residents of Guadalajara, the first two months of 1926 were marked by a 
great feeling of anxiety, paranoia, and uncertainty. As “revolutionary activities” lessened 
noticeably in the countryside, the topic of conversation in the capital city began to turn 
towards the actions of the government against religious institutions, and toward political 
gossip.62 A much publicized federal investigation into the alleged immoral actions 
committed by Governor Zuno in office also gained traction, even dominating national 
headlines. But from the vantage point of Guadalajara, the political battles taking place in 
Mexico City seemed remote and did not do much to disrupt local matters terribly—all 
continued as it had before the scandal. “It is the opinion here that Governor Zuno will 
serve out his term in office,” confirmed Dwyre, “notwithstanding the charges against him 
in the Federal Congress [..and this] opinion is based more upon the fact that he has 
weathered so many political storms than upon his genuine popularity.”63 
Over the course of March 1926, however, both Governor Zuno and the local 
zunista deputies (who comprised the majority) in the Chamber of Jalisco became mired in 
a significant political controversy. After much deliberation and debate, on 23 March the 
                                                
62 SD, 812.00/2735, “Monthly Report concerning Commercial, Industrial, Agricultural, Political 
and General conditions in the Guadalajara Consular District for the Month of February 1926.” There was a 
great belief expressed by the Catholic element of the city that the government was determined to wipe out 
any distinguishable Catholic influence upon the social life of the region. “Of course, the influence upon 
business has been almost as detrimental as that exerted last month on account of revolutionary 
outcroppings,” reiterated Dwyre, “and merchants and the general public feel is that there is not one thing 
there will be another to disturb and to interfere with trade and industry.” During the second half of 1926, a 
mass upheaval with a distinct Catholic influence would begin to take hold of the countryside—and this 
forms the subject matter of the next chapter.  
63 SD, 812.00/2735, “Monthly Report concerning Commercial, Industrial, Agricultural, Political 
and General conditions in the Guadalajara Consular District for the Month of February 1926.” 
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Chamber of Deputies of the XXXI Legislature in Mexico City proceeded formally to 
charge Zuno with violations against the Constitution of 1917 and with crimes against the 
Federation. Although the local deputies were spared, Zuno resigned the next day.64 The 
writing on the wall was clear to all in Guadalajara: Zuno stood in the way of President 
Calles’s plan to centralize power further. In the 1920s, Mexico did not have the proper 
institutional conditions to produce limited government in both the federal and local 
spheres. As a result, in Mexico “federalism multiplied the opportunities for predatory 
behavior by state elites rather than creating more veto players or limited government,” 
contends Díaz-Cayeros: “[To] be sure, federalism allowed regional strongmen to place 
constraints on the federal government, but predatory behavior trumped any beneficial 
effect veto players might have had on the system.”65 With the governorship of Jalisco up 
for grabs in September 1926, it was in President Calles’s best interest to depose Zuno 
before the election. This became a priority for his administration because zunistas already 
favored the candidacy of Jose María Cuéllar, a close collaborator of the former governor 
who was himself the former municipal president of Guadalajara and now served as a 
federal deputy.66  
In Guadalajara, Zuno’s resignation was considered by many as merely a 
temporary solution to a political conflict that had spiraled out of control. Clemente 
                                                
64 See Chapter 2 of this dissertation for a very detailed overview of the conflict.  
65 Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto. Federalism, Fiscal Authority, and Centralization in Latin America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 42. 
66 José María Muriá, Breve historia de Jalisco (Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara, 1988), p. 
492.  
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Sepúlveda, in the meantime, was elevated to the post of governor after Zuno’s 
resignation. But the American Consul in Guadalajara confirmed that: “[It] was clear [for 
all] to see that there has been no actual change in control […in] fact, the man who has 
been substituted is no more than a messenger of the governor […].”67 A few weeks later, 
this was once again confirmed by the same source: “[Zuno] remains in absolute control of 
the State Government and is acting through a substitute governor […].” Zuno continued 
to assert himself as the authority in Guadalajara with regard to any matters of political 
significance; meanwhile, Sepúlveda, the new governor, dealt only with matters of lesser 
importance, but “was instructed to carry out Zuno’s wishes.”68 While the charges levelled 
at Zuno were indeed justified, many continued to ascribe Zuno’s elimination to his 
unwillingness to cede ground to Mexico City. The ramifications of this were clear: 
federal intervention dramatically altered the political arena in Guadalajara and forced the 
hand of zunisitas, who then proceeded to maintain a delicate balance of power. Zunistas, 
therefore, had to walk a very thin political tightrope, for any misstep could spell disaster 
for the federalist spirit in the region.  
The Mexican federalist system was established a century before the events 
described above, a product of both a triumphant popular revolution for national liberation 
against a colonial overlord, and a failed attempt at reestablishing a new form of 
governance in the wake the disastrous reign of Emperor Agustín de Iturbide (1822-
                                                
67 SD, 812.00/27744, 26 March 1926. In this particular report, the American Consul noted that 
pessimism reigned among all the classes regarding the “deplorable situation” and that if a change came the 
entire government would need to be retired, from the governor down to the lower employees.  
68 SD, 812.00/27753, 10 April 1926. 
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1823).69 The imperial legacy of Mexico’s colonial period, however, was formative of the 
type of federalism that emerged in the young republic and beyond. Two important 
concepts must be identified from the colonial system of governance, which formed a 
significant element of federalism in Mexico after the Revolution of 1910: regionalism 
and municpalismo. These played a tremendous role in differentiating Mexico’s strand of 
federalism from that of its northern neighbor, and in providing the ideological and 
political basis for the modern system adopted after the Mexican Revolution. When the 
empire dissolved, the local leaders of Jalisco were the first in Mexico to promote virtually 
complete autonomy from Mexico City and began an “intense” campaign in favor of 
federalism.70 What should be clear, however, is that Jalisco was the first state in the 
young republic to proclaim federalism and, as a result: “the local powerful groups 
assumed the responsibility of defending it, [and] the rest of the federal entities [bestowed 
upon] it the duty to head their defense and, for that [reason] they were considered by the 
Center as the most rebellious state in the Mexican Federation.”71  
                                                
69 For an excellent overview of the local struggles faced by rural peoples during the War of 
Independence, see Eric Van Young’s The Other Rebellion: Popular Violence, Ideology, and the Mexican 
Struggle for Independence, 1810-1821 (Stanford University Press, 2001). 
70 Muriá, Historia de Jalisco, Vol. 3, pp. 215-216. Even before the signing of the Plan de Casa 
Mata (1822)—which did not recognize the new empire, and called for a convening of a Constituent 
Congress—the provincial deputation of Jalisco, for example, reiterated that “Mexico [City] should not 
impose its will over the others, nor adjudicate another title that was not ‘simply the capital of the Province 
of Mexico’.” The governor of Jalisco, Luis Quintanar (1822-1824), also echoed these sentiments when he 
sent a file, containing letters signed by the state’s ayuntamientos, to the Supreme Executive Power under 
the name Voto General de los Pueblos de la Provincia Libre de Xalisco, denominada hasta ahora de 
Guadalajara, sobre construir su forma de gobierno en República Federada. 
71 Muriá, Historia de Jalisco, Vol. 3, p. 219. 
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Zuno himself commented extensively on the conflict between federalists and 
centralist in the days following his resignation. During a public discourse in late March, 
for example, he declared:  
The recent political events have a profound raison d’etre, a great raison 
d’etre: The defense of the National spirit [was] created [and] made into 
Law at the Constitution of Querétaro [in 1917]. [This] spirit is essentially 
federative [and] it is based upon respect for the Sovereignty of the States 
that comprise the country; and [it] is that spirit [which] the Capital of the 
Republic wounded through the centralists, [and it is] the hateful centralist 
group that has attempted to besmirch Jalisco […].72 
 
In the same speech, Zuno claimed that he and his supporters were representatives of the 
true Mexican spirit and not the centralists who simply ignored the will of the people. 
“[We] do not tolerate [being] yoked to the cart of the centralists,” declared Zuno: “Jalisco 
has always been free, and it is proud of having absolute freedom […] and it has always 
defended the government, the Institutions and [the] public opinion [of our people].” 
Zunismo as a political movement, then, came to embody the federalist spirit of the 
region’s past and present struggles against Mexico City—and zunistas showed no signs 
of backing down to those they deemed the “traitors” to the Constitution of 1917.73 
The political fallout over Zuno’s resignation continued to carry over into the 
month of April 1926. But at some point along the way, the politician once again began to 
adopt a policy “of sacrificing everything and everybody to further his own personal 
interests […].” After news reached Guadalajara in late May about the Senate’s definitive 
                                                
72 “Discurso de Jalisco sobre la autonomía de Jalisco,” quoted in Muriá, Historia de Jalisco, Vol. 4, 
p. 304. 
73 “Discurso de Jalisco sobre la autonomía de Jalisco,” quoted in Muriá, Historia de Jalisco, Vol. 4, 
p. 304. 
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verdict regarding his fate, Zuno released a statement to the local press expressing his 
displeasure at the verdict:  
For me it is a new triumph, the act of having been able personally to 
defend Jalisco, for which I have always had veneration and for whose 
rights I have suffered on so many occasions. I could very well have 
prevented the attacks upon me; and also could have continued occupying 
the position of Constitutional Governor of Jalisco, by simply paying a sum 
of money to some of the Senators of the majority; but I preferred the 
sacrifice of today and the resignation of yesterday, rather than contribute 
to the greatest immorality with which the Federal Legislative Power, in 
both chambers, is imbued, which are like harlots, attentive only to their 
material interests, and devoid of all moral sense and of all respect for the 
Country.74 
  
Zuno reiterated that he need not occupy any public office to serve his state, “nor did I 
need any judicial power whatsoever to defeat and to make known the enemies of the 
[Jalisco].”75 The thinly veiled threats aimed at the legislature were purposeful, not only 
intended to cause outrage in the public, but to expose an unspoken truth that everyone 
already knew—that public officials could be bought. But even more significant was the 
fact that the efforts to remove Zuno from the governorship led, within certain sections of 
the local press, to denunciations of federal intervention into local affairs. The U.S. State 
Department, for example, observed and commented on the prevailing opinion of the latest 
press reports, claiming that the press was of the opinion that: “[…] the Federal Congress, 
in occupying itself with the cases of various state governors, has given far more attention 
to these questions of personal politics than to its proper duties as a Legislature.”76 
                                                
74 SD, 812.00/27808, 27 May 1926.  
75 SD, 812.00/27808, 27 May 1926. 
76 SD, 812.00/27745, 24 May 1926. 
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The following section focuses on how federal intervention into local labor politics 
and state elections altered the existing local power structure of the region, which had 
already been refashioned after the Estradista Rebellion. I analyze local political 
negotiations between zunistas and the national government, which often yielded 
important accommodations—both partial and contingent—to the central state; while also 
stressing the values and political evaluations that undergirded such adaptations. In 
particular, I focus on two disputes: 1) the Cinco Minas Company strike in March 1926; 
and 2) the gubernatorial election of September of 1926. Ultimately, I argue that the 
supporters of Zuno were not merely reactors to official policy emanating from Mexico 
City, but also “political initiators” who themselves exercised an important role in limiting 
the impact of the national government in the region during a period of massive social 
upheaval in the state. And as the rumblings of rebellions once again began to be heard, 
Guadalajara itself became immersed in its own critical battle against the country’s 
capital.  
The Cinco Minas Strike of 1926 
 
The Calles presidency elevated the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers 
(CROM) to its zenith of influence and power—unquestionably leading to its ascendency 
as the most powerful Mexican union of the 1920s. In Jalisco, however, Zuno presented a 
significant challenge to Calles’s plan for organized labor since he (Zuno) made 
considerable progress in halting the influence and reach of the union’s leader Luis N. 
Morones’s.77 The rivalry between Zuno and Morones dated back to at least 1924, when 
                                                
77 Jurgen Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution. (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishing Group, 2007), p. 116. Labor boss Luis N. Morones played an important role in 
securing for Calles the support of the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM) during the 
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the latter denounced the former on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies for his cowardly 
behavior and neglect during the occupation of Guadalajara by rebel forces.78 These 
personal as well as professional conflicts played a significant role in what would become 
a larger political struggle between the federal government and the Zuno state 
government. Ambassador James R. Sheffield, for example, observed that: 
[The] interpretation generally given to the fate of Governor Zuno is that he 
has become another victim of the present ascendency of Señor Morones 
and his partisans in the Mexican administration. In this connection it may 
be pointed out that Governor Zuno, who has had an important following of 
distinct labor tendencies in his own state, has not been willing to allow his 
organization to be affiliated with the C.R.O.M. […] controlled by 
Morones. Although, to be sure, there may not have been any essential 
differences in the tenants of Zuno laborites and the Morones elements, the 
source of conflict has undoubtedly been the purpose of Morones to acquire 
control of Zuno’s labor organization against the wishes of the latter.79  
 
The labor organization controlled by Zuno, the Confederation of Libertarian Worker 
Groups of Jalisco (CAOLJ), founded in 1924, counted largely for support on miners, 
textile workers, and bakers, among others. After its founding, the syndicalist group 
                                                
former’s bid for the presidency. In return for this loyalty, Morones became part of Calles’s Consejo de 
Ministros. As Buchenau notes: “[…Calles] brought Morones into the national government as secretary of 
industry, commerce, and labor, and members of the CROM’s political wing, the PLM (Partido Laborista 
Mexicano), served as governors and in the federal and state legislatures.” 
78 See “Diario de los debates de la Cámara de Diputados,” 
http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/30/2do/CPerma/19240102.html. Legislatura XXX - Año II - 
Período Comisión Permanente - Fecha 19240102 - Número de Diario 37. There were at least two 
instances—on 2 January 1924 and on 29 August—where Morones (when he served as a federal deputy) 
lambasted Zuno’s actions. The first, for example, reported that: “The information received in Guadalajara 
by our companions who had the opportunity to leave [the city] after the Estrada’s coup, proved [a 
connection between] Governor Zuno and a great number [of] estradistas rebels […and] that Governor Zuno 
[only hid during the rebellion].” Morones continued: “[…] I do not consider it dignified, nor honorable to 
remain at the margin of a matter [of such great importance for the state].” 
79 SD, 812.00/27745, 24 March 1926. Stout has also claimed that the “primary reason for his 
[Zuno’s] concern [about Mexico City] was that [labor boss] Morones sought to bring regional workers 
under his control [in Jalisco…and in] fact, Zuno had warrant for his concern, for Morones was gradually 
expanding his influences within all states of the Republic for a future bid for the presidency;” see Stout, p. 
44.  
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overtook the CROM’s local affiliate, the Federation of Worker Groups of Jalisco (FAOJ), 
as the most powerful union in the state. “From then on,” wrote Muría, “the disputes 
[between] the Government of Zuno with the callista administration, with the CROM and 
with large companies, such as the Hydroelectric Company and the mining companies 
began to take on greater importance and significance for the autonomy of the region.”80  
 In March 1926, with the full support of Zuno, miners went on strike at the 
American-owned Cinco Minas Company. Over course of the next few months, Zuno 
faced considerable pressure from Consul Dwyre over this matter, which affected 
American interests. “In the case of Cinco Minas the situation no longer is a conflict 
between labor and the mining company,” observed Consul Dwyre, “but is purely a 
conflict between the Zuno Government of the state of Jalisco and the Cinco Minas 
company.” Complicating matters was the fact that the company’s lawyer had to deal with 
Zuno and not with the actual governor of the state, Sepúlveda. While Zuno maintained 
himself in absolute control of the state government, the consul found that direct access to 
him became ever more difficult as he noted that for several weeks he had been 
unsuccessful in his own efforts to gain access to Zuno. In fact, Dwyre described Zuno in 
the following manner: “[Zuno] has continued his policy of coldness and aloofness 
[…with his] condition [being] one of intense mental agitation […].” The situation was 
described as a deplorable one because the American company realized that it could no 
longer continue operating in the state, “unless it can throw off the clutches of the labor 
syndicate, which is ruled and controlled by the Zuno Government.” As a result, Consul 
                                                
80 Muriá, Historia de Jalisco, Vol. 4, pp. 425-426 
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Dwyre warned that if this matter were not dealt with in an expedient fashion and “the 
influence of the Zuno Government and the syndicate” crushed, it would spell disaster for 
the entire industry.81 Over the course of March, Zuno became more involved in labor 
politics and even purportedly assumed a position as head of labor organizations of 
Jalisco, “and these are now so strong that they control the state.” 82  
On 5 April, Zuno contacted the attorney representing the Cinco Minas Company 
and demanded that the matter be settled on that day because the federal authorities were 
preventing him from implementing his measures, as he desired to force the American 
company to accede to worker demands. The former governor even resorted to clear 
threats, vowing personally to drive the consul and the manager of the mine from Mexico 
if the matter were not resolved, and that he “would put the foreign employees of the mine 
out of the state and on the road to Tepic.” An hour after the threats were made an intimate 
friend of Zuno, Agustín Bassave, once again approached the Consul and told him “that 
Mr. Zuno wished to again assume friendly and cordial association […] and that he hoped 
I would be willing to be friends.” Bassave made sure to stress that while it was indeed the 
case that Zuno had resigned from the governorship, he was still in absolute control and 
was the only real governor of Jalisco.   
                                                
81 SD, 812.00/2756, 24 March 1926. Consul Dwyre also described the political situation in Jalisco 
as “unique and dangerous,” but stressed that the federal government would not allow this condition to 
continue unless it could deal with Zuno. Additionally, he stressed that Zuno’s strong position with the 
former president is also looked upon as very significant and that situation in this state may be summed up 
“as having reached a stage where pessimism reigns to a greater extent than it has since the revolution of 
two years ago.”  
82 SD, 812.00/27791, Monthly Report concerning Commercial, Industrial, Agricultural, Political 
and General conditions in the Guadalajara Consular District for the Month of April 1926.” 
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This encounter led Consul Dwyre to comment extensively on Zuno’s hostile and 
anxious attitude: “[This] was prompted by his desperate desire to find a solution to the 
Cinco Minas difficulty which would be satisfactory to him [and] I believe that when he 
was informed that it would not be becoming for me […] to take part in the negotiations 
[…] he lost interest in resuming cordial relations.”83 In due course, the federal 
government also began to take action in the matter, which further intensified the already 
existing animosity between the federal and state governments. Morones eventually sent in 
strikebreakers to replace the CAOLJ affiliated workers at Cinco Minas. “In effect, the 
company [was] using strikebreakers and with the support of the military detachment 
stationed in the region tried to break the strike,” writes Jaime Tamayo, “to which Zuno 
responded with the arrests of foreigners ‘that damaged the workers’ of Cinco Minas 
[…].” Such efforts did very little to appease the American company, and after repeated 
protests Calles and the minister of interior, Adalberto Tejeda, directly intervened in the 
conflict.84  
But the gradual involvement of the federal government in this conflict was not 
lost on the de facto state government. The former governor continuously maintained that 
the on-going strike was due largely to the the American company’s poor treatment of 
workers. With regard to the Cinco Minas Company’s treatment of its employees, Zuno 
was insistent in his views: “[They] were pernicious foreigners who did not lose out on 
any opportunity to reduce the Mexican worker and to evade official regulations.” Consul 
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84 Jaime Tamayo, “Siqueiros, los orígenes del movimiento rojo en Jalisco y el movimiento minero.” 
Anuario III (1981): 84.  
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Dwyre noted, however, that with no legal authority the state labor board dictated what the 
mining company had to pay its workers. He noted that the highest state court had 
declared such a procedure to be illegal. On the matter, Consul Dwyre opined the 
following: 
[T]he labor board (personally urged on by Zuno) states that it will not 
respect the decision of the court, and has embargoed all of the company’s 
stores to force the payment to the workmen of wages during the time they 
have been on strike, and to force the compliance with the labor board’s 
illegal demand. 
 
The case had even made it all the way to the Supreme Court. Dwyre lamented the fact 
that since the company was on the verge of ruin because of the labor dispute, there 
appeared “nothing to do but for the company to strike the best bargain it can with Mr. 
Zuno, realizing that it is absolutely in his power, as there is no authority here to compel 
adherence to the decision of the state district court.”85  
On 9 May 1926, after a month and a half of drawn out negotiations, the strikers 
and the company reached an agreement. The agreement involved a “reasonable” increase 
in wages for the miners in addition to back-pay for the time they had spent on strike.86 
“The final settlement was made suddenly and was influenced almost wholly by the action 
of ex-governor Zuno, who determined to bring the conflict to a close,” observed Consul 
Dwyre. The Cinco Minas case, on the one hand, was of vital interest to all industry in the 
Guadalajara region for it not only demonstrated the power that the state labor boards held 
                                                
85 SD, 812.00/27791, Enclosure No. 5. “Monthly report concerning the commercial, industrial, 
agricultural, political and general conditions in the Guadalajara consular district for the month of April 
1926,” 7 May 1926.   
86 Tamayo, “Siqueiros,” p. 85 
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in forcing companies to comply to the demands of labor syndicates. It clearly showed 
also that while these syndicates had become powerful and could successfully ward off the 
influences of the CROM and federal authorities, they still remained under the control of 
Zuno. But as Consul Dwyre himself warned: “[Although] they were under the dominion 
of one man, […] if the power of this man has been weakened or rendered impotent, the 
result may be either a benefit or a detriment, depending whole upon the policy of the new 
control over the political destinies of the state.”  
While the Cinco Minas strike showcased the strength Zuno still retained in the 
region, in coming months the federal government would continue to intervene in local 
affairs. At the beginning of April, after the strike had been resolved, the American consul 
remained less than hopeful that the political situation in Jalisco would improve any time 
soon: “It is clear to see that a strong, honest and conscientious man is needed to take 
charge of the state, but the names which have been mentioned as possible timber for the 
governorship, if any of them is selected, indicate that such a man is not to be 
designated.”87    
The Gubernatorial Elections of 1926 
 
It had been acknowledged by many in the known that Zuno and ex-President 
Obregón were extremely close. For this reason, Obregón had apparently taken a trip to 
Mexico City in an effort to save his compadre Zuno from his fate. Ambassador Sheffield 
claimed that it was indeed difficult, at least from the perspective of Mexico City, to gauge 
what the permanent political effects the Senate’s decision regarding Zuno’s impeachment 
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case would be, but that it was well-known “that the Federal administration was 
fundamentally opposed to him [Zuno] and that, notwithstanding the intervention of 
General Obregón on Zuno’s behalf during the former’s recent visit to Mexico City, the 
administration would bring its full weight to bear against the ex-governor of Jalisco.” As 
a result, the Ambassador only saw two clear paths for the former governor: either to 
accept his current situation with good grace or openly to resist Federal authority.88  
On 27 May the previously impeached eight minority members of the Chamber of 
Jalisco finally returned to Guadalajara from Mexico City to take their places once again 
at the Legislative Chamber. They waited for three hours in anticipation of the local 
legislature’s meeting, but left once it became clear that the majority was not going to be 
in quorum. The following day, the members of the majority met “at the appointed hour 
and went into regular session,” deciding that it would not be proper to allow the minority 
to join the proceedings given that “they had been accused of rebellion, and that while the 
lower court had absolved them and the Federal Senate had cleared them, the local 
Prosecuting Attorney had appealed the decision of the lower court […] to the State 
Supreme Court […].” The members of the zunista majority, however, knew very well 
that such a decision would arrive much later, after the close of their present session. They 
also knew that this particular session would be their last as they figured to adjourn until 
September, when the gubernatorial election was to be held.89  As this event makes clear, 
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then, despite hearing about the Senate’s formal decision regarding his own impeachment 
case the day before, Zuno still appeared to have cause for optimism.90 
Two weeks later, the American consul in Guadalajara clarified Zuno’s role in 
Jalisco: “At the writing of my last dispatch I expressed the opinion that Zuno appeared 
not to have lost his influence and power […] I now beg to inform the Department […that] 
there appears to be no doubt of Mr. Zuno’s position, which is believed by me to be as 
strong or stronger than ever.” With regard to the current administration of Jalisco, not 
much had changed. In fact, Zuno remained in power through Sepúlveda, who was 
characterized “as a rubber stamp man;” his secretary and department heads remained in 
office; and another supporter of his had recently assumed the municipal presidency of 
Guadalajara. Consul Dwyre observed: 
[It] would be difficult to be able to discover in what particular Mr. Zuno 
has lost ground […] and Mr. Zuno’s candidate for governor [former 
Municipal President of Guadalajara José María Cuéllar] has the 
nomination for the election in September [and many] people whose 
opinions are to be valued, are now expressing the opinion that Zuno will in 
the future play an important role in the national political arena, and I have 
heard several express the opinion that the restrictions placed upon Mr. 
Zuno by the Federal Senate, withdrawing his civil rights for seven and 
one-half years, will probably soon be lifted.91  
 
The following day the American consul invited Zuno to dinner at his home, claiming that 
he first extended the invitation through a close mutual friend, “who informed me that 
                                                
90 Consul Dwyre stressed that because the twelve deputies are in his favor and if the Chamber of 
Jalisco has indeed adjourned until September, “it shows that there will be no legally constituted body in 
session to appoint a new governor, all of which will be taken to indicate that Zuno’s control will continue;” 
see SD, 812.00/27808, 27 May 1926. 
91 SD, 812.00/27823. Political Situation in the State of Jalisco, and the Connection Between it and 
Ex-governor Zuno.” 11 June 1926. 
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Zuno made it a point never to dine out.” Ex-governor Zuno agreed to join Dwyre at his 
home in the company of Emilio Puig (an American citizen, president and general 
manager of the Hydroelectric Company of Chapala); Consul General James Stewart; 
Agustín Bassave (the close mutual friend); Edward H. Hall (Vice-Consul); and 
Raymundo Hernández (Zuno’s personal secretary). The dinner lasted about two and a 
half hours, and was described as “merely a gathering of friends.” Before departing Zuno 
privately informed Consul Dwyre that he would personally be able to resolve any matters 
that the latter desired to address. “These circumstances may appear trivial, but they 
indicate to me clearly the desire of Sr. Zuno to impress himself favorably upon the United 
States Government,” wrote Dwyre, “and it is no more than natural to gain the impression 
that this may be prompted by his aspirations toward national political prominence.” 92  
The first major federal election of 1926 was that for senators and deputies, which 
was to be held on 4 July. Largely seen as a dress rehearsal for the September poll that 
would elect a new governor, this election pit the supporters of Zuno against those of 
Alfredo Romo, a federal deputy who in two months time intended to run for governor. In 
the lead up to this contest “almost daily shooting encounters” took place between zunistas 
and romistas (the supporters of Federal Deputy Alfredo Romo), escalating to the point 
that federal troops were needed to restore order in Guadalajara. Because of these pre-
election disorders, an executive order was issued for violations of existing election laws 
and, as a result, an immediate investigation was ordered to punish all authorities who had 
violated said law. “As one competent attorney puts it, the Federal Government will, of 
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course,” observed Dwyre, “have authority to take action against the governor and the 
local Congress, but it has no legal basis upon which to take action against the 
Municipalities, as the latter would come directly under the local Congress and the 
governor.” Many speculated that despite the action of the federal government, the 
election would continue as planned but would then be declared illegal, and new elections 
would be called for “with perhaps the Federal troops [called in] to insure a compliance 
with the Federal Government’s program.” 93 Notwithstanding these minor disturbances, 
the elections were successfully carried out, despite the federal government’s having put 
pressure on, and even cited, local authorities. The elections, however, were deemed a 
clear victory for the zunista faction and strengthened their control of the state. The 
success of zunistas also meant that “under ordinary circumstances” nothing would be able 
to break Zuno’s power unless the federal government decided to intervene in the matter. 
But according to Consul Dwyre, this remained highly unlikely because “had the Federal 
government decided to take action, the opportune moment would have been just before 
the recent elections.” Such was the former governor’s influence now, then, that the consul 
observed that only “personal violence” against Zuno would change things.94 In fact, the 
victory had been so overwhelming that zunistas swept all of the state’s electoral twenty-
three districts. Among them were included two remote districts, which were normally out 
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of his control and were usually given “to the cats” but had now been brought into the 
fold.95  
 On 5 September 1926, three candidates were to contest the gubernatorial election 
of Jalisco: José María Cuéllar, Alfredo Romo, and Daniel Benítez. The first candidate, 
Cuéllar, a federal deputy, was supported by the Zuno party and appeared to be the most 
popular and would “no doubt receive the support of the state administration at the 
election to be held the first Sunday in September.” Meanwhile, Alfredo Romo, also a 
federal deputy, counted upon the support of labor boss and Secretary of Labor Luis 
Morones, and the support of the federal congress. The election was to be a hotly 
contested affair; in fact, recent confrontations between zunistas and romistas had 
escalated in recent days “with Romo’s brother recently [stabbing] and almost [killing] 
Zuno’s brother.” The third party was led by political outsider Daniel Benítez who 
counted upon the support of the current Minister of Interior, Adalberto Tejeda. Even 
though Benítez was a native of Jalisco, he had been living outside the state (in Mexico 
City) for many years, and as result was practically unknown to many in the state. “His 
campaign is not particularly active, due perhaps to his being somewhat unknown in the 
state,” commented Dwyre, adding: “It is the opinion of many that he has been sent up 
here by the Federal Government merely as an observer, and with the probable support of 
the president.”   
Over the course of the summer the political situation in Jalisco, therefore, 
developed into what could be described as a triangular affair. And while under normal 
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circumstances, without any inference, the zunista faction could legitimately expect to win 
the election, it had become a well-known fact in Jalisco that the political party controlling 
the booths on election day would win the election. In the lead up, there were several 
disturbances and shootings between zunistas and romistas. On the eve of the contest, 
there were two incidents of note: a fight in which one Cuéllar supporter was killed and a 
Romo supporter (a member of the federal congress) gravely wounded; and another 
involving an unnamed politician who shot into a voting booth and killed the election 
timekeeper of the precinct. To prevent further hostilities, the federal government sent in 
federal troops to patrol the streets of Guadalajara and subsequently banned residents from 
carrying guns. On the day of the contest, the streets were visibly deserted as the general 
public hid in their houses, “as they do not care to sacrifice themselves upon the alter of 
[a] ‘democracy’ of knives, sticks and stones.” Even with these preventative measures in 
place, four voting booths were attacked.96 After the election, both zunistas and romistas 
declared victory. The American consul, however, predicted that it seemed apparent that 
Benítez’s third party “will play some mysterious but important [role].”97 
The gubernatorial contest of 5 September has been considered one of the most 
fraudulent in Jalisco’s history. On 12 September the election board of the state, which 
remained under the control of the Zuno faction, met and declared the results in 
Guadalajara as follows: Cuéllar, 8,333 votes; Romo, 228 votes; and Benítez, 371 votes. 
The supporters of Romo, not to be outdone, also convened and claimed victory: Romo, 
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7,098 votes; Cuéllar 274; and Benítez, 286 votes. With the dominant parties at an 
impasse and also refusing to acknowledge each other’s versions of the election, the 
American consul remarked that “it seems probable that the election will be decided by the 
Federal Government and present indications would seem to favor Señor Benítez, but the 
entire situation is very uncertain.” This observation was not made on a mere whim, but 
rather was supported by a meeting the Consul himself had with Benítez, who showed the 
former a letter from Calles indicating that he was to press criminal charges that were on 
file against Cuéllar for an alleged homicide and robbery he previously committed. Muriá, 
for example, has also noted that the romistas, under the protection of Calles and 
Morones, the parliamentary blocks in the federal congress, and the majority of cabinet 
ministers, also pursued the criminal accusation against Cuéllar. While Cuéllar’s path to 
the governorship appeared to be the clearest, the charge against him presented a 
significant obstacle. Although these charges, which had been previously “lost,” now 
mysteriously reappeared, it is clear that they were not simply trumped up by political 
enemies on a whim; rather, they grew out of an incident that occurred on 19 December 
1920 at a voting precinct. On that day, Cuéllar and Zuno, at the time serving as federal 
deputies, arrived at the premises in the company of ten followers to demand access to the 
voting precinct. After the individuals running the booth refused to meet their demands, 
they left. “The booth was closed according to law, at two o’clock,” claimed an individual 
in charge, “[…a] few minutes after two, señor Zuno and señor Cuéllar again returned 
demanding entrance.” They were eventually let in and after a struggle with Gudelio 
Jiménez (a political enemy), they ended up beating him and eventually fired upon the 
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man, killing him.98 Jiménez’s body presented two wounds: the first a blow to his 
cheekbone, the second a gunshot to the left shoulder.99  
The incident caused considerable public outrage and many in the Chamber of 
Deputies called for  Zuno’s and Cuéllar’s impeachment.100 But these demands never 
came to fruition because in Guadalajara the two stole documents from the court 
proceedings and in the Chamber “they made all the antecedents disappear.”101 In the days 
that followed the election of 1926, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Cuéllar, which 
then incapacitated him to hold any political office. “That the Federal government is going 
to such lengths to bring about the arrest of the accused man,” wrote Dwyre, “would seem 
to indicate its determination to crush him and the Zuno faction […and Cuéllar] is now 
reported to have left Guadalajara to escape arrest.”  
The belief in Guadalajara, as a result of this development, was that the election 
would be decided by the federal government. With Cuéllar now out of the running, the 
attention of zunistas turned towards salvaging what remained of their political power. 
After a short trip to Mexico City, Silvano Barba González—the substitute governor of 
Jalisco, a stern zunista supporter, who had only begun serving two months ago—called 
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for a special session of the state congress to declare Benítez the new governor. As the 
Consul Dayle McDonough reported: 
It is reported that he [Barba González] acted under order of the Federal 
Government. The deputies in Congress who attended the session belong 
mainly to the Zuno faction which had supported Señor Cuéllar. There may 
have been a political bargain between Señor Benítez and the followers of 
former Governor Zuno.102 
 
While the actions of the state congress were not set in stone, zunistas clearly preferred to 
negotiate in order to have what they deemed a lesser evil in power, rather than to allow 
the romistas to assume control of the governorship. On 29 September, Benítez was 
officially declared as the governor of Jalisco for the period of 1 March 1927 to 1 March 
1931.103  
That same day, the Mexico City daily Exceslsior published an editorial entitled: 
“The Latest Victory of Zuno,” which in colorful prose presented readers with an 
insightful analysis of “the restless and astute politician of Jalisco, who as they say in his 
district, ‘when he loses wins.’” In the article Zuno was likened to a master fox who in the 
recent elections had outmaneuvered the three candidates: Cuéllar, Romo, and Benítez. 
And that while Zuno himself did not figure in the election, he turned out to be the sole 
victor in the contest. When Zuno “with lynx eyes discovered that his protégé Cuéllar was 
incapacitated for the Government” and that Romo was an unreconciled enemy “of those 
who give neither truce nor quarter,” he converted to “Benitismo.” In the process, the 
former governor apparently delivered all of Cuéllar’s support to Benítez. “It was easy, 
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very easy, likewise for Mr. Zuno to conquer the Central government for the candidacy of 
Señor Benítez,” continued the editorial, “who always had [the] official [support of the 
central government] and good ‘connections’ in the Department of Interior.”  
While tone of the editorial suggested a disdain for Zuno, it did concede that it was 
a well executed plan, admirably conceived, “because while Señor Romo was in the 
capital stirring up the Central Government from parliamentary tribunals and Señor 
Cuéllar was in his hiding place, Zuno ‘organized’ and convoked the Chamber of Jalisco, 
persuaded General Ferreira to give the Deputies a respectable guard and caused the 
governorship of the state to be given to Señor Benítez.” The editorial acknowledged that 
Benítez might be a man of integrity and he might fact turn out to be the ideal governor for 
Jalisco, but the facts remained: he did not work for the candidacy because he was a 
virtual unknown in the state, and thus it was materially impossible for him to have been 
elected. “The victory in the last analysis fell to Mr. Zuno, who will continue to govern in 
Jalisco, through Señor Benítez […],” lamented the editorial, but stressed that Jalisco 
indeed wanted and needed better “because it is not tolerable for Zunismo to be prolonged 
across many epochs and administrations as a hereditary accident in the midst of the grief 
and anxieties of a people which wishes, which needs, which demands good government, 
liberty and integrity.”104   
Conclusion 
 
The de la Huerta Rebellion and its local manifestation in Jalisco, the Estradista 
Rebellion, continue to be viewed as mere glitches in the larger history of 
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postrevolutionary Mexico. The convenient airbrushing of this rebellion out of the 
prevailing narratives on the period, perhaps, has a lot more to do with the fact that it was 
not a genuine “popular” movement, but rather a military uprising. Scholars have 
continued to affirm, however, that its defeat and suppression reorganized politics at 
the national and regional levels, and legitimized the new state that emerged in its 
wake. The reverberations set in motion by the rebellion greatly transformed the manner in 
which the central state interacted with, and produced knowledge of, the countryside.  
This chapter focused on two great problems the Calles administration faced in 
Jalisco during the first two years of its rule (1924 to 1926): 1) the specter of another 
armed uprising in the countryside; and 2) a local political crisis over effective control of 
the state. The first part of this chapter utilized secret agent reports from the Departamento 
Confidencial to explore the Ministry of Interior’s anxieties regarding the possibility of 
another widespread insurgency in the countryside. In particular, the reports authored by 
Agents 15 and 115 not only documented rebel groups that were again up in arms, but also 
expressed the genuine belief that rebels were working in collusion with state authorities 
to circumvent and undermine the national government’s capacity to rule in the area. The 
second part of this chapter analyzed how zunistas survived politically after their leader 
was “toppled.” Through an analysis of the Cinco Minas Company strike and the 
gubernatorial election of 1926, I argued that the supporters of Zuno were not merely 
reactors to official policy emanating from Mexico City, but were also “political 
initiators” who themselves exercised an important role in limiting and negotiating the 
impact of the national government in the region.  
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At the close of September 1926 disorders began once again to spill over from 
Guadalajara into the countryside, where “extreme Catholics seem to be hoping that a 
successful revolution will be started against the Calles Government.” The election of 
Benítez to the governorship was expected, at least temporarily, to curtail tensions. This 
period, nonetheless, was described as the most unsettled in Jalisco since the time of the 
de la Huerta Rebellion of 1923-1924. Consul McDonough, in particular, noted that 
“[there] is a general feeling of uneasiness caused by political strife [and the] religious 
quarrel between the Church and the State[, which has] tended to make conditions 
unstable and to cause uneasiness among all classes of society.”105 Let us now again turn 
to the countryside, where the federal army had been kept busy maintaining order in the 
outlying districts of the state.  
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Chapter 4 
Political Order in the Cristero Rebellion 
 
[My informant] states that the movement is all in the name of the church with the battle 
cry “Viva Cristo Rey” (Long live Christ the King). He states that priests in that district 
have received instructions to take up arms [and] that the overwhelming sentiment of all 
[in] that country is for the revolution, and against the Government. 
  -Guadalajara, consular district report.1 
 
[This] celebration [on 20 November 1930…is] no longer one that preaches violence[,] 
division[,] and hatred, we have arrived to the reconstructive phases of the revolution and 
what better manner to commemorate its [twentieth] anniversary than to erase old 
resentments and parties[,] and to forget the divisions [that were once] created by personal 
struggles [and] the already spent phases of agitation and violence […]. 
-President of Mexico Pascual Ortiz Rubio.2 
 
 
An agrarista3 named Leandro Cayetano, Tenamaxtlán’s self-proclaimed local 
‘son of a bitch’, who over the years had built up a reputation as a matón, was charged 
with orders to guard the military headquarters located in front of the town church. The 
locale resembled an inn with a porch and had a corridor lined with railings on both sides, 
where arms rested. In the early months of 1927, Cayetano swapped allegiances, decided 
to steal arms from the town, and rode into the hills to join the Catholic rebel forces. The 
day of his return, at eight in the morning, the federal soldiers of the town marched to 
Cayetano’s house and arrested him. After a quick trial he was found guilty of treason and 
sentenced to death by hanging at a sour orange tree in the central plaza. Cayetano himself 
put the rope around his own neck, whereupon two soldiers mounted on mules pulled so 
                                                
1 State Department (hereinafter cited as SD), 812.00/28260, 18 February 1927.  
2 Archivo Histórico del Municipio de Autlán (hereinafter cited as AHMA), Sección 6, 1930, 20 
November 1930.  
3 An agrarista was an individual who was in favor of the state’s agrarian reform project.  
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hard that his head hit the branches immediately above him. His body shuddered in jolts. 
The soldiers armed themselves and decided to finish the job off at point-blank. The first 
shot missed, but the second was on target. He gave one last painful moan as his blood ran 
down the small street. The soldiers dragged his body towards the sidewalk with his 
mother following behind, her wails heard all across the town square.4  
This gruesome but finally inconsequential episode in the throes of the Cristero 
Rebellion (mid-1926 to 1929) in many ways is emblematic of the local divisions that 
came to express themselves during these years. That the federal soldiers struggled to 
finish the job off at point-blank might actually say slightly more about their 
incompetence, but only serves to further highlight—in a metaphorical sense—the 
difficulties that representatives of the state faced in enforcing submissions of certain 
sectors of the countryside to the prevailing social order. It also showcases the lives of 
common people trying to adapt to these circumstances, while making their own history.  
In the previous chapter, I focused on how the Calles administration came to 
understand the specter of another armed uprising in the countryside and confronted a 
local political crisis over effective control of Jalisco from 1924 to 1926. During this 
period the Calles regime made remarkable progress in developing the nation. By the end 
of 1925, for example, it had successfully achieved the elimination of the federal deficit, 
founded the Bank of Mexico, and reestablished the country’s credit abroad, among other 
accomplishments.5 The second half of the Calles presidency, after around mid-1926, 
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however, began to confront serious structural problems such as: an economic crisis that 
anticipated the Great Depression; a long-drawn-out dispute with the United States over 
the Bucareli Treaty; a decisive faceoff with the Church; and several renewed uprisings in 
the northern and central-western areas of the country, which required the mobilization of 
regular and irregular forces to combat and suppress them.6 
This chapter focuses on the Cristero Rebellion that broke out in central-western 
Mexico and again greatly challenged the prevailing social and political order of the 
period. The conflict officially had its origins in a law President Calles issued on 14 June 
1926, which fixed a limit on the number of priests in Mexico, ordered the deportation of 
foreign priests, and decreed the closure of Church schools and convents. In response to 
these anticlerical reforms promoted by the central state, the Mexican episcopacy met, 
organized, and decided swiftly to suspend public worship and rally popular support 
behind an economic boycott of the government. Ordinary people in the countryside, 
nevertheless, took matters into their own hands. Armed uprisings soon broke out in the 
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Estudios de la Revolución Mexicana: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003), p. 150. “National product and 
income, which had increased 14 percent during Calles’s first two years in office, declined 4 percent over 
the next three years,” claims Buchenau. The national government proceeded to reduce expenditures “from 
325 million pesos in 1926 to just 288 million pesos in 1928” to save face and eventually tried to stabilize 
the peso by reducing the money supply. The overproduction of petroleum in the United States, coupled 
with increased competition from Venezuela and Colombia, also proved an important factor, as it led to 
lower revenues from taxes on petroleum, which Mexican finances heavily relied upon as a source of 
income.6 As a result, and when combined with the consequences of the Great Depression, “between 1926 
and 1932, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) fell 30.9 percent;” see Jurgen Buchenau, Plutarco Elías 
Calles and the Mexican Revolution (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2007) 
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central-western states of Jalisco, Colima, and Michoacán, rapidly swelling to great 
numbers and spreading like wildfire. Within months the ragtag insurgents, who came to 
be known as cristeros, amassed around twenty-five thousand troops, placing them on par 
with the federal army.7  
The first part of this chapter narrates the events at federal and state levels that led 
to the eruption of a mass uprising with a distinctly religious character in the countryside 
of Jalisco. It embraces the period from the establishment of several anticlerical provisions 
in the Constitution of 1917 to the Calles administration’s efforts to implement them in 
mid-1926. The second part of this chapter, which is divided into two sections, frankly 
abandons any effort at formulating a larger explanatory framework for understanding the 
rebellion as a copious amount of scholarship exists on this rebellion, explaining causality, 
partisanship, and even transnational links.8 Current studies, however, continue to gloss 
                                                
7 Buchenau, p. 130 
8 The Cristero Rebellion has captivated the attention of historians for the past four decades and, 
unlike the de la Huerta Rebellion, has produced a great amount of scholarship. Two discernable approaches 
to understanding the Cristero Rebellion have emerged since the publication of Jean Meyer’s La Cristiada, 
trans. Aurelio Garzón de Camino (Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno, 1991) in 1973. The first approach to 
emerge emphasized the rebellion’s regional character, claiming that it affected the central-western states of 
the Mexico with greater intensity than elsewhere. According to Meyer, this was due in large part to these 
areas being deemed more “Catholic,” and therefore more hostile to a secular state; as opposed to the other 
peripheral areas, which were largely “indifferent” about religion. Recent studies have challenged this 
binary interpretation of the rebellion. The “new” historiographical trend, as Butler has called it, adopted a 
local perspective and rejected “synthetic history” and “big history;” see Mathew Butler, ““Cristeros y 
agraristas en Jalisco”: una nueva aportación a la historiografía crsitera,” Historia Mexicana, Vol. 52, No. 2 
(Oct. – Dec. 2002), pp. 493-530. The new focus of analysis shifted to subaltern actors, adopted 
microhistorical approaches, and highlighted the plight of not just cristeros, but also agraristas and more 
recently pacíficos; see Ramón Jrade, “Counterrevolution in Mexico: The Cristero movement in sociological 
and historical perspective,” (PhD diss., Brown University 1980); José Díaz Estrella and José Román 
Rodríguez, El movimiento cristero: sociedad y conflict en los Altos de Jalisco (Mexico: D.F.: Centro de 
Investigaciones Superiores del Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia, 1979); Agustín Vaca, Los 
Silencios de la historia: las cristeras (Zapopan, Jalisco: Colegio de Jalisco, 1998); Jennie Purnell, Popular 
Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico: The Agraristas and Cristeros of Michoacán 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); the 3rd volume of Moisés González Navarro, Cristeros y 
agraristas en Jalisco (Mexico, D.F., Colegio de Méxio, Centro de Estudios Históricos, 2000-2001); and 
Julia Zamora Preciado, Por las faldas del Volcán de Colima: cristeros, agraristas y pacíficos (Mexico: 
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over the deeply entrenched patterns of local violence and the regional political cultures 
that predated (and survived) the Cristero Rebellion. We still know very little, for 
example, about how this latest cycle of violence impacted the state’s ability to rule 
effectively in both the countryside and Guadalajara. The first section provides an 
overview of agrarian reform and political identities, and examines the anxieties that 
agrarian communities expressed in the early phases of the rebellion. In the second 
section, I explore how local governance and politics functioned in times of unrest and 
crisis. Specifically, I accord importance to letters or reports that reflect the apprehensions 
of municipal administrations and government employees, and also to the complaints they 
expressed to state authorities. I draw attention ultimately to the state government’s 
acquiescence to the newly formed Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) in 1929. I 
contend that this process, in addition to the suppression of the latest rebellion, ended a 
prolonged conflict over effective political control of the region and finally brought 
Jalisco—at least temporarily—within the central government’s sphere of control.  
 
Anticlericalism and the Path to Armed Resistance 
  
 
                                                
D.F.: CIESAS, Colima; Archivo Histórico del Municipio de Colima, 2007). But these studies continued 
overlooking the varying degrees of religiosity present among peasants, taking religion as a given. The work 
of Butler is an exception, however, as he has reminded us that “religion mattered as peasants negotiated a 
path between the conflicting agents of Church and state […];” see Mathew Butler, Popular Piety and 
Political Identity in Mexico’s Cristero Rebellion: Michoacán, 1927-29 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), p. 3. For recent works that have begun to stress the importance of transnational links and networks 
during the rebellion, see Julia Young’s Mexico Exodus: Emigrants, Exiles, and Refugees of the Cristero 
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) and “Un obispo cristero en Estados Unidos: El exilio de José 
de Jesús Manríquez y Zárate, 1927-1932,” in Los Guachos y Mochos: Once Ensayos Cristeros, eds. 
Servando Ortoll and Julia Preciado (Morelia, Michoacán, Mexico: Red Utopía: Jitanjáfora Morelia 
Editorial, 2009), pp. 61-80. 
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The Constitution of 1917 provided a clear roadmap for the extirpation of the 
Church’s influence over the state and society through the elimination of its institutional 
autonomy. Unlike the previous Magna Carta, the 1857 Constitution, which, as amended 
in 1873, ordered the separation of Church and state, the new constitution called for the 
complete disestablishment of the Church in Mexico.9 When Venustiano Carranza became 
president of Mexico (1917 to 1920), however, he never introduced the enabling laws that 
would have required the implementation of the articles associated with religious 
restrictions; instead, this matter was left to the discretion of state governments.  
In Jalisco regional efforts to implement these articles gained wide currency 
throughout 1918. During the month of May, for example, a deputy in the State Congress 
proposed a law complementing Article 130 of the Constitution to “determine the number 
of minsters that could officiate in the State.” The matter led to some significant debate 
and, after several reformulations, the proposal was approved, published, and enacted as 
Decree 1913. After the dispersal of a violent protest on 22 July in Guadalajara, the 
decree, which officially placed a cap of one priest per 5,000 citizens, was amended and 
reclassified as Decree 1927. Largely containing many of the same elements as its 
precursor, the revised Decree 1927 “specified fines of 10 to 200 pesos and [the] 
imprisonment of one to eleven months for priests who did not comply,” and required 
priests to obtain licenses in order to officiate in the state. From August 1918 to February 
1919, then, the decrees emanating from the state government directly attempted to limit 
                                                
9 Jrade, pp. 4-5. That is, if the articles contained therein were actually implemented. The articles 
deemed most restrictive were the provisions giving the state control of the internal functioning of religious 
associations, found in articles 27 and 130.   
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the number of priests in Jalisco and ordered them to register with authorities. These 
efforts were met with decisive action by ecclesiastical authorities as they “countered with 
the suspension of religious services and an economic boycott, until the state government 
reversed itself and revoked the objectionable legislation.”10 In his farewell address in 
February 1919, Governor Manuel Diéguez reflected on the incident: 
[…T]he clergy, far from submitting itself to the mandates of the civil 
authority, assumed from [that moment on] a rebellious attitude and not one 
Catholic priest fulfilled what was ordered: Far from it, [in fact] the 
ecclesiastic hierarchy suspended Catholic services in this city 
[Guadalajara] and in the rest of the State, [and] they made the faithful 
believe that the Government restricted the freedom of worship and excited 
a public religious sentiment against [the Government], which, [finding 
itself] inflamed, was susceptible to translate itself to armed rebellion 
against the constitutional authorities.11  
 
Robert Curley has noted the significance of this episode because it involved many of the 
same issues that triggered the Cristero Rebellion some years later, “with the difference 
that the Church and State were able to come to a political solution” in the earlier crisis.12 
 When Governor José G. Zuno came into office in 1923, he revived an anticlerical 
program that was largely abandoned by previous state governments. Cognizant of the 
Church’s power and influence over Catholics in the region, Zuno consistently 
demonstrated an intense distrust of ecclesiastical authorities. In May 1923, for example, 
he attempted to apply elements of constitutional Article 123 in an effort to ban Catholic 
                                                
10 Jrade, p. 5.  
11 “Informe rendido el día 1º de febrero de 1919 ante la XXVI Legislatura del Estado de Jalisco 
por el C. Gobernador Constitucional Gral. Manuel M. Diéguez,” in Jalisco, testimonio de sus gobernantes, 
edited by Aída Urzúa Orozco and Gilberto Hernández Zaragoza (Guadalajara: Gobierno de Jalisco, 1987), 
p. 237-238.  
12 Robert Curley, “Slouching towards Bethlehem: Catholics and the political sphere in 
revolutionary Mexico” (Phd diss., University of Chicago 2002), p. 258 
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unions and began a concerted campaign aimed at shutting down “Catholic schools, 
convents, seminaries, union offices, and ACJM [Catholic Association of Mexican Youth] 
centers.”13 Over the course of July 1923, Zuno continued to hassle ecclesiastical 
authorities and even found himself engaged in a much publicized spat with the 
Archbishop of Guadalajara Francisco Orozco y Jiménez.14 The quarrel involved, among 
others things, the role of priests in Jalisco allegedly obstructing the state government 
efforts. As a result of these accusations, the governor began to recall priests located in 
various populations around the state.  
In the numerous letters they exchanged, Orozco y Jiménez, on the one hand, 
claimed that Zuno’s intervention in this matter was outside the purview of his power, 
given that it was not fitting for “one authority to impose orders to public employees that 
do not belong to their sphere of action […].” On the other hand, not one to back down 
from a public feud, Zuno found the archbishop’s comments to border on the ridiculous, 
claiming that as a government official in charge of the executive he was justified in his 
acts:  
I believe that you should abstain from meddling in the acts of [my 
government in] a definitive manner […]. I have no obligation, personal or 
official, [to establish] peace and harmony with the clergy, if it is not based 
upon obedience and respect for the laws; since before the official entity of 
the Government [there only] exist citizens with rights and all of their 
obligations. I find it very strange that you would suppose that I have 
recalled priests in some places of the State, for the simple act of doing it; if 
I have recalled them, it is because as residents of some populations, they 
                                                
13 Curley, p. 527. Chapter 3 of this dissertation also provides a brief overview of the clashes 
between Catholic and pro-Zunista CAOLJ unions—in addition to showcasing how Zuno confiscated 
properties belonging to the Catholic Church in the aftermath of the de la Huerta Rebellion. 
14 AHMA, 1923, Sección 6. 
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have committed inconvenient and dangerous acts [that have disrupted] the 
public order.15    
 
Zuno continued to stress that he did not distinguish between catholic priests and those of 
other religions, and that he would continue to recall those that infringed upon the laws or 
did not fulfill the dispositions of his government. “I don’t need you to tell me that it is my 
duty to protect the interest of all of the inhabitants of Jalisco, without [discrimination 
against] their religious ideas,” retorted Zuno, “since […] I believe to have always 
respected the religious sentiments of the society at large.” The governor did stress that if 
an armed movement were to break out in Jalisco, the responsibility would fall upon the 
shoulders of the archbishop. Orozco y Jiménez, taken aback by the accusations, 
responded that he was absolutely certain no religious armed movement was brewing in 
the state, but did concede that “if there was, I would be just as responsible, as you would 
be […].” The archbishop reiterated that these actions clearly indicated to him that Zuno 
was not only separated from the Church, but also suggested he was someone who abused 
his power.16    
 Governor Zuno’s anticlericalism continued to manifest itself well after the 
Estradista Rebellion was defeated, and allegedly he even publicly blamed Archbishop 
Orozco y Jiménez for the uprising. While the rumor did not take, Zuno reprimanded 
Catholic organizations for taking part in the rebellion, which led to the closure of two 
Catholic newspapers, Atalaya and Restauración. On 1 March 1924, the governor ordered 
municipal presidents to prohibit the Catholic Association of Young Mexicans (ACJM), 
                                                
15 AHMA, 1923, Sección 6. 
16 AHMA, 1923, Sección 6. 
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Knights of Columbus, and the Unión de Agricultores from conducting meetings, and 
“charged them with conspiracy to rebel against the established government.”17 
Additionally, in December 1924 he ordered a police raid on Guadalajara’s seminary, 
deemed not to have adequate hygienic standards and, as a result, was confiscated by the 
state government. These anticlerical efforts were also manifest in the closing of Catholic 
schools in Guadalajara and in the various towns and hamlets of Jalisco.18  
This renewed anticlerical zealotry in Jalisco again forced the hands of Catholics in 
the region. “The immediate Catholic response was to organize defense committees,” 
claims Curley, “but these would turn out to constitute the first step toward larger scale 
organizations.” Finding inspiration in a series of lectures that a German Catholic priest, 
Padre Neck, gave in Guadalajara, in which he explained how seventy years earlier 
German Catholics had mobilized against Otto von Bismark’s Kulturkampf with the 
formation of a Wolkesverein (People’s Union), Catholics in Jalisco discovered a parallel 
between the on-going persecution in Mexico and that which occurred in Protestant 
Germany.19 The first of these organizations to emerge was the Unión Popular (UP), 
founded by Anacleto González Flores, which had no formal membership but established 
itself as an important propaganda organization linking Guadalajara with the urban 
outposts of the countryside through the distribution of its newsletter Gladium, which by 
1925 reached a circulation of one hundred thousand.  
                                                
17 Curley, pp. 341-342. 
18 Curley, p. 351 
19 Francis Patrick Dooley, “The Cristeros, Calles and Mexican Catholicism” (Phd diss., University 
of Maryland, 1972), pp. 62-63.  
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The Conflict Escalates  
 
President Calles had long maintained a contentious relationship with the Catholic 
Church. During his stint as governor of Sonora (1915-1919), for example, he expelled all 
the priests residing within the state—a feat that was undone by the next governor.20 This 
protracted enmity continued well into his presidency. In early February 1925 he 
circulated a memorandum to state governors reminding them that “it was the 
responsibility of state and municipal authorities to oversee Church activities and ensure 
that they remained confined within the narrow limits allowed by the Constitution.”21 The 
governors were specifically instructed to take the immediate steps necessary to enforce 
the anticlerical provisions of the Constitution, particularly those pertaining to religious 
education, the suppression of convents, and the expulsion of foreign priests.22 Despite 
Zuno’s reluctance to cede any political ground to Mexico City, as the Calles 
administration began to show its anticlerical tendencies they found a willing and unlikely 
collaborator in Zuno, who, as we have seen, maintained a strained relationship with the 
Church in the Guadalajara region and had in fact shown himself to be pugnaciously 
anticlerical.   
                                                
20 See Michael Monteón, “The Child is Father of the Man: Personality and Politics in 
Revolutionary Mexico,” Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research, 10:1 (2004): pp. 43-61, for an 
excellent article that utilizes modern psychological theory to understand Calles’s leadership of the 
revolution, and how the stigma of his origins as an orphan born out of wedlock affected the development of 
his political outlook and personality. 
21 Purnell, p. 74; Dooley, p. 78. 
22 Marta Eugenia García Ugarte, “Los Católicos y el president Calles,” Revista Mexicana de 
Sociología. Vol. 57, No. 3 (Jul. – Sep. 1995): 138.  
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The drama continued later that month, when on 21 February 1925 a hundred 
men—under the leadership of Ricardo Treviño, the secretary-general of the CROM—
stormed the church of La Soledad in Mexico City. Present among the dissidents were 
members of the Knights of Guadalupe, the order the CROM had created to replace the 
popular Knights of Columbus. After gaining control of the premises, they handed it over 
to Fr. Joaquín Pérez. Jean Meyer has claimed that this incident, arranged by labor boss 
Morones, “marked the birth of the Mexican Catholic Apostolic Church, which, with the 
support of the Government, took possession of half-a-dozen churches.” In direct response 
to this particular incident, however, the parishioners of La Soledad, who held the 
distinction of belonging to a “real barrio bravo,” started a riot and managed successfully 
to reoccupy the church. President Calles closed the grounds in retaliation.23 The Soledad 
incident and other similar occurrences in Guadalajara in early 1925, writes Curley, have 
come to represent the first instances in the postrevolutionary era, in which anticlerical 
action was transformed into a discernable state policy.24 Fifteen days later Catholics in 
Mexico City established the National League for the Defense of Religious Liberty 
(LNDLR) to combat and protest similar actions.25    
On 4 February 1926 Ignacio Monroy, a reporter from the Mexico City daily, El 
Universal, asked Archbishop José Mora y del Río to state his opinion regarding the 
                                                
23 Curley, p. 528. 
24 Curley, p. 527. The author specifically claims that “after the creation of the Mexican Catholic 
and Apostolic Church, a schismatic body parallel to the Roman Church but characterized by its rejection of 
the papacy and support for Calles’s nation-building project.” 
25 Meyer, La Cristiada, p. 34. 
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Constitution of 1917 on the occasion of his article commemorating the ninth anniversary 
of the document’s promulgation: 
The protest that the Mexican prelates have against the articles in the 
Constitution of 1917, which are opposed to liberty and religious dogmas, 
are firmly maintained. It has not been modified, but instead strengthened 
because it derives from the doctrine of the Church, which is invariable, 
because it is the divine truth revealed; moreover, the Episcopate, the 
Clergy, and Catholics do not recognize and will combat articles 3, 5, 27, 
and 130 of the Constitution in force. This opinion will not for any reason 
change without betraying their Faith and their Religion.26   
 
Upon reading this response, Minister of the Interior Adalberto Tejeda ordered the arrest 
of the Archbishop, who was shortly thereafter acquitted by a court. The following week 
Mora y del Río wrote a letter to all of the major newspapers of the country to clarify that 
“the religious matter, which has occupied the attention of newspapers during the past 
couple of days, does not have the importance that El Universal has wanted to give it, 
since they have only reproduced expressions that were contained in a document published 
in the United States by the Mexican Episcopate in 1917.” The archbishop stressed the 
desire of the Church to cooperate with the Government for the prosperity of the 
fatherland. “We hope that these declarations,” continued Mora y del Río, “serve to orient 
the general opinion and thus avoid interpretations that could bring about [problems] to 
Catholics and our Clergy.”27   
President Calles, however, interpreted the original statement attributed to the 
archbishop as a declaration of war and quickly seized upon this opportunity to crack 
down on the Catholic Church. He called upon congress to grant him extraordinary powers 
                                                
26 El Universal, 4 February 1926. 
27 El Informador, “La Iglesia no está en pugna con el estado,” 12 February 1926. 
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to suppress worship and subsequently ordered the closure of church schools and 
convents, the deportation of foreign priests, and the placing of a limitation on the number 
of priests in Mexico. A week later, Minister Tejeda gave a scathing interview to the New 
York Times, in which he leveled charges of superstition against the Church and pointed 
out the utter failure of the Church in the sphere of educating the masses. The Catholic 
Church, he asserted, had accomplished nothing in Mexico, “except to extract money from 
its poor followers […].” The minister specifically condemned the education given by the 
Church to the “Indian” and claimed that it kept him from developing by forcing him to 
believe in miracles. “Even in this enlightened day you may see Indian farmers who refuse 
to start spring planting until the priests bless the ground,” commented Tejeda, adding that 
“the farmers lose much time until they can rake up enough money to pay the priests to 
bless the coming crops.” This type of superstition, according to Tejeda, was against all 
modern progress and only prevented people from advancing and from finding out the 
truth, “because, when people begin to think and inquire, then sham religious political 
organizations fall.”28  
The Rev. Francis C. Kelley, Catholic bishop of Oklahoma and head of the 
Catholic Extension Society of America, speaking under the auspices of the Columbus 
Council, Knights of Columbus, charged that the Mexican state’s agitation against 
Catholic priests and nuns was merely a device on Mexico’s part to draw attention away 
from their proposed theft of American owned properties. “This tirade on the church is to 
cover up something else,” he said, “and this time the something else is the theft of the 
                                                
28 New York Times, “Tejeda Denounces Priests in Mexico,” 28 February 1926. 
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capital of Americans in Mexico.” Moreover, the bishop also responded to the comments 
previously made by Tejeda, which claimed that priests had failed in their work of 
education. In a fiery declaration of his own, the American bishop showed no reservations 
in criticizing the actions taken by the Calles regime: “If Mexico is worrying about 
education, why has it closed the seminaries where educational work is carried on? It is 
not foreign priests they are worrying about—it is all priests.”29    
 
The Ley Calles 
  
 Not more than a week later, President Calles signed a decree consisting of thirty-
three articles relating to the application of the constitutional provisions governing 
religion. The Ley Calles, as it popularly became known, reformed the Federal Penal Code 
by virtue of the full powers which had been previously granted to the president to deal 
with infringements on Article 130. To go into effect on 31 July 1926, the law not only 
expanded upon clerical provisions contained in the code, but also established penalties 
for their violation, among other things, and charged local authorities with implementing 
them. Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department consulted its own experts with regard to the 
legality of such clauses in the Constitution and found that the scope of the new Calles law 
presented a few glaring inconsistencies. After having a conversation with a member of 
the Mexican bar, who was the translator of the Constitution of 1917 as reprinted by the 
Government Printing Office, Washington, an official in the State Department reported 
                                                
29 New York Times, “Catholic Bishops denounces Mexico,” 1 March 1926. 
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that “he stated that if the law were literally interpreted it would appear that a foreigner 
saying his prayers in the privacy of his own room would commit a felony […].”30  
The Mexican episcopate soon met as a committee and decided to suspend 
religious services in Mexico, but reassured Catholics that churches would remain open, 
carefully guarded by the faithful.31 “Since 1917 in which we elevated a protest […] until 
these last months, our conduct was one of silence,” claimed the Mexican episcopacy in 
their collective pastoral letter, “because the antireligious articles were not applied to the 
extent of making life impossible for the Church.” In the lapse of those years, however, 
the committee felt that the governments that had occupied power “without a doubt placed 
grave obstacles” threatening the survival of the Church in Mexico, since “they dictated 
against it some excessively rigorous administrative and often anti-constitutional 
measures.” But never had they actually made it impossible to preach, administer 
sacraments, and worship. The letter continued:  
[…The] law from the Federal Executive promulgated on the second of 
July of the present year, […] makes the divine rights of the Church 
vulnerable […and] is so contrary to natural right, which not only situates 
religious liberty as a primordial base of civilization, but that positively 
prescribes worshiping God as an individual and social obligation; [even] 
the opinion of our eminent Catholic and non-Catholic legal experts [affirm 
that the law] is opposed to [the] Mexican constitution; [and] in the face of 
such violation[s] to our sacred morals, there is no room for any 
compliance on our part. It would be for us a crime to tolerate such a 
situation […]. For this reason […] we protest against that decree [and] 
with your help will work so that that Decree and the antireligious articles 
                                                
30 SD, 812.00/27879, “Political and economic conditions in Mexico during July, 1926.” 
31 Jean Meyer, The Cristero Rebellion: The Mexican People Between Church and State, 1926-
1929 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 44. 
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of the Constitution be reformed, and we will not give up until having 
achieved it.32 
 
Due to the conditions and hostile atmosphere created by the decree, the committee 
decided that it had become impossible to continue practicing the Sacred Ministry. On 31 
July it ordered, until otherwise notified, the suspension of public worship requiring the 
guidance of a priest in all churches across the entire republic.33 As we have seen above, 
these efforts were in fact not new; they had simply adopted on a national scale the tactics 
that in 1918 had been successful in Jalisco.    
The day this decision came into effect, President Calles published a piece in the 
New York Times stating his case to the American public regarding the laws Mexico was 
enforcing. In reference to the pastoral letter published a couple of days before, which 
claimed that his regime was making it impossible to preach, administer sacraments, and 
carry on with religious practices, Calles affirmed that “it is completely false that any 
disposition of the Federal Government, let us not say hinders, but even limits, religious 
preaching, within the churches or the places destined for worship [...].” Calles stressed 
that not only had the clergy failed to justify their attitude, but that a careful reading of 
their pastoral letter revealed three motives. He identified these motives as follows:  
First, the fear of losing that which they call sacred property and which 
since the reform laws, sealed with years of struggle, every Mexican knows 
and feels to be the property of the nation; second, the demand of the 
Government upon the priests before the authorities of the Government, 
and, third, the belief that the purpose of the Government is to make the 
                                                
32 Archivo Histórico de la Arquidiócesis de Guadalajara (hereinafter cited as AHAG), Sección: 
Gobierno, Serie: Cartas Pastorales, Edictos y Circulares, Años: 1900-1935, Caja No. 5.  
33 AHAG, Sección: Gobierno, Serie: Cartas Pastorales, Edictos y Circulares, Años: 1900-1935, 
Caja No. 5.  
 257 
country non-Catholic or to give preference, as they think, to some other 
religious creed.34   
 
In order to stop these selfish proceedings and to elevate the character of the Government 
and the people, Calles justified the need adequately to modify the proper laws so that the 
fulfillment of the Constitution might not be translated into the personal benefit of any one 
individual, but rather into the enrichment of the country by the collective use of clerical 
property.35  
 A week later Bishop Pascual Díaz, Secretary General of the Catholic Episcopate 
of Mexico, accused Calles of fettering faith and vehemently backed the pastoral letter of 
the Mexican Episcopate. Indicating that the president clearly denied limiting religious 
functions, Díaz was quick to point out that these were limited because the Government 
has reduced the number of priests. The interview continued highlighting the position of 
the Church, which amongst other things included a fundamental respect for Mexico and 
the Constitution. “But in order not to be traitors to ourselves,” observed Díaz, “we must 
oppose those secondary precepts which would curtail our liberty of conscience.” The 
bishop reminded the American readership that the Church had not provoked this conflict, 
but rather it was “General Calles” who was responsible for the tirade caused by the 
implementation of his sanctimonious provisions, “which are against religious liberty [and 
                                                
34 New York Times, “President Calles States the Case for the Laws Mexico Is Enforcing,” 1 August 
1926. 
35 New York Times, “President Calles States the Case for the Laws Mexico Is Enforcing,” 1 August 
1926. 
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are] rejected by the people of Mexico.” According to Díaz, Mexican Catholics should no 
longer be deprived of the rights enjoyed by the Catholics of other civilized nations.36 
 On 19 August, Díaz declared that the episcopate of Mexico was ready to accept 
mediation talks to resolve the religious conflict; stressing that the only thing the Clergy 
wanted was to resolve the differences in a decorous and legal manner.37 Two days later 
Díaz and Bishop of Michoacán Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores, accompanied by their attorney 
Mestres Guigleaza, arrived at the Castillo de Chapultepec. President Calles immediately 
attended to the individuals and directed them to his office, where they discussed the 
matters at hand for two hours. Upon leaving the deliberations, the prelates appeared to be 
satisfied, but abstained from making any declarations, as they deemed them of the utmost 
importance. Afterwards, El Informador reported that, “as of now, everything indicates 
that the differences between the Catholic Church and the Government will cease in a 
couple of days.”38 A sudden negative turn of events hit the presses. On 23 August, Díaz 
accused Calles of altering the episcopate’s statement. The president, reiterated Díaz, had 
assured them that the registration of the priests was entirely administrative in purpose, but 
he later discovered that Calles gave a statement to El Universal saying that returning 
priests would be “subject to the laws.” As a result negotiations broke down and the 
                                                
36 New York Times, “Reply of Church Accuses Calles of fettering Faith,” 9 August 1926. 
37 El Informador, “El Señor Presidente Calles dio contestación a la carta que le envió El 
Episcopado,” 20 August 1926 
38 El Informador, “Nuevas probabilidades de que se llegue a un acuerdo entre el clero y el 
gobierno,” 22 August 1926 
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episcopate had dropped its tentatively considered project for resuming services in the 
churches.39 
Minister Tejeda, however, took precautions to assure the successful 
implementation of the Ley Calles and sent a memorandum to all municipal presidents in 
Jalisco, indicating that:  
[…Priests] of the Catholic religion should not be allowed to officiate again 
in the temples without previously fulfilling the requirement of the eleventh 
clause of Article 130 of the Constitution and promise in writing [to obey] 
the laws of reform […] Municipal Presidents shall in turn monitor the 
strict fulfillment of said laws, warning them [Priests] of the punishment 
that they can incur if they do not observe them and should also give notice 
to the Ministry of the Interior of cases so that they can be brought to the 
attention of this Government.40 
 
In Guadalajara, the Catholic clergy responded by abandoning the churches and leaving 
them in the custody of Catholic committees, while in other parts of the state some federal 
soldiers were reported to have forced inventories and/or taken possession of many 
churches. “It is apparent that in outlying sections of the state [and Guadalajara],” reported 
Consul Dwyre, “the authorities have abandoned an attempt to molest or take possession 
of the church property […].”41  
Over the course of the remaining five-months of 1926, armed disturbances in 
Jalisco began to occur with increasing frequency. In October, the U.S. State Department 
noted that in Mexico “all of the elements necessary to bring about a revolution” were in 
                                                
39 New York Times, “Peace hope fades as Mexican Bishops reject compromise,” 24 August 1926 
40 Secretaría General de Gobierno, Cristeros: textos, documentos y fotografías (Guadalajara, 
Mexico: Gobierno de Jalisco, Secretaría General de Gobierno, 2007), p. 166. 
41 SD, 812.404/590 “Political and Economic Conditions in Guadalajara District, Mexico,” 18 
August 1926. 
 260 
place, but did concede that “conditions which in any other country would provoke an 
upheaval may be considered as approaching normal in this Republic.” Nevertheless, the 
report highlighted some developments of note: 1) there was a systematic effort on the part 
of the Government to destroy the political power of the Catholic Church; 2) an economic 
boycott, which had been declared by the Church in retaliation was in effect; 3) heavy 
damages to crops had been caused by storms and floods in various states; 4) there existed 
a significant rebellion led by the Yaqui in Sonora; and 5) there was a general uneasiness 
regarding the possibility of Obregón seeking an unprecedented return to the Presidency.42 
Let us now turn to how partisans of the state, such as agraristas, local authorities, and 
government employees, experienced the outbreak of the rebellion 
 
Agraristas in Times of Crisis  
  
A banquet was held at Lake Chapala on 27 February 1927 in honor of Jalisco 
governor-elect Daniel Benítez, who was to take office in two days time. The ceremony 
was attended by approximately five hundred people, which included several federal 
deputies and officials who had arrived from Mexico City to take part in the festivities. 
Benítez created a favorable impression on those in attendance. Among those present was 
the American consul who noted that the governor-elect’s brilliant speech showed him to 
be better educated, poised, reasonable, and more conservative than former Governor 
Zuno; however, he still believed Zuno shrewder and more astute than Benítez. “The new 
Governor, Lic. Daniel Benitez, is the selection of President Calles,” wrote Consul Dwyre: 
                                                
42 SD 812.00/28056, “Political and Economic Conditions in Mexico during October 1926.”  
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“It will be remembered that three factions presented their candidates for election [last 
September…and while he] received, officially, the smallest number of votes, the election 
was declared illegal and Benitez was declared [as] the new Governor of Jalisco.”43 
When Governor Benítez came into office on 1 March 1927, he was shocked to 
learn that his administration inherited only 952.80 pesos in the state treasury. But what 
made this discovery even more surprising was the fact that the day before, the account 
had shown a balance of 43,124.91 pesos.44 With the number of Catholics up in arms on 
the rise, the governor also inherited a countryside that found itself in full-blown 
rebellion.45 An informant of Consul Dwyre’s, an individual employed in the mining 
sector who was well acquainted with the state, for example, claimed that the insurgents 
held the entire region: “[My informant] states that the movement is all in the name of the 
Church with the battle cry “Viva Cristo Rey” (Long live Christ the King) […and] that the 
overwhelming sentiment of all [in] that country is for the revolution, and against the 
Government.”46 Countless other reports confirmed that rebel forces were gaining strength 
                                                
43 SD, 812.00/28268, Enclosure: 4, “Review of Political, Commercial, Industrial, Agricultural, and 
General Conditions for the Month of February 1927, Guadalajara Consular District, Mexico,” 28 February 
1927. 
44 AGN, O-C, 428-J-10, 8 March 1927. 
45 Jalisco represented the epicenter of what would come to be called the Cristero Rebellion, as 
“both Cristeros and Revolutionaries regarded this state as the nucleus of the violent struggle, and it is there, 
in effect that the roots of the peasant rebellion and the counterrevolution are found.” Jrade gave two 
reasons: 1) that the state experienced the strongest manifestation of rural resistance to the established 
political authorities; and 2) the state became the primary center of the rural-urban alliance, which 
transformed the conflict into a counterrevolution; see Jrade, pp., 59-60. 
46 SD, 812.00/28260, “Renewal of Revolutionary Activities in the Guadalajara Consular District,” 
26 February 1927. 
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in numbers, with arms and ammunition making their way into their hands.47 Despite 
lacking the necessary funds to establish a state militia, Benítez proceeded to sign an 
agreement to sanction the Social Defense of the State. This new corps was to “cooperate 
in the campaign that the Federal Government has undertaken against the rebel movement 
which operates in the state […].”48 In a letter written to President Calles, Benítez wrote:  
[G]iven the difficult circumstances which the state is experiencing, [with 
regard to the] rebellion, I propose to [be allowed to] lead the social 
defenses that I [have] organized in the State, [with] each Defense having 
as a direct commander an official designated by the Head of [Military] 
Operations: In that manner, [we] would be able to punish the bandits, 
which have begun to assault [many areas in the state], [and] roads and 
towns; [as a result,] I would be able to enforce my orders and avoid that 
subordinate authorities disobey the Executive, and [instead] cooperate 
with the campaign developed by this Office.49     
 
A week later, Benítez provided an update to Calles informing him of the progress he had 
made, revealing that his contingent now numbered one-hundred and fifty men, something 
quite short of the social defense group of up one thousand men he had been authorized to 
recruit.50 The governor had been resourceful in his recruitment tactics in large part 
because he lacked the necessary budget to support such a contingent. The Head of the 
Confidential Office in Mexico City, for example, claimed that to create his contingent 
“Benítez [simply] dissolved the police [and] organized them into a Defense to protect the 
                                                
47 SD, 812.00/28266, “Continuance of revolutionary activities in the Guadalajara Consular 
District,” 5 March 1927.  
48 Secretaría General de Gobierno, p. 54.  
49 AGN, O-C, 428-J-10, 8 March 1927. 
50 AGN, DGIPS, 413.2 (3.2) 1, Nombre: Lic. Daniel Benítez, Asunto: Su desafuero como 
Gobernador Constitucional del Estado de Jalisco, March 1927.  
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city.” As of 10 April, the converted police force had yet to see any real action or even 
confront anyone: “[N]ot even real highway robbers or bandits.”51  
It is important to note here that during the turbulent 1920s the federal army tried 
to distinguish among the reservists they deployed to quell rebellions in the countryside. 
These included “state police forces, local self-defense forces (defensas sociales), and 
armed peasants either defending or seeking land (agraristas).”52 But even the available 
sources on this matter make it difficult to identify consistently and distinguish among the 
social groups that participated in and comprised each militia. In Jalisco, for example, the 
defensas sociales varied in their organization and composition, with some being led by 
agraristas. What is certain is that in early 1927 President Calles had already begun the 
process of attempting to arm agrarian communities to suppress the recent rebellion that 
had taken hold of the countryside in central-western Mexico. With much of the federal 
army engaged in putting down a Yaqui uprising in the northern part of the country, Calles 
urged state governors to take all necessary measures to resolve agrarian reform petitions 
pending before state-level Local Agrarian Commissions “in order to counteract the 
discontent being sown among peasants by enemies of the current regime.”53 The 
agraristas of the state were again to be deployed as local defense forces in much the 
same capacity that they served during the de la Huerta Rebellion (1923 to 1924).  
                                                
51 AGN, O-C-, 428-J-10, 10 April 1927, f. 63.  
52 Thomas Rath, Myths of demilitarization in postrevolutionary Mexico, 1920-1960 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2013), p. 36. 
53 Purnell, pp. 68-69 and 82.  
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On 15 January 1927, the state government organized a convention in Guadalajara 
to decide on a plan to oppose the rebellion and to put the orders of President Calles into 
effect. With many agraristas from around the state in attendance, Zuno, and now former 
governor, addressed the convention on the gravity of the situation, stressing that 
agraristas “oft-repeated cries of ‘we have no arms’ could now be dispensed with” 
because two-thousand carbines and large quantities of ammunition were to be distributed 
to the agrarian communities.54 Yet even state authorities themselves remained divided 
over the matter of whether to arm rural people who, to them, appeared indistinguishable 
from their Catholic counterparts. The American consul touched a similar nerve, when he 
informed Washington that the policy of arming the agrarista groups was a poor one 
because he claimed that they were simply “country people and, while they follow a few 
leaders, they are fanatical Catholics like 95 per cent of the population in the country 
districts, and arms in their hands will probably work against the interests of the state 
government.”55 But the promises of guns and ammunition, for the most part, remained 
unfulfilled. This directly placed the state’s agrarian communities in a precarious position 
in light of the rising violence cristeros directed towards agraristas.  
In what follows, my interest is not so much focused on the outcome of the 
rebellion, nor on the internal logic of the conflict, but rather shifts to agrarian 
communities during the conflict. Through an analysis of letters written by community 
                                                
54 SD, 812.00/28199, “Arming of Agrarian Groups for Defending Government against 
Revolutionaries,” 18 January 1927. 
55 SD, 812.00/28199, “Arming of Agrarian Groups for Defending Government against 
Revolutionaries,” 18 January 1927.  
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representatives to government officials, I analyze the anxieties agraristas expressed 
during the early phase of rebellion, from about mid-1926 to mid-1928. I am much more 
interested in highlighting how these communities wrote about and reacted to the threat 
(and actuality) of violence, and in giving voice to the religious divisions occurring within 
their towns, than in narrating the numerous battles they participated in or the extent to 
which they adhered, or did not adhere, to the state’s revolutionary project. But first let us 
now take a step back to see how agrarian reform functioned after the Mexican Revolution 
in order to understand why most agraristas positioned themselves as they did. 
 
Agrarian Reform and Political Identities  
 
In the years leading up to the Mexican Revolution, the principal cause of unrest 
and strife in the rural population was the loss of communal landholdings through sales, 
concessions, outright theft, and adjustments made by local authorities. When the 
Constitution of 1917 was adopted, the decree of January 6, 1915, which established that 
the rights of villages had been violated because they could not sue over lands at law, was 
raised to the status of constitutional provision and incorporated into Article 27. Through 
this now-enshrined right, municipalities and settlements with a communal character 
regained the legal capacity to own real property, which had been done away with in the 
liberal Constitution of 1857. The government’s right to eminent domain was extended to 
include the division of large landed estates taking from them the necessary lands and 
waters in order to endow villages and other communities. Owners were to be indemnified 
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for the property taken, and, if they considered themselves despoiled, had recourse to 
proper tribunals.56   
During the 1920s agrarian reform was generally designed to integrate peasants 
into the reform bureaucracy in a manner which allowed them to the embrace the new 
revolutionary values espoused by political elites. The imparting of these new rational, 
nationalistic, and anticlerical attitudes, which became central tenets of the revolutionary 
project, often required peasant communities to go against the prevailing cultural norms of 
the countryside. “Since villages, which accommodated official norms were more likely to 
receive land,” claims Butler, “agraristas were effectively obliged to build schools where 
they were taught new working practices and exposed to secular cultural influences […and 
above] all it required local agrarian leaders to reinterpret revolutionary tropes creatively 
in village contexts so that they became meaningful to a peasant audience.”57 First 
promoted by federal functionaries at the local level, over time the task of promoting the 
ejido58 began to be taken on by local teachers, veterinarians, agrarian functionaries, and 
even campesinos themselves. Such work had to be carried out in secrecy, with much it 
done at night, and with great caution to avoid reprisal on the part of local hacendados. 
                                                
56 Ulices Piña, “Lords of Agave: Agraristas, Eladio Sauza, and the Struggle for Land in Tequila, 
Mexico, 1932-1937,” UCLA Historical Journal (Vol. 23, Issue 1, 2012), pp. 13-14. 
57 Butler, pp. 53-54.  
58 The term ejido was imported from Spain and has its roots in the name given by the Spaniards in 
the colonial period to common Indian livestock grounds. Gradually, the meaning of the word expanded to 
encompass all agricultural lands claimed by a village. In the post-revolutionary period the word took on a 
completely different meaning and refers to the land grants given to individuals under the official agrarian 
reform; it is also used as a term for a landholding village endowed by the agrarian reform. An ejidatario 
refers to a recipient of a land-reform grant, restitution, or amplification, who is entitled to individual or 
collective use of commonly assigned lands.  
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Adopting an agrarista identity, then, became a display of subordination and political 
loyalty to the new state, inasmuch as it was also a significant display of defiance to the 
cultural norms of the countryside.  
Agrarian communities had to follow a strict legal procedure comprised of several 
important stages in order to be granted land by the federal government. The process was 
initiated through a formal petition submitted by an agrarian community to the state 
governor. The petition specified whether the land grant in question was for a grant, 
restitution, or amplification of an existing ejido. Each land grants required certain 
specifications be met: a restitution petition obliged a community to have proof of a 
Spanish royal grant to an Indian community; dotation grants, were only awarded on the 
basis of either not being able to have proof of a previous grant or to a community that 
was composed of landless agricultural workers; and amplification grants were awarded to 
existing ejidos that lacked sufficient land to maintain the total number of eligible 
ejidatarios. After the community met the initial requirements for the requested action, a 
census was recorded to register all eligible members of the community and extensively to 
survey each property. But in order for a community or village to be endowed by the state, 
they needed to have been in existence for at least six months prior to submitting their 
petition.59 Agricultural workers who resided on an hacienda were ineligible for agrarian 
reform because of contractual reasons until 1934 (provisionally) and (definitively) in 
1937.60 What should be acknowledged, however, is that local communities had to wait 
                                                
59 Piña, p. 29 
60 Piña, p. 17. In 1934, an autonomous agrarian department was created along with a new Agrarian 
Code that allowed for this change.   
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years for their petitions finally to be resolved. And having thrown in their lot with 
agrarismo, many such communities continuously faced intimidation tactics from those 
opposed to agrarian reform aimed at pressuring them into abandoning their petitions.   
Between 1918 and 1932, a total of 263 communities in the state of Jalisco had 
their petitions for ejidos forwarded to the Agrarian Department for definitive resolution, 
218 petitions (82.8 percent) of which were approved, while 45 (17.2 percent) were 
denied. The successful petitions were divided into three categories: grants, 203 petitions 
(93.1 percent); restitutions, 3 petitions (1.4 percent); and amplifications, 12 petitions (5.5 
percent). Based upon data gathered from the Primer Censo Ejidal de 1935, the land 
grants awarded to communities during these years formed two trends—referred to here as 
Trend I and Trend II—that indicate the number of resolutions resolved during the years 
1918-1926, and 1927-1932 (see Figure 5). Trend I averaged a distribution rate of 
approximately 8 ejidos per year, whereas Trend II saw a noticeable upsurge in resolved 
petitions, which placed it at a resolution rate of just over 21 ejidos per year.  
The upsurge of armed rebellion in Jalisco from 1926 to 1929 coincides 
remarkably with the rise of resolved petitions demonstrated by Trend II. Moreover, 
throughout the fifteen years that comprise the data set, a total of 301,404 hectares of land 
were reallocated in the following forms: grants (282,657 ha.), restitutions (2,512 ha.), and 
amplifications (16,235 ha.). Trend I averaged a redistribution rate of approximately 
16,122.7 hectares per year, whereas Trend II averaged 26,049 hectares per year. During 
the early period, a community could expect to receive a grant, restitution, or amplification 
of 1,649 hectares, while in the latter years a community could expect an award of 1,102 
hectares. Although Trend I saw a lower number of favorably resolved petitions, 
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communities on average received 547 hectares more per grant, restitution, or 
amplification when compared to the Trend II, the later period (see Figure 5). 
 
  
Figure 5: Definitive Resolutions of Petitions in Jalisco, 1918-1932. Source: Primer Censo Ejidal de 
1935 (Jalisco) 
  
 
Jean Meyer has used a similar source to conclude that at a national level one-third 
of the land grants from 1917 and 1930 were made between 1926 and 1929; that is, during 
the Cristero Rebellion. The purpose of this accelerated distribution, according to Meyer, 
was “to recruit new adherents and restrict popular support for the Cristeros […] 
particularly in the zones where the rebellion was the strongest.”61 His analysis, at least for 
the case of Jalisco, however, is misleading and does not take into account local dynamics, 
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nor does it reflect an understanding of the petitioning process. The picture that Meyer 
paints here is one of a deeply desperate central government signing off on land grants left 
and right to create new supporters when in fact many of these agrarian communities 
already existed in Jalisco. As the reader will recall, Governor Zuno (1923 to 1926) 
redistributed a total of 113,636.81 hectares of land to 22,157 campesinos, which 
represented 34.9 percent of all land redistributed in the state between 1915 and 1935.62 
While the land grants awarded under the Zuno administration were considered 
provisional, “since a Governor’s decision was subject to review by federal agrarian 
authorities who assisted the President in reaching a final solution,” in most cases agrarian 
communities were usually allowed to take possession of the land and begin to farm their 
ejidos.63 In 1925 Governor Zuno provided insight into the unique dilemma facing Jalisco 
with an update regarding the redistribution of lands to agrarian communities, which he 
claimed had different land tenure patterns as other states. Though much progress had 
been made, Zuno claimed that:  
[the agrarian question] is not really on the eve of resolving itself [here in 
Jalisco], as has already done in San Luis Potosí, due to an infinite number 
of causes, and one of them is that the ejidos in Jalisco [need] be given 
lands from many owners [and properties] and in San Luis there is greater 
facility [to do this because] there are a great number of large populations 
found [within the limits of] one property with rights to land [in that 
region]. Additionally, the number of […] communities [in San Luis 
Potosí] is much less than the Communities that already exist in Jalisco 
[…]. However, circular 37 [that] the Government of Jalisco decreed about 
a year ago, practically resolved the crucial agrarian problem, since in 
accordance with it all of the agrarian groups that had urgency for lands, 
were able to take possession of them. In the present [time] it is only about 
resolving the more technical [aspect] of the problem, given that only 
                                                
62 See Chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
63 Jrade, p. 109 
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communities [with] large industrial and commercial populations are left to 
be granted. The Government of Jalisco considers the desires of the 
President of the Republic, consisting in making the Agrarian Communities 
producing centers, already a reality in Jalisco […].64  
 
In fact, many of these agrarian communities had been previously armed and mobilized to 
suppress de la Huerta Rebellion (1923 to 1924).65 Zuno himself displayed a certain level 
of apprehension with regard to arming agraristas and pushed to disarm them after the 
conflict because many were “badly disciplined,” which allowed for ambitious politicians 
to take advantage of them.66 Taking into account the regional power structure Zuno had 
developed during his time as governor, and the contentious relationship he had with many 
communities, this had more to do with his fear that an “armed peasantry would have 
incurred grave political risks for the state and renewed the chances for another outbreak 
of civil war, with an uncertain outcome.”67  
What should be made clear is that the data in Figure 5 and the analysis promoted 
by Meyer’s study only reflect agrarian petitions that were definitively resolved. While the 
data do indeed tell an interesting story about the importance that federal authorities 
ascribed to definitively resolving agrarian petitions during these years, perhaps to reward 
(and/or even to a degree, incentivize) agraristas to take up arms, this should in no way be 
                                                
64 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 243-J1-L5. 
65 See Chapter 1 of this dissertation.  
66 AGN, Obregón-Calles, 101-R2-B-1, “Confiscation of rebel properties,” f. 37-42. Additionally, 
there also exists evidence to suggest that many village residents also met the arming of agraristas with 
great skepticism “because the deceitful behavior and trickery to which they were continually exposed by 
opportunistic middle-class politicians encouraged peasants to be quite distrustful of such efforts;” see Luis 
Cuevas, Forsaken Harvest: Haciendas and Agrarian Reform in Jalisco, Mexico: 1915-1940 (Xlibris 
Corporation, 2013), p. 209. 
67 Cuevas, p. 209. 
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interpreted as “a kind of blackmail” used to hoax peasants into fighting for the state, as 
Meyer has proposed, nor should agraristas be viewed “as mere cannon-fodder [who] 
played no part in politics [and who were] incapable of exerting pressure on the 
Government.”68 Petitioning for land was inherently a political act requiring years of 
organizing, sacrifice, and the deployment of pressure tactics upon landowners and 
authorities. Agrarian communities were not pulled out of thin air, nor were they simply 
created through the President’s blessing—there was a process to be followed and 
requirements to be met. Meyer’s interpretation, perhaps, has more to do with his 
understanding of the rebellion as a conservative and widespread response to an 
unfavorable, hostile, and authoritarian state, which, as Butler has noted, “exaggerates the 
ideological transparency of the cristeros and oversimplifies the relationship between the 
peasantry, Church, and the state.”69   
In economic, social, and cultural terms, agraristas hardly differed from their 
counterparts—many were practicing Catholics just as devout as the cristeros.70 As 
Purnell has noted, there was indeed nothing inherent to Catholicism that determined 
opposition to agrarian reform, nor did support for the latter imply an assault on the 
Church.71 What then led to Catholics being so antithetical to the agrarian reform? While 
the postrevolutionary state made great advancements in convincing campesinos to 
                                                
68 Meyer, The Cristero Rebellion, pp. 18 and 108 
69 Butler, Popular Piety, p. 6 
70 Meyer, The Cristero Rebellion, p. 106  
71 Purnell, p. 3. 
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petition for land, what remains clear is that a great amount of individuals still resisted 
these efforts. A possible explanation regarding this division is the role that wealthy 
landowners played in halting state advancements in the countryside. In the uprisings that 
we have analyzed so far rural elites consistently sided against the state. In fact, in almost 
all those instances, parish priests supported the actions and interests of the wealthy over 
the interests of campesinos and, perhaps, this has much to do with the fact that they were 
traditionally the Church’s biggest benefactors. As Alan Knight has reminded us, 
Catholics “defended private property rights” and always took the side of landowners in 
disputes against agraristas.72 And as we seen (and will seen in the next chapter) parish 
priest played important roles in shaping public opinion in the small towns of Jalisco. That 
said, where agraristas and cristeros differed, however, at least during this rebellion, was 
in their political identities:  
[M]any agrarista peasants explicitly defined themselves as anticlerical, 
and their personal and political enemies, both elite and popular, as 
Catholics. Other peasants, in turn, accepted and adopted this Catholic 
political identity. It came to express their opposition to [the] 
anticlericalism of the new state, and in many cases to revolutionary 
agrarianism, which, though it sometimes increased access to land, also 
involved a significant increase in the state’s role in the regulation of 
community resources and a subsequent loss of local political autonomy.73 
 
Therefore, being a political Catholic in the 1920s went beyond simply repudiating the 
state’s anticlerical reforms. It came to embody stern resistance to the state’s capacity to 
meddle in the local affairs of the countryside. And while many of those who rose up in 
                                                
72 Alan Knight, “La última fase de la Revolución: Cárdenas,” in Lázaro Cárdenas: modelo y 
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arms against the state were indeed political Catholics, it also should be made abundantly 
clear that the vast majority of such did not rise up “even as they continued to contest the 
agrarian and anticlerical projects of the emerging state.”74 The reports of Agent 17 
(Amalia Díaz) clearly illuminate these forces at play, when she described how ordinary 
people in the town of Teocuitatlán viewed cristeros in relation to federal troops. On 2 
January 1928, for example, Agent Díaz revealed that the town was “plagued” with rebels, 
numbering around fifty to one hundred, but that this was not what caught the attention of 
locals, rather it was instead the federal troops that struck fear in the hearts of these locals. 
On the one hand, the federal troops would enter the town “not hear[ing] reason,” and 
simply take what they wanted “leaving frightened families” without food; while, on the 
other, the cristeros would first ask for food and if they were denied sustenance, they 
would then steal a cow, kill it themselves, leave the area, and not terrify locals, “but in 
the event that there were agraristas [present] they would seek them out and disturb their 
families.”75 Let us turn to how agrarian communities responded during the first two years 
of the uprising; that is, in the lead up to, and immediately after, the state’s attempt once 
again to mobilize and arm agraristas.  
 
Agrarian Communities at the Start of the Rebellion   
 
Not long after the rebellion broke in mid-1926, Fernando Basulto Limón 
organized the first rural defense unit in the town of Zacoalco de Torres, successfully 
                                                
74 Purnell, p. 8. 
75 AGN, DGIPS, 313.1-13 (3.2), “Confidencial” Caja 215, Exp. 3, “Se transcribe informe sobre 
situación sediciosa en el Estado de Jalisco,” 2 January 1928, ff. 180-182. 
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gaining control of the area from Acatlán de Juárez to Atoyac. Often described as a 
prototypical agrarian cacique, Basulto Limón counted upon the support of the federal 
government to organize and supply his troops with arms. Although these defense units 
were in theory subordinate to the federal army and did not share its formation or 
discipline, such agrarista reinforcement groups would come to play an important role in 
the government’s struggle against cristeros. Basulto Limón alleged, for example, that 
those who rose up in arms against the federal government, more than combating the 
forces of the national army, attacked agraristas “preferably in cowardly ambushes 
[…and] whoever fell under their control, alive, was assassinated with the greatest cruelty 
and viciousness.”76 He continued: “A little while after the furious Cristero Rebellion was 
unleashed, whatever having been its religious character, its most passionate and violent 
attacks were against agraristas.”77 In this same town, the cristero cause counted with the 
sympathy and help of landowners and their numerous workers, who were associated with 
the clergy and were supported by a multitude of “fanatics.” An indigenous resident, Don 
Tomás, stressed that parish priest Francisco Alcalá exerted a powerful influence over the 
local population: “[H]e would say that whoever accepted lands from the rich was 
excommunicated, […and] many people believed that so we did not get any lands.” He 
recalled that many individuals who ended up receiving land from the state in that era 
                                                
76 Lourdes Celina Vázquez Parada and Federico Munguía Cárdenas, Protagonistas y testigos de la 
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were also close to the Catholic religion, but were already too committed to the taking of 
lands to turn back: “[A]s the saying goes, once the cow has gone to water, it has gone to 
the water.”78  
While many of the state’s agrarian communities encountered similar hostile 
environments and were also divided along internal lines , the majority of them actually 
lacked the necessary arms and munitions to protect themselves. In this regard, Basulto 
Limón remained an exception to the rule. There was indeed a concerted effort at 
mobilizing agraristas into defense units during the Cristero Rebellion, but arms and 
munitions did not always arrive to agrarian communities in a timely manner, especially 
during the early phases of the rebellion. Indeed, up until at least February 1927, even the 
state government itself was divided on the issue of whether it should place arms into the 
hands of agraristas, and was fearful that such efforts might backfire, sometimes opting 
instead to arm “radical labor groups.”79 The stark reality of these agrarian communities, 
perhaps, more closely resembles the experience of agrarista Enrique Rosales—the 
president of the administrative committee of the agrarian community of El Arenal—and 
that of his two brothers, who counted themselves lucky to escape death in their 
hometown at the hands of a “fanatic mob” led by the priest and beatas of the town. 
“[One] of [my brothers], let himself fall from a height of 5 or 6 meters [from a building],” 
                                                
78 Vázquez Parada and Cárdenas, p. 175 
79 SD, 812.00/28225, Review of political, commercial, industrial, agricultural, and general 
conditions for the month of January 1927, Guadalajara Consular District, Mexico,” 1 February 1927.  
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wrote Rosales, “[while] me and my other [brother were] saved because of the 
intervention of a female cousin.”80  
The attack began on 21 September 1926, when the forty armed men led by 
Asencio Villegas impetuously fell upon the town, yelling “Viva Cristo Rey” and “Viva 
Romo” at the top of their lungs, assaulting the municipal presidency. This assault 
appeared to have been a response to the actions of the local ayuntamiento, which was 
allegedly going to implement the law regarding religious worship. Once at the municipal 
presidency, the rebels fired their guns at the building and destroyed its doors, furniture, 
and other objects, including a portrait of President Calles.81 As a result, the municipal 
president, the secretary, a brother of the president, two policemen, and the police chief 
quickly surrendered, and subsequently dispersed. Among the casualties were the 
following: the secretary of the ayuntamiento, shot four times in the face and eight times 
in the thorax; Sixta Sáldate de Aldana, killed on account of a stomach wound, 3 to 4 
centimeters above the umbilical area; the municipal treasurer, whose left hand was 
superficially wounded by a projectile emanating from a rifle; the brother of the municipal 
president (left hand wound); and the municipal president, who was sparred serious injury 
because a shot intended for his head missed, and instead destroyed his sombrero, but who 
was still beaten with a rifle butt. 
                                                
80 AHJ, Clasificación, G-4-1926, Gobernación, 4-Iglesia, Asunto: “Se piden garantías y que se 
metan al orden a los causantes de atropellos,” 28 October 1926. 
81 The rebels ended up stealing at Winchester rifle, two Marlín rifles, a Colt gun, a Hamit gun, and 
a black blanket worth $1750 pesos. 
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 A month later, Rosales wrote to the governor to inform him that Villegas, one of 
the perpetrators of the attack, was said to be allied with “those who call themselves” the 
agraristas of Amatitán. The so-called agraristas were supported by Don Aurelio López, 
the owner of the Hacienda San José del Refugio. While the agraristas of San José del 
Refugio claimed to be guardians of the order and public security, Rosales described them 
as nothing more than wild animals: “[They] come to [our town] with the goal of 
disarming us [taking away the guns] that we gave been able to obtain through much 
sacrifice for our personal defense […].” Rosales was surprised at the persecution faced by 
his community, given that they had an unblemished record of service in the eyes of the 
National Agrarian Commission. In fact, he wanted to know from the “sensible residents” 
of the area what had precipitated such hatred towards him and his companions. He even 
demanded some official insight into the crimes they had supposedly committed: 
“[B]ecause if we are subjected to the opinion of the fanatic Catholics, we are criminals 
for having [supported] the implementation of the [religious laws].” Rosales claimed that 
the agrarian community he belonged to had formed its administrative committee in 1924 
when it was comprised of twenty or thirty ejidatarios, which by 1925 had ascended to a 
little over seventy members, and by 1926 counted upon one hundred. While they 
consistently asked regional authorities for a detachment of armed men because of the ill-
will that Catholics and the aforementioned agraristas expressed towards his community, 
their demands had fallen on deaf ears. Rosales reiterated to the governor: “[…We] need a 
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detachment that will give us guarantees and [allow] the municipal presidency to fulfill the 
disposition of […the government with regard to the religious law].”82 
 In another illustrative incident, during the previous month, on 19 August 1926, 
the agrarian community of Tototlán directed three complaints to the substitute governor: 
1) that the community currently found itself in difficult circumstances because of the 
hostile attitude that prevailed in the town against the government (federal and state); 2) 
that municipal authorities played an active role in suppressing agraristas; and 3) that 
many of these efforts were organized by the Unión Popular, which made use of its wider 
network that stemmed from Guadalajara. In the eyes of the community president, the 
popular opinion in the town was not only visibly against the national and state 
governments, but also directed against everything that “aspired to be a legitimate 
emancipation of the workers, within the Constitutional Laws of the Republic.” When it 
came to receiving the necessary guarantees from the local town government to enact their 
citizenship, the agrarian community of Tototlán faced an uphill battle as both the 
municipal president and the chief of police “were not only against [us] but also [engaged 
in] pernicious efforts to take away the [lives of] the agraristas and [the] sympathizers of 
the government […].” And to nourish a hostile environment for supporters of the 
revolutionary government, the wealthy class and the clergy of the town had jointly 
organized a local chapter of the Unión Popular, which carried out an “exaggerated and 
perfidious” campaign not to sell them staple foods “if [we] did not have a voucher issued 
by said organization.” In this town, the persecution organized by the Unión Popular was 
                                                
82 AHJ, Clasificación, G-4-1926, Gobernación, 4-Iglesia, Asunto: “Se piden garantías y que se 
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most exaggerated in the evening. While the Unión Popular claimed to be a defense 
organization, the president of the community underscored that he thought it nothing more 
than an organization whose sole goal was to go against his community. The organization 
even went as far as to prevent the agraristas from farming the lands to which they 
already held provisional possession, and had physically received two months before.83 
They ultimately asked the governor to make the necessary guarantees so that the 
members of the community might be able to become receive justice under the Law:  
The situation in which [we] find ourselves is truly serious and demands 
prompt, efficient, and energetic action so that the Government is not 
mocked by a group that [finds itself committing] one of the biggest 
mistakes [and who uses] the closure of the churches, as a pretext to fuel 
their fanaticism and ignorance.84  
  
Three months later, the members of the same community—now residing in Ocotlán—
revealed that they were forced to flee their town because of the persecution led by parish 
priest, Francisco Vizcarra, and the municipal president. “We have also been informed 
that the parish priest […] intends to gather the few people who reside in Tototlán as well 
as those in the surrounding area,” warned the agraristas, “with the goal of revolting 
against the Supreme Constitutional Government.” They not only bemoaned the fact that 
Father Vizcarra had destroyed the agrarian community’s archive, but that they also 
continuously feared for their lives because the municipal president publically supported 
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 281 
the rebels of Los Altos (vocally and materially) so that they could “come to our houses to 
assassinate us.”85 
 In the late evening hours of 10 March 1927, 150 men from the Los Altos region 
invaded the town of Aguatlán (municipality of Zapotlán del Rey) shouting “Viva Cristo 
Rey” and “Death to the Agraristas.” In a letter to the governor, the residents of the town 
affirmed that almost all of them town were members of the agrarian community, and that 
because of this they had always been targeted and persecuted—in this rebellion and the 
previous one—by groups attempting to destroy the conquests of the Revolution. While 
the rebels from Los Altos remained in the town, they proceeded to assassinate Rita Flores 
and Pilar Díaz—both 14 years of age (presumably raped though explicitly not stated)—
and committed other violent acts towards defenseless individuals, “taking advantage of 
the darkness of the night and the circumstances of the moment.” Many of the agraristas 
were able successfully to escape to the nearby hills, but their houses remained targets of 
the cristeros. As a result, they lost various personal property, horses, and saddles. “Since 
this situation leaves the groups that [benefit from] the triumphs of the [revolution and 
who] have been sustaining and enjoying these benefits as agraristas without guarantees,” 
affirmed the members of the community, “we attentively […ask] that you [governor] 
employ your respectable influence [so that we may] obtain the guarantees to which we 
believe [we] have a right […].”86     
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Meanwhile, on 20 April 1927 the Central Executive Committee of the “League of 
Agrarista Communities of Jalisco” informed Governor Benítez that they had received an 
inordinate amount of complaints from member communities about the difficult 
circumstances they dealt with on a daily basis. “The facts communicated [to us] 
demonstrate that the reactionary movement in Jalisco is launched principally against the 
Agrarian Communities,” wrote the Committee, “because of the revolutionary nature of 
these [communities] who in Jalisco have always been loyal supporters of the 
revolutionary Governments […].” The ascent of Governor Benítez to power not only 
brought consequences for those in Guadalajara, but also to those in the countryside. 
Agraristas who favored Benítez, for example, addionally had to deal with armed groups 
organized by pro-zunista municipal presidents, and/or local and federal deputies that 
opposed the new governor.  
The Committee of agraristas, then, thought it a contradiction that functionaries 
who espoused a “revolutionary radicalism” (without so much as having a track record of 
service and sacrifice for the cause, nor antecedents, which could confirm them as 
revolutionaries) were encouraging the development of groups that would present serious 
problems to the government of President Calles. These political radicals who supposedly 
fought the “reaction” had instead slowly but surely turned their attention to assassinating 
individuals that supported the Benítez governorship, “whom they painfully classify as 
boycott-supporters and clericalists.” But the members of the agrarian league boisterously 
protested this label that political enemies had thrust upon them since they had, in fact, 
made up their minds in 1909 long before anyone knew revolution would triumph. They 
specifically reminded state authorities that when the de la Huerta Rebellion broke out in 
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December 1923, they volunteered and went to the Ocotlán front (the bloodiest theatre of 
the uprising) not because they wanted to ingratiate themselves with Military Officers or 
obtain earnings, but they did so out of personal conviction, and to combat what they 
interpreted as a menace to the government of Alvaro Obregón. The Committee asked the 
governor to use his influence to ask the President of the Republic to authorize “the 
agraristas who identify with your government” to be allowed to “organize a raid against 
the disorders in Jalisco, requesting the necessary arms that we would loyally return [once] 
the campaign ends, which we believe could happen in three months.”87 The agraristas 
asserted that if such requests were met they would be able once in for all to destroy the 
perverse machinations that continued to motivate “radical” politicians “who do not count 
upon the support of the people.”88  
The agrarian community of Magdalena similarly wrote to the governor to remind 
him of their previous involvement in the de la Huerta Rebellion, but also to express how 
this conflict had shaped municipal politics and life in the years that followed. When that 
rebellion broke out, for example, members of their community were killed by a 
contingent led by Colonel Juan Pablo Aldasoro, “and in that movement truly barbarous 
acts were carried out [as] many families of our comrades were left helpless.” When the de 
la Huerta Rebellion failed in March 1924, many of the individuals who rebelled against 
the state eventually left the town, but then returned after a brief period of time. 
Specifically, the community mentioned an individual named Aurelio Díaz, who 
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maintained a long-standing feud with the agraristas of Magdalena. In the ensuing years, 
Díaz managed to take advantage of the municipal president’s bad management of the 
town to persecute the existing agraristas. “[We] were denied all [our] request for justice 
because [Díaz] had bribed the Municipal President, who did not pay attention to the trust 
we placed in him [...],” complained the community. Díaz had apparently helped the 
municipal president with his reelection campaign, which to them meant that they would 
continue to experience harassment. Over the past month events had begun to escalate. 
One day Díaz armed himself and went to the house where the agrarian community 
conducted its affairs, claiming that he had been appointed as Commander of the Social 
Defense unit of the town, a position allegedly extended to by Governor Benítez. Díaz 
announced to the agrarian community that: “[The] day had come in which agraristas or 
bandits would be hanged since he believed that [the latter] was the appropriate word [to 
describe] all of those who belonged [to those types] of groups and [that after] forming his 
guard not one would be left [alive…].”89  
According to the agraristas, the persecution carried out against them was mainly 
due to the community’s inability to pay the fees that Díaz had imposed upon them for use 
of the pasture where their cows grazed, in the fields that actually belonged to them. The 
changing political climate in Guadalajara, however, directly impacted Díaz’s influence in 
the town. The agraristas stressed that after his political boss Benítez was deposed as 
governor in May 1927, the municipal presidency began closely to monitor the activities 
of the Díaz. They reported that the latter frequently left town and headed to the 
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surrounding ranchos to attract people to the Cristero Rebellion. While he proved 
unsuccessful in this effort, the community thought it pertinent to label Díaz as a “proven 
fanatic” who was only waiting for rebel groups to come closer to Magdalena to join their 
ranks. Their assumptions were not unfounded, however, because when he was eventually 
arrested and jailed a search of his house revealed a small stockpile of guns and 
ammunition. As a result, the community asked the state government to punish this 
individual “as he truly deserves.” They premised this demand upon the fact that if the 
state government honored their request, it would be eliminating with concrete actions an 
active threat to the pacification of the town “[w]ith the goal of teaching a lesson to men 
that have always been against the Government.”90   
In the fall of 1927, Feliciano Morán, president of the administrative committee of 
the agrarian community of Ayutla, wrote President Calles to inform him of the current 
affairs of his community. As of mid-January, it had found itself dealing with a 
“subversive movement led by Catholic Clergy and the landowners of the country [all of 
whom had] the objective of overthrowing the Government […] and destroying the 
Conquests obtained by the Mexican people […].” While Morán praised the efforts of the 
Federal Government in helping to disperse the cristeros into smaller groups, he lamented 
the fact that many of them still dedicated themselves solely to assaulting small villages 
and targeting those populations where agrarian communities resided. Morán continued: 
[And] they surely do this because of the affinity that exists between the 
campesino groups of the country and the revolutionary Government of the 
Republic, [and as a result they] continue pursuing and assassinating 
[agraristas] with an irrational hatred (odio africano) without there being 
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no [just cause], [and] when we have the misfortune of falling into the 
hands of those popularly called ‘cristeros’ [they never] pardon the life of 
an agrarista.91 
 
With regard to his own town of Ayutla, Morán claimed that the town was overtaken by a 
group of “fanatics” since September 1926. These individuals comprised a contingent of 
approximately two hundred men and remained unmolested by the federal army. This 
region, in particular, had become a rebel stronghold sympathetic to the Catholic cause, to 
the point that the agraristas of Ayutla, Cuautla, Tepantla, Puerta Colorada, 
Tepospisaloya, Juchitlán, Tenamaxtlán, and Tecolotlán had to emigrate from their towns 
and seek refuge in other parts of the state because it became nearly impossible to remain 
in their homes: “[W]e have lost our crops [and] as a result we have been reduced to the 
most painful misery, wandering through the fields of many of our companions, as if we 
were wild animals and harmful to those who tenaciously pursue [us].” While Morán’s 
letter implored President Calles to impart guarantees to the agrarian communities of the 
region, he reiterated that promptness in this matter was of utmost importance because 
many children and women continued to perish due to the “outlandish savagery” 
committed by the defenders of the Catholic religion. These individuals were described as 
“nothing more than bandits disguised as sacristans and misguided ignoramuses that 
want[ed] to install a new regime [which] in these moments is impossible to [install].” The 
“reaction” in this region, according the Morán, worked tirelessly to destroy all the liberal 
laws that had been dictated by previous and current administrations. Much of their effort 
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was dedicated to betraying the government, apostatizing revolutionary principles, and 
disrupting the established social order.92  
Well into the following year, the terror agraristas faced in this region had not 
dissipated, nor had they received arms from government officials to combat the cristeros 
effectively. In May 1928, for example, Severiano Hernández from Tepospisaloya, near 
Ayutla, expressed frustration over the lack of weapons and protection that had been 
afforded to his community:  
The Cristero fanatics do not let us exist in our homes or at work. We 
campesinos find ourselves fleeing to the hills for lack of weapons, and we 
want to know if we have any real guarantees of security or not? Because 
we can no longer endure these assassinations, and therefore everybody in 
this community asks you if in fact we have been tricked by the [state] 
militia organizer? Or was this a government conspiracy for the [religious] 
fanatics to finish us off and exterminate our defenseless families?93 
 
That same month, individuals from the Lagunillas area (municipality of Autlán) also 
complained to authorities that it was impossible for campesinos to work in their fields 
due to the frequency with which rebel bands interrupted them: “[And] as a result they are 
forced to move to Autlán and abandon their fields [because] they lack the arms they need 
to defend themselves [and to] help the Supreme Government combat the fanatic rebels, 
[which] is there desire.”94 
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 The larger takeaway here is that while agraristas continued to be willing and able 
supporters of the postrevolutionary state and wanted to defend its advancements in the 
countryside, they frequently lacked the means and weapons to actually defend themselves 
or coordinate any meaningful attacks. This reflected a paradox of sorts; that is, while the 
state needed agraristas to fight their political adversaries, the cristeros, they were at the 
same time also mistrustful of the agraristas themselves because state authorities feared 
they might join the Catholic cause. As the reader will recall, the opening anecdote of this 
chapter, which narrated the hanging of agrarista turned cristero, Leandro Cayetano, does 
much to illustrate these fears in action. While not a common occurrence, the threat of 
agraristas betraying the state existed and this was enough in the eyes of the state to 
initially delay arming some partisans at the start of the rebellion. But when the rebellion 
began to pick up steam and the government found itself embroiled in another rebellion in 
the north of the country, such fears had to be abandoned. The fact that in May 1928 some 
weapons had still not arrived to agrarian communities, perhaps, has more to do with a 
lack of supplies and man-power to deliver them, than with an unwillingness on the part of 
the state to take a chance on agraristas.  
Governance in Times of Crisis 
 
From the moment Daniel Benítez won the September 1926 election, to when he 
officially assumed the governorship on 1 March 1927, the opposing faction led by former 
Governor Zuno remained overwhelmingly in control of the state legislature, the 
municipal government of Guadalajara, and a significant number of municipal 
administrations in the countryside. In fact, Benítez himself complained to President 
Calles on several occasions about the difficulties of effectively governing in the face of 
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the current political climate. On the occasion of his election, for example, he claimed that 
several commissions from the countryside had visited him: “[W]hen they returned to their 
towns the commissions that came [to Guadalajara] to greet me, were, in many places 
received with gunshots by their [own] Municipal Authorities, abuses that I have not been 
able to [deal with] because the State lacks forces and funds [with which] to organize them 
[…].” Consequently, Governor Benítez feared that the municipal administrations loyal to 
the previous regime would turn on him, begin an uprising, wreck havoc in Guadalajara, 
and retreat to Tequila “where there exists more than eighty armed Zuno supporters.”95 
The governor admitted that he would not be able to carry out any of his proposed reforms 
and programs without first having definitively defeated the difficulties facing his 
administration: “Once I achieve this, I will again initiate tours [around the state] to 
acquaint myself with the needs of the communities, workers, and people in general.”96 
Despite Benítez’s good intentions his stint as governor lasted only a month and three 
weeks before the State Legislature impeached him on 21 April 1927 and named 
Margarito Ramírez as substitute governor. “[H]e [Benítez] could accomplish nothing 
because of the tremendous opposition to everything he undertook,” noted Consul Dwyre, 
and that all of the present indications pointed towards the new regime imposing new 
taxes to replenish the already depleted.97 
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Over the course of the rebellion, Jalisco continued to experience a great deal of 
political turmoil at the state level. But the ascent of Ramírez to the governorship greatly 
altered the prevailing power structure of the region as a public split between him and 
Zuno soon materialized.98 The municipal elections slated for December 1927 provided 
the appropriate theatre in which Ramírez was hoping to turn his new found independence 
from Zuno into an electoral victory for his supporters. With regard to the sudden turn of 
events, the American consul observed that the election at first glance had but little 
importance beyond that of a local struggle, given that both Zuno and Ramírez were 
ardent supporters of Obregón, who earlier in the year decided to seek an unprecedented 
second term. Dwyre wrote: “[I]t is the feeling of the keenest observers in this locality 
[…] that the apparent perfect accord at Mexico City between President Calles and 
General Obregón fails by far to represent the true situation between them and their 
individual ambitions.” And if such a break were to happen, Zuno’s influence in the region 
and support be much more useful to Obregón. The municipal election in Guadalajara, 
however, spelled defeat for Zuno and his supporters since Governor Ramírez gained a 
tremendous amount of political strength in the course of the proceedings, while Zuno 
“lost strength with such rapidity that he gave up the active campaign […] and retired to 
the city of Tequila sometime before the actual elections took place.”99 Over the course of 
the next year Ramírez did something that Zuno refused to do, actually engaging President 
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Calles, making frequent trips to Mexico City, regularly informing him on matters in 
Jalisco, and discussing the state of the Cristero Rebellion with him. 
In what follows, I observe how local governance functioned at the outbreak of the 
Cristero Rebellion. In this section I am much more interested in underscoring what 
municipal administrations and government employees complained and worried about, 
than in providing a comprehensive narrative of the rebellion in the countryside. I have 
chosen to give credence to letters or reports that for the most part were addressed to state 
authorities. I must admit that the documents selected, perhaps, present a partisan view of 
the rebellion given that they reflect the apprehensions and concerns of only a privileged 
few; however, it is exactly those individuals, who exercised state power at the most basic 
level on the totem pole, that I am most interested in analyzing. Governance here, then, is 
understood as evoking a more pluralistic pattern of rule than government; that is, I am not 
as interested in highlighting how state institutions enact it, but rather with the “processes 
and interactions that tie the state to civil society” in moments of crisis and unrest.100 
Below, I emphasize three categories, which continuously appeared in my sources and that 
concerned supporters of the state: 1) the prevalence of the Unión Popular; 2) the role of 
tax collectors in the countryside; and 3) how municipal authorities and their constituents 
processed and reacted to the rebellion. 
 
The Unión Popular 
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A priest from Huejucar named Ventura Montoya frequently visited the hamlet of 
Tlalcosahua, near the northern outpost of Mezquitic, on Sundays and during the week. 
His stated goal was to organize a local chapter of the Unión Popular, which in recent 
years had established itself as an important propaganda organization linking Guadalajara 
with the urban outposts of the countryside. These efforts had been on-going since 
February of 1926, but once local authorities got wind of Montoya’s activities, the priest 
began to change his tune and claimed that his visits simply had the intention of collecting 
information regarding the number of Catholics that existed in the country. Not content 
with the priest’s claim, the commissioner of the hamlet reported to authorities that the 
priest had actually preached to residents about the government being an enemy of their 
religion, branding those individuals serving the government as adversaries of the Church. 
The priest made clear that partisans of the state should be shunned and not included in his 
organization: 
[T]he employees and supporters of this town, should not take part in this 
Unión because they are enemies and have to be combatted, not with arms 
but by isolating them […that is] who ever is a merchant, do not buy [from] 
him, the artisan[,] do not use [his services], [and] the boss[,] do not serve 
him.101 
 
The priest consistently referred to the Constitution as a hodgepodge created by a bunch of 
brutes, who simply attack “our Holy Religion and prohibited us from religiously teaching 
our children […].” Montoya had recently doubled down on his attacks, stressing that 
there should be no government schools and that the residents of Tlacosahua should 
prepare for war against the enemies of the Church. Additionally, the commissioner 
                                                
101 AHJ, G-4-1926, Gobernación, 4-Iglesia, 29 May 1926. 
 293 
claimed that the members of this organization consistently engaged in slander and 
attempted publicly to defame authorities. The commissioner thought it pertinent, 
therefore, to point out that these threats should not be ignored because there were very 
few people in the local Unión Popular that were genuinely good people.102 
 The prevalence of the Unión Popular in a small remote hamlet near the northern 
limits of the state was no accident. As Jrade has noted, the Unión Popular played an 
important role linking the urban areas to the countryside, fundamentally serving to 
transform what had previously been isolated rebellions into a larger mass upheaval with 
an incipient organizational network.103 Prior to the outbreak of violence, this organization 
primarily served as the propaganda mouthpiece of Anacleto González Flores and 
concentrated its efforts around the distribution of its newsletter, Gladium. After the Ley 
Calles went into effect (31 July 1926), religious services were suspended and the 
rebellions broke out, the organization relied on its existing propaganda network to 
mobilize support in urban outposts and in remote rural communities against the 
government’s anticlerical reforms. “This course of action, adopted by associational 
contenders who sought to regain Catholic participation in the public arena,” writes Jrade, 
“proved to be an inadequate outlet of protest for rural communities that were rapidly 
losing control over traditional bases of power […and] as local groups resolved to express 
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their grievances with bullets, local representatives of the Popular Union often joined the 
mobilization efforts.”104  
The increasing visibility and presence of the Unión Popular in the countryside 
began to worry local authorities and officials. The municipal president of Tepatitlán de 
Morelos, in the Los Altos region—an area that would later become an epicenter of the 
rebellion—displayed an uneasiness about the Unión Popular, “whose motto is not to 
comply with government dispositions.” Consequently, those belonging to the defense 
league did not pay taxes to the Receptoría de Rentas; fueled the boycott against the 
authorities and some businesses; and pushed for parents not to enroll their children in 
government-run schools. In September, when classes began for the year no students 
showed up in school. To convince parents to send their children, the municipal president 
of the town threatened to fine residents if they did not send them. While some acceded to 
the wishes of the mayor, the majority did not, which forced him to take the following 
actions: “In light of this I imposed a fine within the limits that the Constitution 
establishes, which they also refused to pay, preferring to remain detained for four days 
[…].” And in an effort to make sure these individuals neither paid their fines nor sent 
their children to official schools, the Unión Popular offered food and funds to support 
their families. The municipal president of the town, nevertheless, remained concerned 
about the recent reports he had received regarding the intention of various individuals 
from the town who planned to overthrow his administration, which forced him to 
implement strict surveillance over the town in order to avoid a surprise.  
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 Federal Deputy Ascención de la Cruz wrote to the Ministry of Interior on 28 
December 1926 to disclose that Catholics in Zapotlán del Rey continued freely to carry 
out propaganda against the federal government, and to report that the interests of the 
revolutionary campesinos were greatly threatened. Moreover, he maintained that at the 
helm of these efforts was the parish priest, who led the Unión Popular in the town and 
enjoyed impunity because he was in agreement (inaccurately, as it proved) with local 
authorities.105 In this particular case Municipal President Narcisco Soto did not take 
kindly to accusations labeling his administration sympathetic to the Catholic cause.  On 8 
January, Soto reassured the governor that he had in fact maintained order in the zone 
under his management and that in Zapotlán del Rey there existed no propaganda against 
the federal government. Soto claimed that since 31 July 1926—that is, when the Ley 
Calles came into effect—all the Catholics of his region had complied with the law, and 
that within the municipality of his charge there had been no specific cases registered of 
persecution against campesinos. The accusations were brushed off as nothing more than 
mere slander promoted by a small group of discontented politicians who because of their 
“unpopularity and their delirium to come to power, try to surprise the superior authorities 
[in order] to create difficulties for the administration I preside [over].” Soto pointed out 
that there were five agrarian communities in the municipality and that none of the 
agrarista commissioners had expressed complaints to him; rather, each one of them 
backed the action of his administration. “Those who have resorted to complaining to the 
Ministry of Interior are false revolutionaries,” emphasized Soto, “as well as false 
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agraristas, who were expelled from [their respective communities] for being drunks and 
exploiters of the camepsino [and continue to hold resentment] because their ambitious 
were not satisfied […].”106 A few month later, members of the agrarian community of 
Aguatlán (located in Zapotlán del Rey), however, continued to complain about the 
actions of the municipal administration, specifically denouncing Soto as an accomplice to 
the actions of the agitators in the area.107 
Tax Collectors  
 
In the second half of the 1920s and beyond, Mexico increasingly (and with added 
zeal) sought a centralized form of governance, where local politicians were willing to 
empower the central government and forgo fiscal authority in return for appealing 
political careers.108 And as we have seen, in Jalisco the process of centralization 
encountered strong resistance from regional politicians who themselves championed a 
federalist system of governance and argued for local institutional sovereignty. The 
Constitution of 1917 established a federalist system of governance, which, as Díaz-
Cayeros has noted, is defined by two necessary and sufficient categories: 1) provincial 
jurisdictions functioning independently from the center; and 2) that the provinces enjoy 
inherent fiscal authority. “This definition highlights, however, the conditions of 
representation and taxation found in federal systems,” write Díaz-Cayeros, “[t]o the 
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extent that state executives are the product of state elections and, once in office, possess 
an independent tax base, one case say they reside in a federal regime.”109 It was in this 
milieu, then, that tax collectors in the countryside became important cogs in the machine 
for the state government, especially during the period of economic instability that 
predated the Great Depression. But tax collectors, as we shall see, experienced greater 
difficulties with regard to carrying out the duties required of their positions in light of the 
economic boycott underway in the countryside, and because of their association with the 
state. The histories of these individual reveal much about daily life in times of unrest, and 
their anxieties illustrate concerns over how power was exercised within the towns where 
they worked. Let us briefly turn to the representative experiences of the subreceptor de 
Rentas in Ayo el Chico and Puerto Vallarta, and the receptor interino in Unión de San 
Antonio.  
On 10 September 1926, the subreceptor de rentas of Ayo el Chico, in the Los 
Altos region, wrote the head of military operations to express his dissatisfaction after 
learning that the municipal president attempted to distort facts, making it appear as if the 
“fanatic clergymen” and citizens of the town had not incurred in any wrong doing. The 
tax collector wanted to put on record a detailed history of what actually transpired in the 
town with the goal of revealing that the municipal president of Ayo el Chico was 
sympathetic to the Catholic cause. When the Ley Calles came into effect a religious 
league was formed and a boycott was implemented. This led many residents to abstain 
from buying good and paying taxes. The municipal president publicly supported their 
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efforts and also the actions of the clergy. He even went to great lengths to suspend the 
concert including salaries that the local municipal band performed every week. Not long 
after these initial incidents, a scandalous manifestation with a deeply religious character 
began gathering and eventually poured out into the streets of the town. The subreceptor 
made clear that this was not a one-time occurrence in the town: “[Last week on Sunday] 
at around six in the afternoon, after numerous [rumors] circulated about a possible 
uprising […] about three hundred men with banners, accompanied by 15 individuals 
armed with rifles, marched and chanted [in the direction of] the temple.” During the 
course of the demonstration, the subreceptor was sought after and signaled out as the 
only individual in the town who was an enemy of their religion and defense league. As a 
result, he was immediately to abandon the town. The subrecptor lamented the fact that 
circumstances were such that the municipal president had to subject his acts to the 
approval of the clergy. But he remained positive that the situation prevailing in the town 
could change if a military detachment was deployed to maintain order and protect the 
employees of the state that actually backed the orders of government in this conflict: 
“[B]ecause I doubt that the [municipal] president [of Ayo el Chico] can obtain approval 
from the clergy to impart them to us [government employees].”110  
Francisco Ayala, a parish priest in the coastal town of Puerto Vallarta, also held 
considerable clout, but actually rose up in arms and attracted a group of “fanatics” to 
support his actions. According to the subreceptor such actions resulted in considerable 
damages to general commerce and led to the theft of 2,530.00 pesos of revenue, which 
                                                
110 AHJ, Clasificación, G-4-1926, Gobernación, 4-Iglesia, “Al C. Jefe de Operaciones Militares en 
el Estado,” 10 September 1926. 
 299 
had been collected in the form of taxes. The subreceptor claimed that the parish priest 
owned two urban properties in Puerto Vallarta (which he denied). The properties were 
instead registered in the cadaster under J. Refugio Gutiérrez, but it was publicly known 
that Father Ayala financed their construction. It was perhaps the accumulation of the 
abuses committed by the bold parish priest that drove the subreceptor of Puerto Vallarta 
to write the governor, but his annoyance over the manner in which municipal authorities 
dealt with the matter clearly underscored his complaints. The tax collector made his 
criticism of municipal authorities quite clear: “[I]t is truly impossible to support the 
tolerance that municipal authorities have for everything that happens, since they 
[municipal authorities all had] knowledge that the uprising was being conceived and that 
seditious propaganda was being printed.”111  
On March 1927, Receptor Interino Isidoro Morales Palafox reported a vivid 
encounter with three hundred rebels in Unión de San Antonio. Under the command of the 
famed “El Catorce” and another individual named Miguel, the rebels entered the town at 
the precise moment Palafox conducted his office hours. He was informed at 13:30 p.m. 
that the rebels were a mere three blocks away; he managed successfully to close the door, 
and gain entrance to a house across the street. In the process, however, he left behind 
several important documents, including: two volumes of the cadaster; eight property 
deeds, which had yet to be processed and taxed accordingly; and other essential books 
that were used to settle tax issues and write reports. In the ensuing moments, Palafox 
overheard that the rebels were after him and, as a result, changed hiding places three 
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times until he felt safe at the house of José de Jesús López “[who] showed himself to be 
more than kind to the person who speaks and offered him whatever he could so that he 
could be calm.” After repeatedly being assured of the rebels’ departure from the town, 
Palafox returned to his office in the company of the municipal president and his 
secretary, only to find it completely destroyed. The door had been unhinged and several 
important documents destroyed, including those containing fiscal data. They also ran off 
with at least nine hundred pesos in federal tax receipts and several revenue-sealed sheets 
of paper belonging to the Registro Civil.112  
While at the time of writing the letter to the state government, the tax collector 
had only been on the job in Unión de San Antonio for two months, his “ten or twelve” 
years of experience made him realize that order in this town would not be reestablished 
any time soon. Given this close encounter, he felt obliged to offer some concrete 
suggestions about how the government could make his job easier. First and foremost, he 
deemed it necessary to establish a competent armed detachment in the region so as to 
inhibit the boycott, which had affected the amount of revenue he collected because many 
Catholics refused to pay taxes, making his job “unsustainable.” According to the tax 
collector, the rebels insisted that any tax payments made to him would be void and 
because the town largely supported the rebellion, residents believed the rebels. Second, 
he suggested that his position in Unión de San Antonio be converted into a permanent 
post in order effectively to gain the respect of town’s residents: “I have placed my life in 
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danger several times [and because of this] I ask you to […] act in my [favor] since I 
believe to have the right […] to be taken into account for a job where I have sufficient 
guarantees to [safely] work […].” If such an agreement could not be reached, the 
receptor interino asked that he be sent back to his old post in Teocuitatán de Corona. The 
tax collector proceeded to warn the government of the former Receptor Aurelio Pérez 
Muñoz, a sympathizer of the Catholic movement, who was in agreement with rebel 
leaders. Palafox warned that if he was indeed replaced, his successor should know that 
Muñoz served as a rebel conduit and used his previous experience as a tax collector to 
collect funds from the residents, which were then given to rebel groups in order to aid the 
triumph of the “sacred cause.”113 
Municipal Administrations  
 
When the Constitutionalist Revolution triumphed in 1914, Venustiano Carranza 
granted the municipalities of Jalisco political and administrative autonomy, a practice 
later enshrined in principle in the Constitution of 1917. “The consequences of municipal 
self-government in Jalisco were as far-reaching as those of revolutionary agrarianism and 
religious segmentation,” argues Jrade, “[…the] consolidation of Revolutionary power 
depended upon the control of municipal governments, but political rivalries among 
Revolutionary factions assured that municipal politics were shaped, at least initially by 
internal community developments.”114 While Guadalajara remained an important site of 
political contestation in the years that followed, Zuno, in his time as governor, knew this 
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principle all too well: that real political power in fact resided in controlling the 
countryside. To this end, after the de la Huerta Rebellion Zuno replaced the majority of 
officials in municipal administrations in the countryside with loyal supporters.115 By the 
same token, the imposition of zunista supporters into municipal posts also led to internal 
community struggles for control of the municipality. But as we shall see, regardless of 
whether municipal authorities were imposed or not, they still had to govern—or at least 
provide the illusion of doing so—and, at some point, had to confront the on going 
violence of the countryside.  
In October 1926, the municipal administrations of San Marcos and Etzatlán were 
both troubled by the recent actions undertaken by rebel groups. On 10 October 1926, in a 
letter to state authorities the municipal president of Etzatlán reported that his town had 
been attacked by a group of Catholics who shouted “Viva Cristo Rey.”116 The following 
day, Alberto Rodríguez, the municipal president of San Marcos (which borders Etzatlán) 
wrote to the governor to shed greater insight on the incident, specifically revealing that 
the intended target of the assailants was the municipal building of Etzatlán. The San 
Marcos municipal president reported that Catholic groups not only violently wrestled 
weapons from the municipal police force, but also left various officers gravely wounded. 
“[I] fear that any minute now due to the excitement of the fanatics of this place the same 
thing will happen again,” feared Rodríguez, “even though the precautionary measures 
[with respect to] the case have already been taken […] I respectfully entreat you señor to 
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interpose your valuable influence, to the effect that this town be granted a [military] 
detachment.”117 Meanwhile that same month, the municipal president of Tuxpan, Luis 
Reyes, reported that four hundred women took possession of the local church, which had 
previously been closed, broke the seals, and unlocked doors. They proceeded to storm the 
streets of the town to beat the drum of rebellion, bellowing “death to the constituted 
Government,” attacking agraristas, and assaulting public employees at their private 
residences. Reyes complained that he lacked the necessary assurances to reduce the 
disorders currently taking place in his municipality. He, too, asked state authorities to 
send in a federal force, but with the objective of “imposing an order to evict the people 
who have seized [the churches] and proceed to apprehend those responsible.”118  
Near the northern shores of Lake Chapala, the municipal presidents of Ocotlán 
and Jamay wrote a joint letter to the state government to defend their respective 
administrations from what they deemed false accusations that detractors had recently 
leveled at their administrations. First, they claimed that it was simply not true that the 
ayuntamiento of Jamay was comprised of individuals with religious sympathies, but 
rather that they had in fact done all they could to enforce the laws “which govern us.” 
The mayors continued emphasizing that it was false that the Presidente del Comité 
Administrativo of the agrarian community of Jamay had 50 armed men under his 
command. While they hoped this to be true, they admitted that he only counted upon the 
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cooperation of four or five members to safeguard the interests of the community and, if 
need be, lend a hand to protect the town. Second, the municipal presidents claimed it was 
not true that resident Francisco Franco’s defense force was comprised of individuals 
disloyal to the government. On the contrary, Franco sought and had been granted special 
permission by military and municipal authorities for the task, and had a few men under 
his orders. The mayors doubled down on their support for Franco: “His work at the head 
of said men has been approved by said authorities from the moment in which he has 
dedicated himself, not to harass liberal individuals, as they falsely affirm, but rather to 
combat the bands that assault the roads and [those] who are hostile to the 
Government.”119   
The municipal presidents jointly argued that their word should be trusted because 
they had for nine years, more or less, unwaveringly identified with liberal individuals and 
“also revolutionaries with advanced ideas” and, as a result, had consistently struggled 
against the clergy and the rich landowners. “[We] repeat that it would please us if a 
meticulous investigation be done [to verify] our conduct […] to the effect that it can be 
proven that we are very far from being defenders of the interests of the clergy, whom we 
have combatted […].”120 The following month Agent Amalia Díaz specifically 
investigated the municipal president of Ocotlán, Indalecio Ramírez, to find out if his 
administration had indeed developed any actions against current Governor Benítez. Díaz 
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reported that the area remained a steadfast bastion of support for former governor Zuno, 
that Ramírez himself was nothing more than an illiterate simpleton who was a puppet of 
zunismo in Guadalajara, and that members of the municipal administration took 
advantage of many of these connections to further themselves.  
This example from the Lake Chapala area, however, offers us additional insight 
into local competing political factions that both supported the national government and 
both opposed the cristeros. Ayuntamiento Secretary Manuel Muñoz, the ex-municipal 
president of La Barca related by kinship with Zuno falsely represented himself as a major 
in the army, and turned a secretarial position into a leadership role in the defensa social, 
“which is comprised of agraristas that are unconditionally affiliated with zunismo […].” 
In order to maintain such a group, the municipal administration imposed a daily tax on all 
establishments and proprietors and which aggravated many residents of the town.121 
While the members of the municipal administration in Ocotlán showed no sympathy for 
the reactionary and conservative forces, as their letters to Governor Benítez make clear, 
they did demonstrate an affinity for making money on the side. Secretary Muñoz and his 
associates, for example, had recently entered the cattle rustling business: “They currently 
slaughter stolen livestock [and] the leader of this operation is an individual named Luis 
who has the best meat establishment in the [local] market.” Agent Díaz emphasized that 
the municipal authorities of Ocotlán were handpicked and imposed by Nicolás Rangel 
Guerrero, ex-municipal president of Guadalajara, with the intention of securing 
individuals loyal to Zuno’s political movement. These loyalists were in turn provided 
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with orders on how they should run their administrative affairs. This proved to be 
especially alarming since Díaz also claimed that Rangel Guerrero’s efforts were 
prodigious as he played an equally decisive role in other municipalities around the 
state.122 
The municipal administration of Autlán was kept especially busy throughout the 
duration of the conflict. On 24 May 1927, the municipal president wrote to Governor 
Benítez to reveal the presence of an armed “defense” group comprised of individuals 
“that I do not consider supporters of the Supreme Government of the Republic.” The 
municipal president warned that in forming themselves into a defense group, they had not 
taken municipal authority into account as the law ordered but were instead acting on their 
own accord. What worried the mayor, however, was that the defense group was manned 
by some members of the municipal police force, which was supposed to remain under his 
command, who and had ceased carrying out their evening patrols. This caused the 
municipal administration many problems, since disorders the police would normally deal 
with went unattended, such as the robbery of the small shop “La Media Pila.” As a result 
of the recent crime wave, the municipal president wanted clarification from authorities: 
“If the [aforementioned] Defense or group of people is acting in accordance with Federal 
Authorities […] it should also operate in accordance with me so that I can [adequately] 
organize [the public order] and make use of patrol service in the town.” The mayor 
continued, revealing that if he expressed ignorance over whether this defense was 
working with the federal army, it was because he had been previously told that a place 
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like Autlán, which was classified as a city, had a sufficient number of inhabitants to 
mount a defense in case of an attack; therefore, it required no official defense group.123  
 In addition to dealing with what appeared to be a revolting police force, the 
municipal president also received complaints from many constituents in the municipality 
of Autlán. The letter he received from the elder indigenous residents and representatives 
of Telcruz, for example, was especially revealing. On August 29, they wrote to the 
municipal president to complain of unjustly being rounded up by the Heads of the 
Acordadas of Ayotitlán, Arnulfo Elías and José Roblada, and transferred to the city of 
Autlán. “[They] do not afford us guarantees as citizens and are threatening us [as if we 
were] enemies,” complained the representatives, “and we are suffering with our small 
animals in a field that is very reduced [and we have] also left our fields without 
cultivating them […].” They had taken all of their arms away and promised to protect 
them, but never fulfilled their guarantees. After detailing the numerous exchanges and 
abuses they had encountered over the year, they asked the municipal president not to 
allow Elías to return to their town, requesting that his weapons be taken away because his 
followers were not men who afforded guarantees to peaceful and hardworking residents. 
Rather, men like Elías only acted on their own accord, only bringing harm upon the 
community: “[His] soldiers are very disorderly[,] commit abuses with their arms, [and] 
sweep women away […].” The municipal president, perhaps, could not do much to 
alleviate the struggles the indigenous peoples of Telcruz faced, but he at least attempted 
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to bring this matter to the attention of competent authorities, subsequently sending a 
transcript of what had transpired to General Manuel Ávila Camacho.124 
The municipal president continued to write state officials well into the fall. On 21 
October 1927, for example, he claimed that about six-hundred armed men assaulted the 
rancherías of Rincón de Luisa, Bellavista, and Lagunillas, located in his jurisdiction. To 
the cry of “Viva Cristo Rey,” the attackers ransacked the houses and proceeded to burn a 
majority of them, leaving the campesinos who resided in these areas in “complete 
misery.” The populations did not suffer any deaths because they had enough time to leave 
their homes, however, but did complain that the rebels knocked down several of their 
corrals, which allowed cattle to invade the fields of several ejidatarios. “I believe it my 
duty to let you know that the federal forces that protect the region are not sufficient to 
battle […the] rebels […],” observed the municipal president, “[and] I see the need for 
sending more forces to this zone.” To prevent such an occurrence, the municipal 
president claimed already to have organized a defense under his own command in the 
most populated area of Autlán, consisting of about twenty five or thirty-men, in addition 
to counting upon the help of government employees and some members of the agrarian 
community.125 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on the Cristero Rebellion in Jalisco, which again greatly 
challenged the prevailing social order of the period. I specifically analyzed it within the 
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context of deeply entrenched patterns of local violence and the political cultures that 
predated (and survived) the rebellion. In the first part of this chapter, I narrated the major 
events that led to the outbreak of a mass uprising with a distinctly religious character and 
focused on the establishment of several anticlerical provisions in the Constitution of 1917 
and on the Calles administration’s efforts to implement them beginning in mid-1926. The 
second part was divided into two sections and turned attention to how agraristas, 
municipal authorities, and tax-collectors experienced the outbreak of the rebellion. The 
first section provided an overview of agrarian reform, political identities, and explored 
the anxieties that agrarian communities expressed to officials; while the second section, 
attended to letters or reports that reflected the apprehensions of municipal administrations 
and government employees, and what they complained about to state authorities. 
Ultimately, I showed how this latest cycle of violence impacted the state’s ability to rule 
effectively in both the countryside and Guadalajara. 
 
*** 
 
On 12 July 1929 the prelates Ruiz y Flores and Díaz arrived at Castillo 
Chapultepec and were directed to the personal office of President Emilio Portes Gil 
(1928 to 1930). A lot had changed since the Ley Calles had gone into effect three years 
before. Plutarco Elías Calles was no longer officially president, Álvaro Obregón had been 
assassinated a couple of months before taking office, and countless country folk had been 
killed in defense of a way of life. The meeting lasted three hours and forty-five minutes. 
Both prelates said their goodbyes and were escorted to the park below, where their 
automobile awaited. National and international journalists attempted to interview the 
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prelates about what they had discussed with the president, but both refused to make any 
declarations. Monsignor Ruiz y Flores, as he posed for a picture amidst the multitude of 
photographers, surreptitiously remarked, “If only you guys could take a picture of the 
heart, because then you would see and know what we feel in these moments that we 
cannot say.”126  
Ten days later, the bells of Catholic churches across the nation, which had 
remained silent for 1,158 days, once again began to sound, because a solution to the 
religious conflict had finally been reached.127 At least 100,000 devout Catholics were 
reported to have knelt in prayer between daybreak and noon that day at the shrine of the 
nation’s patroness, the Virgin of Guadalupe. “On entering the church one could see 
thousands of men, women and children on their knees,” reported a special correspondent 
to the New York Times, “There are no seats or pews […and each] held a lighted candle as 
a prayer, in many instances audible, was offered.” Military airplanes were rumored to 
have dropped printed announcements of the Church-state accord over the state of Jalisco  
and other regions where religious rebels were still in arms. The insurgents were notified 
that safe conduct to their homes would be granted to them if they surrendered at once.128  
In the aftermath of Obregón’s assassination and the Cristero Rebellion, Calles’s 
presidency was coming to an end but he began to take steps to form the Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario (PNR), which in years to come would become the national ruling party. 
                                                
126 El Informador, “Quedó Solucionado ayer el conflicto religioso,” 13 June 1929. 
127 El Informador, “Las campanas de los templos de México se echaron a vuelo en señal de jubilo 
por arreglo del conflicto religioso,” 23 June 1929. 
128 New York Times, “100,000 Mexican kneel at shrine in thanks for peace,” 24 June 1929 
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Beginning in 1929, the PNR began to propagate a new official historical interpretation of 
the Revolution, one that combined all the heroes of the revolution into one family: “[T]he 
revolutionary family combined all those who had fought for the revolution, and 
particularly leaders such as Madero, Carranza, Obregón, Villa, and Zapata […but 
conveniently] for Calles, all five of these leaders had died by assassination.”129 President 
Pascual Ortiz Rubio (1930 to 1932) continued elaborating the trope when he wrote a 
message to municipal presidents in Mexico regarding the celebrations to be held across 
the entire republic on 20 November 1930 to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of 
the start of the Mexican Revolution. “[T]he Government of my charge has endeavored to 
make sure that the customary festivities now have greater splendor,” read the message, 
“and to suggest that you dictate provisions as deemed appropriate to ensure that in the 
whole [municipality] the ceremonies surpass in solemnity those of previous years 
[…].”130  
President Ortiz Rubio stressed that despite two decades of constant threats and 
dangers posed to the revolutionary project, the great majority of citizens should feel a 
great sense of pride in having contributed to its moral and social conquests, and to the 
transformation of the nation. “[The celebration that today is imposed is no longer the one 
that preaches violence[,] division[,] and hatred,” underlined Ortiz Rubio, “[…and] the 
best way to commemorate its anniversary is to erase old resentments and parties[,] and to 
forget the divisions [that were] engendered by personal struggles [and] the already spent 
                                                
129 Buchenau, p. 156. 
130 AHMA, Sección 6, 1930, 20 November 1930. 
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phases of agitation and violence […].” The old habits of Mexico were to make way for 
national unity, work, and confidence in the definitive triumph of the Revolution.131 
  
 
 
 
                                                
131 AHMA, Sección 6, 1930, 20 November 1930. 
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Chapter 5 
Socialist Education and the Second Cristero Rebellion 
 
Children are taught in the government schools that there is no God. They are 
taught to despise their parents and to look upon the state as the supreme authority 
in their home life and morals. The persecution grows worse. Many of our fine 
young sons have been killed. They are being killed, secretly, silently. No man 
knows when his time may come next …. It is of the children [that] we must think. 
We cannot abandon the children to this program from Moscow. The fires of 
Bolshevism are burning in Mexico…Men are dying for this now […] Men are 
dying for their faith as Christians died in early Rome. Mexico has become a land 
of martyrs.  
-Archbishop of Guadalajara, Francisco Orozco y Jimenez1 
 
 
On 20 July 1934 former President Plutarco Elías Calles arrived at the Governor’s 
Palace in Guadalajara to deliver a national radio broadcast in front of ten thousand 
supporters, announcing the dawning of a new era:  
[the] revolution has not ended; its enemies are in ambush seeking to turn 
its triumphs to defeat; it is necessary that we enter the new era of the 
revolution, which I will call the era of the psychological revolution; we 
should enter [and] take possession of the minds of the youth, because the 
youth and children should belong to the revolution.  
 
The Grito de Guadalajara as this speech came to be known called upon the “men of the 
revolution” to rise up and attack its enemies with decisiveness. “[I]t would be sinful […] 
if we did not snatch the youth from the clutches of the clergy, of the clutches of the 
conservatives […],” avowed the general: “[T]he future of the fatherland and of the 
revolution cannot be placed into enemy hands.” Calles maintained that it was the duty of 
all governments of the Republic, all authorities of the Republic, and all revolutionary 
                                                
1 State Department (hereinafter referred to as SD), 812.404/1784, “Comment on magazine article,” 
24 August 1935.  
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elements to carry out this definitive battle, “because the youth should belong to the 
Revolution.”2  
Not long after Calles delivered his speech in Guadalajara, two federal deputies 
submitted a bill to reform Article 3 of the Constitution.3 The proposed amendment 
intended to bestow upon the state at all levels (federation, states, municipalities) the duty 
to impart primary, secondary and normal instruction as a public service—with primary 
instruction being free and obligatory for all citizens. The instruction at these new schools, 
however, was to be socialist in its orientations. This reform sought, on the one hand, to 
eliminate “religious dogmatisms and prejudices” in all schools; while, on the other, to put 
an end to the Church’s role in educating the youth of Mexico.4 Believing they had been 
deprived of their rights as citizens, many ex-cristeros5 once again rose up in arms and 
retreated to the hills to wage a military campaign against the Mexican state. Come hell, 
high water, insurmountable casualties, or offerings of peace, these ardent Catholics 
refused to surrender to what they deemed an unjust federal government that had stolen 
the riches of the nation and intended to corrupt the souls of their children.6 
                                                
2 El Informador, “Palabras de Calles al Pueblo de Jalisco,” 21 July 1934.  
3 SD, 812.42/269, “Mexican Educational Program.” 
4 Excelsior, “El Otro Dogmatismo,” 25 July 1934. 
5 The term, ex-cristeros, refers to the insurgents who fought on the side of the Church during the 
first Cristero Rebellion; that is, the Church-State conflict of 1926 to 1929. These individuals were known to 
shout “!Viva Cristo Rey!” just before they were executed before firing squads. This led to them being 
called ‘Cristo-Reyes’, which was then subsequently shortened to cristeros.  
6 SD, 812.00-REVOLUTIONS/198, “Developments Indicating Possible Revolutionary Activity in 
the Los Altos Region of Jalisco,” 1 April 1935.  
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The previous chapter explored how the Calles regime (1924-1928) implemented 
several anticlerical measures that led to the eruption of a massive upheaval in central-
western Mexico with a distinctly religious character, the Cristero Rebellion. It went on to 
engulf the state of Jalisco for nearly three years, pitting partisans of the state (agraristas, 
local authorities, and government officials) against Catholics defending their way of life. 
As the reader will recall, I explored how local governance and politics functioned when 
the prevailing social order was disrupted and violence once again became a feature of 
everyday life for rural dwellers. The Church and state eventually reached a peace 
agreement in mid-1929, officially putting an end to the bloodletting. Nevertheless, during 
the rebellion, as the violence raged on in the countryside, the capital city of Guadalajara 
also found itself in a critical battle of its own against Mexico City. In the ensuing melee, 
the political fiefdom of José G. Zuno gave way to the centralizing force of the Calles 
regime. But it was the assassination of President-elect Alvaro Obregón at the hands of a 
Catholic militant a year earlier, however, that proved to be the most decisive event in the 
political development of postrevolutionary Mexico. This tragedy not only consolidated 
the status of Calles as the new patriarch of the Mexican Revolution, but also afforded him 
the opportunity to restructure politics on a national level. The creation of the Partido 
Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) soon followed suit and over the course of the next six 
years, three leaders—Emilio Portes Gil, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, and Abelardo Rodríguez—
served brief terms as president, in a political system in which Calles retained power 
behind the scenes and ruled the country as Jefe Máximo. 
This chapter focuses on the implementation of federal schooling policy and 
explores the rebellions that emerged in its wake, collectively known as the Second 
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Cristero Rebellion (1934-1940) or colloquially as La Segunda. The historical literature on 
this episode classifies the ensuing violence as a guerilla movement comprised of ragtag 
bandits who aimlessly besieged the countryside, without a plan or the support of locals.7 
More recent studies, however, have begun to explore the local manifestations of this 
rebellion in greater depth, revealing a much more nuanced portrait of the mass upheaval 
and its participants. On the one hand, Adrian Bantjes’ regional study on Sonora, for 
example, understood this conflict as a three-month struggle that occurred within the 
backdrop of changing and uncertain national politics (e.g. the power struggle between 
Calles and Cárdenas)—claiming that such violence was symptomatic of just how closely 
both national and regional politics “intertwined and interacted in unpredictable ways.” 
This, in turn, according to Bantjes, led to political openings at the local-level in which 
opposition groups took advantage of to promoted specific agendas.8 While, on the other, 
Enrique Guerra Manzo has argued that the rebellion more closely approximated a social 
movement led by rebels promoting specific political plans, which intended to establish 
alternative social orders founded upon catholic principles and civil liberties.9 Yet very 
                                                
7 See Ortoll, “La batalla del cerro” p. 6; Serrano Álvarez, La batalla del espíritu, p. 98. Jean 
Meyer has written that the rebels of the Second Cristero Rebellion, “were no different than the ‘primitive 
rebels’ that Eric Hobsbawn [writes] of given that they organized [their] protest in a pure state, in a country 
where protest was now not possible since Calles had organized the new state apparatus […].” See 
Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels, p. 5 and Meyer, La Cristiada, p. 381. Gil Joseph, however, has provide us 
with some food for thought noted that the modalities of peasant resistance were not spontaneous or 
unthinking as Hobsbawn suggested: “they were often inchoate and diffuse […and] they frequently aimed to 
destroy or undermine, actually or symbolically, the dominant class’s authority but proposed no blue print 
for its replacement.” See Joseph, “On the Trail of Latin American Bandits,” p. 8. We need to go beyond the 
basic assumption that the insurgents of the Second Cristero Rebellion were mere social bandits: “Indeed, 
peasant resistance was all about politics—but popular, rather than elite, politics.”   
8 Adrian Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth: Cardenismo, Sonora, and the Mexican Revolution 
(Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 1998), pp. 43-56. 
9 Guerra Manzo, “El fuego sagrado,” pp. 514-515. 
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few studies have actually attempted to analyze the impact of a progressive national 
reform in a conservative region where Catholics generally followed the orthodox 
liturgical practices endorsed by the institutional Church, as opposed to the syncretic or 
folk tradition with strong indigenous strains.10  
The first part of this chapter explores the debates over the national government’s 
Six-Year Plan on Education during the administration of President Lázaro Cárdenas 
(1934-1940).11 Specifically, I look at ideological sites of affirmation and contestation, 
that is in documents such as editorials and speeches, where elected officials articulate and 
enact their political beliefs and positions. In the second part I look at how state led efforts 
to eradicate religious education, at the heart of village life, affected rural communities. I 
argue that local community grievances, political divisions, and varying degrees of 
religious sensibilities directly molded the manner in which rural people understood the 
                                                
10 Fallaw, Religion and State Formation, p. 31. 
11 Socialist education in Mexico has been well-studied by national and foreign historians, whose 
works highlight the relationship between this educational project and forms of resistance to state projects; 
see María Ann Kelly, “A chapter in Mexican church-state relations: socialist education, 1934-1940” (Phd 
diss., Georgetown University, 1975); Gilberto Guerra Niebla, ed, La Educación socialista en México 
(1934-1945): antología (Mexico City: Ediciones El Caballito: Secretaría de Educación Pública, Dirrección 
General de Publicaciones, 1985); Susan Quintanilla and Mary Kay Vaughan, eds, Escuela y sociedad en el 
periodo cardenista (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997); Mary Kay Vaughan, Cultural Politics in 
Revolution: Teachers, Peasants, and Schools in Mexico, 1930-1940 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 
1997); Elvia Montes de Oca Navas, Protagonistas de la educación socialista en el Estado de Méico, 1934-
1940 (Zincatepec, México: El Colegio Mexiquense, 1999); Lázaro Cárdenas: modelo y legado, Vol. 3 
(México: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Historicos de las Revoluciones de México, 2009); and Jesús 
Adolfo Trujillo Holguín, La educación socialista en Chihuahua 1934-1940: una mirada desde la Escuela 
Normal del Estado (Chihuahua, México: Universidad Autónoma de Chihuahua, 2015). But very few 
specific studies exist for the important case of Jalisco. The work of Pablo Yankelevich represents one of the 
few exceptions. With regard to socialist education Yankelevich claims that at the highest administrative 
levels, the reform was meant to effectuate an absolute subordination of the population to the central state: 
“however, if that evaluation is extended strictly to [the implementation of the program,] it resulted in a 
disaster;” see Yankelevich, “La batalla por el dominio,” in Escuela y sociedad en el periodo cardenista, 
eds. Susan Quintanilla and Mary Kay Vaughan (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997), pp. 112-113 
and 138-139 and La educación socialista en Jalisco (Zapopan, Jalisco: El Colegio de Jalisco, 2000). 
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state’s cultural revolution of the 1930s. In what became increasingly a hostile working 
environment for supporters and representatives of the postrevolutionary state, as rebels 
and parish priests worked together to undermine federal schooling policy, violence 
against partisans of the state again became a central story. This ultimately determined 
whether locals accepted, disregarded, or altered the Six-Year Plan on Education. 
 
The National Discourse on Public Education 
 
The Six-Year Plan, presented at the second national convention of the Partido 
Nacional Revolucionario in December 1933, attempted to address what lawmakers 
considered the four most important problems facing the country: 1) public education; 2) 
agrarian reform; 3) labor; and 4) communications in the nation’s interior. Originally the 
idea of Calles, the Plan called for “a formulation of a detailed program of action based on 
reason, statistics, and the lessons of experience.”12 It was officially approved on 3 
December and immediately served as the new political platform for the PNR and the 
government of Mexico. The Plan called for more federal control over schools and the 
opening of 12,000 new rural schools, providing the following timetable: 1,000 in 1934; 
2,000 in each of the years 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1938; and 3,000 during the year 1939. 
To these were to be added an additional 3,000 rural schools that the federal government 
would not financially support, but only direct technically and administratively.13 The 
education imparted in these schools, however, was to be socialist and secular. And it was 
                                                
12 Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, pp. 551 and 567. 
13 El Universal, “Programa de educación que desarolla el gobierno,” 20 July 1934. 
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precisely this last point that on July 1934 motivated Calles publicly to announce in 
Guadalajara the dawning of a new era.  
After a formal bill was submitted to amend Article 3 of the Constitution, debates 
surrounding the socialist education program began to gain added importance and traction. 
On 25 July 1934, in the days following Calles’ Grito de Guadalajara, both El Nacional 
and Excelsior of Mexico City published editorials presenting the pros and cons, 
respectively, of the education reform. El Nacional, the official organ of the PNR, lauded 
the proposed reform as a means of modernizing the old traditional school system, 
departing from the dominance of the private Catholic type. It agreed with the view that 
extending the progressive socialism of the present government to penetrate the thought of 
the schools was in keeping with “the general tendencies of our present legislation and of 
our administrative practices […].” The Revolution was in need of a complete overhaul, 
according to El Nacional, and the great social and political struggles of the past were to 
be integrated into a concrete ideology that would not only undergird the principles of 
governmental actions and maintain constitutional order, but would also impart those 
values onto the younger generation, “which the Fatherland will need in the future.”14  
Excelsior, however, took a much more pragmatic view of the recent 
developments. The editorial presented a series of thought-provoking questions which 
sought to challenge the hegemony of the state-sponsored initiative: “How are we going to 
prepare thousands of teachers, [to] all [be] socialists of the same school, in order not to 
fall into disastrous educational anarchy? How can dogmatisms be destroyed with another 
                                                
14 El Nacional, “Lo que significa socializar la enseñanza,” 25 July 1934. 
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dogmatism?” The journalist complained that the legislator “must tell us precisely to 
which socialism he refers, for this is of great importance to the success of the reform.” 
The socialism to be adopted, therefore, needed to be not of a contradictory or divergent 
nature, so that the socialism taught in one school would not be different from that in other 
schools. “To establish another sectarianism is not the way to go about it,” decried the 
editorial: “[…It] is as logical as committing crime to stop crime; as using alcoholism to 
put an end to drunkenness; as expecting sensuality to develop chastity; as preaching 
robbery to do away with thieves […].” “It would be wise to think of these things,” 
warned the journalist, “before converting ourselves into pontifices of an infallible 
dogma.”15  
On 10 October 1934, the secretary of the chamber presented an objection to the 
project to reform Article 3 of the Constitution written by a group of deputies and 
senators, themselves also affiliated with the PNR, who wished not to be judged as 
undisciplined individuals for not agreeing with the reform, but rather insisted that their 
actions reflected a desire to debate the issue and make sure that the educational reform 
aligned more closely with the “historical reality of Mexico.” Echoing many of the 
sentiments expressed in Excelsior, the chief concern of these senators and deputies was 
confusion over what socialist education actually meant for the country: “[B]ecause the 
concept that was presented to us about the school is vague and [intellectually] of little 
substance [since] it limits itself to saying that ‘The education that will be imparted will be 
socialist...it will provide a culture based on scientific truth...’ [...].”16  
                                                
15 Excelsior, “El Otro Dogmatismo,” 25 July 1934. 
16 “Diario de los debates de la Cámara de Diputados,” H. Congreso de la 
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Later that week, Senator Ezequiel Padilla delivered a charged address to the 
Mexican Senate in response to the critiques leveled at the socialist education program: 
“The opposition is right,” conceded Padilla, “[the] importance of this reform is not 
pedagogical […but has] enormous ideological importance in connection with the 
Revolution itself.” With the aim of silencing detractors of the reform, Senator Padilla 
defined Mexican socialism as “an outcry, a protest against [...] social injustice […] which 
does not discuss a political, nor uphold a religious[,] banner; the Revolution is a struggle 
against the condition of exploitation in which the working masses live.” The speech 
concretely laid out the ideological underpinnings and justification for the intended 
reform, which among other things included the elimination of intermediaries—that is to 
say, non-state officials—in order to deliver the dispositions of the Constitution directly to 
the workers and producers. Additionally, the clergy was singled out as a political faction 
that all throughout Mexico’s history had controlled “the hearts of the masses.” 
“Fanaticism must be combatted, religion must be combatted with the book, with 
education, [and] with persuasion,” declared Padilla. The senator affirmed that the nation 
was in the midst of a revolutionary dawn and that Mexican socialist doctrine was 
advancing by gigantic steps.17 Three days later, the Jefe Máximo met with members of 
the Mexican Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in the city of Cuernavaca to reinforce 
in them the importance of the socialist education program. Calles lamented that the 
                                                
Unión,http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/index.html. Legislatura XXXVI – Año I – Período 
Ordinario–– Número de Diario 17, 10 October 1934. 
17 El Nacional, “Discurso del Senador Ezequiel Padilla dado en el Senado Mexicano,” 20 October 
1934. 
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coming generation “to whom we must deliver the sword of the Revolution” was not yet 
properly prepared. Calles ended the meeting with some sound advice to his fledging 
politicos and insisted that state governors should be stimulated into action “in order to 
link them with the far-reaching measures which may have to be adopted by the federal 
government.”18 
On 30 November 1934, President-elect Lázaro Cárdenas addressed the Chamber 
of Deputies in Mexico City regarding the education problem facing Mexico and signaled 
out three changes that had been initiated by the Mexican Revolution. The first centered 
on the added importance of education and this was reflected by the increased funding 
apportioned to it in the general budget approved by Mexican Congress.19 The second 
change was manifest in the growing number of teachers now present in the country that 
allowed the government to widen access to popular education considerably; while the 
third maintained that the revolutionary government had figured upon the most effective 
manner in which to provide an education to children so that they may understand life 
within a scientific point of view. Cárdenas continued: 
[T]he Socialist School, which my Government will [spur], [will] make 
education appropriate to the needs and legitimate aspiration [of] the 
Mexican people [...] not only [by] multiplying and improving educational 
institutions in the countryside and in the city, but also by specifying its 
social purpose [and by creating a Socialist School that will allow students 
to identify with the [struggles] of the proletariat [and] in [that] sense 
strengthen ties of solidarity [...This] will create [in] Mexico [...] the 
                                                
18 Excelsior, 25 October 1934. 
19 “Diario de los debates de la Cámara de Diputados,” H. Congreso de la Unión, 
http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/index.html. Legislatura XXXVI – Año I – Período Ordinario–– 
Número de Diario 30, 30 November 1934. 
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possibility of integrating [our] revolutionary [ideology] within a strong 
economic and cultural [framework].20 
 
The socialist school, then, was to step out of its traditional mold and become an active 
agent of change. These new schools were now to be collaborators of the labor unions, 
cooperatives, and the agrarian communities of the nation, “and were to combat until 
destroyed, all of the obstacles that oppose the liberating march of the workers.”21 
Cárdenas’ rhetoric was not mere ostentatiously chicanery aimed at swaying 
popular perception in favor of the government proposed program, but was actually put 
into practice by the Mexican state. At the close of 1935, for example, the Mexican 
Congress set aside 48,595,000.00 pesos out of a total budget of 287,197,105.15 pesos for 
‘Education’ (16.9 percent). ‘Education’ was the second most important expenditure the 
Mexican state expected to incur that year and was only exceeded by the amount allocated 
to “War,” which amounted to 69,542,614.59 pesos, or approximately 24.2 percent of the 
entire budget—hardly surprising, considering the reported increase in hostilities, 
violence, and rebellion plaguing the countryside of Mexico. The amount apportioned to 
‘Education’ becomes even more impressive when it is compared to the other non-war 
categories funded by the Mexican state, categories more commonly thought to be pillars 
of postrevolutionary state rule, such as agrarian reform. For example, 6.9 percent 
(20,000,000.00 pesos) was allocated to ‘Agricultural Credit’ to fund the recently opened 
                                                
20 “Diario de los debates de la Cámara de Diputados,” H. Congreso de la Unión, 
http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/index.html. Legislatura XXXVI – Año I – Período Ordinario–– 
Número de Diario 30, 30 November 1934. 
21 “Diario de los debates de la Cámara de Diputados,” H. Congreso de la Unión, 
http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/index.html. Legislatura XXXVI – Año I – Período Ordinario–– 
Número de Diario 30, 30 November 1934. 
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Banco Nacional de Crédito Ejidal, 5.2 percent (14,862,056.00 pesos) for ‘Agriculture’, 
and 2.7 percent (7,857,416.00 pesos) for ‘Agrarian’ matters. And even if one were to 
combine all three of the agricultural allocations, funding for ‘Education’ still surpasses 
that category by 5,875,528 pesos.22 
The socialist education program attempted to remedy what the PNR saw as an 
enormous ideological and doctrinal divide among the popular masses and the rest of 
Mexico:  
[T]he children, youth and workers of the country, do not receive nor have 
the social, economic, and political preparation [to] sufficient[ly] and 
capab[ly] face the harsh problems of our current world. These 
[individuals] today need, more than ever, to know, in order to orient 
themselves after the diverse sectors of contemporary social thought. […] 
Thus, the socialist socialist character of our teaching obeys the historical 
transit of the Mexican Revolution, in which the economic and social 
interests of the great masses of the population, constantly and decidedly 
struggle for their liberation [against the] exploiters that, in possession of 
the only property and wealth [of the nation], have made and will [continue 
to] make their cultural demands impossible.  23  
 
On this issue former president of the republic—and the then-current president of the 
PNR—Emilio Portes Gil, in a published discourse on education, echoed these sentiments: 
“I believe that the school [of] the socialist reform contains two fundamental ideas […] 
one idea of an entirely rationalist, scientific character […and the second] aspect […] to 
my understanding, is that it tries to create more human hearts and minds […].” The 
socialist pedagogy promoted, therefore, attempted to provide students with the “reason” 
for all physical and social phenomena. In the process this would rid the youth, men, and 
                                                
22 S.D, 812.00/30327, “Transmission of Resumé of Conditions in México during December 1935.”  
23 Archivo Histórico de Jalisco (hereineafter cited as AHJ), IP-1-936-46-1145, “Prologo general de 
las obras,” January 1936.   
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women of all “falsehood,” and instil in the minds of children “the idea that a tenacious 
labor is necessary for cultural and economic rehabilitation […in order to] forge a new 
society, more attune to […] the reality of things […].” The task of the “good” teacher was 
now to plant seeds for the blossoming of “good” ideas and, with the necessary scientific 
explanations, to remove from children and the campesino element the prejudices of 
which they have been victims for many years.24 
 
*** 
  
 On 12 December 1934, the reformed Article 3 was officially enacted into law and 
state-sponsored socialist education was officially established to combat religious 
“fanaticism.”25 An earthquake had struck: “[S]easoned by years of protest, Catholic 
groups [again] took to the streets and sparked boycotts in the cities and countryside.”26 
Moreover, this “explosion” led to the destabilization of national-level politics. And 
                                                
24 AHJ, IP-1-936-46-1145, “La escuela y el campesino,” January 1936.  
25 Article 3 of the Constitution, amended in December 1934, now read as follows: “Education 
imparted by the state will be socialistic, and furthermore will exclude all religious doctrines and [will] 
combat fanaticism and prejudices, and toward this end the school will organize its teachings and activities 
so as to imbue in the young a rational and exact conception of the universe and of social life. Only the 
state—Federation, States, Municipalities—shall impart primary, secondary or normal education. Authority 
may be granted [to] private individuals who desire to impart education in any of these grades, but [will] 
always [be] subject to the following norm: I.—The activities and teachings of private schools must follow, 
without any exception whatever, the precepts of the first paragraph of this article […].”  The article, 
furthermore, stressed that teaching in official educational establishments, as well as primary, secondary, 
and normal instruction, cannot be administered nor supported by religious corporations, religious ministers, 
and associations or societies, directly or indirectly, tied to the propaganda of a religious creed. 
26 Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, pp. 34-35. In Guadalajara, for example, the Red 
Guard of Women of the Left (ARMI) decried that “in these moments […the clergy is] carrying out a 
clerical ‘Boycott’ against socialist education.” These women subsequently asked for the seditious labor of 
the clergy to not go unpunished and for the actions of the clergy to be suppressed with all the rigor of the 
Law. See Archivo Histórico del Estado de Jalisco (hereafter cited as AHJ), Instrucción Pública-1-935-43-
1079, Legajo 1, “Letter from the Red Guard of Women of the Left to Governor Sebastián Allende,” ff. 50-
52. 
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caught in the throes of a critical battle between Mexico’s longtime strongman, Calles, and 
the new president, Cárdenas, the Maximato began to show signs of splintering. In fact, 
political tensions between the two had begun to simmer over a steady fire for months on 
end; however, in June 1935 the political dispute reached its boiling point. President 
Cárdenas was rumored to have given Rodolfo Calles, minister of communications, a 
message for his father that read: “Tell your father, the General [Calles] that I cannot agree 
with him on [what he said about me] which was published in the newspapers […] and I 
will continue my labor program in the present form … If the General can follow in line 
with me on this program[,] we can work together.” Calles subsequently spoke harshly of 
Cárdenas’ vanity and widened the breach even more with a public statement released on 
12 June, in which he made reference to the Presidency of Ortiz Rubio (1930-1932). If not 
so intended, the reference to the fate of Ortiz Rubio—who apparently did not follow the 
advice of Calles and was subsequently forced to resign—offended Cárdenas, who acted 
promptly and vigorously to strengthen his position.27 But unlike Calles, Cárdenas showed 
an inclination to conciliate in the religious question and sought not to permit socialist 
education to assume a radical or offensive form.28  
The implementation of new federal schooling policy in Mexico, however, had 
many untended consequences—especially in areas where the state remained unable to 
fully claim the political loyalty of a large part of its citizenry. While Guadalajara had 
                                                
27 SD, 812.00/30225, “Personal correspondence between Josephus Daniels and ‘Mr. Secretary’,” 
18 June 1935. Therefore, the flare-up between Calles and Cárdenas was entirely due to the refusal of 
Cárdenas to accept the advice of Calles—whose word had been the final and decisive one for a long time.  
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been brought into the fold of the PNR in recent years, in many regions of Jalisco it could 
make only incremental gains in its efforts displace local and regional cultures of 
resistance.  
 
The Reform in Action and the Struggle for the Countryside 
In early 1935 the Archbishop of Guadalajara, Francisco Orozco y Jiménez, 
granted an interview to Liberty, a popular American magazine, in which he denounced 
the recent educational reforms undertaken by the national government. “Our Church 
[and] our children are under terrible persecution,” complained Orozco y Jiménez: 
“[b]ehind the mask that the government turns on the world today is hatred of God, hatred 
of everything that is good and decent and that we hold dear.”29 The Archbishop had never 
been one to back down from publicly stating his opinions to media outlets regarding the 
ongoing persecution of the church; however, the imprisonment on the night of 18 October 
of thirty-one priests charged with the crime of rebellion would force him into hiding in 
the town of San Pedro Tlaquepaque. Many of the newspapers in different parts of the 
republic launched sensationalist attacks against the Catholic clergy, while reporting that a 
plot on the part of priests in Guadalajara had been uncovered. Much of the ink spilled 
focused on depicting Orozco y Jiménez as the “head of the rebel bands in Jalisco.” On a 
public relations front, this approached the level of catastrophe for the Mexican clergy.   
On 10 November 1935, in response to recent events, the then Vicar General of 
Guadalajara, José Garibi y Rivera made an effort to distance the High Clergy from all 
                                                
29 SD, 812.404/1784, “Comment on magazine article,” 24 August 1935.   
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radical elements: “[…I] wish to state in the most explicit and definite manner that neither 
his Excellency [Orozco y Jiménez], nor I, nor the clergy of Jalisco have anything to do 
with any armed activities.” In fact, Garibi y Rivera specifically referenced a circular—
under the date of 11 October 1932—prohibiting any priest from taking part directly or 
indirectly in such activities, “even threatening them with penalties for disobeying orders 
[…].” “[A]lthough strictly speaking it might be possible that some individual disobeyed 
this order,” lamented Garibi y Rivera, “I nevertheless have the satisfaction of stating that 
in recent years all have complied with the order […].” The Vicar General closed his plea 
with a request directed to the president of the republic. Promoting a politics of 
conciliation but not necessarily acceptance of the new state project, Garibi y Rivera asked 
President Lázaro Cárdenas to use his influence to prevent a precipitous judgment of the 
thirty-one imprisoned priests and to terminate of the series of attacks leveled against the 
high clergy, “since we are not outside the law and since it is not fair that we be treated as 
outcasts in our own country.”30  
The Second Cristero Rebellion cannot be fully understood without an analysis on 
the key role that the implementation of the socialist education program played in inciting 
the widespread popular rebellion of the period. Despite the conciliatory attitude the high 
clergy held towards the state, many rebel groups and parish priests interpreted socialist 
schools as state instruments to suppress, and in certain cases to eradicate, their traditional 
belief systems. In what follows, I provide an overview of how the state attempted to 
implement socialist education in the countryside. The first section focuses on the more 
                                                
30 El Informador, “Carta Abierta,” 10 November 1935.  
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technical aspects of the project and analyzes the spatial distribution of schools on the eve 
of the reform, and after its first year. The remaining sections explores the scope of the 
violence rebel groups exercised against teachers and agraristas, which frequently took 
the form of harassment, persecution, and torture.   
Putting Ideology into Practice 
A total of 177 new schools opened statewide in 1934 (100) and 1935 (77).31 The 
location of every single school founded during these two years is available, and when 
they are organized under the twelve administrative regions of the state (see Figure 6), 
their spatial distribution is as follows: Norte, 33; Altos Norte, 17; Altos Sur, 19; Ciénaga, 
13; Sureste, 22, Sur, 18; Sierra de Amula, 20; Costa Norte, 0; Sierra Occidental, 11; 
Valles, 10; Centro, 11; and Costa Sur, 13.32 Over the course of those next two years, 202 
new teachers were hired (31 males to 69 females in 1934; 35 males to 66 females in 
1935). The spatial distribution of these new hires was the following: Norte, 27; Altos 
Norte, 10; Altos Sur, 14; Ciénaga, 18; Sureste, 18; Sur, 22; Sierra de Amula, 18; Costa 
Norte, 0; Sierra Occidental, 13; Valles, 16; Centro, 36; and Costa Sur, 10. The three 
regions, however, with the greatest percentage increase in hired teachers, from 1934 to 
the end of 1935, were: Norte (50 percent), Altos Sur (73 percent), and Altos Norte (33 
percent). These figures are significance because the above-mentioned three regions were 
                                                
31 Secretaría de Educación Pública (hereafter cited as SEP), G-29 Sección: Depto.-Escuelas-
Rurales, Serie: Dirección Educación Federales, Años 1935-1936, Lugar: Jalisco, No. de Expediente: 24.  
32 Instead of organizing the distribution of schools under “zonas escolares,” I opted to use the 
“Regionalización administrativa” established in 1998 by the Government of Jalisco in order to have a 
constant upon which to build the analysis. The redistricting, shifting, and creation of new zones during this 
period made it difficult to conduct any meaningful spatial analysis. For example, in 1926, the SEP created 
six school zones and during the 1930s there appeared to be many more changes to these zones. In 1934, for 
example, there were at least eight—while the following year saw the school zones increased to twenty-four. 
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the areas in Jalisco where the Cristero Rebellion had the most partisan support. As such, 
these represented renewed efforts on the part of authorities to impart new revolutionary 
ideas in areas where they traditional have had much difficulty or failed. 
 
Figure 6: Map of Administrative Regions in Jalisco by Jpablo Cad, 
Creative Commons. 
 
One of the biggest hurdles facing lawmakers was actually coming to an agreement 
about what socialist education meant. How were they going to have thousands of teachers 
on the same page? In 1935 President Cárdenas established the Instituto de Orientación 
Socialista, which did much to lay out the scope of the reform and make the postulates of 
the socialist school more comprehensible to the masses. The institute consistently 
designed programs, textbooks, pedagogy, and taught Marxism to teachers. It became 
important to have teachers on the same page because they were now the intermediaries 
between the government and the people; as such, they were not only responsible for 
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making communities in the countryside aware of their rights and obligations as citizens, 
but they too assumed responsibility to help support agrarian reform, labor organizations, 
and to defeat “parasitical” groups and institutions.33 
The teachers were regularly trained in Centros de Estudio located in the larger 
towns, such as La Barca, Guadalajara, Atequiza, Tizapán, Ameca and Autlán. The 
training centers had the objective of preparing the teachers in the region to acquire the 
corresponding diploma. Professor García Ruíz, however, lamented that it still was not 
possible to extend these efforts to other places around the state due to a lack of “absolute 
cooperation with the Inspector or because of a real physical impossibility, given the lack 
of communication [in more remote areas].” The department instead focused most of its 
efforts to promoting an orientation campaign to introduce the socialist school to the 
countryside. “[I’ll] continue attending […] conferences about the technical aspects of it,” 
affirmed the García Ruíz, “[…to be able] to make a simple presentation to the Campesino 
Communities [in order] to dispel the erroneous opinions that the enemies of the scholastic 
reform keep planting in the campesino element.” The Professor closed his report with a 
firm warning, insisting that the work left to be carried on in the state of Jalisco was 
extremely difficult and required the absolute loyalty of all, decided enthusiasm, and 
intense activities.34  
                                                
33 Engracia Loyo, “El Instituto de Orientación Socliasta y la formación del maestro revolucionario 
(1935-1937),” in Lázaro Cárdenas: Modelo y Legado, Tomo III (México: INEHRM, 2009)  pp.209-213 
34 SEP, G-30 Sección: Depto.-Escuelas-Rurales, Serie: Dirección Educación Federales, Años 
1935, Lugar: Jalisco, No. de Expediente: 9. 
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As of 31 January 1935, the Director of Public Education in Jalisco, Professor 
Ramón García Ruiz, confirmed that a total of 607 schools in the state were dependent on 
his department to function in the state (with a total of 772 teachers assigned to them).35 
The public schools were represented by the following types: Rural, Article 123, 
Kindergarten, Semi-Urban, Communal, and an Evening Center (see Table 4).36 Out of all 
these, the 393 Rural Schools and the 209 “Article 123” type comprised the bulk of all 
schools functioning in the state (see Table 4). Designed to organize the campesino and 
indigenous masses under new leadership structures at the communal level, rural schools 
aimed at displacing the “old intellectuals” and served as an important medium through 
which the ideology of the Revolution could be widely and effectively transmitted to 
citizens. Article 123 schools, established under article 123 of the Constitution of 1917, 
placed the onus on local bosses to “establish schools, infirmaries, and all of the other 
necessary services to communities […],”obliging them to construct and maintain said 
schools in addition to paying teacher salaries.37 Over the course of 1934 the 
administration of Article 123 schools passed over to the Secretaría de Educación 
Pública, which then attempted them to enforce compliance with the socialist education 
reform much to the chagrin of rural elites that “already resented the minimal costs 
                                                
35 SEP, G-30 Sección: Depto.-Escuelas-Rurales, Serie: Dirección Educación Federales, Años 
1935, Lugar: Jalisco, No. de Expediente: 9. The total number of schools present in the state, which were not 
necessarily under the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Education, are as follows: State Schools, 
723; and Federal and Article 123 Schools, 481. This brings the total number of schools present in the state 
of Jalisco to 1,004; see El Informador, “Nueva División de Zonas Escolares en el Estado de Jalisco,” 27 
July 1935.  
36 SEP, G-30 Sección: Depto.-Escuelas-Rurales, Serie: Dirección Educación Federales, Años 
1935, Lugar: Jalisco, No. de Expediente: 9.  
37 Martínez Moya and Moreno Castañeda. La escuela de la Revolución, p. 246. 
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associated with sustaining schools [and who] reacted viscerally to the federalized Article 
123 schools, which they rightly feared to be hotbeds of social mobilizations.”38  
 
 
Table 4: Schools under the Department of Federal Education in Jalisco (January 1935) 
 
Zone   Evening Center   Kindergarten   Elementary   Rural    Communal   Art. 123   Total 
1            1                          2   --     46            --       22          71 
2             --     --   1             42           --       45          88 
3            --     --   --     51           --       22          73 
4            --     --   --     41           --       51          92 
5             --        --   --     38           --       5            43 
6            --     --   --     59           --       24          83 
7             --     --   --     73           --                  0         73 
8            --     --   --     43           1       40          84 
Total:              1                 2   1     393           1      209       607 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: SEP, G-30 Sección: Depto.-Escuelas-Rurales, Serie: Dirección Educación Federales, Años 1935, 
Lugar: Jalisco, No. de Expediente: 9. 
 
At the beginning of 1934, a year before socialist education was officially put into 
practice, “Jalisco already began to make a big push [towards the] strategy [of socialist 
education when Governor Sebastián Allende] made reference [to] the need [to] dismiss 
conservative teachers […].”39 The actions of Governor Allende, however, brought up an 
important point of contention; that is, teachers themselves were not an ideologically 
homogenous group. In mid-1935, the Frente Único de Maestros Revolucionarios wrote 
to the governor of Jalisco to inform him that  conservative teachers [in some areas have 
made] impossible [for socialist education] be implemented [in the state of Jalisco…and 
                                                
38 Stephen Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution: Forging Nation and State in Chiapas, 1910-1945 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), p. 157. 
39 Armando Martínez Moya and Manuel Moreno Castañeda. La escuela de la Revolución. 
(Guadalajara: Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco, Universidad de Guadalajara, 1988, p. 203.  
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that it be] proved that said elements have taken part in attacks [and] that they are 
pretending to be [on the side of] the Government and that they are in reality its worst 
enemies.”40 
Placing the Violence into Perspective 
The violence against teachers varied from outright murder to several instances of 
kidnapping, extortion, and terror. On the evening of 1 September 1935, for example, an 
armed group of “outlaws” arrived in San Jerónimo—a hamlet with no more than a few 
hundred people—and marched to the private residence of Professor Guadalupe Rico 
Garza, who lived there with her sister, Elena. The two sisters opened the front door “full 
of terror” and were forced to leave the house, half-dressed, to undertake a painful trek on 
foot through the surroundings hills. Rico Garza somberly described what happened next: 
“My sister and I did not separate for a single moment, because given the threats from our 
kidnappers we expected [to be] killed [at] any minute, and the fear, together with the 
fatigue from a night of walking, had us beside ourselves.” They continued the long walk 
for another day until darkness came upon them. The “outlaws” then proceeded to stab 
Elena, fourteen times whom they mistook for her sister the rural teacher, killing her. 
“That horrendous sight drove me mad and […I] started to run between the hills, without 
knowing if I was followed or not,” recalled Professor Rico Garza, “perhaps [the desire 
for] self-preservation made me pause and attempt to guide myself.” In those moments, 
the Professor came upon a recently plowed field, dropped to the ground, covered herself 
                                                
40 AHJ, Instrucción Pública-1-935-43-1079, Legajo 1, 14 May 1935. 
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with dirt, and remained there until the following morning, when federal soldiers found 
the rural teacher alive and well.41 
Professor J. Jesús Cisneros, Director of the Economic School for Children, also 
decried the kidnapping of three teachers in the area complaining that “there are [no] more 
than 13 teachers and […] there is a party of cristeros that marauds in that region.” 
Cisneros begged the president of the republic to equip the teachers with arms, or at least 
to give them the necessary protection so that they be able to effectively carry out their 
educational tasks.42 Meanwhile, in the nearby town of San Cristóbal de la Barranca, 
Professor J. Cruz García declared that the “fanatics” had recently kidnapped him, and 
what was more, they had even stolen his prized typewriter and other objects in addition to 
the the school funds he had.43  
In the town of Totatiche, for example, a group of five individuals armed and 
mounted on horseback stormed into the classroom of local schoolteacher J. Dolores 
Iñiguez. He was taken about 300 meters from his school, La Cementera, whereupon the 
rebels demanded a pistol and money from the teacher. Since he was unable to provide the 
attackers with what they wanted, the defenseless teacher was executed and the rebels 
continued onwards to join others marauding in the area.44 The tragic death of Iñiguez 
                                                
41 Las Noticias, “Como fue el atentado en San Jerónimo,” 23 September 1935.  
42 Archivo General de la Nación (hereinafter cited as AGN), Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (hereinafter 
cited as LCR), 533.3:16, “Telegrama del Prof. J. Jesús Cisneros M. dirigido al Presidente Cárdenas,” f. 36, 
23 September 1936. 
43 AGN, LCR, 533.3:16, “Telegrama del Prof. J. Cruz García dirigido al Presidente Cárdenas,” f. 
35, 25 September 1936. 
44 AGN, LCR, 533.3/16, “Official transcription of the C. Attorney General,” f. 45, 25 May 1936. It 
appears that the death of J. Dolores Iñiguez occurred the month before.  
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sparked a lively debate at the Fifth Grand Convention of Mexican Teachers, where the 
topic of conversation revolved around the great number of similar events said to have 
taken place in different parts of the country “since the implementation of socialist 
education.” The convention unanimously demanded from President Cárdenas that he 
order effective guarantees to the rural teachers, “enforcing immediate punishment to the 
perpetrators of the crimes” and also sought reparation from the government for the 
damages suffered by widows and orphans.45 
Shortly after the educational reform was carried out in Jalisco, Professor Silviano 
Robledo, Director of the Superior School for children in Arandas, wrote to General 
Director Alberto Terán to denounce the tenacious propaganda that the “fanatics” of the 
population had too openly directed against his school. “[It affected the school] to such a 
degree,” lamented Robledo, “that the parents who had their children in the school of my 
charge, do not send [them] because of the mere fact that it is a socialistic school.” The 
propaganda locals undertook was so successful that it had completely decimated student 
attendance. “On this date they count [on only] two or three children in each group, and 
because the majority of the inhabitants of this locality are fanatic enemies of the 
revolution […they] attack the socialist school,” complained the Professor. However, the 
recent threats leveled at Robledo went beyond the realm of the professional and into the 
                                                
45 AGN, LCR, 533.3/16, “Transcription of the Quinta Gran Convención Mexicana de Maestros,” 
ff. 57-58, 7 May 1936. On 6 December 1935, The New York Times reported that Cárdenas had promised 
16,000 guns to rural teachers “to protect their lives as they spread socialist education throughout the 
country.” The demonstration was apparently led by two women teachers whose ears had been cut off who 
“coupled their call for protection with a request for higher wages and a pledge of support to President 
Cárdenas and the program of socialist education.” The president made no answer to their demands, but did 
make arrangement to distribute arms to teachers.   
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domestic: “[T]hey [the rebels] threaten us with death, and they give us an example; that 
they will do to us what was done to the [municipal] president of Jesús María; if I do not 
depart from this population in eight days, with all of my family.”46 Like a soldier on the 
frontlines who just had passed beyond the point of return, the Professor held his ground 
and subsequently asked Terán to give the municipal authorities of Arandas orders to 
intervene in matters so that they could carry out the law in reference to scholastic 
attendance. This man was not one to be intimidated by the ‘fanatics’ and appeared intent 
on carrying out the dictates of the Revolution. 
School Zone Inspector Professor Gilberto Ceja Torres, after listening to the 
opinions of rural teachers and individuals identified with the government of the 
Revolution, also signaled out the Catholic clergy as the primary group responsible for the 
widespread agitation that reigned in the area, and for the hostile propaganda many locals 
promoted against the socialist school, “as well as [for] the attacks against teachers.” Over 
the past month the “fanatic” rebels, to the war-cry of “Viva Cristo Rey,” had committed 
all sorts of atrocities: they burned school materials belonging to Tenasco de Abajo 
(municipality of Santa María) and Dolores (municipality of Colotlán); threatened a 
female teacher with death if she continued at the helm of the school; and forced many 
teachers to flee from their posts. “In general the teachers during the evenings,” confirmed 
Ceja Torres, “have to seek refuge in the woods or places near the school [that] they judge 
to be safe […].” The difficult situation continued to worsen “everyday,” to the extent that 
                                                
46 AHJ, Instrucción Pública-1-935-43-1079, Legajo 9, 25 February 1935. 
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the Professor was obliged to demand guarantees from Governor Everardo Topete—
complaints that fell on deaf ears.47  
The town Degollado also complained of declining school attendances due to the 
“fanaticism fomented by the Clergy.” The use of “spiritual suggestions,” which the 
Clergy exercised through religious practices, among other methods, contributed to a 
drastic decline in attendance to the point that not even 10 percent of the children attended 
the local schools. To remedy this situation Engineer Alfredo Félix Díaz E. directed his 
efforts to the Municipal Authorities, but was unable to move them to intervene in matters. 
And since the Engineer believed “that education is [extremely] important to achieve the 
progress of the Country and should not be neglected in any entity, I have continued my 
efforts with the objective of increasing school attendance in the aforementioned schools, 
to the effect that I met with the heads of household of this place to make them understand 
the moral responsibility that incurs in unjustifiably opposing the education of their 
children, since these [children], [are now] developing in ignorance, [and] instead of being 
useful [to] the Fatherland they will turn into social parasites […].”48 
In the northeastern region of Los Altos, a surveyor noted that pressure against 
rural teachers, by the “cristeros” was mounting every day and that they did not count 
upon the necessary elements to combat the detrimental actions of the Church, “since there 
are very few teachers that venture to go to work in those places, and those who go cannot 
                                                
47 SEP, Sección: Escuelas Rurales, Serie: Inspección Educación Federal, Años: 1935, Lugar: 
Jalisco, Exp. 5, No. de Folios: 4, ff. 3-4, 15 November 1935.  
48 SEP, G-30, Sección: Depto.-Escuelas-Rurales, Serie: Dirección Educación Federales, Años 
1935-1936, Lugar: Guadalajara, Jalisco, No. de Expediente: 34, ff. 28-29, 2 November 1936.  
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develop any [effective strategies], due to the lack of children and the excessive risk to 
their lives.”49 A SEP report claimed that the problem of this region—and specifically 
School Zone XI—were twofold: there was widespread fanaticism and an economic 
problem, which prevailed in all of the surrounding towns. Specifically citing his own 
experience in Jalostotitlán, the inspector wrote the following:  
[…I] was able to find out of the ridiculous state of the people and the state 
of slavery that the campesino [is subjected to by] the clergy and other 
capitalists, who do [not] allow [them to have] free will, to the extent [that 
they have used] the implementation of [the] Socialist School as a pretext 
to provoke very dangerous agitations against the Government […And its] 
first victims are our Rural Teachers who [find themselves] alone and 
without the protection of any Authority nor of any person [...while they] 
have been boycotted, persecuted and disliked by all of the residents of the 
towns and hamlets, our teachers [still] go to great pains to lend true social 
services to the Communities.50  
 
The report stressed that various rebel groups operated in the surrounding areas of the 
countryside and have the teachers in a constant state of anxiety. And when they entered 
these populations, for example, the only person they would look for is the “Rural 
Teacher,” stressed the report, “and they then go to our humble schools to look over the 
documentation and the books of the school to assure themselves […that] the “bad” 
Socialist Education books have not arrived to the region […].”  
Director of Federal Education, Professor Ramón García Ruíz, echoed similar 
sentiments regarding the effects of the campaign that the Catholic Clergy and 
conservative elements promoted against local schools: “[I]n some regions school 
                                                
49 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, “Observations collected in Los Altos, Jalisco,” ff. 132-138, 13 April 
1936.  
50 SEP, G-26, Sección: Depto.-Escuelas-Rurales, Serie: Inspección Escolar Federal, Años 1935, 
Lugar: Jalisco, No. de Expediente: 13.      
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attendance has greatly suffered [and this has] become more notable in the Zones of 
Colotlán and in the so-called region of Los Altos […].” Nevertheless, he maintained that 
teachers valiantly remained in their posts, “counteracting with decided action, the 
campaign against the enemies of the Revolution.” Professor García Ruíz, however, 
lamented the recent death of rural teacher Apolonio González, who had been serving the 
indigenous town of San Sebastián in the municipality of Mezquitic, the northern Huichol 
region of the state, which he also deemed the result of the “perverse conduct of clerical 
elements […].”51 
Local parish priest’ opposition to the socialistic school not only took the form of 
open hostility, but also demonstrated a propensity to align itself with local rebel groups. 
For example, in the town of Mezquitic, Father Norberto Reyes was said have advised 
parents from his pulpit to abstain from sending their children to government schools. 
Often described as the most formidable agent with which the “reaction” counted, Father 
Reyes even went as far as to organize an attack in collusion with “fanatic” rebels near the 
Monte Escobedo region of Mezquitic. Romualdo Avila Vázquez, director of the Huichol 
and Cora indigenous boarding school,52 carefully described how a conniving Reyes 
informed the local cabecilla (rebel leader) about the impending departure of Professor 
                                                
51 SEP, G-30 Sección: Depto.-Escuelas-Rurales, Serie: Dirección Educación Federales, Años 
1935, Lugar: Jalisco, No. de Expediente: 9.  
52 The indigenous boarding school appeared not to have been functioning for very long. For 
example, Prof. Romauldo Avila Vázquez commented on 18 September 1935 that they had just acquired a 
“magnificent locale in the town of Mezquitic, wherein we will be able to establish the Boarding School, in 
virtue that we count upon a good number of classrooms and the departments [that are] necessary to provide 
housing for the students, whom will count upon all of the comforts.” The boarding school hoped to start its 
work in the last days of September—a month before the attacks which I have narrated; see Las Noticias, 
“Se Establecerá en Mezquitic Internado Indio.”  
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Ceja Torres from the area, “so that he may be one of the individuals assaulted.” The 
professor appeared to have escaped; however, the same could not be said for the six 
members of the rural defense unit accompanying him. All were said to have perished in 
the ensuing mêlée except for one individual, who, as he lay on the ground, was reported 
to have yelled following at the top of his lungs: “[D]eath to the priest and death to all 
cristeros.” Vázquez implored the Jefe Militar of the zone to make a visit to the Monte 
Escobedo so he might become aware of the prevalent situation and proceed to 
exterminate the “cristero” parties that marauded the area.53 
To place these above examples into context, historian David L. Raby documented 
a total 139 incidents of violence committed against teachers in Mexico from 1931 to 
1940. These figures, however, represent only a general snapshot of the violence given 
that it is impossible to say with certainty how many teachers died during the decade, 
since many went reported.54 Raby postulated that a meticulous review of all the 
newspapers of the provinces would place the figure closer to 200 or perhaps much higher. 
In my own research, I have come across at least 46 instances of violence committed 
against teachers in Jalisco from early 1935 to late 1939—31 of which I personally 
                                                
53 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, “Telegram from Ávila Vázquez addressed to President Cárdenas,” ff. 
190-191, 29 October 1935. 
54David L. Raby, “Los maestros rurales y los conflictos sociales en México (1931-1940).” Historia 
Mexicana, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Oct. – Dec., 1968), p. 190-226. Raby relied mainly on Mexico City-centric 
newspapers and documents from the SEP and identified the following cases: 15 in Jalisco; 14 in Veracruz; 
13 in Puebla and Michoacán each (the author admitted that the figure for Michoacán was inflated because 
of his research focus); 9 in Guanajuato; 8 in Campeche; 7 in Guerrero, Morelos, and Zacatecas; 6 in 
Querétaro; 4 in Nayarit, Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas; 3, in Baja California Sur, Durango, Hidalgo, México, 
Oaxaca, and San Luis Potosí; 2 in Aguascalientes, Colima, Sonora, and Tabasco; and 1 in Coahuila, 
Chiapas, and Yucatán. 
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documented. These incidents were either reported by government agencies, local 
newspapers, or mentioned in personal correspondence.  
The collections of the AGN, newspapers, and the U.S. State Department records 
showcase at least 21 documented instances of violence carried out against socialist 
teachers. For example, in the collections of the AGN, Professor Luis F. Rodríguez 
Lomelí, inspector of federal education in Chapala, wrote to President Cárdenas to 
denounce the municipal commissioner of San Luis Soyaltán, who brutally beat Federal 
Rural Teacher José Dueñas Castellón; in Sayula, eight federal school teachers were shot 
at by a group of twenty individuals sent by the guardías blancas of Hacienda 
Amatitlán—however, they were fortunate enough to escape unscathed. The problem of 
teacher assassinations appeared to garner some national attention to the point that the 
syndicate of teacher workers from Cordoba, Veracruz, wrote to President Cárdenas to 
demand justice against the assassins of a teacher in the state of Jalisco and to ask for 
guarantees for their other companions; while from Hermosillo, Sonora, Juan G. Oropeza 
from the majority congress of teachers of the state and peasant workers, expressed the 
organizations indignation about the assassination of teacher José Dolores Medina of 
Jalisco. They subsequently asked the president to arm teachers and campesinos “in order 
to repeal [the] aggression of reactionary groups.”55  
Additional instances of violence were found in the Guadalajara-based newspaper 
El Informador, which reported the following incidents: Prof. Jesús Rosales, victim of an 
assault in Atoyac (21 April 1935); Prof. Neri Mejía, gravely hurt as he traversed the road 
                                                
55 AGN, LCR, 533.3/16, ff. 19, 28, 40, and 55. 
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from La Guitapa and Lagos de Moreno (13 February 1936); Carlota Dorado, kidnapped 
by a group of armed individuals in Mezquitic (23 March 1936); an assault of the local 
school in Paredones, which led to the death of one student (23 March 1936); and 
Prudencia Barba, beat up by elements that are enemies of the revolutionary program (30 
October 1936). Meanwhile, The New York Times also reported the mutilation of two 
teachers, whose ears had been cut off (6 December 1935). In addition to the above-
mentioned, the State Department made note of the following four incidents: the school-
mistress at Mechoacanejo was kidnapped by the followers of Lauro Rocha; a band of 
armed men burned the school house and wounded the teacher at Corralitos; a female 
teacher was attacked by a group of men near Cinco Minas, which led to her death; and 
that an unnamed teacher was kidnapped by rebels at Mexticacan.56 
At face value, what these instances of violence make clear is that there was a 
concerted effort on the part of rebels groups and priests to halt the educational 
advancement of the state in the countryside and that many teachers were assaulted, 
maimed, and even murdered by the former. But what the numbers do not reveal, 
however, are the subtler forms of violence aimed at teachers, such as intimidation tactics, 
insults, or even the news of a fallen comrade, that were even more prevalent and 
widespread, and must have directly impact rural teachers’ ability to carry out the socialist 
reform.   
The Huichol of Northern Jalisco  
                                                
56 See SD, specifically 812.00/30394, 812.00, 812.00/30433, 812.00/30368. 
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The regime of Lázaro Cárdenas adopted the official ideology of indigenismo, 
which promoted a range of paternalistic developmentalist policies that aimed to integrate 
ethnic groups and assimilate them into the national whole. Indigenismo not only sought to 
secure collective welfare for particularly poor and marginalized regions, but also aimed 
to achieve a process of ‘acculturation’ which would, in theory, convert indigenous 
peoples into citizen-bearers of a mestizo ‘national culture’. While many radical 
indigenistas advocated for more than just the incorporation of assimilated indigenous 
peoples—and many indeed sought to adopt a true cultural pluralism—the official policy 
never departed from a position that saw indigenous peoples as “members of a social class 
taking part in the collective task of production.”57 Reflecting contemporary indigenista 
thought, an essay from El Maestro Rural titled ‘Los Huicholes’ described them as “an 
isolated, primitive group which maintained the same ‘pristine’ life that their ancestors 
had known [and as such] they were not viewed as a part of the national culture, and were 
destined [to be the] recipients of the benefits of the Revolution and civilization.”58 The 
Huichol, according to the article, lacked “a spirit of initiative, they are lazy or indolent, 
they have no forethought.”59  
Agustín Mijares Cossío, a full-blooded indígena of Huichol ancestry, submitted a 
“Petition for benefit of the Huichol Tribe” to President Lázaro Cárdenas. Adopting the 
                                                
57 Joseph, Gilbert M. and Jurgen Buchenau. Mexico’s Once and Future Revolution: Social 
Upheaval and the Challenge of Rule since the Late Nineteenth Century. (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2013) p. 189. 
58 Alexander S. Dawson, “From models for the Nation to model citizens,” Journal of Latin 
American Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1998): 280.  
59 Marjorie Becker, Setting the Virgin on Fire: Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán Peasants, and the 
Redemption of the Mexican Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 67. 
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indigenista ideology, Mijares Cossío wanted to better the condition of the indigenous 
peoples of the region, which he claimed the the socialist program intended to do. “[The] 
situation presented [within] the conglomerate of indigenous peoples is nothing short of 
sad [because] they remain (a great number of them) until today,” grieved Mijares Cossío, 
“as they were before the conquest with their same ancestral customs and traditions, 
whose state[,] because of their [heterogeneity] needs specific models, [and] precise and 
well-defined plans [for social] incorporation […].” The plan submitted by Mijares Cossío 
to President Cárdenas was divided into two parts: the first insisted on the general 
recognition as theirs of all of the territory the Huichol inhabited; and the second, asked 
for the establishment of rural schools within the indigenous communities of Santa 
Catarina, San Andres Cohamiata, Guadalupe de Octoán, and Tuxpan. The latter demand, 
however, required the newly established schools not only to be granted sufficient 
schooling material, medicines, and sports equipment, but also stressed the need to have 
professors who truly understood what the “transformation of [the] disenfranchised 
masses” meant. Lastly, Mijares Cossío informed President Cárdenas that the people of 
the region had been under fire by the insurgents for “nearly five years” and that this 
problem did not receive the necessary attention from officials. As a result, he claimed 
that: “[It] is a grave problem for my Race brothers, all the more so [because] during the 
period [I] signaled out more than fifty indigenous men have succumbed [to attacks].” 
Mijares Cossío begged for the execution of an all-out plan to exterminate the insurgents 
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(that is, those who resisted the government), so that the indigenous peoples of the region 
could live in peace.60 
The predominantly indigenous region of the north, however, presented 
administrators and authorities with a unique set of barriers that prevented the successful 
implementation of socialist education.61 The municipal president of Mezquitic, Francisco 
Gaeta, for example, complained to the headquarter of the military zone, accusing the state 
government of clearly forgetting the indigenous people of the remote northern region, 
since the average distance between Guadalajara and their population prevented Governor 
Topete from thoroughly getting to know their needs and desires. Francisco Gaeta 
continued:  
[We] have been armed for more [than] twelve years [and] many of our 
residents have sacrificed their lives in defense of their personal interest 
[and those] of the Supreme Government, since we are whole heartedly 
pro-government and this has aroused the hate of those that with a false 
banner like that of Cristo Rey [rose up in] arms against the Revolutionary 
Governments […] of our Country; they have burned our houses, and we 
have nevertheless remained undaunted; we have continued fighting so that 
one day the old peace will shine for us, but a peace without compromises 
with the bandits […rather one] founded upon progress and work […] we 
need to work [in order] to live and […] we are not free to go a [...] league 
because we are victims of the cristero assassins […].62  
 
                                                
60 AGN, L.C.R, 503.11/259, “Peticiones en beneficio de la tribu Huichol,” ff. 27-30 
61 The region of the north presented formidable obstacles for officials due to the perceived 
backwardness of the indigenous people. Professor Valle, who toured the region in 1933, revealed that: “the 
ancestral indolence of the Huichol, whom have persisted in their primitive customs, with a tendency 
towards hunting, more so than the raising of animals and [are] averse to cultivation, to which they only 
dedicate themselves to in a rudimentary manner on a small scale, makes all of the hope of carrying out the 
idea [of creating a boarding school difficult] which [I had previously undertaken] with much enthusiasm;” 
see Las Noticias, “Los Huicholes, al magen de toda la civilización, 25 March 1933.  
62 SEP, Seccion: Escuelas Rurales, Serie: Dirección Educación Federal, Subserie: Establecimiento 
de Escuelas, Años: 1935-36, Lugar: Jalisco, Exp. 24, No. de Folios: 190, 11 December 1935.  
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Gaeta lamented that while the citizens who had risen up in arms to defend the state 
government were offered guarantees and protection, the multitude of individuals from the 
area of Mezquitic that actively risked their lives had not. As a result of this, many did not 
have the means to feed themselves because of mounting debts, which they acquired in the 
process of sustaining the prestige of the government. The municipal president, in addition 
to soliciting repair money for the schools that rebels burned to the ground, also submitted 
a request to elevate the local elementary school in status. There were many children 
present in the municipality of his charged who finished their education, but whose parents 
did not have the necessary money to transport them to other places to continue their 
studies.63     
Meanwhile, Francisco Montoya, a representative of the indigenous peoples of 
Santa Catarina, a town located in the municipality of Mezquitic, continued complaining 
well into 1938 about the lack of schools, the lack of effective guarantees for the teachers 
safety, and the “thousands of sufferings” people living in the area had to endure: “[W]e 
all want to be educated, to be protected, to have in place in our town a detachment that 
can provide us [with] guarantees, [one] that does not exploit us in the same manner as the 
armed insurgents, who are finishing us off, they kill peaceful [residents], they steal our 
cows […].” In an effort to repel the rebel forces, a federal general had apparently armed 
five residents of the community, but these individuals could not defend the surrounding 
towns. “[The five individuals] have only compromised us, since [because of them] the 
rebels rob us[,] kill [our people], and have silenced us,” affirmed Montoya: “[W]e want 
                                                
63 SEP, Seccion: Escuelas Rurales, Serie: Dirección Educación Federal, Subserie: Establecimiento 
de Escuelas, Años: 1935-36, Lugar: Jalisco, Exp. 24, No. de Folios: 190, 11 December 1935.  
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the five residents from our town who took up arms and who are with [the general, to] not 
be permitted to return armed to our town […].” The individuals from the community who 
were armed lacked discipline and only spent ammunition. In the process, they made such 
a fuss that it caught the attention of the marauding rebels, who would then take it out on 
the peaceful residents of the town. “We [the peaceful residents] all have the will to serve 
the Government,” affirmed Montoya, “but [in order for us] to take up arms we need there 
to be detachments in ours towns [to actually convince] the majority of the residents to 
taken [arms].”64 
The Masks of Hypocrisy and the Clergy in the Field 
One of the biggest obstacles teachers faced was the opposition posed by local 
town priests. On 20 May 1938, for example, Professor Luis N. Rodríguez, director of the 
Federal School in Tonalá, described in great detail the retreats (ejercicios de encierro) 
that the Church was accustomed to celebrate in the town:  
[T]he priests, during these retreats, inspect [the people of the town] before 
[they go] to sleep, and [following this the priests tell] the one who d[o] not 
have lashes identified on their back or in any other part of their bodies 
[that they] should not sleep in company of those who have completed their 
penitence, and they would [be] lock[ed] up in a separate room[. But] late 
into the night the priests themselves come disguised and drag and scratch 
[the] trusting ignorants [in the room...The] next day [those individuals] 
would give the horrifying and terrifying account to the rest, who like a 
dogma believed that event.65 
 
                                                
64 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, “Escrito de Francisco Montoya, vecino del pueblo de Santa Catarina del 
Estado de Jalisco,” ff. 30-31, 27 January 1938.   
65 AHJ, Gobernación-4-7129, 20 May 1938.  
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In many rural areas, these types of ejercicios appeared to be especially pronounced 
during the Lent season. About three years earlier, for example, the federal school director 
in Jalisco described a similar occurrence in the area of Encarnación de Díaz:  
As [a] concrete fact I will show to this Superiority that the agitation in this 
Zone has begun with all its vigor and strength from the arrival of the 
religious celebration called ‘Lent,’ because with impunity the priests of all 
of these towns have been celebrating acts in the churches that they call 
‘ejercicios epirituales’ which during a week [they] dedicated to women, 
other mature men, other young people, and other children, etc., whose 
reunions were carried out behind closed doors with the strictest censure so 
that no foreign elements can penetrate and in [said] meetings [they] 
anathematized mothers who sent their children to the schools as well as 
the fathers, and harshly threatened children and the young [people and told 
them] that in no form should they pay attention to the Socialist Education 
that the Government in imparting.66 
 
Returning to letter written by Director Rodríguez, when the first teachers arrived on the 
scene in Tonalá to take charge of the local school, “an angry mob of beatas” (especially 
pious women who wore religious habits) unexpectedly encountered them, and then 
proceeded to stone the teachers. The priests had allegedly organized the entire town—the 
young women, the youth, fathers, and mothers. And catechism was taught to children and 
adults, and activities were held at the town church in the morning, at mid-day, afternoon, 
and at nighttime. Everyone engaged in the offering of the fruits, paid a tithe, and paid 
fees to enter retreats. And as a result of the campaigns carried out by the priests, more 
than 60% of the agraristas who then years before had organized themselves to obtain 
ejidos had given up their plots of land.  “[T]he worst of it all,” protested Rodríguez, “is 
that the priests have made the heads of family believe that it is best that children enter 
                                                
66 SEP, G-26, Sección: Depto.-Escuelas-Rurales, Serie: Inspección Escolar Federal, Años 1935, 
Lugar: Jalisco, No. de Expediente: 13. 
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stupid into heaven [rather than] wise into hell [and] that the current schools belong to the 
devil.” 
 
Figure 7: Government Propaganda. Source: AHJ, IP-1-936-
46-1145 
 
When Rodríguez arrived in the town of Tonalá to take over the post of Director, 
there were only 42 students enrolled in the local schools out of a total student population 
of about 500 to 600 children. After waging a propaganda campaign against the local 
opposition, Rodríguez was able to increase enrollment to 93 students for daytime courses 
and 36 students for the newly opened evening courses. When schools arranged festivals 
or meetings with parents, however, priests would organize outings with children or adults 
at the same time to obstruct the effort of the school. Although the professor appeared to 
be making some headway, the harsh realities of life in a town controlled by parish priests 
stifled any true progress made. “[T]his place has always been a protector of cristeros, 
[and it was] here [that] Lauro Rocha, leader of the rebel movement of this State, was 
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hidden,” bewailed Rodríguez. And so strong was the power and influence local priests 
wielded that the Professor acknowledged: “Here [the] Municipal and State authorities are 
not in charge, [here] we fully live in the XVIII century […and] in this town there are 
periods of the year when the poor only eat once or twice a day; but they do have [money] 
for the ‘alms’ of the vampires […].”67 
The Leftist Block of Teachers of Jalisco, from the town of Amatitán, also 
denounced the lower clergy’s role in inciting people into open rebellion against the 
socialist school, and affirmed their role in deceiving the people with their “masks of 
hypocrisy.” In a letter to President Cárdenas, they wrote that: “…the Catholic Clergy of 
this entity are the first that have been inciting the people against the Socialist School 
which your government has established regulations for, which they sometimes do 
publicly with insults to [authorities…].” The teachers attested to having experienced the 
influence of the clergy in the field, “seeing as this is where all the priests carry out their 
insatiable campaign against us the revolutionary teachers to the end of avoiding that the 
children attend the official schools […].” The teachers, however, declared that an assault 
against the school was an assault against the revolutionary teachers, and therefore against 
the government of the republic.68 If the rural teachers were truly the “soldiers of the 
revolution,” as former President Calles had once remarked, then these individuals needed 
to ready themselves for an unconventional war against an enemy that did not obey a code 
of ethics. 
                                                
67 AHJ, Gobernación-4-7129, 20 May 1938. 
68 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, “Bloque Izquierdista de Maestros Jaliscienses, Member of the 
C.R.O.C.J.,” f. 167, 19 November 1935.  
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The situation at hacienda La Quemada in the Municipality of Magdalena had 
escalated to the point that it began to affect the everyday lives of peaceful individuals—
innocent people merely caught in the crossfire. So dire was the situation for this 
particular community that it sent Francisco Mercado all the way to Mexico City to seek 
an audience with the president of the republic. In a hastily hand-written letter, a worried 
Mercado informed Cárdenas: 
Finding myself here in this [city] since a few days ago, I would really 
thank you Sir if you could receive me in your office or wherever you may 
order to deal with some matters that I have in representation of the people 
of La Quemada […] and I cannot return without dealing with anything 
[since] my trip was made with much sacrifice [and] for that reason I beg 
that you concede me the meeting I solicit.69  
 
The pressing matter Mercado sought to resolve pertained to the declarations of the local 
parish priest of Magdalena in his sermon: “[He said] that [we] should have the courage to 
defend [our] religion [and that we] should learn to die for it, that if [we] did not have 
[the] courage to be Catholic, [we] much less [had the courage] to be martyrs, that to be a 
martyr you need a lot [of courage], that [we] did not know how things were, that the 
country is preparing for a great movement […].” The representative of the community 
confided in Cárdenas that it was well-known that the parish priests of the region—in San 
Marcos, Etzatlán, Ahualulco de Mercado, Tequila, San Andrés, and Magdalena—were all 
having periodic meetings in the Cerro Grande of San Andrés, near a place called “Agua 
Fria,” and that a gavilla (band) of 15 men, equipped with “almost new 7mm Mausers and 
                                                
69 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, “Hand written letter authored by Francisco Mercado and addressed to 
President Cárdenas,” f. 43, without date.  
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automatic 45 caliber pistols,” also marauded the same hills and therefore the threat of 
violence against those in favor of the state existed. Mercado confirmed this, along with 
the influence of the priest decimated the enrollment of the official school.”70 
 In addition to the influence priests wielded over communities in the countryside, 
rebel violence (and the reality of death) was also reflected in the preoccupations of 
ordinary people, in particular women. Many such letters, addressed to President 
Cárdenas, varied greatly in their content, but showcased similar themes, concerns, and 
anxieties. In the municipality of Tecolotlán, Ventura Cueva Vda. de González, for 
example, described how her husband Apolinar González and his brother Natividad Cueva 
were attacked and murdered by a band of rebels under the command of Jesús González. 
As a result of the attack, the letter writer was left a widow with several young children. 
From the village of El Chante in Autlán, Anita Guzmán, Matilde Aragón, and others 
signees, also wrote to President Cárdenas to denounce how Jesús Gutiérrez and others 
were assassinated by the rebels led by Matías Villa Michel and others, who subsequently 
burned their houses and harvests.71 
“El [maestro] sembraba la verdad entre los campesinos…” 
 Over the course of the 1920s, the state increasingly began to incorporate 
campesinos into the postrevolutionary bureaucracy, while also seeking to enforce the 
anticlerical provisions contained in the Constitution of 1917. Schools in the countryside 
                                                
70 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, “Typed letter authored by Francisco Mercado and addressed to President 
Cárdenas,” f. 42, 20 December 1937.  
71 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, ff. 79 and 82.  
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became crucial tools to transmit this new ideology and culture to the peasantry. As a 
result, two distinct political identities emerged: agraristas and political Catholics. The 
previous chapter made clear that both became bitter enemies with much of this hatred 
coming to the forefront during the Cristero Rebellion (1926-1929). The origins of this 
division, however, is more difficult to discern; that is, nothing inherent in Catholicism 
denounced land reform. While the postrevolutionary state made significant headway in 
educating campesinos, many still resisted government efforts to do so. As I have noted in 
Chapter 4, one possible explanation regarding this division that consistently appears in 
letters and reports is the role that wealthy landowners played in halting state 
advancements in the countryside. The parish priests, in turn, consistently supported the 
actions and interests of the wealthy over the interests of campesinos. Ultimately, this has 
much to do with the fact that they were the Church’s biggest benefactors in the 
countryside and always “defended private property rights.”72  
What the sources I have analyzed make clear, however, is that many—not all—
parishioners listened to their priests and were willing to risk their lives under the guise of 
religion. In claiming this I do not mean to question whether Catholics themselves truly 
believed they were doing the work of God, nor do I mean to disparage their worldview. 
Rather, what I do want to make evident is that the archival evidence suggests that priest’s 
manipulated their parishioners to protect their own streams of revenue. It therefore comes 
to no surprise, then, that landowners made life in the countryside impossible for teachers 
                                                
72 Alan Knight, “La última fase de la Revolución: Cárdenas,” in Lázaro Cárdenas: modelo y 
legado, Vol. 3 (México: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Historicos de las Revoluciones de México, 2009), p. 
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and agraristas, but then found a mass of people (from the same socioeconomic class of 
the latter) willing to support their actions.  
In the municipalities of Lagos de Moreno, San Juan de los Lagos, Encarnación de 
Díaz, Jalostotitlán, Unión de San Antonio, and Ojuelos de Jalisco, the director of Federal 
Education, Professor Ramón García Ruiz, for example, complained of the area’s 
hacendados who, for various reasons, began “sending people sometimes disguised as 
soldiers to […] threaten the teachers of the Federal Schools of the surrounding areas”—
forcing them to flee from the “Article 123” schools located within the compounds of 
haciendas. The landowners apparently engaged in these acts with the objective of arguing 
to authorities that teachers had abandoned their employment. As we learned in an earlier 
section, the owners of large estates were to fund Article 123 schools, including the salary 
of teachers, but the schools themselves had to maintain a certain number of students. The 
tactics therefore were implicitly used to lessen their financial burden on the part of 
landowners, but also to reduce enrollment. “If this Secretariat [of Public Education] does 
not take sides on this matter and obtain firm support from the Ministry of Interior and the 
Department of Labor […],” warned García Ruíz, “the Department [of my charge] cannot 
be held responsible for the reduction of school[’s attendance and] every time that it is 
physically unable to stop the dispersal of the campesino element in the aforementioned 
region of Los Altos.”73  
 
 
 
 
                                                
73 SEP, G-30, Sección: Depto.-Escuelas-Rurales, Serie: Dirección Educación Federal, Años 1935, 
Lugar: Jalisco, Observaciones: 2-Recortes Periódicos, No. de Expediente: 17, 25 Abril 1935. 
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Figure 8: La Escuela Socialista. Source: AHJ, IP-1-936-46-1145 
 
The Regional Organizer of Ejidos, Emilio Guzmán Andrade, also complained of 
the same hacendados, clarifying the composition of the rebels: 
[…T]hey are laborers from the different Haciendas who [following the] 
orders of their owners and to the cry of Viva Cristo Rey, impede the 
carrying out of [the] Socialist Education [program] and […] try to impede 
employees [from] carry[ing] out the missions they have been entrusted 
with, setting out to additionally scare to the ejidatarios driving them from 
the population centers to hinder the labors that they carry out in said 
populations.74 
 
Encarnación de Díaz provides a noteworthy and illustrative example in which 
hacendados were said to have ordered their peons to yell “viva el agrarismo,” carry a red 
and black banner, and commit all types of atrocities so that the landowners could blame 
the agraristas of the region. These efforts led to the kidnapping of a member from the 
Agrarian Community of Los Gallos, which confounded Guzmán Andrade: “[I]f the rebels 
                                                
74 Archivo Histórico de la Defensa Nacional de México (herineafter cited as AHDNM), 
Operaciones Militares, XI/481.6/, Estado de Jalisco año de 1935, f. 7, 27 April 1935.  
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were truly agraristas they would have not kidnapped[,] for any natural reason[,] a 
comrade but rather would have imparted protected them.”75 The ejido of Las Cruces also 
reported similar experiences, since a band of fifteen rebels passed through the area and 
were recognized by ejidatarios of the community as peons from the local hacienda. In 
Teocaltiche, the School Inspector also confirmed suspicions that some of the rebels were 
actually individuals paid and armed by the landowners, with the goal of extorting the 
professoriate of the region. The school inspector established that they too carried red and 
black banners, “and ran off a professor [and] threatened him that if he continued they 
would assassinate him[,] and yelled down with agrarismo and socialist education.” This 
prompted the School Inspector to diagnose the problem: it was symptomatic of the 
educational-religious question and of the efforts of landowners to keep their lands, which 
they did by taking advantage of the “ignorance” of the people.76   
The agraristas masses, however, were on the side of the teachers and vehemently 
defended socialist education. On 2 October 1935, for example, gathered at the local 
elementary school in the town of El Limón, the municipal president, Fermín González; 
the president of the commissariat ejidal, Francisco Piña; the president of the municipal 
committee of the P.N.R., Ramón Solórzano; and the director the school, Professor Justo 
Santana, proceeded to read a signed letter circulated by the president of the committee 
(on education) of the State of Jalisco, Manuel F. Ochoa, which read as follow: 
The executive of the State has been carrying out [an] intense labor in favor 
of [the department of] Public Education […] but unfortunately the 
                                                
75 AHDNM, Operaciones Militares, XI/481.6/, Estado de Jalisco año de 1935, f. 7, 27 April 1935.  
76 AHDNM, Operaciones Militares, XI/481.6/, Estado de Jalisco año de 1935, ff. 5-7, 27 April 
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reactionary elements, enemies of the Revolution, [have] put up obstacles 
to the praiseworthy efforts of the Government. The Committee of the 
State[,] deeming that it is its duty to cooperate with the Government 
[…urges] this [local] Committee, so that by all means at its disposal, it 
insure that attendance at the schools established in that Municipality be 
abundant, denouncing before Municipal Authorities the parents or tutors 
reluctant to send their children to the schools, to the end of applying the 
corresponding sanctions to them.77  
 
Because “some fanatic elements” had openly carried out propaganda against the socialist 
pedagogy—to the point that they had infiltrated the rank and file of the P.N.R., the 
agrarian community, and the local town government—the Committee unanimously 
agreed, among other things, that “those who belong to the Agrarian Community, and 
whose children are not in school because of [the threat of] excommunication, […] should 
be the first to lose their rights to their lands for palpably demonstrating that they are not 
in agreement with the Six-Year Plan of our current President Gen. Lázaro Cárdenas 
[…].” The representatives of El Limón intended to unmask “for once and for all those 
hypocrites” with the goal of having Cárdenas realize who in reality were “the real 
agraristas”—whose efforts, were dedicated to the economic betterment of the people.78 
Sworn loyalty to the state, however, did not necessarily equate with widespread 
protection for all of the law abiding citizens of Jalisco. There was a price to pay for the 
fulfillment of the promises of the Revolution and that debt, more often than not, was 
                                                
77 AGN, LCR, 533.3/16, “Acta que se levantó, con motivo al acuerdo que se tomó para 
contrarrestar la labor clerical […]”, f. 81, 2 October 1935.  
78 AGN, LCR, 533.3/16, “Acta que se levantó, con motivo al acuerdo que se tomó para 
contrarrestar la labor clerical […]”, f. 81, 2 October 1935. In the course of that meeting, the representatives 
of El Limón also agreed upon the following: “[T]he parents, [who] belong to the P.N.R., who have children 
of school age and do not have them [enrolled] in the socialist schools, should be disowned [by] the Party”; 
and that “any councilman in function that has not fulfilled the above requirements, should be removed from 
the office that they unworthily carry out, for being the first to attack the orders emanating from the 
Supreme Government.”      
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collected by rebel forces. From the nearby municipality of Tonaya—municipal president 
and commander at arms—Abraham Uribe wrote to President Cárdenas to report a party 
of cristeros “that were up in arms” and who had penetrated the Agrarian Community of 
Los González. Uribe claimed to have offered resistance with five comrades, but was 
overwhelmed by rebel forces “[…and] not being able to resist the pressure of the 
mentioned rebels, because [they numbered] greater than forty individuals, we were forced 
to disperse ourselves leaving two of my comrades dead at enemy hands.” Additionally, 
the letter tells of the cristeros who devoted themselves to the shameful acts and burned 
down houses, and destroyed “whatever crossed their paths.” The municipality found itself 
in dire circumstances, “without homes, without anything to eat and without clothes.” 
Uribe thus sought the help of the president of the republic so that he might provide the 
community with adequate support to secure for itself the definitive possession of its 
lands—lands that community members had spent four years struggling to acquire and that 
were now in rebel hands.79 
The townsmen of San Luis Soyatlán (Municipality of Tuxcueca) complained that 
their agraristas did not have any arms with which to defend their own interests and 
guarantee the safety of teachers. This was never more evident than on the night of 7 
October 1937, when sixteen individuals armed with their rifles whose faces were covered 
with bandanas entered the respective town “firing their arms and sowing panic among the 
residents […].” They arrived at the store located in front of the Federal Rural School, 
robbed it, and then went in search of the three teachers who lent their services to the 
                                                
79AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, “Carta escrita por el Presidente y Comandante de la Comunidad de los 
González al Presidente de la República”, f. 93, 21 November 1936.  
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school, “as well as the ejidatarios.” The teachers were able successfully to hide, but 
remained in imminent danger: “[since] it is about individuals who are hostile to the 
Government [and are] enemies of Socialist Education, [given that] their war-cry is ‘Viva 
Cristo Rey’ and ‘Death to Socialist Education’ […].”  In response to such actions, 
Professor Luis Rodríguez Lomelí wrote to the Head of the 15th military zone in order to 
ensure arrangements be made so that the agraristas of the neighborhood, where the 
Federal Rural School was located, be granted armaments, “since these [individuals] are 
the only ones who can guarantee the peace of the region, for being of revolutionary 
thought and loyal to the Government.” As a result, the Department of Federal Education 
provided the agraristas, who were deemed “friends of the Socialist School,” ten guns to 
protect the lives of the teachers fulfilling their commissions.80  
In some cases, however, agrarista support for socialist education was not enough 
to guarantee its successful implementation. And local conflicts between agraristas and 
landowners showcase another important point of contention among agrarian politics, 
conservative groups, and teachers. On 29 August 1936, for example, El Informador 
published an article accusing the agraristas of the town Techaluta of not providing local 
teachers with guarantees for their secutiry: “Yesterday the [professors] María de Jesús 
Villaseñor and María del Carmén Quiñones, directors respectively of the elementary 
schools for boys and girls, […have] fled the violent acts committed by a group of 
                                                
80 SEP, Seccion: Escuelas Rurales, Serie: Dirección Educación Federal, Subserie: Nombramiento 
de Personal. Años: 1935-37, Lugar: Guadalajara, Jal., Exp. 25, No. de Folios: 310, 10 October 1937. 
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agraristas.”81 A month later, the ejidatarios of that particular agrarian community wrote 
to the governor to set the record straight with regard to the role their members played in 
preventing the two teachers from carrying out their duties. In particular, they accused the 
teachers of “emphatically lying,” explaining that community members “[have] exhausted 
all of the resources that are within [their] reach to impart the [necessary] protection 
[…and especially] to the professoriate of the region.” Despite their efforts to secure the 
arrival of the postulates of reform to the town, the agraristas claimed that the good faith 
shown to teachers was not taken into consideration because the “Reactionaries”—led by 
Felipe Cortés, a bandit who since the “past Cristero Rebellion” dedicated himself to that 
profession—had already subvert the professoriate of the region. Thus, according to the 
members of the community the agraristas of the town did not bother the teachers 
whatsoever. On the contrary, some of the teachers were accused of collaborating with 
local landowners to “satisfy their [the landowners] appetites”—who are “the most fervent 
enemies of socialist education […].”82  
The agraristas of Jalisco also challenge us to rethink our assumptions regarding 
agrarismo—in particular that campesinos shared a sense of solidarity because of their 
subordinate status in society. Ten agrarian communities from the region of Ahualulco, for 
                                                
81 El Informador, “Piden su reconcentración los maestros de Techaluta por carecer de garantías.” 
29 August 1936.  
82 SEP, G-30, Sección: Depto.-Escuelas Rurales, Serie: Inspección Escolar Federal, Años 1935-
1936, Lugar: Guadalajara, Jal., No. de Expediente: 23, f. 24. Rafael Pila, Secretary of the League of 
Agrarian Communities and Campesino Syndicates of Jalisco, also complained the influence that 
landowners possessed and of the intense labor they carry out against agraristas: “the hordes of cristeros, 
comprised of elements paid by landowners affected by their ejido grants, [have] begun to assassinate 
ejidatarios.” The Secretary specifically made reference to the assasinations of Nicolás Santana, Sabino 
Morán and other, and asked for the intervention of President Cárdenas in such matters. See AGN, LCR, 
559.1:23, “Telegrama de Rafael Pila al Presidente,” f. 22, 29 July 1938.  
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example, demonstrated the dilemma that faced many communities of this region in a 
complaint sent to President Cárdenas. In a telegram the ten commissioners denounced the 
“so-called agraristas” from the Agrarian Community of Arroyo Hondo in the 
municipality of Ameca, “who have assumed a frank rebellious attitude against the 
Constitutional Government.” The members comprising the community in question were 
said to be individuals with dreadful backgrounds, a marked “fanaticism,” and an anti-
agrarista agenda in addition to supporting systematically the reactionary movement and 
engaging in banditry. The commissioners complained of the frequent cattle thefts, and 
threats levelled against their homes and collective interests.83 In an effort to counteract 
this type “fanaticism,” present in a number of cases across the state, many residents of 
Jalisco submitted information concerning secret plots to state agencies aimed at 
infiltrating rebel forces. The goal of these plots was to strengthen the position of the 
federal government and to establish federal schools in the Los Altos region, which over 
the last ten years had seen a great deal of insurgent activity.”84 Federal Teacher Victor 
Contreras noted that the region of Los Altos, which had always put up resistance to the 
                                                
83 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, “Telegrama de los Presidentes Comisariados Ejidales de las 
Comunidades de Agrarias de la Región de Ahualulco al Presidente de la República,” f. 98, 4 November 
1936. 
84 AGN, LCR, 551.3:60, “Se pide autorización para ingresar a filas de núcleos rebeldes, a efectuar 
a exterminarlos,” f. 26. 22 April 1935. The most comprehensive scheme hailed from the town of Santa 
Rita, Municipality of Ayo el Chico (Ayotlán) in which federal teacher Victor Contreras suggested using a 
mixture of agrarista elements from local communities and residents of alteño origin to establish camps 
adjacent to Los Altos. They were to covertly “educate the consciences of the poor alteños [and to teach 
them] what [it meant to be a] modern worker […].” In a similar fashion, Eulogio Narváez of Lagos de 
Moreno also sent a hand written letter to the President of the Republic to offer his services in order to 
“suffocate those party of bandits that are said to be part of the Liberating Party of Religious Beliefs.” 
Narváez claimed he had assurances that the leaders of the local rebel forces would accept him into their 
ranks, whereupon he would be able to infiltrate the group and provide valuable information to the federal 
forces. The main motivations for Narváez appeared to be his desire to teach the bandits and those that 
protect them a “lesson in the most definitive manner” and to assure peace in the region.  
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liberal laws of Mexico, could be one of the most valuable and prosperous areas of the 
country, if the presidential measures were effectively applied.85 Let us now turn to the 
region of Los Altos—the hotbed of the rebellion—and how the region responded to 
educational reform. 
 
 
The Rochista Rebellion in Los Altos de Jalisco 
 
For as by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one 
shall many be made righteous. 
-Romans 5:19 
  
The previous section presented a bird’s-eye view of rebellion during this period, 
without emphasizing differences among rebel groups. In this section, I specifically focus 
on the rebellion led by ex-cristero Lauro Rocha in the conservative region of Los Altos, 
which one contemporary labeled as “the last bastion of clericalism in Mexico.”86 I ask 
three central questions: Who were the men who followed him? Why did they rise up in 
arms? What was their ultimate fate? I argue that the rebels who participated in this armed 
struggle were not simply holdouts from the first Cristero Rebellion (1926-1929), but 
instead were citizens who promoted an active political platform shaped by adverse 
responses to state interventions, the right to local autonomy, and preexisting religious 
sensibilities, which had become incompatible with the modern vision for the nation 
promoted by the postrevolutionary state.  
*** 
                                                
85 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, “Documents from Victor Contreras intended for President Lázaro 
Cárdenas,” f. 100-104, 13 October 1936. 
86 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, “Observations collected in Los Altos, Jalisco,” ff. 132-138, 13 April 
1935.  
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After spending a year compiling data for the establishment of a school, J.D. 
Durand observed that in “the region of Los Altos [...] the clergymen are congregated in 
great numbers and believe it is their duty to assure that the Government maintains itself 
away from their domain.” Moreover, in describing the spirit of the people in this region, 
he reported the following:  
As a human element the Alteño can be considered a product of the highest 
quality. They are individuals of immense mental possibilities. They are 
noble in their sentiments, proud, brave, hard-working, lovers of the home 
and everything that this institution involves, friends of order, conservative 
with their mental conceptions, they love the good life, music, art, and they 
know how to live happy, they like to experiment with plants and animals 
to find the best varieties to cultivate, they are fond of the good breeds of 
racing horses and have created with that activity an industry and art, they 
love to travel; a lot of the men especially speak English, because of having 
lived periods of diverse length in the United States. They maintain a lot of 
the practices and customs inherited from their ancestors [and] some of 
their indigenous forefathers. They conserve the architecture, some of the 
dress, the language and the Catholic religion which dominates much of 
their actions and controls their consciences, and in some occasions it even 
affects their vital interests […].87     
 
The surveyor, J.D. Durand, himself a native of Chihuahua, additionally submitted a 
“plan” on how to solve the issues of the region. He specifically provided three primary 
suggestions: that the federal forces of the region completely retreat, since they have 
proved their inability to pacify it, and a rural police force, comprised of individuals from 
the same region, be established instead; that the existing system of propaganda for the 
socialist school (primarily carried out through radio, the press, and “ignorant individuals 
contracted by the Government”) be abandoned and that less offensive methods be 
adopted that are aimed at awakening the interest of the people instead of instilling fear, 
                                                
87 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, “Observations collected in Los Altos, Jalisco,” ff. 132-138, 13 April 
1935.  
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hatred and mistrust; and, lastly, that officials needed to find a better method of putting 
into practice the existing laws pertaining to worship, “since Los Altos is the Mecca of 
Catholic Priests expelled from other places.” The surveyor also stressed that while the 
priests of the region continued to roam around in Los Altos:  
Children will continue to be distant from the official schools, [and this] 
represents a serious problem for the nation, since the present generation is 
growing in the most complete ignorance under the tutelage of the clergy, 
which is maintaining it not only distant from the educational 
establishments but also instilling a profound hatred towards civil 
authorities in particular those of the State and federal, in general […the] 
level of ignorance is bigger to the extent that [as] time passes […] the 
power of [the] Church augments in that proportion, because their spiritual 
power precisely rests on the ignorance of their adepts.88 
 
Many of the region’s citizens had emigrated to the United States in the wake of the First 
World War in search of better living conditions and had, over the course of those years, 
heavily invested their savings in the purchase of land and houses in their respective home 
communities. Several of these individuals also brought back with them their funds, 
undertook entrepreneurial activities, and established diverse businesses on a small 
scale—such as, electric plants, transportation services, factories, bakeries, clothing and 
grocery stores, and merchandizing. But when many were forced to return permanently to 
their homeland during the depression-era repatriation raids of the early-1930s, they came 
home to “an economic and social situation entirely distinct from that which they enjoyed 
in their neighboring country.” Durand on the resilience and character of Alteños:   
…[their] mental and spiritual struggle is clear, and it is enough to just be 
in the region some two or three days to become aware of it. Some express 
their feeling openly and even criticize the laws and practices of our nation 
[…] it is not difficult to observe a profound hurt in their souls when they 
                                                
88 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, “Observations collected in Los Altos, Jalisco,” ff. 132-138, 13 April 
1935. 
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realize they are fighting against the impossible. The way in which they are 
living suffocates them, it deprives them, [and] it limits the free 
manifestation and spontaneity of their mental aptitudes and nullifies their 
capacities as producers of wealth. […] They are beings that prefer death in 
the battlefield [instead of] dying prisoners to the claws of misery and 
hunger. They are men and women of all type that do not easily submit 
themselves to unfavorable conditions and who know how to accept a 
struggle when this is the only alternative […].89 
 
A Leader Emerges  
 
In early 1935 General Carlos Martín del Campo, Secretary of War and Navy 
declared that in the Republic there were no rebels.90 In the spring of 1935, however, a 
worried Governor Everardo Topete could no longer deny the discontent and disorder 
brewing in the Los Altos region. In a letter to the personal secretary of President 
Cárdenas, the governor decried the lack of protection afforded to the region, “the Región 
Alteña is currently completely unguarded [and I] consider it very dangerous [if] it 
continues in this way […].” Topete stressed that an immense problem would be created if 
the region were neglected, “since the war the individuals known as ‘alteños’ waged in the 
past [cristero] rebellion is too well known.” The governor acknowledged that the mere 
presence of federal forces in simple detachments, in the settlements of greatest 
importance, would be sufficient enough to prevent any uprising.91  
A month later, that is to say, on 15 May, the military headquarters of Los Altos 
voiced its first public warning against the rebels in opposition to the Government of the 
                                                
89 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, “Observations collected in Los Altos, Jalisco,” ff. 132-138, 13 April 
1935.  
90 El Informador, “No hay rebeldes en la República.” 15 January 1935. 
91 AGN, LCR, 559:6, “Letter from Governor Topete to Luis I. Rodríguez,” f. 125, 19 April 1935. 
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Republic, published in local newspapers across the region. In the statement, General 
Antonio A. Guerrero called upon those who had taken up arms to put behind them all 
resentment and differences, and to dedicate themselves exclusively to their work: “[I] 
assure them that this military zone under my command will afford them [all] guarantees, 
[…] so long as their conduct is in strict accordance with this principle,” announced the 
general: “I make the same promise to the small armed groups who are still […] operating 
in different parts of the State, [who are bothering] the real campesinos [peasants] and 
keeping their defenseless families in anxiety.” Guerrero unequivocally made it known to 
all the rebels that if they did not heed the call to surrender, the full forces of the zone 
would energetically pursue and punish any insurrectionist.92 
On 1 April 1935, Lauro Rocha called upon the “valiant” and “suffering” sons of 
Los Altos to renew their previous undertaking, “which was terminated by Destiny just 
when the clear light of the SANTA LIBERTAD was shining in the East.” The rochista 
movement had a considerable historical evolution behind it, for they belonged to a world 
that had long known conflict with the state’s representatives. The implementation of 
                                                
92 SD, 812.00-REVOLUTIONS/198, “Developments Indicating Possible Revolutionary Activity 
in the Los Altos Region of Jalisco.” 15 May 1935. Of note, about two weeks before the declaration, on 3 
May 1935, the Director of Federal Education in Jalisco, Professor Ramón García Ruiz, described “an 
anguishing situation for teachers.” This had continued to prevail in Los Altos “because of the attitude that 
diverse groups of fanatics have taken [and] in some cases [they] have begun to take on a rebellious attitude 
against the National Government, operating in many cases with the utmost secrecy and in others openly 
taking advantage of any opportunity that is presented to them to persecute the teacher, whom they consider 
the most addicted defenders of the Revolution.” Two days prior to the declaration, on 13 May, Jesús Pérez, 
municipal president of Degollado, wrote a letter to the general secretary of government in Guadalajara 
complaining about the increasing number of rebels groups that marauded in Los Altos. “[They] constantly 
raid in all the municipalities [of the area] and then pass over to Michoacán,” complained Pérez, “where they 
return, when they have felt the persecution of the federal force […] and in that manner these individuals 
always endanger [teachers], like the ones that are established [and] imparting instruction to children in the 
ranches of this municipalities.” The municipal president assured the offices of Guadalajara that in any case, 
even if it with the help of the same federal forces, that they would pursue those rebels to prevent further 
danger. See AHJ, IP-1-935-43-1079, Legajo 10, ff. 357, 351. 
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socialist education—in addition to other state projects such as agrarian reform, and the 
worsening economic conditions that afflicted the region—reignited once again the desire 
among people of the region to fight for the greater glory of God and to protect the youth 
and their women from what Rocha called “the disgraced revolutionaries of the present 
who, perfidious and begging, usurp power with the audacity of the serpent which offers 
the venom of its fangs with the brilliance of its eyes.” The manifesto Rocha circulated,  
which relied heavily on religious rhetoric and allegory, provides great insight into the 
motivations, grievances, and ideological trajectory behind the movement: “[Y]ou know 
lies are the favorite weapons of our enemies…hypocrites and dissemblers, they deny that 
there is religious persecution when everyone knows that in Mexico it is a serious offense 
to be a Catholic, and that for this single offense we are condemned to live as outcasts and 
sentenced to death.”93 
In the eyes of the rebel leader, the government wished to take possession of the 
souls of their children in order to make of them hordes of hardened criminals, “taught to 
kill women, children, and peaceful old people.” The rochistas feared forever losing “the 
souls of our children, the virtue of our women, the honor of our youth, the dignity of the 
home; and, what is even more sacred […] the destruction of the Mexican soul […].” And 
much like previous rebel movements in Mexican history, Rocha also fought in the name 
of the Holy Mother of Guadalupe and appealed to the “ardent and self-denying and happy 
love we all feel towards [her, which] is the jewel and glory and honor of our forefathers 
and the only noble inheritance for those who follow us in life.” Rocha called upon all 
                                                
93 SD, 812.00-REVOLUTIONS/198, “Developments Indicating Possible Revolutionary Activity 
in the Los Altos Region of Jalisco,” 1 April 1935.   
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men, women, and children, without regard to sex, age, or condition, to “cooperate in 
bringing to an end as soon as possible this campaign which need to last only long enough 
to regain our lost liberties.” 
 
 
 
Figure 9: General Lauro Rocha. Courtesy of El 
Museo Cristero in Encarnación de Díaz, Jalisco. 
 
The continual degradation of living conditions in Mexico was also cited by Rocha 
as another grievance that motivated rebel demands: 
Thieves and rabble, they have enriched themselves in such a manner that 
all our people are in hunger and misery, business paralyzed, industries 
bankrupt, agriculture unprofitable, while they, the great bandits of Mexico, 
export tons of gold for deposit in the vaults of banks in Europe and the 
United States in order to enjoy, some day not far distant, their profit when 
the furious wave of this seas provoked by them overcomes.94 
                                                
94 SD, 812.00-REVOLUTIONS/198, “Developments Indicating Possible Revolutionary Activity 
in the Los Altos Region of Jalisco,” 1 April 1935. It should be noted that in addition to fighting against the 
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The rebel leader also called for the overthrow of the “tyrants” who had stolen the wealth 
of the nation; that is to say, politicians such as Calles, Cardenas and “all those packs of 
dogs and treasury robbers.” According to Rocha, these politicians were to be delivered 
into the hands of the people who would then exact strict justice on each of them. For 
Rocha and his men, this was the supreme movement, the occasion when they either saved 
themselves or were forever defeated, “If we heed the call of duty we shall be free, but if 
we withdraw as cowards, the maledictions of God and the Fatherland will be upon us.”95 
A contemporary report regarding the situation in Los Altos describing the rank 
and rile of rochistas, which were comprised of one-hundred and twenty-six rebels. It is 
important, however, to highlight that these calculations represent conservative estimates 
and did not take into account inroads on the movement of the growing number of deaths 
due to an increasingly effective military persecution. Place of birth was only available for 
twenty-six of these individuals, which represents approximately 20.4 percent of the 
enlisted troops. The rebels came from five municipalities located in Los Altos: Arandas, 
Jesús María, Tepatitlán de Morelos, San Miguel el Alto, and Atotonilco el Alto; and 
twenty-three of these individuals (85.1 percent) hailed from the municipality of Arandas; 
while the remaining rebels were equally distributed among the remaining four 
municipalities. Rocha appeared to be the principal cabecilla (leader) of the movement 
and his immediate forces were comprised of seven additional cabecillas. Every cabecilla 
                                                
socialist education program and widespread poverty, rochistas also fought against agrarian reform and to 
regain the liberties granted to them in the 1929 Arreglos.  
95 SD, 812.00-REVOLUTIONS/198, “Developments Indicating Possible Revolutionary Activity 
in the Los Altos Region of Jalisco,” 1 April 1935.   
 371 
 
was in command of a gavilla (band) comprised of an average of approximately eighteen 
subordinates. The report indicates that four of the seven gavillas marauded in Los Altos 
and the surrounding areas; and of those four groups, three received specific orders to 
carry out. The men of cabecilla Arredondo served as escorts for Rocha, while the men of 
Macías had the specific task of marauding near the principal road, near El Josefina, which 
permitted continuous assaults on military trucks that patrolled near León, Guanajuato. 
Cabecilla Concepción Rizo was assigned the similar task of assaulting cars that toured 
from Atotonilco. These conservative figures represent a snap shot of the rebels during 
their decline and, therefore, they do not account for the possibility that at one point the 
number of people involved in the movement could have been significantly larger. 
However, what the figures do effectively demonstrate is that even during this time, when 
rochistas saw their numbers drastically reduced at the hands of increasing military 
attacks, they retained a great deal of organization and discipline.96  
The leaders of the movement all held regular meetings with Lauro Rocha at 
Picacho de Ayo or at the ranches of La Mesita, Cierro Gordo, Palmitos, and Támara to 
distribute cartridges amongst the gavillas. And to be up to date with the movement of 
federal troops, the rochistas had spies at the peaks of Cerro de Ayo, Cerro Gordo, Cerro 
de San Judas, Cerro del Viborero, and Cerro del Caracol. Many of the rebels were 
supplied with arms and munitions through the use of informal networks that reached 
Guadalajara to Los Altos and, at one point, to Veracruz. Various women, among them 
                                                
96 AGN, LCR, 559.1:23, f. 118, 10 March 1936. 
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Doña Luisita Ruiz Velasco and Josefina Ruiz Velasco, for example, reported to have 
acquired much ammunition and guns for the rebels.97  
A Portrait of a Battle 
On 22 September 1935, El Informador reported that rochistas, “dissatisfied with 
the current state of the Republic,” raided the population of San José de Gracia in the Los 
Altos region.98 The rebel fighters quickly overwhelmed local authorities, defeated the 
rural defense unit (comprised of agraristas), and proceeded onward to commit various 
abuses and kidnap numerous individuals in the township. Among those into to the 
clutches of rochistas were licenciado Enrique Ramírez, who later obtained his freedom 
and returned to Guadalajara; señor Gabriel González Tizareño, executed and abandoned 
on the battlefield; and licenciado Lorenzo Reynoso Padilla, the Judge Counsel of 
Tepatitlán, who had travelled to San José de Gracia to assist the High Court of 
Guadalajara, and whose fate remained unclear. What is atypical about this incident, 
however, is that the violence was directed towards local officials and judicial 
representatives. The actions of rochistas went well beyond simply engaging in acts of 
collusion with parish priests and landowners, and offers additional insight into the arsenal 
of tactics that rebel forces utilized.99     
                                                
97 El Informador, “En la Metrópoli Hicieron Más Aprehensiones de Católicos,” 24 November 
1935. They both put on record how they acquired some Thompson guns and machine guns for the 
movement, which they claimed to have acquired them from various ex-deputies. One of them specifically 
expressed having acquired from the Arsenal of Veracruz about 18,000 cartridges for the rebel cause. 
98 El Informador, “Fusilamientos y Secuestros en el Pueblo de San José de Gracia,” 22 September 
1935.  
99 El Informador, “Fusilamientos y Secuestros en el Pueblo de San José de Gracia,” 22 September 
1935. 
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The violent acts of protest committed by rebels, conversely, did not go 
unpunished at the hands of federal forces and were met with sophisticated retaliations. 
These cristeros of la Segunda were no longer fighting a guerrilla campaign against an 
undertrained and ill-equipped army; they were now fighting a war against a federal army 
that had prepared for the possibility of a renewed insurrection and intended to severely 
cripple, and suppress, the rebel bands as quickly as possible. To achieve this goal, the 
federal army established military garrison detachments in all of the former “cristero” 
towns effectively to combat the rebels’ ability freely to maneuver over rugged terrain that 
favored cavalry units instead of a European-style army.100 The deployment of aviation, 
the use of radio, the construction of new roads and trails, and the laying of telephone lines 
also dramatically improved the military’s capacity to coordinate better attacks, and 
allowed for greater efficiency in the transmission of knowledge regarding enemy 
positions and tactics.101  
Nine days after the raid of San José de Gracia, Brigadier General Florentino 
García Carreón released the following statement: “Yesterday one of the columns that 
operates in the region of Los Altos and that Brigade General Antonio A. Guerrero 
personally directs, […came upon] a party of bandits lead by Lauro Rocha [and with] our 
troops obtaining marked success[,] a serious defeat was inflicted on them, causing them 
                                                
100 AGN, LCR, 559.1:123, f. 118, 10 March 1936. A report on the situation that prevailed in the 
region of Los Altos, for example, concluded that with the establishment of detachments in Río Sánchez, La 
Gloria y Rincón de Molino, Cerro de Ayo, El Josefino, Cabrito, Santiaguito, Santa María de Valle, San 
Ignació, Cerro Cordo, and Viborero, “they would quickly be able to localize the bandits and give them a 
decisive blow.” See Jean Meyer, La Cristiada. (Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno, 1991), p. 365. See Jean 
Meyer, La Cristiada, p. 365. 
101 Meyer, La Cristiada, p. 365. 
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to completely disperse.” The Military lamented the death of one corporal and six other 
casualties, “all of the 33rd regiment, who today were brought to [Guadalajara] to be 
treated.”102 The following day El Informador published a detailed vivid account of the 
battle that had taken place. Upon clearing the field, federal forces came across twenty-
one dead rebels, and among them was Jacinto Angulo, who was said to have served as 
Rocha’s second in command, in addition to “other leaders.” Angulo was previously 
suspected of being the individual who just days before had assassinated several 
policemen of San José de Gracia and law-intern González Tizacareño.103 
The politics of conciliation and the fall of Rocha 
 
On 12 April 1936, the newly appointed Archbishop of Guadalajara, José Garibi y 
Rivera, wrote his first pastoral letter to the clergy and faithful of the region’s archdiocese. 
This letter advised all Catholics who desired to make a difference and “participate in the 
crusade against the terrible persecution carried out by the state,” to leave aside the gun 
and in its place pick up the bible. Any Catholic who refused to pay attention to his call, 
according to the Archbishop, would not be fulfilling their duty as children of the Church. 
The duty of all the faithful was to join Acción Católica, an organization that would 
provide individuals with a peaceful alternative to counteract the unfavorable policies of 
the government. Garibi y Rivera declared explicitly that he would carefully guide the 
organization so that it would not, under any pretext, take part in political or war-like 
activities. 
                                                
102 El Informador, “La Persecución a los Rebeldes,” 2 November 1935. 
103 El Informador, “Fuerte Derrota a los Rebeldes de Lauro Rocha,” 3 November 1935. 
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 In regards to the countryside, however, a very serious problem had arisen in 
recent months; worried about the matter, His Excellency said the following:  
[A]t this time, a great many Catholics are without any kind of organization 
or discipline in our unfortunate country. The fact that they are without 
leadership fills me with anxiety, especially when I am painfully aware that 
some of them have reached the point where they believe that the Catholic 
cause of the Church in Mexico can only be saved on the condition that 
efforts [be] disassociated [...] from the bishops themselves[,] and when I 
say this I pray to God that no one gets the impression that I believe that 
Catholics should undertake the defense of their rights by violence or arms. 
At a time when rochistas were fighting an uphill battle against an army that had 
effectively reinvented itself, the words of the Archbishop signaled the beginning of the 
end for the “valiant” and “suffering” sons of Los Altos. “I pray to God to safeguard me 
against inciting anyone to such action [rebellion] because without discussion[,] whether 
or not such action be licit [...] it is not my mission and I cannot nor do I desire to meddle 
in anything which lies beyond the field of my proper activities,” cautioned Garibi y 
Rivera. “[T]his is the order of the Holy Church [... and] the Roman Pontiff [who] has 
prohibited priests from taking part in anything resembling an armed movement.” 104    
On 3 July 1936, a morally defeated Rocha wrote: “I believe that I will not last a 
long time [...On] my return to this region [of Los Altos], I will find the peaceful people 
completely changed [...] we are [now] living in a completely hostile environment.” Rocha 
attributed the fate he foresaw to several reasons, among them: the great poverty that 
reigned in the area due to the loss of harvests of 1935; the changing attitudes present 
among government of officials and the clergy; the open efforts some parish priests 
                                                
104 SD, 812.404/1912 1/3, “First Pastoral Letter Addressed by The Most Excellent and Most 
Reverend Dr. José Garibi Rivera to The clergy and Faithful of the Archdiocese of Guadalajara on 12 April 
1936,” 14 August 1936.  
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carried against the rebels; and Archbishop Garibi y Rivera’s first pastoral letter, “which 
has caused us more damage than the government itself.” These were no longer the words 
of a rebel leader who sought the reclamation of lost liberties, local autonomy, and the 
overthrow of the “tyrants” controlling Mexico. Rocha posed a set of rhetorical questions: 
“What should we do in this case? Should we confront the ecclesiastical authorities? 
Scandalize the people? Should I keep pushing towards a sterile sacrifice...or do I convert 
myself to a chief of bandits? What do I do with those that I have [led] into arms in Los 
Altos?” Gone were the days when the population regarded him as ‘honorable’ and non-
criminal. “The entire world denounces us,” lamented Rocha, “and the ones who do not 
dare to, even deny us a tortilla.” 105 A half-year later, the cabecilla (rebel leader) fell 
before the blazing guns of three army officers while hiding at the home of a friend in 
Mexico City.106   
Conclusion 
 This chapter explored the initial debates over the national government’s Six-Year 
Plan on Education and subsequently analyzed the nature of political violence during the 
Second Cristero Rebellion (from mid-1934 to 1940). I approached the topic from three 
distinct, but ultimately interrelated, lenses. The first focused primarily on ideological sites 
of affirmation and contestation, such as editorials and speeches given on the senate floor, 
to highlight what politicians and officials thought about the socialist education reform. 
The second showcased how federal schooling policy was implemented in the countryside. 
                                                
105 Meyer, La Cristiada, p. 382. 
106 The Washington Post, “Mexico’s Robin Hood is Slain After Gun Battle in Hideout,” 1 January 
1937. 
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In the process, I argued that community grievances, political divisions, and varying 
degrees of religious sensibilities shaped the manner in which rural people understood the 
state’s cultural revolution of the 1930s. Despite efforts on the part of the high clergy to 
maintain a neutral attitude towards the state, I showed that many rebel groups and parish 
priests interpreted socialist schools as state instruments of domination, deliberately 
designed to suppress, and in certain cases to eradicate, the traditional belief systems of 
their parishioners. The actions of locals in the face of escalating violence in the 
countryside ultimately determined whether they decided to accept, disregard, or alter the 
socialist education program.  
The third lens sought to isolate the Rochista Rebellion in the Los Altos region, 
add context, highlight their reasons for fighting, and offer a social profile of the rank and 
file that comprised the movement. In highlighting the rebellion led by Lauro Rocha, I 
contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how rebels operated, yielding greater 
insight into their worldview and motivations for fighting. As a result, these findings 
challenge the assumption that the ideology of rebels was archaic (in the sense of being 
antiquated or pre-political) as the historiography has proposed. Instead, the insurgents of 
the Second Cristero Rebellion were rural people who actively participated in armed 
struggles in defense of a sacred way of life, which in the eyes of the new post-
revolutionary state had already disappeared, never to return.  
Chapter 5, in part, has been published as: Piña, Ulices, “The Different Roads to 
Rebellion: Socialist Education and the Second Cristero Rebellion, 1934-1939,” Letras 
Históricas (Universidad de Guadalajara) No. 16 (Spring 2017 – Summer 2017): 165-192. 
The dissertation author was the sole author.  
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Epilogue 
 
On 28 August 1974, José Guadalupe Zuno left a printing shop affiliated with the 
Universidad de Guadalajara. He proceeded to walk towards a green Ford Galaxie, where 
his chauffeur and trusted friend, Miguel González, awaited. Zuno was now an old man, 
aged eighty-three, who suffered from diabetes. But Father Time had been, for the most 
part, good to him. Following the events portrayed in this dissertation, he had gone back to 
school and managed successfully to reinvent himself as a lawyer and maestro, and went 
on to make significant contributions to public life in Guadalajara as an intellectual, 
popular historian, and author of many works. Before Zuno stepped into the Galaxie, 
however, if he were to have paused for a moment to contemplate just how much his 
surroundings had changed from the time he was governor, he would have seen a city in 
the midst of dramatic growth and transformation.1 The population of Guadalajara had 
swelled from 147,575 residents in 1921 to at least 1,999,391 by 1970, whereas the 
population of the state had almost tripled in size during that same period. Foreign 
investments too had become more visible in the region as twenty-four enterprises had 
recently moved in, among them General Mills, Ingersoll Rand, Kodak, Phillip Morris, 
Pepsicola, and Ralston Purina.2 But the violence that came to characterize the countryside 
of Jalisco, however, had long become but a distance murmur. And Guadalajara itself was 
                                                
1 See “Censo General de Habitantes 1921,” Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e 
Informática (hereinafter cited as INEGI), accessed May 13, 2017, 
http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/ccpv/1921/ and “IX Censo General de Población 1970,” INEGI, 
accessed May 13, 2017, http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/ccpv/1970/default.html.  
2 Jon Shefner, The Illusion of Civil Society: Democratization and Community Mobilization in 
Low-Income Mexico (Penn State Press, 2012), p. 53.  
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now a hotbed of guerrilla warfare nourished in large part by the radical student movement 
that emerged in those years.  
On an international stage Mexico had recently staged the Games of the XIX 
Olympiad. While this represented a significant investment on the part of the Mexican 
government and was to be the country’s coming-out party as a modern nation, it quickly 
turned sour. Ten days before the Olympics kicked off, the Díaz Ordaz administration 
attempted to suppress on-going student protests in an effort to portray a stable and 
peaceful Mexico to the international community. This resulted in the government 
attempting to evacuate five thousand student protesters from the Plaza de las Tres 
Culturas in the Tlatelolco neighborhood of Mexico City. When the attempt failed to yield 
results government forces fired upon the protesters, killing and subsequently arresting 
many. The Tlatelolco Massacre, as it came to be known, ushered in a new era of 
confrontation between the ruling party and civil society.  
In the wake of these unfortunate events, the ruling party nominated Zuno’s son-
in-law, Minister of Interior Luis Echeverría Álvarez, for president of Mexico. And to 
rehabilitate the image of the PRI, Echeverría embarked on a public relations tour 
covering more than thirty-five thousand miles and nine-hundred municipalities.4 Tracing 
his own political genealogy back to the recently departed Lázaro Cárdenas, whom he 
called his mentor, Echeverría’s efforts became a symbolic opportunity for the ruling party 
                                                
4 Gilbert M. Joseph and Jürgen Buchenau, Mexico’s Once and Future Revolution: Social 
Upheaval and the Challenge of Rule Since the late Nineteenth Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2013), p 168. 
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to reconstruct a diverse support base that could cut across socioeconomic class lines.5 
When Echeverría came into office in December 1970, his administration attempted to 
enact the social reforms he had campaigned on: reviving land reform (to some extent); 
lowering the voting age to eighteen; implementing significant housing and food subsidies 
for citizens; and releasing several political prisoners. Echeverría endeavored once again 
to make the legacy of the Mexican Revolution relevant to a new generation of young 
people, but this president faced a new and more difficult social, political, and economic 
reality than his predecessors.6  
In 1973 an economic crisis wrecked havoc around the world and Mexico was not 
spared; consequently, the demand for Mexican products plummeted. The previous 
infusion of billions into the economy to help pay for the president’s social programs, in 
turn, led to runaway inflation. And the following year, credit became constricted and 
interest rates soared “raising the cost of the government’s foreign loans that helped pay 
for the new social programs.” Echeverría countered by taxing the wealthiest Mexicans at 
higher rates. The elite refused to pay and massive capital flight ensued—consumer prices 
increased and the peso gradually devalued.7 While the president continuously offered 
support for leftwing and nationalist movements in Latin America (throwing his support 
behind Allende in Chile, for example) and publicly espoused what would become known 
                                                
5 María L. O. Muñoz, Stand Up and Fight: Participatory Indegenismo, Populism, and Mobilization 
in Mexico, 1970-1984 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2016), p. 16. 
6 Muñoz, Stand Up and Fight, p. 22. 
7 Joseph and Buchenau, Once and Future Revolution, pp. 172-173. 
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as Third Worldism,8 he also poignantly and brutally repressed left-leaning groups in his 
own country. After the shock of Tlatelolco, the student movement radicalized and many 
of its followers joined urban guerrillas or engaged in rural rebellion.10  
The student movement in Guadalajara, however, had its origins as a rebellion 
against the Federación de Estudiantes de Guadalajara (FEG), which controlled the 
Universidad de Guadalajara (UdeG). The FEG would go on not only to exercise 
authority over the student body of the UdeG, but also to reproduce the structures of 
control that the PRI used to govern. On the one hand, the FEG professed itself an 
anticlerical group, extolled the virtues of a university education, and outspokenly 
identified itself as anti-imperialist; while on the other, “it employed violence and 
corruption to keep students submitted and rewarded with impunity those […] who did the 
dirty work of the organization.”11 As a result, the student movement did not take off in 
1968 as it had in Mexico City; rather, the FEG remained loyal to the government. Even 
after the events at Tlatelolco, the FEG “organized armed groups to patrol all of the 
centers [on campus] and to [prevent them from] making communist propaganda or [be in] 
favor of the student body in Mexico City.”12  
But as a new generation of recent arrivals from the countryside began to come of 
age in the Guadalajara of the 1970s and enroll at the UdeG, they began to contest the 
                                                
8 See Luis Echeverría, “The Struggle against Colonialism,” The American Journal of Economics 
and Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Jan. 1974): 64. 
10 Joseph and Buchenau, Once and Future Revolution, pp. 169 and 171. 
11 Sergio Aguayo Quezada, La charola: una historia de los Servicios de intelligencia en México 
(México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2001), p. 151. 
12 Aguayo Quezada, La charola, p. 156 
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power of the FEG. Guerrilla organizations such as the Partido Revolucionario Obrero 
Clandestino Unión del Pueblo (PROCUP), the Liga Comunista de 23 de Septiembre, and 
the Frente Revolucionario Armado Popular (FRAP) soon emerged and demanded a voice 
in the political world that had been shaped by the PRI and its instruments. Clashes 
eventually ensued in Guadalajara, and from 1970 to 1976 at least ninety-five deaths were 
recorded, while another one-hundred and twenty-seven individuals were at some point 
wounded.13 The guerilla organizations also began to adopt the practices of similar 
organizations around the country, kidnapping prominent authorities or politicians. On 4 
May 1973, for example, the FRAP kidnapped Terrance George Leonhardy, the American 
consul in Guadalajara, demanding and successfully receiving the release of thirty political 
prisoners and one-million pesos in exchange for his freedom.14  
 In was in this context, then, that Zuno decided to get into the Galaxie chauffeured 
by his good friend. When the vehicle reached the intersection of Avenida Revolución and 
Calle Constancia, it was intercepted by a grey 1968 Ford. Four men armed with guns and 
a hammer hurriedly stepped out and descended upon the Galaxie. They subdued the 
chauffeur with an unidentified gas, momentarily blinding him. The assailants snatched 
Zuno from the Galaxie, transferred him to the other vehicle, and sped away.15 The 
kidnapping of Zuno in Guadalajara soon turned into a national crisis, garnering 
significant media attention in large part because of his relation to President Echeverría, 
                                                
13 Aguayo Quezada, La charola, p.176. 
14 “Leonhardy Kidnapping,” Wikileaks, accessed on May 13, 2017, 
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973MEXICO03082_b.html. 
15 El Informador, 29 August 1974. 
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but also because of his local standing. In a briefing to the press, the governor of Jalisco, 
Alberto Orozco Romero, declared: 
I profoundly lament that such a worthy jalisciense has been the object of 
an attempt that [has] upset our entire entity. Personally, this event has 
affected me, since my maestro Lic. Zuno Hernández has been an example 
for me to follow because of his remarkable collegiate, revolutionary, and 
patriotic trajectory, and he has served as a guide to those of us who have 
[gone on] to govern the state of Jalisco.16 
 
Additionally, the Guadalajara-based daily El Informador published a great number of 
letters showing support and solidarity. One such letter came from the agrarian community 
of Zapotiltic, which claimed “to be willing to personally lend our collaboration to safely 
and soundly rescue such an illustrious jalisciense.”17 That same day, the Mexican 
Attorney General Ojeda Paullada informed the press that the government of Mexico 
would not negotiate with criminals. But he took time, however, publicly to lavish praise 
on the old man’s impeccable career and credentials: “[Zuno] is widely known for his 
honesty, his revolutionary trajectory [and] ideology and his struggles in benefit of the 
people, which he has sustained all of the days of his life.”18 The passing of time had done 
much to rehabilitate the image of Zuno. In fact, he had come to represent a Mexico 
riddled with contradictions, one in which politicians publicly embraced progressive 
views, but in practice behaved just as any other powerful cacique would.19 His illicit 
                                                
16 El Informador, 29 August 1974. 
17 El Informador, 29 August 1974. 
18 El Informador, 30 August 1974. 
19 Aguayo Quezada, La charola, pp. 146-147 
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behaviors and corrupt practices had been forgotten, simply relegated to the dusty boxes of 
the national archive in Mexico City.  
The demands of the kidnappers were made public on 31 August. The operation to 
kidnap Zuno, and allegedly called “Operation Tlatelolco, 2 October 1968,” had been 
successfully carried out by members of the FRAP. Addressed to Zuno’s family the letter 
not only professed responsibility for sequestering of the old man, but claimed that the 
FRAP had done so in order to punish a representative of the corrupt and exploitative 
bourgeoisie: 
[As] a response to the permanent repressive campaign that [many] 
repressive corps carry [out] throughout the country against the proletarian 
people fighting against misery, exploitation, and all of the evils that the 
[…] bourgeoisie provokes to seize the wealth [that] the proletarians 
produce, [we] categorically declare that he [Zuno] will only obtain his 
freedom as soon as the bourgeoisie [meets our] demands.20 
 
They subsequently demanded twenty million pesos, the release of ten prisoners, and an 
airplane, but the government publicly refused to negotiate. There was talk, however, of a 
discrete agreement having been reached, which would have required the government to 
release a group of detained political prisoners.21 He was released unharmed after ten 
days. Speaking to a group of reporters, Zuno claimed that he did not hold resentment 
towards his captors because they were healthy boys, good people, that they were simply 
misguided “because they wanted to change the world without knowing how to do it.” 
And with regard to the supposed inaction of his son-in-law, President Echeverría, Zuno 
believed it the right decision but lamented the weakness of current day politicians, 
                                                
20 El Informador, 31 August 1974.  
21 Aguayo Quezada, La charola, pp. 180-181. 
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including his own son-in-law, who did not honor the Mexican Revolution “because they 
have been letting themselves be influenced by the reactionary forces of the world, who 
have put reactionary ideas [into their heads].”22 
But buried amidst these sensational headlines, there was another story unfolding 
in Mexico. The day of Zuno’s kidnapping, the general director of the National Company 
of Popular Subsistence (CONASUPO), Jorge de la Vega Domínguez called upon the 
campesinos of the country to produce more food in order to lessen their dependence on 
foreign nations. Addressing the Confederación Nacional Campesina, de la Vega hoped 
that peasants would respond by abandoning old egalitarian ideas in favor of petty 
capitalist enterprise because the current situation was now about “real” and “daily” 
issues—it was about trying to construct a new modern society, and the only way this 
could be achieved, according to the director, was to be in solidarity with the “popular” 
government: “There is a crisis and there is hunger [around] the world […in] Mexico, 
surely, there are difficult situations which […] we are resolving.”23 These situations were 
never resolved, nor did they get any better in the years to come. In 1976 the peso lost half 
of its value, taking the dollar to twenty-five pesos.24 As a result, what began as a 
promising period soon turned into one of the most critical in recent Mexican history.  
*** 
 
                                                
22 El Informador, 9 September 1974. 
23 El Informador, 29 August 1974.  
24 Joseph and Bucheanu, Once and Future Revolution, p. 173.  
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 This dissertation has explored the political history of Jalisco during the turbulent 
decades that followed the Mexican Revolution of 1910. This was as much a history of 
state power in Mexico as it was an account of agency, resistance, and accommodation in 
the countryside. Along the way three interrelated stories emerged, showcasing how state 
power was understood at various levels of society. The first was concerned with how 
individuals came to see their place in the social order, especially during and after 
moments of disruption and crisis. The second narrated the struggle between regional 
authorities in Guadalajara and the central government in Mexico City over effective 
political control of the state. And the third studied how political projects—such as 
agrarian reform, anticlericalism, and educational reform—came to intersect with the 
social and cultural contexts of life in the countryside. I have argued that anxieties over 
(the threat and/or actuality of) violence shaped the manner in which citizens in Jalisco 
understood their rights and ultimately contested the presence of the state. Rebellious 
Citizens also examined the impact of three significant rebellions that shook the 
established social order: the de la Huerta Rebellion (1923-1924), the Cristero Rebellion 
(1926-1929), and the Second Cristero Rebellion (1934-1940). Together, the long-term 
effects of these recurring upheavals were not only formative to the new regime that 
emerged in the postrevolutionary period, but also challenged our understanding of local 
participation in the political process, often seen as a closed sphere dominated by powerful 
state agents ruling with unquestioned authority, where ordinary people rarely made their 
voices heard. Instead, these episodes revealed how local officials debated the limits of 
national power and struggled with how to govern, while simultaneously consenting to the 
demands of citizens.  
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